10 Forms of bisexual injustice

Bi, being, and becoming a knower

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Introduction: The knowledgeable bisexual

Before we delve into a discussion of knowledge and power, and their implications for bisexual identity, we need to address why it is important to have this discussion. In order to unpack the marginalisation faced by bisexuality within scholarship and knowledge production, it is important to acknowledge that bisexuals are indeed a marginalised group. This marginalisation is manifested not only through people and their lived experiences, but also within the academic setting. Nevertheless, bisexuality scholarship has taken great strides towards an autonomous position not only within LGBT and queer studies, but also in mainstream studies and social theory (Maliepaard, 2018b). Disseminating knowledge about bisexuality will not only inform professionals and scholars about this disparity, but will in turn also reach those who need it most: bisexual individuals who are dealing with discrimination, ignorance, and binegativity (Eliason, 1997). This will allow bisexuals to feel supported by the availability of knowledge, and to feel validated in the legitimacy of their experiences.

This chapter will lead you from the Foucauldian deconstruction of Western sexuality to an understanding of the epistemic position of bisexuality within the conceptualisation of sex, desire, sexuality, and identity. The chapter will cover the medicalisation of sex, bisexual discourse, the critique of current sexual scholarship, the multiplicity of bisexual identity, its complex position within identity politics, and the tools of bisexual erasure. There is a vast body of work on epistemology (theories focused on the way knowledge is perceived and produced), and I aim to lay down a preliminary foundation to help provide an understanding of how bisexuality is positioned within knowledge production. I hereby urge you to read this chapter as a first glimpse into the complex nature of bisexuality's epistemological role – both within the social sciences and in more personal interrelational contexts. This is in order to tantalise you to continue reading, as *to know* is one thing, but understanding *why we know* or *do not know* is equally important.

The invention of sexual identity

The human desire to strive for knowledge is one of the cornerstones of who we are as a species, and is crucial to the way we make sense of life and living. There is an easy connection to be established between what we deem to be knowledge and our understanding of what might be considered “the truth”. Moreover, various important epistemologies have shown us that the conception that there is a singular truth is highly contested. The epistemologies in question are those of philosophy, ethics, and phenomenology. Phenomenology is the study of the things (phenomena) we experience, and how these phenomena are intersubjectively constructed (Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1963). Phenomenology provides insight into how the *production* of knowledge – which is distinctly different from knowledge itself – revolves around power. To have hegemonic power is to hold the dominant position within a group of concepts, thoughts, and ideas. This position is so dominant in fact that when one interacts with that set of ideas, one will have the tendency to think and act through this dominant stance before any other. This makes hegemonic power a pervasive force throughout all aspects of life: the social, the political, the material, and particularly identity. In response to the experience of second-class citizenship compared with those in hegemonic positions in Western society (the cisgendered, the heterosexual, the white, the middle class), feminist, queer, and racial epistemologies have focused on developing understandings of how these hegemonic powers produce knowledge. This is achieved by critiquing the literary canon for its marginalising practices: observing how and why dominant powers obscure the production of knowledge by those who fall outside the hegemonic position (Ahmed, 2006; Foucault, 1978; Sedgwick, 1991). Moreover, these epistemologies resist their marginalised position as “invalid” subjects, and aim to produce knowledge – both autonomous and intersecting – from gendered, queered, and racial/non-Western perspectives. These epistemologies have given us the understanding that neither knowledge nor “truth” is a one-size-fits-all concept, but instead they both rely heavily on the ways in which they are constructed.

Regarding the construction of knowledge about sexuality, we should take a step back and look at the foundations of the epistemologies of the marginalised. The French poststructuralist Michel Foucault (1926–84) deconstructed the Western view of sex and sexuality in *The History of Sexuality* (1978), in which he laid the theoretical foundations for contemporary sexual scholarship. Through this deconstruction, Foucault offered a new perspective (not only on sexuality, but on power and “singular truth”) by creating a historical narrative around the construction of the homosexual *identity* – separating it from same-sex sexual practice and rejecting the idea that sexuality is an innate, static human condition (Foucault, 1978; Weeks, 2017). Foucault’s (1978) deconstruction shows history as a narrative, a story for us to pinpoint where the desire to make sense of sex and sexuality

became discursively problematic. Through the act of classification, certain sexual acts became problems in need of correction, and subsequently became regulated by those in hegemonic positions of power. Due to the medicalisation of sex during the Victorian era, and the rise of psychoanalysis in the early twentieth century, Western society started to define sexual identities (Foucault, 1978). With the rise of sexology, sex became a science – and with medicalisation comes inherent *pathology*. In Victorian times, procreation mattered more than pleasure, and sexual freedom (heterosexual or otherwise) became repressed, resented, and rejected. According to Foucault (1978), anything that transgressed procreational sex required management through oppressive power (exercised by and through institutions such as religion, state, and family). Thus, through the creation of the discourse that surrounds heterosexual procreative sex, combined with the pathologisation of transgressive (non-procreational) sex, the social stigmatisation of “sexual deviancy” emerged within society (Callis, 2009; Foucault, 1978; Weeks, 2017). This was the moment in Western history when sexual identities emerged and became embedded within culture and society:

The nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life-form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality [...] The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.

(Foucault, 1978, p. 43)

This management of sexuality, and the rise of heterosexual and homosexual identities, meant that society was now structured around sexual normativity. Here we see the pillars of binary thinking come to life within discourse, and ultimately in the way we are conditioned to think about sexuality.

Bisexuality and discourse

If we shift the Foucauldian analysis of sexual normativity towards bisexuality, a historical perspective also indicates the construction that led to the problematisation of this identity. To define something (in this case, sexuality) is to problematise the undefined (bisexuality): once the undefined is considered a deviation (neither straight *nor* gay), regulation must occur to uphold the power of that which *is* defined (heterosexuality *and* homosexuality). Neither psychoanalysis nor sexology defined bisexuality as a sexual identity in the early twentieth century, but instead saw it as the biological gateway to normative sexual attraction and normative sex (Callis, 2009). From this perspective, the focus regarding bisexuality lay on biological hermaphroditism: the foetus starts from an intersex disposition before becoming male or female, so therefore it is also bisexual before becoming

heterosexual or homosexual (Angelides, 2001; Ellis, 1915; Freud, 1962). Callis (2009) states that because bisexuality was not classified autonomously in sexology and psychoanalysis, bisexuals were never considered “a species”, nor was there any “truth” to be found within bisexual identities. Therefore, not only did bisexuality escape medicalisation, but this simultaneously led to a void in the development of bisexuality as an identity, accompanied with the potential for discursive denial – the understanding that bisexuality simply does not exist (Hemmings, 1995, 2002).

Foucault’s (1978) *The History of Sexuality* shows that both sexual identity and its regulation are socially shaped through societal structures, as same-gendered sexual practice was around long before it was deemed to be “homosexual”. Moreover, scholars such as Callis (2009) note through Foucauldian analysis that same-sex sexual acts are not performed exclusively by homosexuals – even if one cannot “prove the truth” of bisexuality through a binary “either/or” understanding of homosexual and heterosexual sex. This either/or thinking equally leads to the further ontological erasure of bisexuality through discursive attempts to “consolidate discrete lesbian and gay identities” (Monro, 2015, p. 26). The lack of “truth and proof” of bisexual identities within this normative construction leaves a deafening silence. However, silence is a powerful tool in its own right: “There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses” (Foucault, 1978, p. 27; see also Fricker, 2007). As with performative speech acts, there is an equally performative element to the act of silence: there is tremendous weight in that “which is not said”, and to be situated outside of discourse can therefore be a method of playing out power relations. These power struggles occur in spheres where discourse is both produced and maintained (from wider society to academia) (see Elia, Eliason, & Beemyn, 2018; Monro, Hines, & Osborne, 2017). These spheres interact strongly with one another, and have similar mechanisms for silencing marginalised sexualities.

We can start to see that discourse is always not-neutral and not necessarily ethically sound, as its production relies on power and context (Foucault, 1978). Discourse has the ability to develop and maintain privilege, and equally, the ability to inflict serious harm on those living through discursive discrimination, discursive silence, and subsequent marginalisation. A core assumption of phenomenology is that there is an evident connection between discourse, knowledge, and experience, none of which can be produced without affecting the others. This is evident in intimate narratives of sexuality, identity, and culture, as they are lived experiences – the emotional and physical embodiments of a social reality (Plummer, 1995). Knowledge and discourse shape social realities, which in turn shape experiences, which subsequently shape identity. So if the production of knowledge (by social researchers) revolves around experience, we are confronted with a multitude of potential issues – not only epistemological, but also ethical. Questions arise such as: Who is allowed to produce knowledge? Who is allowed to

disseminate it? And who is allowed to have a voice? Moreover, this leads us to wonder what potential injustice the answers to these questions might bring to light.

Howard Becker's (1967) article "Whose Side are We On?" highlights the role social scientists (and sociologists in particular) play in the production of knowledge, and the complex ethical issues that can come with this position. The article actively engages in a request for academia to take a reflexive stance on knowledge production. Becker asks whether the academic tries to disseminate other people's knowledge (or perhaps other knowledge) into the world for altruistic reasons (e.g. "it is the right thing to do") or for more selfish reasons (e.g. for career advancement under the weight of academia's "publish or perish" culture). Moreover, he questions the academic's position in keeping these hierarchies of knowledge in place, specifically regarding the power to provide someone with a voice – using the platform of academia to generate further discourse. Plummer (1995) refers to the narrative power of sexual experiences, and how remaining silent about these experiences (such as being closeted, or perhaps being discursively silenced) is not just a process of pain, but also a process of potential. There is potential within silence if one utilises it as a survival strategy, and there is potential within breaking a silence. When sexual subjects are explicitly given a voice, they are given the opportunity to turn the narrative around – to redirect it from a *story* into a *device* for identity politics: "The private pains increasingly become public ones; the personal sufferings become collective participations; the pathological languages turn into political ones" (Plummer, 1995, p. 110). This enables us to see social research, especially sexual scholarship, as a place where platforms can be provided to multiply the voices of marginalised sexualities and place the focus on their lived experiences. After all, it is a space for the social researcher to decide whose "side" they are on in the shadows cast by hegemonic power.

Knowing versus ignorance: Silencing bisexuality

In choosing our "side", we acknowledge the power dynamics which oppress, and we lend our voices to the unheard. Those in positions of power prioritise and grant privilege to certain knowledges over others, allowing unprivileged knowledge to be silenced or rendered invisible. Miranda Fricker's (2007) work focuses on these power/knowledge interactions, and contributes to the development of a theoretical framework regarding epistemic injustice, which we can apply to bisexual marginalisation. Fricker (2007) discusses two types of epistemic misconduct that can occur simultaneously as well as autonomously: hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice. These injustices, as the word "epistemic" implies, revolve around marginalisation *through* knowledge.

This marginalisation (testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, and wilful hermeneutic ignorance) comes from the invalidation of a group's

lived experiences, and by preventing them from advancing discursive knowledge about those lived experiences, either out of ignorance or due to deliberate denial. Specifically, testimonial injustice is the inherent disadvantage of a marginalised group that cannot be heard due to society's perception and interpretation of its experience. These perceptions and interpretations, which can be seen as stigmas (such as sexism and binegativity), in return skew the ability of these marginalised groups to make sense of their own experiences.

This can be elaborated with an example: "I am a bisexual person, and I feel uncomfortable trying to fit in with both the heterosexual and the lesbian and gay community; I feel like I do not belong anywhere". If "society" then turns to me and says, "That is not true, you belong everywhere, because as a bisexual you are heterosexual as well as gay", then my experiences are made invalid. Therefore, I cannot provide a true testament to my experience, and the knowledge I am trying to impart to society is silenced (Fricker, 2007).

Second, there is hermeneutical injustice – that is, the inability of marginalised groups to add to knowledge about their position – due to a lack of societal resources. This in turn results in the group's inability to articulate its own marginalised experience; this is referred to as situated hermeneutic inequality. To give an example through the academic discourse surrounding bisexuality: if bisexuality is subsumed within lesbian and gay studies, but fails to be seen as a topic of autonomous scholarship, a bisexual person cannot find the knowledge or language they need to develop an understanding of their own experience (Monro, 2015). Pohlhaus (2012, p. 715) takes hermeneutic injustice one step further by asserting that this injustice is not built upon a lack of knowledge or an inability to grasp it, hereby referring to it as "wilful hermeneutic ignorance". Wilful hermeneutic ignorance happens when people in dominant positions of power *purposefully* ignore the experiences of the marginalised (Pohlhaus, 2017). Yoshino (2000) and Erickson-Schroth & Mitchell (2009) indicate that wilful hermeneutic ignorance is an underlying issue in sexual scholarship's relationship with bisexuality. Such unawareness can be very harmful: To wilfully reject/ignore/erase the experiences of marginalised groups keeps the power structures that silence those groups in place.

It is important to address a more contemporary understanding of bisexual identity, not only to acknowledge the desire to categorise sexualities, but also to examine the political and social mechanisms inherent in these power structures. As bisexuality shifted away from the medicalisation of sex (which had created an epistemic void by not establishing bisexuality as a sexual identity, as well as by pathologising it), the notion of bisexuality as the in-between of monosexual identities embedded itself deeper within discourse. Despite the development of sexuality research, bisexuality remained remarkably unaddressed. Kinsey's (1948) research on sexual behaviour and attraction (which placed participants on a scale between exclusively monosexual identities) did not just successfully combat the pathologisation

of sexuality, but also emphasised that a wider scale of sexual possibilities existed. However, Germon (2008, p. 255) argues that Kinsey's research perpetuates the failure to recognise bisexuality as an autonomous sexuality, because it indicates "bisexuality's complexity [while at] the same time it gestures toward the impossibility of capturing that complexity with a single signifier". Germon (2008, p. 255) discusses "bisexuality as a descriptive noun [which] covers a vast array of non-gendered sexual styles, sensibilities, and practices because there are countless ways in which one can be bisexual". Barker and colleagues (2012) point out that the descriptive conceptualisation of bisexuality derives not only from discourse, but also from cultural understandings. Rust (2000) indicates that these descriptors are personal understandings that come in a great variety, indicating that there is no such thing as a single bisexual identity. As the gendered/sexed aspect of bisexual sexual attraction is not restricted to cisgendered people alone, it should also encompass attraction to nonconforming genders (people who identify as transgender, non-binary, intersex, etc.) (see Callis, 2014; Monro, 2015; Rust, 2000; Swan & Habibi, 2018). Ochs (2015, para 2) thus defines bisexuality broadly, as all-encompassing:

The potential to be attracted – romantically and/or sexually – to people of more than one sex and/or gender, not necessarily at the same time, not necessarily in the same way. And not necessarily to the same degree.

This multiplicity of bisexual attraction, behaviour, and identity not only reveals the fluidity of sexuality, but also simultaneously complicates the bisexual position within identity politics. For example, "one challenge of uniting non-monosexual communities is the balancing act of being inclusive enough to avoid unintentionally excluding others while remaining cohesive enough to move together in collective action" (Flanders, 2017, p. 2). There is the issue of identification based on acceptance: Callis (2014) found that bisexual individuals sometimes used other labels of identification (such as queer), because these were granted more validity, recognition, and visibility within the broader LGBT community. Some research has also indicated that there are bisexual people who simply do not care about identity labels, or who use different labels in different contexts as a form of individual agency (Maliepaard, 2018a). Israel (2018) addresses how the desire to categorise and classify sexualities can lead to the enforcement of labels that ultimately invalidate the authenticity of bisexual identity. To be aware that one does not erase experiences based on the differentiation between cultural consensus and self-identification is to accept these identifications as authentic – despite a potential terminological disagreement or potential political incoherence. One person's bisexual identity can be another person's pansexual (which is another person's queer, and another person's heteroflexible, etc.) – and at times, several terms are employed simultaneously (Rust, 2000). These different identifications make it harder to lay an *epistemic foundation* for

a multifaceted category such as bisexuality, which raises the issue of “political dilution” (Flanders, 2017). Arguably, this is where sexual scholarship can make a distinction between queer studies and bisexuality studies, or can address bisexuality more comprehensively as well as acknowledging its autonomy. As Elia and Eliason (2012, p. 4) note:

Although bisexuality studies has grown in prominence as an academic sub-field within sexuality studies over the past several years, it has mostly existed in the shadows of gay and lesbian studies and more recently it has been in the shadow of transgender studies as well.

Scholars such as Angelides (2001), Callis (2009), Hemmings (2002, 2007), Monro (2015), and Monro, Hines, & Osborne (2017) have criticised academic spaces for their marginalising practices – and particularly queer theory for its lack of engagement with bisexuality: “In spite of occupying an epistemic position within this very opposition, the category of bisexuality has been curiously marginalised and erased from the deconstructive field of queer theory” (Angelides, 2001, p. 7). Moreover, Monro’s (2015) work states that queer theory (and queer politics) can even add to the erasure of bisexuality, due to queer theory’s inherently destabilising epistemic nature. The creation of a unified queer identity potentially loses bisexual experience rather than acknowledging bisexuality and its discourse as autonomous. However, Hemmings (2007) suggests that queer theory’s lack of interaction with bisexuality revolves around the conceptualisation of bisexuality as an identity that both solidifies binary identity categories (i.e. it highlights the opposites) and undermines them (i.e. sexuality is fluid). This ontological critique not only shows the importance of the disempowered status of the bisexual subject, but also highlights the position of bisexual identity. Bisexuality is the space that defies the discursive divides of sexuality, power, and knowledge.

Methods of marginalisation

Earlier in this chapter, experience was mentioned as playing a key role in the understanding of the lives of marginalised groups. As hooks (1984, p. ix) explains in *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*, “to be in the margin is to be part of the whole, but outside the main body”. This has already become evident with bisexuality scholarship in relation to the main body of knowledge on sexuality. While we will not move away from discourse entirely, as it is intricately connected to experience, it is important to see how bisexual marginalisation happens in practice. Yoshino (2000) has written about the methods of bisexual erasure, building on the work of scholars such as Ault (1996) and James (1996), who criticise the monosexual/plurisexual binary. Plurisexual identities are sexualities that are not based on singular sexed/gendered attraction; they include bisexual, queer, pansexual, and fluid identities

(Galupo et al., 2014; Swan & Habibi, 2018). Yoshino (2000) focuses on mechanisms of bisexual erasure by both straight and homosexual people, and asks what monosexual people have to gain from such epistemic violence. His essay considers not only the “hows” but also the “whys”, positing three arguments as to *why* monosexuals might erase bisexuality: (1) for identity stability; (2) to maintain sexual attraction as a form of distinction; and (3) to combat (bisexuality as) a threat to monogamy.

In regard to identity stability, we can draw upon the discursive and political distinctions discussed previously in this chapter. Heterosexuality has a privileged position within identity politics, and therefore has a whole plethora of other privileges (Ahmed, 2006; Ochs, 1996; Rubin, 1984). These privileges in turn “straighten” all subjects, forcing systemic heterosexuality upon all transgressive sexualities, genders, and identities (Ahmed, 2006). Therefore, those who identify as lesbian/gay have to heavily safeguard their political position, as their lesbian/gay identity arises from an ongoing sociopolitical struggle that stems from (and can conform to) compulsory heterosexuality (Puar, 2007; Welzer-Lang, 2008). According to Yoshino (2000), these positions are complicated by the existence of bisexuality, which suggests a lack of “truth” in monosexuality – which chimes with the lack of “truth and proof” of bisexuality, discussed above (see Callis, 2009). If bisexuality exists, you can never fully “prove” you are hetero- or homosexual. This can lead to a position in which straight people might lose privilege, or lesbian and gay people might lose the rights for which they have had to battle – a potential loss of political positioning, which in turn requires a defence.

To “discriminate erotically on the basis of sex” (Yoshino, 2000, p. 4) stems from the discursive divide between sexual morality and desire (Foucault, 1978; Weeks, 2017). To desire one and not the other entails an intense focus on someone’s sex/gender as a prerequisite for sexual and romantic affection (Yoshino, 2000). This requires the world to be built in dichotomous categories of desire and non-desire (Diamond, 2008). Therefore, if we take the importance of singular sex/gender out of that categorisation, the concept of (mono)sexual stability falls apart. Likewise, discrimination against bisexuals as a supposed threat to monogamous relationships comes from the deployment of the often-used stigma that bisexuals are promiscuous (Barker et al., 2012; Van Alphen, 2017). According to Rust (1992, 2000), this stigma is built around the cis-orientated understanding that bisexuals are unable to be sexually satisfied by only one partner, and therefore require two – one (cis) man and one (cis) woman. The (re)iteration of this binegative stigma not only undermines the normalisation of bisexuality as a whole, but also sustains the notion that bisexuals are not capable of loving, fulfilling, and (if desired) monogamous relationships.

Further to Yoshino’s (2000) analysis of *why* monosexuals epistemically erase bisexuality, he makes three arguments regarding *how* this erasure is deployed: through (1) class erasure; (2) individual erasure; and

(3) delegitimation. The erasure of bisexuality primarily revolves around the lack of validation and recognition of bisexual identities as legitimate. Class erasure (“class” in the sense of “category”, as seen in Foucauldian deconstruction, rather than in the socio-economic sense) describes the erasure of bisexuality as a legitimate or autonomous sexual identity. As mentioned above, this is a form of hermeneutic injustice that is particularly evident within academia (James, 1996; MacDowall, 2009; Monro, Hines, & Osborne, 2017). With individual erasure, however, the lack of validation occurs on a personal level: it accepts and recognises bisexuality as a legitimate sexuality, but it excludes the individual from that identification. Such erasure is often rationalised through the idea that the individual is experimenting with their sexuality (Ault, 1996; Brewster & Moradi, 2010; Rust, 1992). Interestingly, as mentioned by Maliepaard (2017a, 2017b), this belief is also internalised by bisexual individuals, causing them to doubt their own romantic and sexual attractions to multiple sexes/genders due to the discursive understanding of the normative sexual binary. While the previous methods certainly also delegitimise bisexuality, the method of delegitimation (Yoshino, 2000) takes the form of a far more deliberate act: wilful hermeneutic injustice (Pohlhaus, 2012). Moreover, it takes this injustice a step further: The delegitimation of bisexuality requires the acknowledgement of bisexuality as a category, yet purposely upholds negative views against those who identify with that category, thus becoming a form of violence as (such as microaggression, see Botswick & Hequembourg, 2014). This is also referred to as “the politics of delegitimization” (Erickson-Schroth & Mitchell, 2009, p. 298), and it erases any positive associations of bisexuality with stability, undermines its validation, and reduces its visibility.

The discursive treatment of bisexuality can arguably be viewed as a form of epistemic violence, through the intentional or unintentional refusal to allow bisexual individuals to have a voice and to have their experiences heard (Dotson, 2011; Fricker, 2007). The epistemic erasure of bisexuality manages to uphold binegative attitudes and beliefs, which in turn can unwittingly be internalised by bisexual individuals (Frost & Meyer, 2009). Likewise, through the imposition of binegative values onto bisexual experience, bisexual individuals suffer from symbolic violence (Monro, 2015), which can ultimately lead to mental, physical, and sexual health issues (Barker et al., 2012). McLean (2018) argues that the implications of living invisible lives are detrimental, and that significant change is required to break the cycle of marginalisation due to epistemic and interpersonal erasure:

Poorer rates of health, as well as substantially lower levels of identity disclosure, are significant contributors to the isolation of bisexual people. Given these things, finding supportive sexual minority communities is vital to developing a positive bisexual identity, and connections with

other bisexual people in particular provides support to those who are socially isolated. Increased visibility and greater legitimacy of bisexuality in society is key if bisexual people are to find supportive bisexual individuals and communities.

(McLean, 2018, pp. 88–89)

Conclusion

With the emergence of sexual medicalisation, Western society built itself around a dichotomous structure of sex, sexuality, and gender. This discursive categorisation of identities led to an ongoing struggle for legitimisation and sociopolitical rights. Bisexuality has been caught in the monosexual fray, suffering from an epistemic injustice that renders this sexual identity invisible, unseen, and disregarded. This epistemic injustice has both academic and interpersonal ramifications, and the mechanisms of erasure and delegitimisation position bisexuality in an uncomfortable place. Compulsory heterosexuality and the monosexual divide ensure that plurisexual individuals question the legitimacy of their own experiences. Being placed on the margins, or in between the binaries, bisexual individuals can suffer from stigmatisation, discrimination, and subsequent mental health issues. Bisexual voices need to be heard, and bisexual stories need to be listened to, in order to undo the injustice faced by bisexuality – allowing it to flourish into an autonomous sexual identity, and an equally autonomous field of sexual scholarship.

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