5

BETWEEN VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE

ENI and the Building of the African Petroleumscape

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In 1955, the Italian national hydrocarbon agency Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) launched what the coordinator of ENI's activities in North and West Africa later described as its "grande disegno africano," the company's exploratory and commercial expansion into the African continent.¹ Despite Italy's colonial past, ENI managed to establish itself as a seemingly neutral actor and, within ten years, it entered the oil market of twenty-five newly founded African countries—including the former Italian colonies and many newly independent countries of the sub-Saharan region. Through diplomacy, advertising, and the construction of material artifacts such as refineries, pipelines, motels, and gas stations, ENI (or "ENI" as it was renamed after privatization in the 1990s) developed an incremental network of more and less visible lines and nodes through which oil was extracted, transported, refined, and commercialized.

In order to understand the impact of the oil industry on spatial and social realities, we need to consider, as suggested by this volume, the entire petroleumscape: "the layered physical and social landscape" created by petrocapiatalism.² The Lefebvrian triad of represented, material, and experienced spaces linked by the notion of the petroleumscape is particularly useful as a way of questioning the relationship between the spatial and the propagandistic operations of ENI and the lived experience of the infrastructural artifacts built by its subsidiaries.³ Adopting this holistic approach, this chapter interrogates actors, typologies, spaces, and scales often neglected by architectural historians, and combines the study of the artifacts' material presence with an analysis of how they have been represented and appropriated.

Oil infrastructures have played a key role in defining the dynamics and aesthetics of petrocapiatalism. In *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space*, Keller Easterling compares infrastructures to the medium of Marshall McLuhan's famous expression: "the medium is the message." Following McLuhan's suggestion, this chapter considers ENI's oil infrastructures as both messages and media in order to reveal what they are "doing" beyond what they are "saying."⁴ In other words, it reads the difference between the "declared intent" and the "underlying disposition" of gas stations, refineries, and pipelines disseminated by ENI across the African continent.⁵

In postcolonial Africa, gas stations and motels might convey a sense of freedom, refineries might evoke a narrative of national self-reliance, but what was ENI's intention when they designed and constructed them? Were they, as claimed by ENI, decolonizing tools enhancing energy independence or rather instruments to establish a neocolonial petrol-based empire? These questions have no simple answers, but by examining spatial, architectural, and aesthetic aspects of ENI's projects, their "dispositions," and the multiple ways in which they were communicated, this chapter explores the unspoken territorial and social vision that the Italian company pursued on the African continent and the consequences of their materialization. This chapter offers an alternative to the official narrative of the pioneering and developmental mission proposed by ENI in Italy and abroad. It first describes ENI's role in the Italian postwar context. It then traces ENI's African expansion through three projects, representing the different phases of ENI's oil supply chain: production, circulation, and commercialization. The three projects are the Tema refinery in Ghana, the Tanzania-Zambia Mafuta (TAZAMA) oil pipeline linking Zambia and Tanzania, and Agip (originally the acronym for Agenzia Generale Italiana Petroli) service stations and motels (especially the Agip Motel of Dar es Salaam). In order to understand the role played by these infrastructures within ENI's broader expansionist project, I consider their material and spatial impact, but also how they have been represented and narrated, mostly by ENI and its local partners—the African governments—as well as by African artists and citizens.

The material presence of oil infrastructures ranges from the invisible to the hyper-visible, from the mundane to the spectacular. As we will see, these seemingly neutral objects can play an important role in an oil company's geopolitical and territorial strategies and in the definition of urban and territorial patterns. They can be strategically concealed, located in remote sites, buried underground, enclosed in inaccessible industrial areas, advertised in postcards and stamps, or they can be too ubiquitous to notice. Philosopher Jacques Ranciere argues that the distribution or partition of the sensible, far from being merely phenomenological, is an inherently political gesture.⁶ Exploring how "(in)visibility is mobilized and why"⁷ allows us to read the complex system that goes from refinery to filling station and beyond as a cultural, political, and historical phenomenon. ENI's "disegno," I argue, should not be understood as an assemblage of utilitarian and neutral technological artifacts but as the product of power ideologies entangled with historical, geographic, and social circumstances that radically affected lived experiences and geopolitics.

ENI and Italy

In 1953, the Italian government established ENI to support Italy's economic development through the production and supply of oil and gas. Within a few years, under the guidance of its first president Enrico Mattei, the public holding evolved into a powerful entity that has been described as "a parallel state" capable of influencing Italy's foreign politics and diplomacy.⁸ During the 1960s, thanks to the support of the US through the Marshall Plan, Italy underwent a phase of transformation: a predominantly rural nation was converted to a proto-industrialized and consumption-oriented society. ENI did not restrict its activities to extracting and distributing gas and oil derivatives: it soon expanded its scope into the petrochemical industry, engineering, and construction while Agip, the group's commercial branch, began promoting an oil-consuming lifestyle based on individual mobility.⁹

The image of a seductive and motorized lifestyle proposed by Agip was carefully created through tailored advertising campaigns, including television shows, documentaries, and sponsored appearances of Agip gas stations in Italian movies.¹⁰ The company adopted the ideal of individual freedom and automobility to support narratives of national independence. Stopping to fill your car at the Agip “was much more than choosing a brand; it meant choosing Italy and the company that represented the nation.”¹¹

The Agip logo, the six-legged fire-spitting dog, became a familiar presence across the Italian landscape.¹² The mythological animal combined the power of the fire-spitting

FIGURE 5.1 ENI's industrial and commercial facilities distribution in Italy in 1959. The map shows the locations of multiple refineries, petrochemical and chemical plants, mechanical factories, power plants, hydrocarbon deposits, gas bottling plants, offices, laboratories, and gas stations. *Source:* ENI Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, Relazioni e Bilancio al 30 Aprile 1960, ENI Historical Archive.

dragon and the devotion of the dog to symbolize the power of Agip gasoline and its reliability. Celebrated by Agip's motto, the "six-legged dog, loyal friend of the four-wheeled man," the yellow sign accompanied Italian drivers across the pENInsula making them feel at home on the go (Figures 5.1–5.3).¹³

FIGURE 5.2 An Agip gas station along the Italian Highway. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

FIGURE 5.3 Agip Motel in Montalto di Castro, Italy. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

Architecture was one of the main instruments of ENI's propaganda. During the 1950s, Enrico Mattei invited the most prominent Italian architects and designers to envision its headquarters, factories, company towns, and filling stations.¹⁴ The goal of the newly designed gas stations, usually associated with a bar, a restaurant, and a shop for Agip products, was to be recognizable and to invite the customers to stop, relax, and consume. The elegant and sober corporate design transformed the mundane activity of fueling the car into an aesthetic experience.

To complement the distribution network, Agip implemented Italy's first chain of motels. These Italian versions of an American typology, reinterpreted as small suburban motor-hotels, were located along the highways and main roads in proximity to urban areas and tourist attractions and offered relatively cheap accommodation to motorists, tourists, and truck drivers. In 1962, the *Architectural Review* described Agip's corporate image as the "public face of an Italian economic miracle." The article compared Agip's house style to the work of renowned designers hired by the Olivetti and Braun companies and explained its success in the masterly play of subtle variations and alternative compositions of basic elements. The author concludes that "entering a highly competitive field later than its rivals, Agip has established itself by offering a better service than the other companies, better in the double sense of being more comprehensive and better presented" (Figures 5.2 and 5.3).¹⁵

The "Grande Disegno Africano"

ENI's initial attempts to find oil within Italy were partially successful, but not sufficient to satisfy the demand resulting from the rapid industrialization of the Po Plain (see Geroldi and Pessina, this volume). Frustrated by the poor hydrocarbon discoveries on the Italian territory and by the constraints on crude oil import conditions imposed by the US and the international oil cartel of the so-called "Seven Sisters,"¹⁶ in 1955 ENI's president Enrico Mattei launched what was later described as the "grande disegno africano," which can be translated as the "big African project" or "big African scheme." Through its African expansion, ENI expected to discover rich oil deposits to supply Italian factories and enter new and rapidly growing markets for Agip's refined products.

Between 1914 and 1943, Italy had a substantial colonial presence in Africa with colonies in Eritrea, Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya. After World War II, it hoped to regain control of its former possession. The national neocolonial ambition was precluded by the official denial of the UN, which forced Italy to adjust its geopolitical attitude.¹⁷ The denial of the UN led to the strategic adoption of an "anticolonial" position in support of African leaders' struggle for independence and against their former colonial masters. In those years, after decades of colonialism and centuries of exploitation, independence movements were reaching the point of negotiating their formal independence from France, Britain, and Belgium. ENI's parallel diplomacy understood the decolonization of Africa as a moment of possibility in which global power relations and alliances could be redefined, but also as the right moment for Italy to regain access to Africa's wealth and emancipate itself from the international oil lobby.¹⁸ Italy's access point to Africa's postcolonial politics was the notion of "development," a Western-forged notion that, since the late colonial era, became the primary aspiration of independent African states. The importance of fossil fuels to activate—both literally and metaphorically—the engine of development was clear to both African leaders and to ENI.

In the draft of a speech to give in Tunis in 1961, ENI's president Enrico Mattei stated:

I am here to (...) help you in the fight against underdevelopment.

I do not only believe in decolonization for moral reasons of human dignity but for economic and productivity reasons too.

Before all this, I had to decolonize Italy because many sectors of the Italian economy were colonized (...). Colonialism is not only political; it is first and foremost economic; the colonial condition is given when the infrastructure to transform raw materials are missing and when the demand and supply of a fundamental resource are defined by a hegemonic power (...)

(...) I offer parity, co-management, the education of a technological elite that will make you economic subject, rather than the object or passive receiver of a foreign initiative.¹⁹

ENI's president underlined the economic and material aspect of imperial domination and depicted both Italy and newly independent African countries as victims of the economic colonialism of the oil cartel. By providing "missing infrastructures," such as refineries, pipelines, and gas stations, he offered to help break this energy dependence and spur self-reliance (Figure 5.4). All this, with better conditions than oil multinationals would offer, thanks to the support of the Italian government.

Playing the dual role of the caring national agency and the profit-oriented multinational, ENI's operations in Africa fluctuated between foreign investment and cooperation aid. This commercial and diplomatic strategy granted ENI a friendly image and paved its economic penetration with paternalistic good intentions. What ENI offered was actually a paradoxical "oil-based energy independence" sold as a key step toward development and modernization.

The vision of the "grande disegno africano" materialized into an incremental network of pipes and nodes that would guarantee ENI's presence in a growing number of African countries. Despite ENI's "anticolonial" stance, its first African agreements were concluded with former Italian colonies: with Eritrea in 1956 and with Ethiopia and Somalia in 1958. In 1957, ENI signed its first contract with Egypt and, in 1959, in partnership with local governments, it established Agip Casablanca and Agip Tunis. Contracts followed in the next few years to form Agip Congo, Agip Ghana, Agip Tanzania, Agip Zambia, and many others. Within ten years, ENI and its engineering subsidiary (Società Nazionale Metanodotti [SNAM] Progetti) built six refineries (in Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia, Tanzania, Congo, and Zambia) and fifteen coastal deposits from which Agip local branches were distributing gas and gasoline through over 1,300 gas stations in over twenty-five countries.²⁰ The administration of ENI in Africa was organized into four geographic sectors: North Africa was managed from ENI's headquarters in Rome, East Africa from Nairobi, West Africa from Accra, and Central Africa from Brazzaville.²¹ Here, and in many other capital cities of newly founded African states, ENI acquired prestigious representative buildings in prominent positions to host its regional and national headquarters. Often, ENI shared these spaces with other Italian companies (mainly FIAT, the Italian car manufacturer), Italian schools, and cultural centers. In Kampala, Uganda, ENI shared space with the Italian embassy. This administrative structure was supported by a more widespread network of local Agip offices, where ENI's employees studied the local market, made geological surveys, and continuously planned the growth of ENI's empire. This diffuse territorial presence made ENI's "parallel diplomacy" more present and locally engaged than Italy's official diplomacy.²²

FIGURE 5.4 ENI's activity in Africa in 1968. The map shows the countries where ENI's subsidiaries were active in extracting, refining, and distributing petroleum products, in searching for uranium, and in the engineering and construction of pipelines and other industrial plants. ENI n.3, 1968. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

The Tema Refinery, Ghana, 1960–1963

In 1957, Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to achieve political independence. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, was a committed leftist, anti-imperialist, and Pan-Africanist, but also a skillful diplomat able, in the context of the cold war, to gain

foreign aid and investments from both the capitalist and communist blocs.²³ He firmly believed that economic independence would be achieved through the development of the industrial sector and radical social modernization. His ambition took shape in the Volta River Project, a territorial infrastructural scheme that consisted of a huge hydroelectric dam and a new industrial area served by an international maritime port in Tema, a former fishing village located a few kilometers from the capital city, Accra. Nkrumah's developmental narratives depicted the Akosombo dam and the Tema port as a step toward self-reliance: they were expected to satisfy the energy requirements of a flourishing industrial sector and provide the basic infrastructures to independently process Ghana's natural resources, which in the colonial era had been exported as raw material and manufactured abroad. The Tema industrial area hosted factories for the processing of timber, bauxite, cocoa, and crude oil (Figure 5.5).

The rapid development of postcolonial Ghana inspired many African leaders and showcased Africa's development potential. Envisioning multiple benefits of participating in Ghana's economic growth, Enrico Mattei decided to start investing in the country. In 1960, ENI registered Agip's local branch as the Ghanaian Italian Petroleum Company (GHAIP), and in the following year, proposed to President Nkrumah that ENI's engineering department build Ghana's first refinery. After ENI's proposal was made public, other oil multinationals rose up against this initiative. Mobil, the American oil multinational, made a counter offer, but after evaluating both proposals, the Ghanaian government assigned the construction to SNAM Progetti, ENI's engineering subsidiary, which offered better conditions and more space to local actors. The agreement between ENI and the Ghanaian authorities stated that GHAIP would run and own the refinery for ten years, after which the Ghanaian government would get 50 percent of its shares. To ensure control over the plant's operation, the Ghanaian government would own the pipeline connecting the tanker harbor to the refinery, through which crude oil was delivered.²⁴

One of ENI's newsreels recorded the opening ceremony of the refinery, which was inaugurated in 1963 in the presence of the Ghanaian and Italian authorities, local chiefs (owners of the land on which the plant stands), and the first group of GHAIP workers.²⁵ During his speech, President Nkrumah declared: "Since we reached independence we wanted Ghana to be a modern industrialized state. Only in this way could we survive as an independent nation. The oil-product made in Ghana will reduce our dependence on the import of energy resources."²⁶ Thanks to the new plant, Ghana could negotiate and buy crude directly from oil-producing countries and independent producers (like ENI) instead of importing refined products at the fixed prices imposed by the oil cartel. The shared struggle for energy independence united the interests of ENI, Ghana, and many newly independent nations. During the 1960s, ENI and other oil companies successfully marketed refineries as a step toward energy self-reliance, to the point that in 1963 thirteen new plants were under construction across the continent.²⁷

The GHAIP facilities consisted of two parts: the campus and the plant itself. The most representative space of the campus, situated along the main access road, was a green and tidy compound where a composition of low, white modernist buildings hosted the offices, canteen, clinic, and laboratory. Behind the campus, the plant was organized as an ordered labyrinth of pipes, conduits, machinery, and tanks from which emerged the distillation tower.

The plant started operating as a tolling refinery, processing crude oil for third parties who paid a fee for the service. The oil companies could ship their tankers filled with crude to the port of Tema, where the oil would enter the refinery through the state-controlled

FIGURE 5.5 Tema, new town and industrial area master plan. Source: David Hilling, "Tema—The Geography of a New Port," *Geography* 51, no. 2 (1966): 111–25.

pipeline, and once processed, the by-products could be stored or loaded on gas or fuel trucks and distributed in Ghana and in neighboring countries.²⁸ Like other ambitious facilities built during the Nkrumah era, the refinery's capacity was based on expected domestic demands for fossil fuel that did not grow as rapidly as anticipated. Consequently, the refinery only operated intermittently.²⁹

After the contract was signed, in 1961, ENI started recruiting a local workforce. The selection process led to the employment of around one hundred Ghanaians with different levels of education and experience. Before the opening of the refinery, the technical staff with responsible positions were sent to Italy for training in ENI's factories, refineries, and laboratories.

GHAIP workers were offered a series of benefits: they and their close families could enjoy the company's medical facilities, they were offered favorable loans to buy Italian cars, and they had the right to a monthly allotment of free gasoline. GHAIP employees were also assigned flats in the newly developed settlement of Tema, just a few hundred meters from the plant.³⁰

The master plan for the new town was developed by the Greek firm Doxiadis Associates to accommodate the workers of the industrial areas and port of Tema (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). Interlocking communities or neighborhoods were divided into low-, middle-, and high-income levels. The different communities were characterized by different densities and housing typologies, all based on the needs of the nuclear family supported by one—usually male—wage laborer employed at the industrial park.³¹ Doxiadis's approach to planning complemented Nkrumah's desire to modernize all aspects of Ghanaian society and ENI's desire to transform citizens into consumers.

During the construction of the refinery and the first decade of joint operation, ENI's geologists were searching for potential deposits in Ghana and offshore, while GHAIP consolidated a growing distribution network. Even though the Italo-Ghanaian company entered a market sector where other oil multinationals were already established, it benefited from the positive image gained by constructing the refinery. Through its paternalistic politics and the advantageous conditions of its contracts, ENI managed to convey the image of a friendly public company of a Western but neutral country that supported Ghana's struggle for independence.³² In reality, large-scale infrastructures like the GHAIP refinery operated as modern Trojan horses, allowing the company to access new territories while the plant's constant requirement of maintenance and improvement generated a new dependence on

FIGURE 5.6 Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah and ENI's representatives at the opening ceremony of the Tema refinery. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

FIGURE 5.7 A page from the Ghanaian government publication *Accra-Tema in Pictures*. Accra, Ghana: Advanced Press Ltd., 1969. Source: Balme Library, University of Ghana.

ENI's skills and spare parts, as the long-lasting cooperation between ENI and the Ghanaian government demonstrated.

Another tool for ENI's successful penetration of the Ghanaian market was advertising. ENI's activity in Ghana was celebrated in 1974 with the company's publication of a calendar featuring a series of pictures taken by James Barnor, a Ghanaian photographer and photojournalist. Barnor collaborated with various Ghanaian and British newspapers and with the influential South African anti-apartheid magazine *Drum*. For the calendar, which was distributed to GHAIP clients, Barnor portrayed elegantly dressed women surrealistically posing in front of Agip barrels and gas tankers. The minimal compositions of the black-and-white images of shiny clean oil barrels are highly aestheticized. Throughout this set of pictures, oil is never visible but always present. Taking a synecdochic approach, Barnor creatively photographed oil without directly showing it, while the emancipated, fashionable female models suggest oil's broader "economic and social benefits."³³ Barnor depicted the promise of wealth and modernity that access to oil was expected to make available to Ghanaian citizens and showed that oil not only embodied Nkrumah's vision of industrialization and self-reliance, it also carried expectations of individual freedom. Like Ross Barrett and Daniel Worden observe in their volume *Oil Culture*, such representations fetishize oil's value as a magical substance able to bring development and freedom while detaching it from dirt and labor (the latter appears in one of the pictures as a blurry presence in the figure of a tanker driver). Images like the ones Barnor produced for Agip, particularly popular in the 1960s, reflected the shared enthusiasm for oil power and played a key role in the expansion of global "petrocapitalism" and its aesthetic (Figures 5.8 and 5.9).³⁴

FIGURE 5.8 Agip Ghana Calendar, 1974. Model with oil drums. Picture: James Barnor. Courtesy of the artist and October Gallery, London.

FIGURE 5.9 Agip Ghana Calendar, 1974. Model with Tank and Driver. Picture: James Barnor. Courtesy of the artist and October Gallery, London.

The “Freedom Pipeline”: Zambia and Tanzania, 1966–1968

The TAZAMA³⁵ Pipeline is probably the most ambitious of ENI’s African projects, not only because of its size (at 1,700 km, it was the longest African oil pipeline at the time), but also for its geopolitical relevance (Figures 5.10 and 5.11). In 1966, the Zambian government invited ENI—which had gained a reputation as a reliable oil multinational by constructing refineries in Ghana, Morocco, Tanzania, and Tunisia—to present a proposal for the construction of a pipeline connecting the Zambian Copperbelt with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.

Zambia, known as Northern Rhodesia at the time of British rule, was facing an oil crisis as a consequence of the embargo the UN imposed on Southern Rhodesia after its white

FIGURE 5.10 *Drum East Africa* article about the Zambian oil crisis and the oil lift, March 1966. Source: British Library.

FIGURE 5.11 SNAM Progetti's brochure of the TAZAMA pipeline. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive. Location: Relazioni esterne, b.155 f.2FC0.

minority's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Zambia was the world's third-largest copper producer, and its highly specialized economy was vulnerable to copper price fluctuations and depended on the availability of fossil fuels to support mining complexes. During the years of colonial domination, coal, oil, and copper were shipped through Southern Rhodesia and the closure of the Zambia-Rhodesia border left Zambia almost completely isolated and surrounded by white-controlled territories. The oil crisis forced the landlocked country to adopt severe oil rationing, only partially eased when British, American, and Canadian air forces organized an airlift to bring oil in from Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.³⁶

ENI's pipeline proposal unexpectedly defeated the proposal made by the British "London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Company" (LONRHO), the industrial partner of the two

Rhodesias during the colonial era. A 1969 *Financial Times* article, entitled “Italian penetration of the Zambian economy,” explains:

The ascendancy which has been gained by Italian interests in Zambia in recent years has caused considerable heart-burning among advocates of British interest who have tended to regard Zambia as a traditional market because of its former British connections.

The reasons for this development are two-fold: The first is that the Zambians regard the Italians as politically more acceptable than the British in view of their lack of a colonial past in Central or Southern Africa.

Going to Italy in preference to Britain is also helpful in demonstrating to the public that the new independent Government is no longer tied to Britain’s apron strings. Such a demonstration is always politically popular.

But there is a second reason which is equally valid and perhaps in the long run more important. In whatever sphere the Italians have come in they have done an efficient job at reasonable prices and rates of interest with a minimum of bureaucratic red tape hold-ups.³⁷

The pipeline contract indeed involved SNAM Progetti, ENI engineering subsidiary, as the engineering company and a consortium of Italian banks as funding institutions granting a soft terms loan to the Zambian government payable in fifteen years. This advantageous package was made possible by ENI’s legal status as a state-owned company.

The 8.5-inch looped pipeline with its five pumping stations delivered the first shipment of refined products on September 2, 1968, thirteen months after the beginning of construction. The refined liquid had departed from the TIPER (Tanzanian and Italian Petroleum Refining Company Limited) refinery of Dar es Salaam, built by ENI and managed in partnership with the Tanzanian government, thirty days earlier. Owner and manager of the pipeline was the newly established TAZAMA Authority Ltd., a joint venture between the Zambian and Tanzanian governments, but ENI could still control the flow of diesel fuel departing from Dar es Salaam.

The pipeline carried refined oil products until 1975 when, based on the trust earned from the pipeline construction, the ENI group was appointed to build Zambia’s first refinery. After the construction of the Zambian refinery, SNAM Progetti was contracted to modify the pipeline to allow the flow of crude oil and convert the pumping stations’ engines to the new propellant. In the following years, SNAM was asked to increase the pipeline capacity with an additional outside pipe of 769 km; two pumping stations were also added and the existing ones were provided with additional engines.³⁸

The pipeline and the refinery were perceived by Zambians as an important step toward real economic and energy independence. Even though the main goal of the pipeline was to supply fossil fuels to the mining industry of the Copperbelt, the postcolonial regime inserted the new infrastructure into narratives of nation-building, Pan-African cooperation, and decolonization in relation to the white-controlled south and the emancipation from colonial contractors. The new geography defined by the pipeline did indeed alter the territorial structure that was subjecting Zambia to southern Africa, but it reproduced a network based on resource extraction and control where new foreign powers like ENI would play a central role.

In a letter to one of his collaborators, Marcello Boldrini, ENI's president after Mattei's death in 1962, described the project as "an operation that opens new possibility for the Italian industry and marks a material and long-lasting presence in a territory, that of East Africa, beyond which Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa represent the 'Hercules pillars' of the free Occident."³⁹ The pipeline embodied ENI's strategy of progressive territorial conquest through "material and long-lasting" infrastructural artifacts justified as a "decolonizing" mission in support of independent governments and based on the belief that modernity and development were a direct consequence of easy access to oil (Figures 5.12 and 5.13).

In 1968, the construction of the pipeline was epically narrated in a video documentary *De l'océan indien au coeur de l'Afrique: L'oléoduc Dar es Salaam–Ndola* (*From the Indian Ocean to the heart of Africa: The oil pipeline Dar es Salaam–Ndola*), directed by Raoul Brunlinger for SNAM Progetti.⁴⁰ This was one of many industrial documentaries that ENI commissioned from well-known directors to shape the company's public image and communicate its often invisible work in a highly aestheticized manner. ENI documentaries directed by Bernardo Bertolucci, Gilbert Bovay, Joris Ivens, and many others appeared at international industrial film festivals and often screened (in shortened versions) on Italian TV and in movie theaters.⁴¹

Brunlinger's film follows the 45,000 tons of steel pipes from their arrival in Dar es Salaam to the construction site of the terminal tank in the Zambian Copperbelt. The steel pipes, through which oil normally flows unseen, serve as the main character of the movie, which shows how the laying of the pipes progresses, despite technical and contextual difficulties, thanks to the hard work of Italian, Zambian, and Tanzanian workers. The narration underlines the workers' effective cooperation, the advanced technological means offered by SNAM, and simultaneously, the creative solutions deployed to overcome Tanzania's

FIGURE 5.12 Construction of the TAZAMA pipeline, Tanzania 1966. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

topographic complexity. The visualization of oil-related labor here, as in other ENI's neo-realist documentaries, is showcased to honor workers' epic endeavor to rescue Zambia from its energy isolation. Indeed, the documentary's voice-over proudly announces that despite multiple difficulties, the construction of Africa's longest pipeline was heroically achieved ahead of schedule because "the needs of modern life do not allow delay."⁴² "From the Indian Ocean to the heart of Africa" displays what Georgiana Banita defines as "naïve petro-progressivism," through which ENI depicted itself as a godsend satisfying Zambia's craving for energy independence. The pipeline was primarily intended to serve the company's profit and expansion.⁴³

Agip Architecture on Africa's Roads in the 1960s and 1970s

With the end of formal colonialism and of urban and territorial racial segregation measures, Africans regained freedom of movement. After many years of colonial segregation, mobility and unrestrained flows were perceived as an important part of decolonization. This newly achieved freedom went hand in hand with continental, regional, and national developmental policies, aiming, through the construction of roads and highways, to foster trade, tourism, and Pan-African integration.⁴⁴ But circulation and automobility required another kind of oil-related infrastructure: gas stations. Despite their colorful and decorated architecture, these small-scale roadside facilities, more mundane than other oil infrastructures, tend to escape both everyday and scholarly attention. Nonetheless, they played a fundamental role in increasing mobility and expanding ENI's empire.

In the African landscape, Agip gas stations not only advertised ENI's refined products, they also served as quasi-military outposts marking ENI's "conquered territories" and granting the company a widespread and enduring territorial presence. Agip was in charge of this last segment of the oil supply chain, the most visible and recognizable of the company. As an indication of its importance, Enrico Mattei decided to retain the presidency of Agip and direct control of its commercial activities, which he considered the "facade of the group."⁴⁵

In the early 1960s, the "facade of the group" made its appearance along the expanding road network of sub-Saharan Africa. In East Africa, the Agip logo became so well known that in his 1977 novel *Petals of Blood*, Kenyan novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o included a scene where boys and girls of Ilmorog village sit along the road and playfully "spell out

FIGURE 5.14 Agip service station in the Republic of the Congo, 1967. Source: ENI Historical Archive.

FIGURE 5.15 Agip Italian advertising campaign showing various Agip activities in Africa, including a gas station in Ibadan, Nigeria. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

LONRHO, SHELL, ESSO, TOTAL, Agip beside the word DANGER on the side belly of the tankers.”⁴⁶ Ngugi’s novel offers a nuanced perspective on infrastructural development in early postcolonial Kenya and across the African continent. While he criticizes the neocolonial attitude of international capital and the collusion of the postcolonial state, he also reminds us, through the joyful song of Ilmorog’s children, that infrastructures have a generative social and cultural power. ENI and other oil companies understood this power and invested in infrastructures to promote travel, leisure, and consumption.⁴⁷

Agip’s African gas stations were based on the prototypes “59” and “61” (Figures 5.2 and 5.14) designed by ENI’s internal engineering office (the Agip Ufficio tecnico) and were

composed of one or more pumps and a small building hosting the gas station manager's office, a toilet, and a store for Agip lubricants and bottled gas. In the bigger service stations, these standard elements could be integrated with a snack bar and a mechanical workshop offering technical support and a car washing service. Despite the specificities of the different contexts, all stations were made of basic standardized elements united under the steel projecting roof with the Agip sign (translated in Aramaic or Arabic where needed) and by the omnipresent six-legged dog logo. The metal structure of the canopy, the minimal modular construction of the building, and the pumps themselves gave the gas stations the image of a perfectly functioning engine.

In the African landscape, Agip stations emerged as enclaves where every detail was designed and produced in Italy, including the pumps, workers' uniforms, the yellow furniture of the snack bar, and the trucks delivering the refined products. Agip's Italian advertising campaigns often played with the contrast between the informal activities happening along African roads and the modern, controlled, and tidy space of the service station. Like Foucauldian heterotopias of compensation, the stations were depicted as "perfect, meticulous and well arranged" "other spaces" juxtaposed with the "disordered, ill-conceived" outside⁴⁸ (Figures 5.14 and 5.15). These images of Agip African facilities produced by ENI's photographers to document and advertise the company achievements show how the story of ENI's involvement in postcolonial Africa is also a story of "the familiar" versus "the strange," through which the first one defines itself in relation to the latter, serving as the "other."⁴⁹ For postwar Italy, a poor but industrializing country recovering from defeat in World War II, Africa was not only a geographical entity, but also a means for Italy to develop its own Western identity in opposition to an unknown and schematized "other"—represented by African citizens depicted in their traditional costumes and activities. Making Africa the "other" allowed Italy—despite its poverty relative to countries like France, Germany, and the US⁵⁰—to represent itself as a modern and developed country at the heart of the hegemonic cultural imaginary of the West.⁵¹

Aiming at keeping people on the road and increasing circulation and consumption, in Italy ENI built a chain of over forty Agip motels.⁵² Only a few were built outside Italy. Some motels operated as Agip showcases in prominent urban areas like those of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, others were strategically located at relevant highway intersections like in Mbarara, Uganda, or in proximity to ENI's extraction or refining sites, like in Mohammedia, Morocco.⁵³ The Motel Agip of Dar es Salaam was inaugurated in 1964, the year of the birth of independent Tanzania as the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.⁵⁴ The motel was located in the center of the city, between the commercial neighborhood or Indian Bazaar and the administrative district originally planned as the German colonial quarter. The structure hosted the motel itself, a large service station offering full mechanical service, and a showroom for FIAT, the Italian automobile manufacturer (Figures 5.16 and 5.17).

In 1970, ENI commissioned Lionello Massobrio to film the development of Africa's local tourism and increased automobility. In "Africa on the Road," the director collected a series of staged episodes that illustrate the experiences of various African motel customers: an elegantly dressed family with two kids on a road trip to Kenya's national parks, a young couple on a romantic honeymoon in North Africa, and a businessman driving his car from the Tanzanian countryside to the busy city of Dar es Salaam. In Dar es Salaam, the businessman parks his car at the gas station where a diligent group of Agip workers takes care of his vehicle while he checks in to the motel. In the following scene, the hotel's concierge

FIGURE 5.16 A postcard featuring the motel Agip and the Agip service station in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, ca. 1970. *Source:* delcampe.net.

FIGURE 5.17 Workers at the Agip service station in Dar es Salaam. In the background is the Agip Motel. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, ca. 1974. *Source:* ENI Historical Archive.

collects the car from the gas station, drives up the ramp and parks the car in front of the motel entrance so that on the following day the businessman can quickly leave the building and proceed with his busy schedule.⁵⁵

The car-oriented architecture of the motel and its location shaped its clientele, which consisted mainly of white settlers driving to the city and to “the Agip” for short stays in the capital, foreign workers of nongovernmental organizations and international companies who stayed as long-term motel guests, and members of the government who worked in the proximity and drove to “the Agip” for business lunches and meetings.⁵⁶ On the motel’s opening day, the Tanzanian government-owned newspaper *The Nationalist* reported that “from the car showroom and petrol station at ground level to the peaceful roof garden the motel is every inch modern,” underlining the role that automobility played in Tanzanians’ perception of modernity.⁵⁷ Indeed, to the Tanzanian members of the upper class who could afford it, automobility came to symbolize a “drive into the modern.”⁵⁸ Cruising up the concrete ramp of the motel and enjoying their meal at “the Agip” restaurant, with its direct view of the parking lot, offered a stage to perform their newly achieved aspirations. Beyond their technical functioning indeed, AGIP roadside facilities operated “on the level of fantasy and desire” and stimulated a “deeply affectual relation” that “is an important part of their political effect”⁵⁹ and of the successful expansion of the petroleumscape.

The Dar es Salaam motel was one of over thirty motels built by Agip as a variation of motel prototype “59” developed by Agip’s in-house design office.⁶⁰ Unlike the site-specific, singularly crafted buildings of the early 1950s, these standardized typologies were developed in order to optimize the design and construction process and to improve the company’s marketing performance, as suggested by studies of branding recognition and consumer trust. Through prototyping and prefabrication, Agip technicians sought to increase control over construction time, costs, and quality and to minimize accidents caused by unskilled workers and extreme atmospheric conditions. The need to control processes despite ENI’s intercontinental expansion affected construction processes as well as Agip building aesthetics.

In the Tanzanian postcolonial context, like in other newly independent countries, Agip’s sober modernist architecture was welcomed as a sign of newness and modernity. For its ability to materialize a visual rupture with the colonial past, modern architecture became the preferred style of independent Tanzania, through which Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first president, sought to develop a new and inclusive national identity. Furthermore, as proudly underlined by the *The Nationalist* article on the Agip Motel, the new facility was a sign that Tanzania was increasingly attracting foreign tourists and investors.⁶¹

Thanks to ENI’s diplomatic and propagandistic efforts, Agip’s modernist architecture and its aesthetic principles broadly circulated along its extensive supply chain and became a common presence in the African landscape. For this reason, the Italian oil company should be considered one of the main actors responsible for the globalization of the “aesthetic regime of modernism.”⁶² Shifting the focus from accounts of a few well-known master architects (often of Western origins) designing institutional buildings of newly independent states to the work of a national and multinational oil company, global modernism can be seen as a complex phenomenon entangled with the geopolitical and “geo-economical” dynamics of nation-building, development, and petrocapi-talism.

Conclusion

The final goal of the “grande disegno africano” was to broaden ENI’s market and acquire rights for oil exploration in an ever-growing number of territories in order to sustain Italy’s industrial development. Looking at ENI’s empire from its “margins” and reading its operations “against the grain” reveals a series of inconsistencies in ENI’s narratives and exposes the violence and the impact of its seemingly neutral operations on African territories and societies.

The end of Africa’s formal colonization offered the precondition for ENI’s penetration that was achieved thanks to diplomatic, propagandistic, and infrastructural effort. ENI’s narratives hinged on promises of modernity and development and on the reputation of the Italian company as a benevolent national agency different from rapacious and profit-oriented oil multinationals. Indeed, unlike other private oil companies, ENI offered advantageous contracts, soft terms loans, and 50-50 partnerships with local governments, paving its expansion with paternalistic good intentions.

Infrastructures such as refineries, pipelines, and gas stations were fundamental to ensure oil production, circulation, and commercialization, but unlike their Italian counterparts, ENI’s infrastructures in the African context operated as quasi-military outposts for its logistic expansion. The same infrastructures were successfully marketed by ENI’s propaganda as tools to transcend colonial dependencies and achieve energy independence at the national level and as a means of acquiring individual modernity and freedom. With the support of local governments, ENI reshaped the African territory and—by promoting an oil-based lifestyle—affected people’s everyday lives and imaginaries, contributing to the flourishing of an oil-based consumerist civilization.

Notes

- 1 Giuseppe Accorinti, *Quando Mattei era l'impresa energetica io c'ero*, 3rd ed. (Matelica: Hacca, 2008), 160.
- 2 The notion of the petroleumscape was coined by Carola Hein. Carola Hein, “Oil Spaces: The Global Petroleumscape in the Rotterdam/The Hague Area,” *Journal of Urban History* 44, no. 5 (September 2018): 887–929, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144217752460>; Carola Hein and Mohammad Sedighi, “Iran’s Global Petroleumscape: The Role of Oil in Shaping Khuzestan and Tehran,” *Architectural Theory Review* 21, no. 3 (September 2016): 349–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13264826.2018.1379110>.
- 3 Hein, “Oil Spaces.”
- 4 Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space* (London: Verso, 2014), 13.
- 5 Ibid., 13.
- 6 Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006).
- 7 Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42, no. 1 (2013): 327–43, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522>.
- 8 Andrea Greco and Giuseppe Oddo, *Lo Stato parallelo: La prima inchiesta sull'ENI tra politica, servizi segreti, scandali finanziari e nuove guerre. Da Mattei a Renzi* (Milan: Chiarelettere, 2016).
- 9 Elisabetta Bini, *La potente benzina italiana: Guerra Fredda e consumi di massa tra Italia, Stati Uniti e Terzo mondo (1945–1973)* (Roma: Carocci, 2013), 142.
- 10 See, e.g., Dino Risi’s “Il sorpasso,” 1962; Mario Missoroli’s “La bella di Lodi,” 1963.
- 11 Francesca Carnevali, “State Enterprise and Italy’s ‘Economic Miracle’: The Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, 1945–1962,” *Enterprise & Society* 1, no. 2 (June 2000): 249–78, <https://doi.org/10.1093/es/1.2.249>.

- 12 Venturi, Scott Brown and Izenour wrote: “The Italian landscape has always harmonized the vulgar and the Vitruvian: the contorni around the Duomo, the portiere’s laundry across the padrone’s portone, Supercortemaggiore against the Romaneques apse.” “Supercortemaggiore” was the name of Agip gasoline. Its name came from Corte Maggiore, the town where Italian gas deposits were first discovered, while the gasoline was refined in Italy and extracted mainly in Iran, and later also in Egypt and Tunisia. Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972); Carnevali, “Economic Miracle.”
- 13 Author’s translation of Agip’s motto: “Il cane a sei zampe, amico fedele dell’uomo a quattro ruote.”
- 14 Bacciocchi, Baccigalupo and Ratti, Gellner, Mollino, BBPR, and Castiglioni among others. For an account of ENI’s architectural interventions in Italy, see Dorothea Deschermeier, *Impero ENI: l’architettura aziendale e l’urbanistica di Enrico Mattei* (Bologna: Damiani, 2008).
- 15 “The Face of the Miracle,” *Architectural Review* CXXI, no. 783 (May 1962).
- 16 The term “Seven Sisters” (for some, a creation of Enrico Mattei himself) referred to the seven international oil companies forming the “Consortium for Iran” oligopoly that included the Anglo-Iranian Oil company (now BP), Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil California (later Chevron), Gulf Oil, Texaco, Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Esso, Exxon, and now ExxonMobil), and Standard Oil New York.
- 17 Elisabetta Bini, *La potente benzina italiana: Guerra Fredda e consumi di massa tra Italia, Stati Uniti e Terzo mondo (1945–1973)* (Roma: Carocci, 2013), 142.
- 18 ENI strategically supported the leaders of independent states, but also the leaders of independence movements still struggling for decolonization like in the case of Algeria. Bini, *La potente benzina italiana: Guerra Fredda e consumi di massa tra Italia, Stati Uniti e Terzo mondo*.
- 19 Enrico Mattei’s speech, Tunis, 9–10 June 1960. Translated by the author from Italian. Enrico Mattei and Paolo Mieli, *Scritti e discorsi 1945–1962: raccolta integrale dall’archivio storico Eni*, ed. speciale per Eni (Milano: Rizzoli, 2012), 730.
- 20 Daniele Pozzi, *Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei zampe: tecnologia, conoscenza e organizzazione nell’Agip e nell’Eni di Enrico Mattei* (Venezia: Marsilio, 2009).
- 21 Pozzi, *Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei zampe: tecnologia, conoscenza e organizzazione nell’Agip e nell’Eni di Enrico Mattei*; Accorinti, *Quando Mattei era l’impresa energetica io c’ero*.
- 22 Author’s interview with A.M. and M.C. in Accra, Ghana, November 2019.
- 23 Stephan F. Miescher and Dzodzi Tsikata, “Hydro-Power and the Promise of Modernity and Development in Ghana: Comparing the Akosombo and Bui Dam Projects,” *Ghana Studies* 12/13 (2011): 15–53.
- 24 See Ghana Oil Refinery Gh/Praad/RG.7/1/105, Tema Industrial Developement Gh/Praad/RG.7/1/368, Agipt Gh/Praad/RG.7/1/391, Ghaip Gh/Praad/RG.7/1/1840–43. Public Records And Archives Administration Department Accra, Ghana.
- 25 Lavoro italiano in Africa—insediamenti ENI in Congo Belga e Ghana, Cinegiornali C, ENI Historical Archive. “Archivio Storico ENI”, <https://archiviostorico.eni.com/aseni/it/explore/audiovideo/IT-ENI-AV0001-000139?r=search#/search/ghana>, accessed June 19, 2020.
- 26 Gatto Selvatico, Anno IX, N10, 1963.
- 27 B. S. Hoyle, “New Oil Refinery Construction in Africa,” *Geography* 48, no. 2 (1963): 190–94.
- 28 The plant produced gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), diesel fuel, kerosene, and other refined products with a capacity of 28,000 barrels per stream day.
- 29 Interview with Mr. Forson, former employee and managing director of the Tema Refinery (1970–2004), Tema, November 2019.
- 30 Interview with Mr. Addoo, former employee and chief manager of the Tema Refinery, Tema, November 2018.
- 31 Viviana d’Auria, “From Tropical Transitions to Ekistic Experimentation: Doxiadis Associates in Tema, Ghana,” *Positions*, no. 1 (2010): 40–63.
- 32 This perception emerged through various interviews with former workers of the refinery.
- 33 Barrett and Worden, *Oil Culture*, (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 2014): XXV.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 TAZAMA is the acronym of Tanzania Zambia Mafuta (oil in Swahili).
- 36 Andrew Cohen, “Britain and the Breakdown of the Colonial Environment: The Struggle over the Tanzam Oil Pipeline in Zambia,” *Business History Review* 88, no. 4 (2014): 737–59, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680514000749>.

- 37 "Italian Penetration of the Zambian Economy," *The Financial Times*, August 14, 1969.
- 38 Author's interview with Davison Thawethe, managing director of the TAZAMA Pipeline Ltd., Dar es Salaam, August 2019, and ENI Historical Archive, Fondo ENI: Relazioni Esterne, b.155 f.2FC0; Estero, Iniziative industriali, Zambia, b.69 f.1; Estero, Iniziative industriali, Tanzania, b.384 f.1CCD; Estero, Coordinamento regioni estere, Tanzania, b.30 f.12.
- 39 Letter of ENI President M. Boldrini to Stammatti, 7 October 1966: "Nella mia valutazione, si tratta di realizzare un 'opera che, oltre ad essere economicamente valida e ad aprire nuove possibilità al lavoro italiano, costituirà una presenza concreta e duratura nell'ultimo lembo dell'Africa Orientale, oltre al quale, Mozambico, Rhodesia e Sud Africa, rappresentano un po' le Colonne d'Ercole dell'Occidente libero." ENI Historical Archive, Fondo ENI. Presidenza, Presidenza Marcello Boldrini, 143-32E832E8.
- 40 "From the Indian Ocean to the Heart of Africa. The oil pipeline Dar es Salaam – Ndola," Raoul Brunlinger, 1968. ENI Historical Archive, Rome.
- 41 See, for example, Joris Ivens's 1960 documentary *L'Italia non è un paese povero (Italy is Not a Poor Country)*, Gilbert Bovay's *Gli uomini del petrolio (The People of Petroleum)* of 1965 and *Africa, nascita di un continente (Africa: The Birth of a Continent)* of 1968.
- 42 Author's transcription and translation from French from "De l'océan indien au coeur de l'Afrique. L'oléoduc Dar es Salaam – Ndola," Raoul Brunlinger, 1968, ENI Historical Archive, Rome.
- 43 Georgiana Banita, "From Isfahan to Ingolstadt," in *Oil Culture*, eds. Allan Stoekl, Ross Barrett, and Daniel Worden (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 145–68, <https://doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816689682.003.0008>.
- 44 See, for example, the project of the Trans-African Highway promoted in the late 1960s by the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
- 45 Interview with Eng. Ennio Ghellini Sarqenti, Milano, 28 marzo 1987, ENI Historical Archive.
- 46 Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Petals of Blood* (Oxford: Heinemann International Literature and Textbooks, 1986).
- 47 For an in-depth analysis of *Petals of Blood* and road infrastructure development in postcolonial Africa, see Kenny Cupers and Prita Meier, "Infrastructure between Statehood and Selfhood," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 79, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 61–81, <https://doi.org/10.1525/jsh.2020.79.1.61>.
- 48 Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias," in *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory*, ed. Neil Leach (New York: Routledge, 1997), 330–36.
- 49 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003).
- 50 "In 1956, for example, Italy had one car for every 47.4 people, compared to 1 to 3 in the United States, 1 to 11.8 in France and 1 to 20.7 in West Germany." Elisabetta Bini, "Selling Gasoline with a Smile: Gas Station Attendants between the United States, Italy, and the Third World, 1945–1970," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 81 (2012): 69–93.
- 51 Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories, Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
- 52 Accorinti, *Quando Mattei era l'impresa energetica io c'ero*, 36.
- 53 Fernanda De Maio et al., *e169 | EniWay* (Edizioni Engramma, 2019).
- 54 Tanganyika achieved formal independence in 1961.
- 55 Massobrio Lionello, *Africa on the Road/ Al servizio dell'Africa*, 1970, ENI Historical Archive.
- 56 Author's telephone interview with N. M., manager of the motel from 1964 to 1999. August 2019.
- 57 Author's interview with Mr. Mkindi, former employee of the Agip Motel, Dar es Salaam, July 2019.
- 57 Jordan Lane, "Agip Motel Adds Beauty to Dar," *The Nationalist*, July 31, 1964.
- 58 Laura Fair, "Drive-In Socialism: Debating Modernities and Development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania," *American Historical Review* 118, no. 4 (2013): 1077–104.
- 59 Larkin, "Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure."
- 60 Laura Greco and Stefania Mornati, *Architetture Eni in Italia (1953–1962)* (Roma: Gangemi, 2018).
- 61 Lane, "Agip Motel."
- 62 Tom Avermaete, Serhat Karakayali, and Marion Von Osten, *Colonial Modern: Aesthetics of the Past Rebellions for the Future* (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2010).