Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism

Edited by
Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw and
Leena Malkki

ROUTLEDGE

Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism

President Obama has declared that the greatest terrorist threat which America faces is attacks by lone wolf terrorists. This volume expands the lone wolf rubric to include autonomous cells: small groups of terrorists who cooperate, but operate independently. The challenge presented by lone wolves and autonomous cells, unlike the threat emanating from established terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, has proven intractable because of the difficulty of gathering intelligence on these actors or effectively countering their actions. Lone wolves operate under the radar, staging deadly attacks such as that at the Boston Marathon, and the 2011 attacks in Norway. This volume includes theory and policy studies, individual case studies, and the technological impacts of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as the impact of social media in the process of recruitment and radicalization.

This book was originally published as a special issue of *Terrorism and Political Violence.*

Jeffrey Kaplan is based in the Department of Religious Studies and Anthropology; and Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence, and Memory at the University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh, USA.

Heléne Lööw is based in the Department of History at Uppsala University, Sweden.

Leena Malkki is based at the Network for European Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland.

This page intentionally left blank

Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism

Edited by
Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw and Leena Malkki

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2015
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN, UK

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 13: 978-1-138-85122-1

Typeset in Times New Roman
by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

Publisher's Note
The publisher accepts responsibility for any inconsistencies that may have arisen during the conversion of this book from journal articles to book chapters, namely the possible inclusion of journal terminology.

Disclaimer
Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

Contents

Citation Information

The chapters in this book were originally published in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014). When citing this material, please use the original page numbering for each article, as follows:

Chapter 1
Introduction to the Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism
Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw, and Leena Malkki
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 1–12

Chapter 2
On Tribalism: Auxiliaries, Affiliates, and Lone Wolf Political Violence
Jeffrey Kaplan and Christopher P. Costa
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 13–44

Chapter 3
Counterinsurgency and Lone Wolf Terrorism
George Michael
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 45–57

Chapter 4
Law Enforcement Tactics and Their Effectiveness in Dealing With American Terrorism: Organizations, Autonomous Cells, and Lone Wolves
Christopher Hewitt
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 58–68

Chapter 5
Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 69–85

Chapter 6
The Pre-1914 Anarchist "Lone Wolf" Terrorist and Governmental Responses
Richard Bach Jensen
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 86–94

Chapter 7
Men in Black: Dynamics, Violence, and Lone Wolf Potential
José Pedro Zúquete
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 95–109

Chapter 8
Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe) Case Study
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 110–128

Chapter 9
Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe
Mattias Gardell
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 129–155

Chapter 10
Hatred of the System: Menacing Loners and Autonomous Cells in the Netherlands
Jelle van Buuren and Beatrice de Graaf
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 156–184

Chapter 11
Political Elements in Post-Columbine School Shootings in Europe and North America
Leena Malkki
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 185–210

Chapter 12
Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures
Patrick D. Ellis
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 211–225

Chapter 13
An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells
Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 226–245

Chapter 14
Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media
Katie Cohen, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati, and Jonas Clausen Mork
Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 26, issue 1 (January–March 2014) pp. 246–256

Please direct any queries you may have about the citations to clsuk.permissions@cengage.com

Notes on Contributors

Gary A. Ackerman is the Director of the Special Projects Division at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, USA.

Katie Cohen is a Psychology student in the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) at Stockholm University, Sweden. Her background is in logic and philosophy.

Christopher P. Costa is a senior Department of the Navy civilian. In a 25-year U.S. Army career he served the majority of his service with the Special Operations Forces (SOF). He has communicated his research results through conferences in the United States and abroad.

Beatrice de Graaf is a Full Professor of Conflict and Security History at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

Patrick D. Ellis is a WMD and Homeland Security Analyst and Instructor at the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air University, Alabama, USA.

Mattias Gardell holds the Nathan Söderblom Chair in Comparative Religion at Uppsala University, Sweden.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington D.C., USA, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Security at Georgetown University, Washington D.C., USA.

Christopher Hewitt is an Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, USA.

Richard Bach Jensen is a Professor of History in the Louisiana Scholars' College at Northwestern State University, Louisiana, USA. His book, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934*, was published in 2013.

Fredrik Johansson is affiliated with the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm University, Sweden. His research interests are data mining and techniques for analysing social media.

Lisa Kaati is affiliated with the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm University, Sweden. She is interested in techniques, methods, and tools for analysing data from the Internet.

Jeffrey Kaplan is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh and the Director of the UW Oshkosh Institute for the Study of

Religion, Violence and Memory. His books include *The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature* (2005, with Bron Taylor) and *Millennial Violence: Past, Present and Future* (2002).

Heléne Lööw is affiliated with the Department of History, Uppsala University, Sweden.

Leena Malkki is a Lecturer at the Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland.

Clark McCauley is Professor of Psychology and co-Director of the Solomon Asch Centre for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, USA. He is also Editor of the journal *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*.

George Michael is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Westfield State University, Massachusetts, USA, and the author of *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (2012).

Jonas Clausen Mork is a Researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm University, Sweden, and has a background in decision support and philosophy.

Sophia Moskalenko is a Social Psychologist working on questions of radicalization at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, USA.

Lauren E. Pinson is a Senior Research/Project Manager at START and a PhD student at Yale University, Connecticut, USA.

Jelle van Buuren is a PhD Researcher and Lecturer at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

José Pedro Zúquete is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences in Lisbon, Portugal and The Institute of Social and Political Studies in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Introduction

JEFFREY KAPLAN

Department of Religious Studies and Anthropology; and Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence, and Memory, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA

HELÉNE LÖÖW

Department of History, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

LEENA MALKKI

Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

The most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.
—President Barack Obama[1]

Lone wolf and autonomous cell violence is as old as time itself. Phineas, the biblical figure who might well be considered the archetypical Lone Wolf (Numbers 25:1-9) is credited with averting the wrath of God from the Hebrews by taking it upon himself to murder an Israelite man and a Midianite woman whose miscegenatistic coupling threatened the survival of the Hebrew people. Phineas' act was cited by the Sicarii, a radical offshoot of the 1st-century Zealots, as the inspiration for the doomed uprising against Roman rule, which ultimately led to the expulsion of the Jewish people from the Holy Land. In recent years, Phineas inspired eponymous organizations or networks in the American Racist Right and the Israeli Radical Right.[2] The "Lone Avenger" motif has appeared in every era and in virtually every culture in the world.

The Lone Wolf Threat Today

As evidenced by the quotation by President Obama which precedes this introduction, "lone wolves" have become a term of art which is found in government and security circles no less than in the popular media. Even if lone wolves have always existed, it is commonly believed that it is a phenomenon distinct to our times that reflects many

general trends in terrorism, conflicts, and societies in general.[3] The Internet and social media are among major recent developments that have enabled communication in ways and in scope that was not possible before. More generally, in today's globalized world, the power of an individual to do good or bad is believed to have increased greatly. Lone wolf terrorists are essentially an extreme manifestation of the feared "super-empowered angry men"[4] who are believed to be next-to-impossible to detect in advance, but capable of major destruction.

One example of what such angry men can do was given on July 22, 2011, when the Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik decided to turn the fantasies that had been flourishing in radical anti-Muslim subcultures into reality with a frightening determination and cold bloodiness. Breivik took lone wolf terrorism to a new dimension; he carried out two totally different kinds of attacks, one a car bomb in Oslo, and the other a shooting spree on the island of Utøya, Norway. His targets were mainly youngsters and no lone wolf has single-handedly killed more people in a single shooting spree than he did. His case is discussed in depth by Mattias Gardell in an article in this volume.

It is feared that lone wolves may be capable of much more than this. The ultimate threat scenario combines the unpredictability of lone operators with worries about the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in the post-Cold War world. Until now, this scenario was found disturbing but unlikely because the terrorists seemed to have neither motivation nor capability for such kinds of attacks. Now, many feel that it is not safe to assume that anymore. Two articles in this volume explore this scenario. Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson provide a thorough analysis of the CBRN pursuit of lone actors in history, while Patrick Ellis looks at what capabilities may be within the reach of the lone operators or small groups in the future, as well as a discussion about possible countermeasures to secure against this kind of an attack.

This apocalyptic scenario partly explains why so much attention is paid to the lone wolf threat. The U.S. is not alone in its focus on lone operators. Lone wolves are defined as the most significant terrorist threat in Europe as well. EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has stated that EU intelligence and other "terrorism experts" have pegged the number of lone wolves operating on the continent to be somewhere in the 400 s:

> "It is a phenomenon of 'Lone Wolves,' as we call them," EU top Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove told the German news agency DPA. "We can estimate that they are in the 400 s all across Europe."[5]

These comments were offered in the context of the killings of Mohammad Merah, a French-Algerian allegedly operating in the name of Al Qaeda. This makes Merah's identification as a lone wolf dubious. Rather than being taken alive, Merah jumped out the window with "guns blazing," making it impossible to know the degree to which Merah may have operated as a lone wolf.[6] More dubious still is the claim that 400 lone wolves are operating in the EU. By its very nature, lone wolf terrorism is opportunistic and unpredictable. There is no way to reliably estimate the number of lone wolves in the EU or anywhere else. If it was that easy, detection and thus presumably intervention would not be such a big challenge.

While Breivik's actions transfixed European observers, lone wolf actors in the United States have undertaken more focused, but no less effective, attacks. The most

well-known recent American lone wolf actor is Maj. Nidal Hassan. Major Hassan, an army medical officer based at Ft. Hood in Texas, was reportedly disaffected by American actions in the Islamic world and was himself facing deployment when he went on a shooting spree, killing thirteen and wounding another thirty persons. Found guilty of the murders, Major Hassan has been sentenced to death.[7]

A similar attack at an American base in Kuwait occurred when a U.S. Army Sergeant, Hasan Akbar, lobbed a grenade at fellow servicemen and followed up with automatic weapons fire, claiming that his act was intended to stop Americans from killing more Muslims in the Middle East. Then on April 15, 2013, two brothers acting as an autonomous cell set off ingenious home-made pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Miscalculating the design of the bombs, the blast scattered shrapnel only at knee level, killing only three but seriously injuring over two hundred. The act was soon followed by a massive police operation to capture the suspects. One of the brothers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was killed during the chase and his younger brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was finally captured. The Boston Marathon bombing was the most effective act of domestic terrorism since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Oklahoma City too was the act of a two-man autonomous cell. Timothy McVeigh carried out the bombing and Terry Nichols dealt with the logistics of the act.

The contrast between the Oklahoma City bombing and all of the lone wolf and autonomous cell actions considered in this volume is instructive. In the post-9/11 cases, lone wolf attacks are by default and often erroneously identified with radical Islam. Oklahoma City by contrast was motivated primarily as revenge for the deaths of the Branch Dravidians who died in a standoff with the FBI and was carried out by a far right-wing actor. Nonetheless, many of the 21st-century lone wolf and autonomous cell attacks center around either Islamist or anti-Muslim extremists.[8]

The Islamic element of the contemporary lone wolf phenomenon is what most concerns governments and security services. The decade-long War on Terrorism has degraded the most threatening of the established Islamist terrorist groups. Al Qaeda central, for example, has been pushed to the periphery of the Islamic world and its leaders forced to live furtive lives ever in fear of the next cruise missile to fall on their heads. Its charismatic leader, Osama Bin Laden, was killed by a team of Navy SEALs in Pakistan in 2011. He was only the most well-known AQ casualty. Bin Laden's second-in-command Saeed al-Shihri was also killed by an American drone. While there has been a great deal of controversy over the accuracy of U.S. military claims and increasing reporting of a vast underestimation of civilian casualties in the drone campaign,[9] it is widely believed that between military pressure and the cruise missile campaign, AQ central's command and control now constitutes a virtually negligible terrorist threat.

What remains of AQ is the third leg of the Command, Control and Communication (C3) triangle: namely, communication. Arguably the most significant casualty of the drone war was the American-born propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki, who personified the new breed of Islamist radical. A convert to radical Islam, he transcended the world of Western AQ wannabes by making contact with his distant heroes, finding acceptance in their closed and highly compartmentalized ranks, and utilizing digital media to attract an unknown number of Western Islamists—many of whom like himself were recent converts to Islam.

Awlaki and the Western jihadists that he targeted in his writings constitute a nightmare for Western intelligence agencies. As border controls in the U.S. and to a much lesser degree the EU become increasingly effective, a 9/11 or 7/7 style

mega-event utilizing imported jihadists is today taken less seriously as a threat. However, there is little defense against an individual citizen of a Western country with no record of radical activity in the past who, for reasons of his or her own, decides to strike a blow against the powers who are perceived as waging a war on Islam. To be sure, there is nothing innovative about this kind of proxy war. Western citizens acting in the name of foreign terrorist groups is a venerable terrorist tactic. Such actions may actively involve members of the organization. One example of this is the case of Murielle Degauque, a young Belgian woman who was convinced to carry out an Islamist-inspired suicide bombing with the aid of her husband and other terrorist operatives.[10] Her case stands out as an example of the near impossibility of detecting and deterring homegrown terrorist strikes so long as the lone wolf actor avoids the mistake of seeking contact with the group or publicizing their beliefs or intentions on social media or the Internet. How then to counter cases in which the decision to strike and the means with which the action is to be conducted are left entirely to the would-be terrorist? Articles by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, Christopher Hewitt, and George Michael examine various aspects of the problem of detection and deterrence.

It is important to keep in mind that, contrary to popular perception, lone wolves are not alone in the true meaning of the word. This point is highlighted throughout this volume. Lone wolves do not sit in dark cellars becoming self-radicalized (to use a term currently popular in the EU) in front of a computer, contrary to popular perceptions of the phenomenon. Lone wolves, however lonely they seem to be, are very much part of larger communities of likeminded actors. The fact that some seem to have spent most of their time in front of a computer does not mean they are alone—modern communication technology is just exactly what the word say, a technology to communicate with others.

The primary means of detecting and hopefully deterring lone wolf attacks is believed to be an effective monitoring of the Internet for signs of radicalization or incipient violence. This approach applies to both lone wolf terrorists and school shooters. Particularly in the world of school shooters, there are often traces of incipient violence that appear with little or no effort to shield these communications from outside observation. Failing interdiction, as the paradigmatic case of Anders Breivik demonstrates, the on-line traces of the perpetrators serve a forensic function, offering lessons to authorities as they prepare for the inevitable next violent tragedy.

The technical aspects of Internet surveillance are the subjects of the paper co-written by Katie Cohen, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati, and Jonas Clausen Mork from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Their article demonstrates the inherent difficulties involved in monitoring the Internet. It documents ways in which police and intelligence agencies in Europe go about the nearly impossible task of mining the unfathomably vast sea of messaging on the Internet. It is no surprise that the United States has gone light years further in its efforts to mine the Internet for signs of foes real or imagined. The revelations of the National Security Agency's overreach involving their obtaining on-line data on virtually every American citizen and every foreign national who might correspond with American citizens began with Edward Snowden's leak of a trove of classified NSA files.[11] In light of these revelations, the warning contained in Cohen et al.'s article seems prescient:

> It also challenges the feeling of a place—in our case the Internet—being truly public, in the sense of allowing and accepting the presence of people

> who fall outside of current norms. A recurring worry is the function creep of surveillance systems: will they really only be used to reduce criminality or will they in fact become powerful tools of oppression? And who will eventually pay the price?

This concern is shared by Christopher Hewitt, who asks in his article "to what extent is it legitimate to gather intelligence on extremist movements and activists if they have not actually engaged in violence?" Furthermore, his analysis of 47 terrorist plots in the U.S. after 9/11 demonstrates that undercover agents have often played a crucial role in discovering the plots. This unavoidably raises the question of how many of these plots resulted from a sting operation in the first place.

Hewitt's study also shows that tips from the general public have traditionally been important for identifying and capturing terrorists. A recent study by Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert shows that in almost two-thirds of the lone wolf cases they studied, family and friends had knowledge about the perpetrator's intent to engage in terrorist activity.[12] This highlights the advantages that a good information flow from the public to authorities can have in preventing lone wolf terrorism plots from materializing. However, as Hewitt argues, encouraging public cooperation has its problems too; tracking down the numerous leads is costly and the repeated calls for vigilance may inflate public concerns about terrorism and increase the feeling of insecurity among the citizens. These concerns are also discussed by George Michael in his article in the context of applying counterinsurgency methods of winning hearts and minds in the case of lone wolf terrorism.

Research on Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells

Until very recently, lone wolves have been largely overlooked in the area of terrorism studies. Alex Schmid's 2011 definitive update of the *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* makes only passing mention of the phenomenon, and then primarily in the context of the American radical right. Schmid attributes the reasons for this lacuna in the terrorism literature to the belief that terrorism—or at least "serious" terrorism—was almost by definition considered to be a group activity that was driven by a coherent political agenda.[13] Bruce Hoffman's revised edition of his highly regarded *Inside Terrorism* does mention lone wolves and provides a working definition drawn from the FBI's Strategic Plan 2004–2009:

> The most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor, or "Lone Wolf" terrorist. They typically draw ideological inspiration from formal terrorist organizations, but operate on the fringes of those movements. Despite their ad hoc nature and generally limited resources, they can mount high-profile, extremely destructive attacks, and their operational planning is often difficult to detect.[14]

Beyond the Unabomber however, Hoffman devotes little attention to actual cases. Finally, encyclopedias of terrorism have often proven unhelpful to scholars and at times misleading to students. This is the case with the second edition of Gus Martin's *The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism* which devotes too much of its limited space (or limited interest as the case may be) with a discussion of the

psychological problems which the article's author believes to be the common thread in lone wolf terrorism.[15]

Following the increased policy interest in lone wolves, several new studies on lone wolves have been published during the last few years that have improved our understanding of the phenomenon. For example, recent quantitative studies provide us with overviews about how common such attacks have been, what have been the preferred *modi operandi* and targets, and the background of the perpetrators.[16] There are also studies dealing with the history and development of the idea of leaderless resistance,[17] as well as analyses that predict the further development of the lone wolf threat.[18]

That said, there is still a lot to be done. The current debate on lone wolf terrorism is largely driven by the current focus on the problem by policy makers such as President Obama. It is widely believed that the lone wolves are more numerous in the post-Cold War world than in the previous decades and there are some quantitative studies that back up this observation. Ramón Spaaij, for example, found in his study on lone wolf terrorism in 15 Western countries that there has been a slight rise in the number of such attacks since 1968, especially outside the U.S. Still, only a very small minority of attacks are conducted by lone operators.[19]

There are good reasons to think that the current operating environment provides unprecedented possibilities for lone operators and leaderless resistance in particular. However, it is still important to ask whether the alleged rise of lone wolf terrorism could be partly attributed to the changing *interpretations* and *perceptions* of terrorism rather than from changes in the patterns of terrorist attacks and organization. While violent attacks themselves are all too real, what we call terrorism is, after all, ultimately a socially constructed category of events and actors. As Philip Jenkins, among many others, has pointed out, the interpretations of terrorism, like any other historical events and phenomena, tend to change over time.[20] These interpretations are strongly influenced by the contemporary politics and debates. While this is true for all phenomena, it is perhaps even more pronounced in the case of the highly politicized and securitized question of terrorism.

An important part of the ongoing debate about the changing nature of terrorism that started in the 1990s has been the argument that the organizational structures behind terrorist attacks have changed. Unpredictability, more than anything else, seems to be elevated as the key characteristic of terrorism currently. Part of this unpredictability is explained by the changes in terrorist organizations. The organization of "new" terrorism has been described with words such as networks, transnationality, loose organizational structures, ad hoc groups, and a large variety of actors ranging from experienced professionals to complete amateurs.[21] In this world of "universes of like-minded individuals,"[22] "bunches of guys,"[23] and "lone-wolf packs,"[24] it seems to be extremely difficult to know from which direction the next major terrorist attack may come.

These views on the changing nature of terrorist organizations, coupled with the challenges it poses to the security and intelligence agencies, have changed the way we look at the violent acts perpetrated by lone individuals. As van Buuren and De Graaf aptly put it in their article regarding the Netherlands, while the fact that violence was perpetrated by an individual or an ad hoc group was earlier seen as a mitigating condition, it is nowadays seen as an aggravating condition. This development is hardly specific to the Netherlands.

Without denying that the dynamics of terrorism may have changed in ways that legitimate such a view, it is important to notice that our views about terrorism affect

the way we look at the world. What sets in is a phenomenon that Philip Jenkins describes as "if I hadn't believed it, I wouldn't have seen it with my own eyes."[25] Looking at the world through the current understanding of the terrorist threat, we are much more likely to pay attention to violence perpetrated by lone individuals and interpret it as terrorism than we were, say, in the 1970s, when terrorism was understood by definition as a group activity. Therefore, it is possible that we find more lone wolf activity nowadays partly for the simple reason that we find it increasingly significant and actively look for cases of it.

For this reason, a mere look at the standard histories of terrorism does not necessarily provide a full picture about the changes and continuities in lone wolf and autonomous cell terrorism. Indeed, the recent upsurge of interest in lone wolf terrorism has led to the re-evaluation of terrorism in the earlier decades. As we state at the beginning of the introduction, lone wolves are a very old phenomenon. It has been widely pointed out that the anarchist wave of terrorism, as defined by David C. Rapoport, was also characterized by loose organizational forms, lone wolves, and autonomous cells. The manifestations of this wave of terrorism in Italy, Spain, and the U.S. are discussed by Richard Bach Jensen in this volume. More examples of lone operator and autonomous cell violence can be found in several other countries, including the Nordic countries which are mentioned much more seldom in this context. For instance, in 1908, Algot Rosberg, Anton Nilsson, and Alfred Stern, members of the Young Socialists movement, blew up the ship *Almathea* in the harbor of Malmö. The attack was related to the ongoing strike in which the workers in the docks demanded better work conditions. The blast killed one person and injured 23.[26] In Finland, which at that time was an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia, a Finnish-Swedish activist, Eugen Schauman, assassinated the highly unpopular General Governor Nikolai Bobrikov in 1904.[27] As Jose Pedro Zúquete shows in his article, the legacy of this era continues to inspire some anarchist-oriented activists at least flirting with illegal forms of protest.

The historical examples of previous lone wolf cases, loose networks, and leaderless resistance activity in the earlier decades are not limited to the anarchist wave, however. As Jelle van Buuren and Beatrice de Graaf demonstrate in their article, political violence in the post-World War II Netherlands has always been perpetrated primarily by loosely knit groups and lone individuals. Moreover, as Malkki has argued elsewhere, while the New Left wave has been portrayed mainly as a manifestation of "old" terrorism, if one looks at terrorism of that era with current interpretative glasses on, one can find imagined communities, transnational networks, and ad hoc groups not completely unlike what the researchers have found in jihadi terrorism.[28] However, lone wolves of the 1970s hardly exist in the terrorism literature, for the simple reason that they have not been considered as worthy of attention before.

The current focus on violence by lone individuals unavoidably raises the question of how lone wolf terrorism differs from other types of lone operator violence such as workplace shootings and spree killings. This question is explored by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko in their article in this volume with regard to the radicalization process of lone wolf terrorists.

A unique aspect of this volume is its inclusion of school shootings, which are discussed briefly by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko and more elaborately by Leena Malkki in their articles in this volume. School shootings and lone wolf terrorism have been largely considered as unrelated phenomena and they have been

framed differently in the public debate as well as in the area of policy. A closer look reveals that school shootings and lone wolf terrorism actually have several things in common. Both are spectacular acts of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by a lone actor (or a very small group) that deviate from the usual patterns of violent crime. Furthermore, both were seen originally as primarily an American concern, but have apparently become more common in Europe during the last decade.

One obvious difference between lone wolf terrorism and school shootings appears to be that school shootings do not have a political motivation or agenda. As Malkki argues in her article in this volume, this view can be contested. Several school shooters have explained their motivations in political terms and expressed the hope that their example would encourage others to join the struggle. The school shooting research community has typically rejected such statements as quasi-ideological or *post-hoc* rationalizations of an act that is in reality driven by the shooter's personal problems. But what about the cases that have traditionally been interpreted as unquestionably lone wolf terrorism? Can the same argument be made about some of these cases as well? Despite the vast literature dealing with the definition of terrorism, terrorism studies have very little to say about how to decide whether an act should be considered political or not.

If lone wolves have long been overlooked in the literature, still less attention has been paid to the threat of autonomous cells even though they are occasionally discussed in the context of the lone wolf phenomenon. In part, a reason for this state of affairs is that the notion "autonomous cells" calls up images of World War II when such cells operated behind enemy lines, whether that enemy was National Socialist Germany or the Western states that opposed it. More recently, cells operating in an autonomous fashion were ubiquitous in the anarchist wave of terrorism and a primary tactic of the COMITERN, and later Soviet efforts to operate in Western countries during the Cold War. In the age of the lone wolf, the autonomous cell has a somewhat archaic ring to it.

While cellular structures are easier to monitor than the true lone wolf, they may be far more numerous on the ground. Their ability to recruit members with particular skills further heightens the degree of potential threat that they represent. Like lone wolves, autonomous cells may take their inspiration from established groups, but they maintain no direct contact with the movements they seek to represent. Instead, they take their direction from the virtual world of the overt and covert aspects of the Internet, as in earlier days they took their inspiration from books and pamphlets. They operate on their own, pick their own targets, and independently finance their operations. In many ways, they are the ones who turn the ideas that flourish in various radical subcultures into reality. In some respects, we can talk about different levels of activists; the producers of the ideology, the key intellectuals; the "keyboard warriors" active in numerous overlapping Internet communities and in various forms of social media. In these forums they promote their ideas and call for radical actions. Such actions may include stalking and harassing both declared opponents as well as groups and individuals whom they perceive to be symbols of "the enemy."

In some cases, an organization can turn to the leaderless resistance strategy after failing to carry out attacks or when they lack the resources to carry out attacks directly. Even though loose organizations or acting alone are generally seen as providing a tactical advantage for terrorists, it should not be forgotten that for actors themselves, it is often rather a strategy borne out of desperation and failure than prowess. This is how the strategy of leaderless resistance was explicitly presented to

the American far right by Louis Beam. The same can be partly said about the jihadists who, as noted above, have also come to embrace the leaderless resistance strategy.

This volume, in summation, is intended as a contribution toward filling in these lacunae in the terrorism literature by both offering cutting edge theory, in-depth case studies, and a number of elements that have had little consideration in the literature of lone wolf terrorism: a) the role of autonomous cells; b) the threat of CBRN weapons employed by lone wolves and autonomous cells; c) the inclusion of articles written or co-written by intelligence, police, and military personnel; and d) the inclusion of school shooters, who are analyzed in the context of lone wolf and autonomous cell operators. We believe that this volume represents a step forward in the interdisciplinary study of lone wolf and autonomous cell violence.

Future Directions

The contributions in this volume open up several avenues for further research on lone-wolf terrorism and autonomous cells. We know too little about the nature and scope of lone wolf activity, let alone autonomous cells, in the previous decades to have a comprehensive understanding of its historical development. More research is also needed about the relationship between lone-wolf terrorism and other forms of lone operator violence. It is equally clear that all of the implications of the recent changes in the counterterrorism and intelligence, including moral and ethical concerns, are not well understood.

Few analyses address the "big picture" of lone-wolf and autonomous cell terrorism beyond contributions focusing specifically on jihadi terrorism or those discussing very generally the changing nature of terrorism. Jeffrey Kaplan, a career academic, and Christopher P. Costa, a former career military officer offer some insight into the possible future directions of lone wolf and autonomous cell research from the perspective of civilian and military security specialists in their article "On Tribalism: Auxiliaries, Affiliates, and Lone Wolf Political Violence." The "New Tribalism" concept has attracted significant attention from senior American military officers and has attracted interest in China as well.[29]

Kaplan and Costa suggest that a motive force behind lone wolf violence is the desire on the part of the actor, even subconsciously, to become part of a cohesive and supportive milieu that is seen in explicitly tribal terms. It is not a remarkable finding that terrorist actors seek to become a part of a movement of world changing significance. The article borrows heavily from David Rapoport's four waves model of modern terrorism to recast our understanding of tribalism in the post-bin Laden world.[30]

"The New Tribalism" however differs significantly from the international aspirations of the earlier waves of terrorism. In an increasingly anomic world, the attraction of primordial ties has rekindled the timeless dream of belonging—of family as experienced on a global level. Modern internet and social media technologies serve to bring the tribal dream within reach of a global audience of true believers who are prepared to take independent action as the price of belonging to the virtual tribe of the aspirant's choice.

"The New Tribalism" differs significantly from the anthropological conception of tribe as being based on blood ties and centering on a particular geographic locus. In this model, "tribes" may allow for personal contacts with the leadership although in most cases a "virtual tribe" with no direct contact between Lone Wolf or autonomous cell actors and the established leadership of the virtual "tribe" is the norm.

The authors contend that there are two forms of the ''New Tribalism'': ascriptive (membership based on primordial ties of blood and location) and aspirational in which the actor aspires to become part of a tribal community. Both categories can be quite benign in terms of generating Lone Wolf terror. In exceptional circumstances however, both forms may manifest as malign.[31] The paradigmatic cases of the Acholi tribe in Uganda, which gave birth to the genocidal dreams of the Lord's Resistance Army and the remarkably similar apocalyptic visions of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge a generation earlier, are cases of malign ascriptive tribalism.[32] Examples of malign aspirational tribalism, ranging from Al Qaeda to Anders Breivik's quixotic defense of the ''White tribe'' in Europe are ubiquities in the modern world and it is from these ranks that the lone wolves and autonomous cells described in this volume come into being.

Finally, Kaplan and Costa offer the ''New Tribalism'' model into the ongoing strategic thinking in the United States where it has profound implications for irregular warfare, and special operations as a strategic option, when placed in a global rather than simply a regional context. Among the issues that concern the authors, and are only now beginning to capture the attention of Western security planners, is whether China's tribal unrest to take one example will emerge as a long-term security concern outside its borders, and whether U.S. interactions with tribal actors in this region could be leveraged into a strategic advantage on the model of the 19th century cases of T. E. Lawrence and Wilhelm Wasmuss.

In many ways, China brings us full circle from where we began by making a case that counter-terrorist planners must be conscious at all times of the implications of tribes, tribal space, and deeply sensitive to tribal members and their grievances; suggesting that tribal passions and tribal peoples on the peripheriesof the central state are both an opportunity and a threat. Taken together with the other essays in this volume, this reframing of tribalism should provide a deeper understanding of the complexeties and depth of the lone wolf threat.

We hope this special issue will trigger new research projects that will improve our understanding of the timely and multifaceted phenomenon. Our own joint effort was triggered and facilitated by the conference ''Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism'' that was held on September 24–26, 2012 at the Uppsala University, Sweden. The editors wish to express their gratitude for the Center for Police Research, Uppsala University for hosting and financing what turned out to be a very productive conference.

Notes

1. ''Obama: Biggest Terror Fear is the Lone Wolf,'' C*NN*, August 16, 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/.

2. David C. Rapoport, ''Moses, Charisma, and Covenant,'' *The Western Political Science Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (June 1979): 123–143. On the contemporary Israeli and American cases, see respectively Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: Free Press, 1999) and Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right*, (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000), 242–244.

3. This is discussed by George Michael in his article for this volume. See also George Michael, *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012).

4. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (Newly updated and expanded edition) (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

5. "EU Could Be the Home to 400 'Lone Wolf' Extremists, Expert Says," *EU-Digest*, March 22, 2012, http://eu-digest.blogspot.com/2012/03/eu-could-be-home-to-400-lone-wolf.html.

6. "Al Qaeda Fanatic Is DEAD: French Serial Killer Jumps Out His Flat Window With All Guns Blazing in Dramatic End to 32-Hour Siege," *The Mail on Line* (British Daily Mail), March 22, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2118052/Toulouse-shooting-Mohammad-Merah-dead-jumping-flat-window-guns-blazing.html. Given the excitement, Mr. de Kerchove might be forgiven for a bit of hyperbole.

7. The *New York Times* has posted its complete reportage on the Hassan case at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/nidal_malik_hasan/index.html.

8. To be sure, there are other motives for lone wolf terrorism. For a partial table of lone wolf attacks, see Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 103–116. For a more comprehensive if not always accurate view, see Jeffrey D. Simon, *Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2013), 145–180.

9. The estimated ratio of civilians to terrorist dead is in the neighborhood of 50 to 1. Columbia Law School, *Counting Drone Strike Deaths,* 2011, http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinal.pdf.

10. Stephen Castle, "Girl Next Door Who Became a Suicide Bomber," *The Independent*, December 2, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/girl-next-door-who-became-a-suicide-bomber-517797.html.

11. "Statement by Edward Snowden to Human Rights Groups at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport," *Wikileaks.org*, July 12, 2013, http://wikileaks.org/Statement-by-Edward-Snowden-to.html.

12. Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert, "Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* (forthcoming).

13. Alex P. Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011), 242–243. The Leaderless Resistance model analyzed by Schmid is drawn from Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 80–85.

14. FBI, *FBI Strategic Plan 2004–2009* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, nd), 15–16; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40–41.

15. Randy Borum, "Lone-Wolf Terrorism," in Gus Martin and Harvey W. Kushner, eds., *The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism,* 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), 361–362.

16. See, e.g., Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 8 above); Gill et al., "Bombing Alone" (see note 12 above); Jeff Gruenewald, Steven Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, "Distinguishing 'Loner' Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender Characteristics," *Criminology and Public Policy* 12, no. 1 (2013): 65–91.

17. E.g., Michael, *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (see note 3 above), Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance" (see note 13 above).

18. E.g., Simon, *Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 8 above).

19. Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 8 above), 27–33.

20. Philip Jenkins, *Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know About Terrorism* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003).

21. For discussion on the changes in organizational structures behind terrorism see, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, "The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 1–15; Ian O. Lesser et al., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999); David Tucker, "What Is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14; Peter R. Neumann, *Old and New Terrorism* (Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity, 2009); Martha Crenshaw, "'Old' vs. 'New' Terrorism," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 51–66. See also Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Leena Malkki, "NO: The Fallacy of the New Terrorism Thesis," in Richard Jackson and Justin Sinclair, eds., *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2012), 66–79.

22. Brian Michael Jenkins, "Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24 (2001): 324.

23. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

24. Raffaello Pantucci, *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists* (London: ICSR, 2011), http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.

25. Jenkins, *Images of Terror* (see note 20 above), 14.

26. Oscar Bjurling, "Tvedräktens Tid," in *Malmö Stads Historia* 4 (1985): 331–394.

27. See, e.g., Tuomo Polvinen, *Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland, 1898–1904* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

28. Leena Malkki, "Radicalisation and Terrorism in History: Lessons From the Radical Left Terrorist Campaigns in Europe and the United States," in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 69–82.

29. Jeffrey Kaplan has been invited to offer a series of lectures on the topic from a "Sinocentric" perspective in the summer of 2014.

30. David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73. The waves were, in order of appearance: (1) the Anarchist wave, (2) the National Liberation wave, (3) the Left Wing wave, and (4) the Religious wave.

31. Malign in the context of this article adopts the hostile Western view of foreign terrorist groups. We recognize the fact that global viewpoints do not necessarily subscribe to this perception. The Pew Global Opinion Survey tracks opinion trends and demonstrates the diversity of views on what does and does not constitute a malign entity; see http://www.pewglobal.org/.

32. Jeffrey Kaplan, *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism's Fifth Wave* (London: Routledge, 2010). This text posits the "New Tribalism" as constituting the "fifth wave" of modern terrorism in the context of Rapoport's Four Waves theory. In retrospect, aspirational and ascriptive tribal aspirations are a motive force in the fourth or religious wave of terrorism rather than being a distinct wave in and of itself. Fifth wave theory however was of key importance in forming our understanding of the "New Tribalism" with its global tactical and strategic implications.