Introduction

Rethinking white societies in Southern Africa, 1930s–1990s

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White workers and the white underclass are (back) in the spotlight. The emergence and success of right-wing populist movements across Europe and North America are provoking debate and discussion about the attitudes and role of the “white working class”, and all manner of political outcomes are attributed to this group. While definitions of this class are often unclear, it is generally regarded as a dynamic and reactionary force, largely motivated by hostility to “non-white” migrants, and when mobilised, it pushes politics and society to the right.¹ For historians of Southern Africa, this contemporary discourse has unerring parallels with the historical experiences of white settler societies in the region, where working-class and poor whites have been regarded as the most ardent supporters and beneficiaries of the white minority regimes which were, one by one, overthrown during the latter part of the twentieth century.

Despite its recent prominence, the idea of a racialised working class is not a new one. Race and class have animated historians of Southern Africa perhaps more than any other issue. Yet in the literature on the region’s history and in popular understanding, race and class are often treated as synonymous. Whites are regarded as a homogenous group which is uniformly wealthy and comfortable and atop a binary power structure, especially for later decades in the twentieth century. Indeed, as will be discussed in this book, existing scholarship on white workers and the white poor is overwhelmingly concentrated in the early twentieth century, with the implicit assumption that these categories of analysis are no longer valid for white societies in later periods. This book challenges this assumption and demonstrates its inaccuracy through new research on non-hegemonic whites in Southern Africa – that is, those whites who, due to their class position, were not firmly established in the dominant political, economic and social structures of the racial state from the 1930s to the 1990s. In this, we draw on the work of Ann Stoler, who argued that whites in colonial societies ‘were neither by nature unified nor did they inevitably share common interests and fears’, and that, far from being unimportant, internal divisions amongst whites shaped the practice and intensity of racial policies in different colonial settings.² As the case studies in this book show, social class remained a salient and tension-producing element within white society throughout the century. Homogenising understandings of white societies not only are unconvincing

and unhelpful for understanding race in the region but also actively obscure many of the social, political and economic complexities which animated the regimes in question. Moreover, the assumption that there were no real class divisions within white societies inadvertently reproduces the propaganda and myths propagated by white minority regimes: e.g. the classless *volk* of apartheid South Africa or the supposed egalitarianism of white Rhodesia.

In this book, early career and established historians offer a reassessment of Southern Africa's white societies as being often divided, fraught with tension and subject to constant state surveillance and intervention. This, we argue, reveals the workings and constructions of race and class in a wider sense. Indeed, there has been a lack of interest in the everyday experiences and agency of ordinary whites, how they lived, the jobs they performed, their relations with other whites, as well as with other "non-white" Africans, and how this was viewed by states.³ Similarly, the empirical grounding of much of the literature on white identity and power has been insufficient.⁴ Scattered work has been produced on this topic since the late 1990s, but it has not previously coalesced, and it has mostly been within a national framework with little scope for comparison.⁵ Yet as Jonathan Hyslop notes in this book, the economic integration of the Southern African region has long been established and recognised – not least by various moves towards and efforts at political integration since 1910. It is curious, then, that beyond the economic, historians have continued to approach states in the region as individual entities with hard and fast borders.⁶ This book argues for a regional approach and demonstrates how the history of white workers and the white poor reveal the social, political and cultural connections which, in addition to the economic, characterise the Southern African past.

In this book, class emerges in a variety of guises. Some authors – particularly those studying white labour movements – employ the concept in a materialist sense to identify those bound together by their position within workplace relations of production and by the organisational forms and the consciousness and collective action this engendered. Other contributors use class to refer to socio-economic indicators such as education, income and associated life chances – or the lack thereof. Still other authors adopt a cultural approach, attending to issues of taste, values, traditions and everyday life. In the various contributions, these different conceptions or emphases are seldom clear-cut; rather, they intersect with each other, producing a striking synergy both within and between chapters which would have been unthinkable some 30 years ago, when debates about class were last *en vogue*. This, we contend, is the result of two premises – the first has now become established; the second is what we are seeking to establish in this book. Firstly, it is now well established that class – like race – is constructed and relational, and that for historians, the challenge is to examine what this meant in practice in various temporal and geographical contexts. The different approaches in this book all conceive of class in this relational sense. They also share, indeed demonstrate, a second premise: race and class cannot be considered independently – we cannot talk about race without talking about class. Path-breaking scholarship on "whiteness" and racialised

class identities emerging in the American academy in the 1990s established this understanding in the United States. David Roediger, a central figure in this 'new labour history', argued that, for the USA, 'working class formation and the systematic development of a sense of whiteness went hand in hand'.⁷ Drawing on these insights, this book seeks to establish this claim for the Southern African context. By concentrating on white workers and the white poor, it seeks to counter the tendency in existing literature which unproblematically associates white skin with privilege or even defines white identity as power and privilege.⁸ The societies considered in this book were all organised along racial lines, and those living in them who were racialised as white certainly enjoyed related privileges. Yet as the case studies presented here clearly show, whites were not always privileged in the same way. The social histories of whites presented in these chapters reveal that there were multiple and different kinds of whiteness across the region, and these were inextricably connected to the manner in which different whites were classed. In parallel to familiar representations of colonial- and apartheid-era Southern Africa's bourgeois white societies, living in the lap of luxury on the back of black exploitation, there remained elements of a white underclass, a working poor and a consciously blue-collar contingent. Within these groups, too, there were important variations. As will be shown, the white copper miners in Northern Rhodesia buying yachts with hefty pay cheques lived very different kinds of lives from those of recently transplanted Portuguese peasants eking out an existence as subsistence farmers in Angola and Mozambique.

Despite such variations, there were important points of commonality within the region. In contrast to the emphasis placed on the invisible or unmarked nature of whiteness in white majority contexts such as North America or Europe, different classes of whites in Southern Africa were all subject to what has been termed the 'hypervisibility of white skin in Africa'.⁹ In all the societies considered in this book, whites were minorities, often small minorities, making their presence glaringly obvious. Yet power and privilege did not always automatically follow from the presence of white skin. As Deborah Posel has shown, for instance, South Africa's 1950 Population Registration Act defined a white person through appearance, as well as through markers pertaining to lifestyle and social acceptance.¹⁰ We argue here that the meanings and consequences accompanying white skin were always historically contingent, constructed, contextual and entangled with class. In other words, in order to move beyond a one-dimensional understanding of white settler society and the interracial dynamics which underlie white minority rule, we need to consider that power, status and hegemony were not necessarily fixed, secure or self-evident for all those raced as white. While in the context of a racially organised society white skin certainly bestowed a significant measure of dominance and privilege, it could also attract the disciplinary power of the state in ways which resonated with state attitudes towards and regulation of the black majority. As this book shows, the manner in which historical subjects were raced was very much contingent on how they were classed.

The research presented here investigates how race was made and sustained in practice. The case studies presented here are drawn from the former Southern African territories of the British Empire, most prominently South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as Portugal's African colonies. Of course, these are not exhaustive, and the absence of scholarship on Botswana, Katanga or Namibia reflects the state of this field of historical inquiry and points to crucial future avenues of inquiry. We hope that the present book will encourage further research and test the validity of the arguments advanced here against case studies drawn from elsewhere in the region.

Centrally, the new research presented in this book demonstrates the persistence of class amongst Southern African whites and how this was entangled with the ways race was made and sustained in practice. In contrast to established understandings, white workers and poor whites were features of the colonial landscape throughout the twentieth century, right up to the last days of minority rule, and, indeed, beyond. Where they were less visible due to the privileges, protection and opportunities afforded within these racist contexts, they remained present nonetheless, and their upwards social mobility was typically much less solid than has been assumed. Social distinctions within the white population – whether based on status, ethnicity or income – therefore remained a feature of Southern African society throughout the colonial period. Minority rule did not produce a solid block of equal, race-based privilege. And as the next section shows, white colonial regimes were ambiguous at best and hostile at worst to the subaltern whites it perceived to lurk and loiter around the edges of race-based societies.

Social history and suitable subjects in Southern Africa

Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular, has a rich tradition of social history. This scholarship emerged in a particular politicised context, namely the revival of black trade unionism, student revolts and the great upsurge in resistance to apartheid in the 1970s. As a result, many historians at the time pursued an openly, entirely justifiable political aim to link historical research with these movements and make it available to those engaged in these struggles.¹¹ As a result, their work had relatively little to say about whites beyond highlighting the racialised power blocs produced by the capitalist political economy of the Southern African region. Other scholars, similarly observing the grassroots activism of the liberation struggle, sought to incorporate the agency of ordinary people in analyses of the development of racial capitalism. This gave rise to a tradition of social history scholarship which included important work on white societies focused on the turn of the twentieth century. The tumultuous clashes between the white labour movement and the South African state, culminating in a full-blown armed insurrection in 1922; industrial diseases that decimated the ranks of the first generation of white mineworkers; rural poverty that forced Afrikaners from the land and into the cities; and the ferment of radical and revolutionary politics amongst working-class whites offered rich

subjects for historians.¹² Particularly noteworthy is Robert Morrell's *White but Poor*, an edited collection which is very much a predecessor to this present book. In his introduction to Morrell's book, Bill Freund (also a contributor to this book) argues that white society in South Africa 'consists and consisted of deeply differentiated, sometimes antagonistic classes whose fragile unity under a segregated society represented a difficult political achievement'.¹³

This argument is taken up and extended in this book. In doing so, we seek to amend two interrelated limitations suffered by the existing scholarship: one chronological and the other geographic. The first is that it is largely concentrated in the late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century in the context of the mineral revolution and associated processes of industrialisation and urbanisation.¹⁴ There are only a handful of studies which extend our knowledge on the topic beyond this period.¹⁵ The neglect of white labour and the white poor as historical subjects in South Africa after the 1940s can be attributed to assumptions about the "solving" of the poor white problem following the so-called civilised labour policy enacted by the Nationalist-Labour Pact government from 1924 and the success of the National Party's (NP) apartheid policies in bringing about the embourgeoisement of the white population after 1948.¹⁶ State intervention in the form of racialised employment protection, social security, and the harnessing of the post-war economic boom primarily for the benefit of whites has given rise to the implicit assumption in the literature that white workers and the white poor effectively ceased to exist after the mid-twentieth century. One corollary of this was that scholars no longer deemed the analysis of white societies in these terms valid. Scholarly attention for the period following the 1940s, therefore, turns elsewhere, and little attention is paid to the lives of ordinary whites in these societies until the post-apartheid period. Since the 1990s there has been a flurry of work, primarily by anthropologists and sociologists, on poor whites and interest, bordering on fascination, in the media with the so-called re-emergence of white poverty – mostly in South Africa but also in Zimbabwe.¹⁷ This demands the historicisation of white precarity and the probing of the fragility of race-based privilege.

This is not to deny that the lives of whites across Southern Africa underwent significant changes in the twentieth century. Developmentalist, interventionist states did improve the living standards of their white inhabitants. In South Africa, many of those regarded as poor whites and unskilled white workers enjoyed greater material prosperity and higher incomes, along with attendant shifts in status and consumption patterns. The numbers of whites also rose markedly, as the economic boom drew hundreds of thousands of European immigrants to Angola, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. The various political regimes also sought to attract new settlers in the post-war period to bolster their position. This period, therefore, also saw shifts in the nature of white societies. With the exception of white workers on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, the powerful white labour movement of the early twentieth century was either repressed or co-opted by the state. In South Africa, following the bloody suppression of the Rand Revolt, the 1924 Industrial Conciliation

Act incorporated white trade unions into state structures and 'marked the end of effective white labour militance'. The same occurred in Southern Rhodesia following the passing of the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, which was closely modelled on South African legislation.¹⁸ Repression predominated elsewhere. The army was used to break the 1923 strike by white railway workers in Angola, while in Mozambique the combative white workers' movement was crushed after a military coup in 1926 installed a dictatorship in Portugal, and the last major strike by white workers there took place in 1932.¹⁹ In Belgian Congo's Katanga province, Union Minière du Haut Katanga, the mining company which dominated the region, successfully suppressed the nascent white labour movement on the mines in the early 1920s.²⁰

In much of the existing scholarship, it appears as though white labour movements' transformation from militancy to quiescence during the 1920s resulted in the assumption that whites ceased to be workers, as they no longer offered a serious or sustained challenge to capital. One account, of Wankie Colliery in Southern Rhodesia, for instance, argued that although white miners had taken serious strike action in the 1920s, by the 1950s there was no industrial unrest as 'almost all settlers saw themselves as whites rather than workers'.²¹ This argument bears more than a passing resemblance to the historical orientation of the South African Communist Party. The Communist Party had initially drawn its support from white male workers, which it regarded as the only real proletarians in South Africa. Yet following the 1922 Rand Revolt and the subsequent shift of white working-class loyalties to the Pact Government, the party reorientated itself towards African workers and their organisations.²² Historians seem to have followed suit, and the historiography on the period after the 1940s discusses a working class that is uniformly black.²³ This perspective – characteristic of traditional or 'old' labour history writing – conflates the history of white workers' organisations with the history of white workers themselves.²⁴ Beyond developments in labour specifically, the long post-war economic boom is understood to have fundamentally altered the nature of white societies. Scholarship emerging in the 1970s, therefore, not only advocated a focus on black labour but also debated the role and questioned the very existence of the white working class in South Africa beyond the early decades of labour militancy. Scholars in this debate – in which white miners generally stood in as proxies for the wider white working class – placed a heavy emphasis on class structure and concluded that most, if not all, white workers should be regarded as part of the middle class; thus, they were best categorised as 'white wage earners', according to Robert Davies, or the 'new middle class', according to Harold Wolpe.²⁵ These designations were regarded as more appropriate both because whites predominately performed supervisory jobs and because the high wages paid to white workers were dependent on low wages for African workers, with the former extracting surplus value from the latter. The number of whites still employed as productive workers, these scholars argued, were so few that they could usefully be considered part of a broader white group outside the working class.²⁶

The second limitation of the existing scholarship is geographical: it concentrates overwhelmingly on South Africa and, within South Africa, on the Witwatersrand. White communities in Angola, Katanga, Mozambique, Namibia, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia have received comparatively little attention. Only two of the nine chapters in *White but Poor*, for instance, are not on South Africa. Morrell notes that he unsuccessfully tried to solicit chapters on the white poor elsewhere in the region to generate comparative insights.²⁷ What scholarship does exist largely conforms to the chronological limitations described earlier in this section.²⁸ One noteworthy exception is the relatively substantial scholarship on whites and whiteness in post-colonial Zimbabwe, despite the comparatively small size of this population.²⁹ Here, however, the focus has overwhelmingly been on white farmers, and issues of white self-representation and notions of belonging. The catalyst for this literature was Zimbabwe's chaotic and often violent land reform programme in the 2000s, which seized control of white-owned land and thrust the country's white farmers into international prominence as easily the most discussed white population in the entire region.³⁰ The experiences of white farmers are typically taken to be characteristic of whites in the country – though they constituted only a small proportion of a white population that has long been predominately urban³¹ – and there is little in this literature on white workers and the white poor. Indeed, discussions of divisions within the white population largely focus on attitudes towards and integration with black Africans.³²

One reason why South Africa has attracted by far the most scholarly attention is that it contained the bulk of the region's white population. To be sure, numbers of whites elsewhere were not insubstantial. At the peak of their respective white populations, in the mid-1970s, there were 280,000 whites in Southern Rhodesia, an estimated 335,000 whites in Angola and some 200,000 whites in Mozambique, though whites never constituted more than about 5 per cent of the total population in any of these states.³³ Yet South Africa's white population exceeded these by far, with over 4.1 million in 1974, an estimated 17 per cent of the total population.³⁴ The white population continued to grow until the early 1990s.

Although South Africa had by far the largest white population, the numbers do not tell the full story. Whites in Southern Africa were highly mobile, both within and beyond the region. South Africa's large white population did not remain within the country's borders. Afrikaners were to be found in Angola, Namibia, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.³⁵ Many whites in Southern Rhodesia were born in South Africa, while others had spent time living there, and large numbers of whites came into Rhodesia from Angola and Mozambique when Portuguese colonial rule collapsed in 1975.³⁶ Considerably larger numbers of Portuguese whites arrived in South Africa via Angola and Mozambique.³⁷ Many white workers also habitually crossed borders in search of work. It was not unusual for a white miner working on the Rand to also have worked on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt and vice versa, and white railway workers often worked across the railway network linking South

Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. One consequence of constant movement is that the figures for the total white population in any given territory do not accurately reflect the numbers of whites who had actually lived there, as beyond South Africa these relatively low figures masked high rates of immigration and emigration. For instance, an average of 10,207 whites arrived in Southern Rhodesia every year between 1955 and 1979 (255,175 in total), but the total white population in 1979 was only 228,583.³⁸ Clearly, white settlers across Southern Africa were often not settled at all. In some ways, physical mobility constituted another form of race-based privilege, and this mobility of whites in the post-war period contrasted sharply with the intensifying control to which Africans were being subjected. At the same time, contributions to this book show that for many whites, physical mobility represented a precarious and unstable unsettledness.

Debates surrounding the role and position of white labour and scholarship on early-twentieth-century white working-class lives took place in a context in which white labour formed an important political constituency in Southern Africa. While this is no longer the case today – for either this specific class or this race – the arguments offered by scholars such as Davies and Wolpe remain unsatisfactory, and the contributions in this book forcefully demonstrate how and why class remained a salient feature within white society. White miners in South Africa, who featured so prominently in scholarly debates, saw their wages increase markedly during the early apartheid period. Indeed, the gap between white and African wages widened significantly in the course of the 1950s and 1960s.³⁹ Yet whatever upwards mobility these workers enjoyed as a result of their inflated wages, their material and subjective privilege remained dependent on state patronage. This became clear in the late 1970s, when labour unrest and economic instability forced the apartheid government to consider reforming race-based labour legislation. As Danelle van Zyl-Hermann shows in this book, white workers vehemently resisted reform efforts. Blue-collar workers in both the mining and the steel industries consciously defined their collective identities and interests in this regard as being rooted in the workplace, and they articulated this as being opposed not only to the African workers whose labour competition they feared, but also to white employers and the capitalist exploitation from which they demanded state protection. Even in the hey-day of apartheid, white identities remained classed and closely linked to work. Similar arguments are made in Nicola Ginsburgh's chapter on white railway workers in Southern Rhodesia and Duncan Money's chapter on white mineworkers in Northern Rhodesia, two groups whose identities and defence of their perceived interests were based on the work they performed. Both these chapters and Bill Freund's chapter on white workers in South Africa's state-owned industrial enterprises point to the continued recruitment of skilled white workers from Europe. Clearly, a demand for such workers and their skills remained in the region's economies. Most of these workers continued to perform the same kinds of jobs in Southern Africa that they had done on mines, railways and steel plants in the UK and elsewhere.

The most obvious form of subordination and marginalisation which stratified white societies in the region was the continued presence of poor whites. Typically, stratification in white societies is examined along national and ethnic lines – for instance, in South Africa, marginalised whites are almost exclusively cast as Afrikaners⁴⁰ – but this book moves beyond such conceptualisations.⁴¹ Contributions from Cláudia Castelo and Caio Simões De Araújo detail the rural settlement schemes whereby poor and often illiterate peasants from metropolitan Portugal were moved to newly-created, isolated agricultural communities in Angola and Mozambique to bolster Portuguese colonial rule. There was little materially that distinguished these white peasant farmers, disliked and mistrusted by other whites and the colonial authorities, from the Africans alongside whom they lived. George Bishi's chapter on "undesirable" white immigrants in Southern Rhodesia shows how the state regarded the maintenance of a certain level of material prosperity as a core component of white identity and continually intervened to remove those who failed to meet the proscribed and shifting material standards of white "desirability". Indeed, persistent state intervention directed at whites is an important indication that the perceived problem of "poor whiteism" endured. In Southern Rhodesia, fears that children of impoverished white families would "degenerate" prompted extensive state control over white families that, as Ivo Mhike's chapter explains, undermined the state's guiding ideology of white supremacy. Similarly, Neil Roos's chapter on white public servants in South Africa explores how a huge expansion of the public service sought to provide jobs for lower-class whites, but these same public servants were mistrusted by white elites and hence were carefully monitored, disciplined and subjected to intrusive scientific management techniques.

Together, these chapters demonstrate the class dimensions of racial power: despite their considerable privileges, many whites lacked much of the mastery and dominance associated with white power in colonial Africa. Their fate was largely decided, and their agency limited, by others. Both white workers and the white poor occupied a position within white society which was often an ambiguous or uneasy one, and their actions, individually or collectively, could upset established racial boundaries or destabilise white societies.

It should be apparent from this section that there is an important distinction to be made between white workers and the white poor, which are too readily conflated in the existing literature. Many white workers, for instance, were relatively wealthy, and as will be seen, the kinds of histories that can be written about these two groups are often very different. At the same time, boundaries between the two groups were not hard and fast, and there are some instances where a certain historical trajectory might connect the two groups. For one, as a result of sustained state intervention, the white poor often became white workers. Freund, for instance, explores how racially preferential employment in new state-owned industries in South Africa was seen as a solution to white poverty. Many white workers themselves feared not only that this process of upwards mobility could be reversed but also that they would once again slip

into the indignity of being “poor whites”. This was the case, for instance, for the semi-skilled white mineworkers discussed by Van Zyl-Hermann, who saw the spectre of white poverty lurking menacingly about the discussions surrounding labour reform in late-apartheid South Africa.

Despite these historical connections, it is helpful to maintain a distinction between white workers and the white poor, not least because they appear in the historical record in different ways. Sources produced by the former, especially material relating to work, are relatively easy to discover. White workers often gave evidence to government enquiries, were quoted regularly in newspaper articles and formed organisations which generated their own, often substantial, archives. Ginsburgh, then, can draw upon publications produced by the whites-only Rhodesia Railway Workers’ Union along with newspaper interviews with white trade unionists. Money, similarly, utilises documents produced by striking white mineworkers, along with records of negotiations in which white mineworkers made their demands forcefully clear. The white poor, on the other hand, only infrequently produced sources about themselves – Will Jackson has noted, ‘the voices of poor whites in their own words’ have been ‘elusive’.⁴² This was a category of people which others wrote about – usually in a disapproving, interventionist manner. Mhike, for instance, provides rich information on state efforts to discipline and rehabilitate indigent whites, but there is little surviving information on how the white poor themselves regarded such state interventions. Castelo’s chapter presents a similar reality, where there is abundant evidence on how state officials and institutions regarded Portuguese peasants, but these peasants left few impressions about how they saw themselves and their place in this new setting. Unlike white workers, the white poor were scattered and atomised in this period and did not form their own organisations. Where the white poor gathered in any numbers – or, more often, where they were gathered by state intervention, such as in Angola’s *colonatos* – they were subject to close supervision and control, which generated a different kind of documentary record than that produced by white workers.

The kinds of sources which are available has consequences for the kind of histories which appear in this book. Our contributions focus on the relationships between whites and the state, to the unavoidable neglect of histories of personal spaces, families, intimacies and emotions, though Mhike’s chapter touches on some of these. The main regrettable absence is an in-depth consideration of gender. Roos’s chapter describes how the patriarchy of Afrikaner nationalism both enlarged and limited employment opportunities available to white women, in a manner resembling the employment of black workers, where white labour shortages were evident – but closer attention needs to be paid to the experiences and agency of white female workers in their relations to the state.⁴³ These important histories would reveal much about the internal life of Southern Africa’s white societies. It would, however, entail a very different project from the one we have attempted here and would have to grapple with the problem of sources. It is possible that historical biography, which Hyslop utilises in his contribution, could be a way forward for these kinds of histories.

Emerging themes

The following chapters present new scholarship on white societies in colonial-era Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The chapters are arranged chronologically, rather than by country, in order to facilitate the regional conversation and render visible continuities and discordances throughout the period under investigation which have otherwise been overlooked. The first chapter sees Jonathan Hyslop suggesting a trinity of analytical axes for approaching the history of white workers and impoverished whites in Southern Africa. Historians would do well, Hyslop argues, to employ comparison between states, seek connections across the region and consider contemporaneous global ideologies and events. This would serve to revise existing understandings of and reveal new insights into white society in Southern Africa. These methodological propositions are born out in a number of the empirical case studies presented in the remainder of the book. In this regard, a number of themes come into focus.

1 Class-based disruption in white societies: Indocility and transgression

In Southern Africa, as in other settler colonial contexts, white rule depended on a sharply delineated boundary between colonisers and colonised. This was upheld by the mythology of fixed racial categories, a fiction maintained only by conscious and determined interventions on the part of political and social elites. Existing scholarship has demonstrated how, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poor and working-class whites were the main objects of elite anxieties. Their poverty as well as their proximity to black Africans – living alongside, performing the same kinds of work, maintaining social relations with or, perhaps more than anything, having sex with – provoked acute fears of racial degeneration and the disruption of the carefully constructed racial boundaries on which white rule depended.⁴⁴ But these themes fade from scholarship on the latter part of the twentieth century. As Southern Africa basked in the glow of the post-war economic boom, its white societies are generally considered to have attained uniform wealth and displayed unvarying support for state policies. White societies, it seemed, had settled into comfortable homogeneity, without significant subsections causing concern and requiring intervention.

Yet a number of contributions in this book demonstrate the persistence of class-based racial disruption throughout the century and across the region. Whether this persistence related to perception (the gaze of the state and elite anxieties) or to reality (the agency of nonhegemonic whites) is not always clearly distinguishable in the available sources. But both clearly continued to characterise the region and saw class and race intersect with age, ethnicity and gender. Social interaction between white and black continued to raise concerns. Ivo Mhike's chapter tracks the manner in which white working-class children playing with their African counterparts, or young white petty criminals consorting with blacks, attracted the attention of police and welfare officers

in inter- and post-war Southern Rhodesia and marked these white youths out for state intervention. The financial insecurity and hence assumed moral fallibility of their home lives was often blamed for their disruptive behaviour. Many were placed in single-sex corrective institutions. But these were not guaranteed to turn out model white citizens. As Mhike shows, white youths resisted state intervention, often absconding from rehabilitative schools to return to their previous ways of life. George Bishi identifies workers of Italian, Greek and Portuguese origins as another section of Southern Rhodesian society which was marked out as potentially threatening racial boundaries. In the post-war context, the proximity in which these immigrants lived and worked with Africans was identified as disruptive by the state. Revealingly, this was compounded by their non-British origins – their ethnicity, evidently, identified them as potentially racially nonconformist, amplifying the threat they posed.

In direct contrast to fears aroused by multiracial mixing and congeniality, however, there was another, seemingly contradictory way in which white workers and the white poor were seen to threaten the established racial order. This was revealed in the course of the century. As local imperatives and international pressures shifted, white authorities became increasingly concerned about lower-class whites' ostensible propensity for hostility towards Africans. While earlier colonial histories readily provide an abundance of examples of crude and violent racism amongst political and social elites, racial prejudice – at least in public life – became more subtle in Southern Africa by the mid-twentieth century. For Southern Rhodesia, for instance, Alison Shutt has shown how perceived manners and social etiquette became an important part of white identity.⁴⁵ Politicians in the Central African Federation stressed the policy of “partnership” between whites and Africans, Portugal championed the idea of a multiracial empire, and South Africans reformulated apartheid as the ostensibly equal but distinctly separate development of the country's different “nations”. White elites across the region came to regard open expressions of racism as impolite and uncivilised – and potentially dangerous to political arrangements which cloaked continued white power in a veneer of nonracialism.

In this context, racial tensions were blamed on the actions of white workers and the white poor. These lower-class whites were seen to inflame racial friction by their proximity to Africans, whom they were thought to abuse, be violent towards and compete with economically, thereby frustrating Africans' aspirations. One contemporary apologist for the Central African Federation claimed racial tensions arose because ‘the attitude of the British artisan towards the black people is very much less liberal than that of other grades of [white] society’ and due to the behaviour of white women like ‘the mechanics’ wife, who has never had a servant’ and so treated servants with ‘downright contempt’.⁴⁶ In this book, Caio Simões de Araújo details similar complaints by white settler elites in Portuguese Mozambique that poor whites mistreated and antagonised Africans, disrupting the colony's supposedly harmonious race relations. Here, the colonial vision of whites as a superior race guiding Africans towards civilisation and development was seen to be imperilled by those whites

who lived and worked alongside Africans. Similarly, in South Africa, the intransigence of the white workers described by Van Zyl-Hermann and their hostility towards Africans was blamed for slowing economic growth and antagonising African workers.

The idea that both sociable contacts *as well as* overt hostility by poor and working-class whites disrupted racial hierarchies reveals the manner in which social distance from racial others was a necessary component of white identity throughout this period, even if the manner in which this was demonstrated or lived changed over time. Throughout, however, white workers and the white poor were regarded as unable to maintain proper relations with Africans. As one “liberal” colonial civil servant in Northern Rhodesia put it:

The basic difference between us and the settlers is probably that we feel that Europeans, as rulers and with their more absolute moral standards, have, by the principles of their own religion and culture, a responsibility towards the under-privileged.⁴⁷

This is not to say that these nonhegemonic whites jettisoned their privileged position in the racial state. The disruption they caused was more in the line of indocility than transgression. This argument is most clearly advanced in the chapter by Bill Freund. The South African parastatals Iscor and Sasol formed a key part of the “civilised labour” policy first championed by the Pact Government in the 1920s, and continued by the National Party after 1948. But civilised labour was not simply a matter of employing white workers and paying them higher wages to maintain a certain standard of living. The workers themselves, Freund contends, needed to be “civilised” – disciplined and regulated to adopt certain ideas of productivity, temperance and respectability suited to the interests of the racial state and urban industrial capitalism. The company towns of the Vaal built to accommodate blue-collar families reflected such top-down efforts to create civilised white labour. But ‘regimentation bred rebelliousness’, Freund argues, and many white workers sought to escape the ‘dictates of civilised labour’ by living outside the parastatal towns in peri-urban spaces, supplementing their incomes with small-scale farming or illegal business activities, both of which involved employing or working with Africans. These disruptions did not, however, amount to actually transgressing social boundaries upholding the racial state. Rather than transgression, Freund argues, such white working-class practices may be more accurately described as indolence. In other words, the decision of some – although hardly all – white workers to forsake the world of “civilised” working-class living for the physical and racial borderlands did not necessarily amount to a forsaking of their racial privilege and power, but a choice for exercising it on their own terms.

Indeed, throughout this book, there is really only one example of an individual who transgressed the boundaries of whiteness – Charles Taylor, the militant trade unionist who was deported from Southern Rhodesia in 1954 for instigating a strike on the Rhodesian Railways. As Nicola Ginsburgh relates, Taylor openly

criticised the treatment of coloured prisoners by the South African authorities, defended African workers' right to strike, and expressed his lack of concern at borrowing money from an African or allowing his daughter to enter into an inter-racial marriage. In the eyes of the colonial authorities, these views demonstrated a dangerous lack of racial propriety on Taylor's part. Yet Taylor is clearly an exception – one of a handful of transgressions recorded in existing scholarship on white racial states of working-class individuals rejecting or renouncing whiteness.⁴⁸

As this book demonstrates, indocility was much more widespread than existing literature recognises. Duncan Money shows that the Copperbelt's white mineworkers were a truculent, disruptive presence on the mines, quick to defend their autonomy against white managers. Yet even at their most militant, they did not question or transgress racial boundaries, and sought to maintain their status as a racially bound class. Neil Roos similarly highlights instances of indocility and even occasional defiance amongst lower-class Afrikaner civil servants, despite their superiors' efforts to subject them to disciplinary interventions designed to eliminate dissidence, tighten ideological adherence and produce conformity. Roos offers examples of low-level officials acting compassionately across the colour line, of nurturing relationships of trust and even accepting support from blacks. Such instances demonstrate the limits of state's capacity to manage whites lower down the public service hierarchy, and reveal the agency of white subalterns in a manner which challenges existing certainties about apartheid society. At the same time, there is no evidence that such moments of indocility and defiance ever amounted to outright opposition to the racial state. In fact, Roos argues, the public service simultaneously provides a lens unto the complicity of lower-class whites in the production and maintenance of apartheid society through their participation in the institutions of the state.

White workers and poor whites therefore continued to threaten racial hierarchies throughout the twentieth century. The fact that this involved perceived disruption as well as real indocility, but not actual transgression or sustained opposition to reigning racist practices, codes and behaviours, opens up the possibility of rethinking racial interaction and identities in the racial state. A focus on lower-class white agency reveals race as functioning not in terms of clear dividing lines or borders, as the mythology held, but in terms of zones or spaces in which working-class realities produced room for manoeuvre and space for ambiguity.

2 Discipline, rehabilitation – and the failure of state interventions

From the preceding discussion on class-based disruption, it is clear that both analytically and methodologically, nonhegemonic white agency cannot be examined without attention to the role and nature of the racial state. A significant body of literature on Southern Africa's white-ruled states around the turn of the twentieth century has focused on efforts to demolish racially mixed

urban areas, provide work or welfare for whites, assign children to their supposed proper racial group, prevent Africans from owning property, and prohibit interracial intercourse – all motivated by the desire to uphold white power.⁴⁹ This revealed official uneasiness about whether whites' ostensibly innate racial superiority – the legitimising basis for white minority rule – was indeed grounded in biological fact. But existing literature suggests that, by the middle of the century, unruly white elements within Southern Africa had been successfully uplifted and co-opted into racial capitalism, and state attention could shift more intently to the suppression or appeasement of African demands. As already indicated, a number of contributions in this book challenge this view by tracking continued state efforts to discipline and rehabilitate lower-class whites perceived to be disrupting, or threatening to disrupt, the racial order. These continuities reveal the constructed, and historically and contextually contingent nature of race, even during the heyday of colonial power: “whites” in Southern Africa were not a natural category – they were only white in as far as they were socially constructed as such. The process of drawing racial boundaries, Hyslop argues, was crucial to how states constituted themselves. White workers and the white poor disrupted ostensibly self-evident racial hierarchies and categories, and states' responses to such disruptions reveal the variety of forms the constitution of the racial state took.

Welfare and punitive measures such as those discussed by Mhike in the Southern Rhodesian context were part of a broader repertoire of interventionist racial disciplining. In South Africa, the apartheid state had vast resources at its disposal. Roos directly links the dramatic expansion of white public sector employment during the 1950s to Afrikaner elites' fears of the risk which poor, disabled or delinquent whites posed to the ideological and racial purity of the *volk*. The material upliftment of lower-class whites was driven not by the elite's altruism but by nationalist fervour born of racial fear and by distrust and disdain resulting from class prejudice.⁵⁰ Demonstrating one of the many contradictions inherent in the apartheid project, efforts to absorb large numbers of relatively unskilled whites into the public service led to uneconomic forms of employment which clashed with reigning ideas about scientific management and workplace efficiency. Politically and ideologically, too, the process was hardly watertight. Afrikaner elites apparently had little faith in their more humble brethren's ability to provide the productive and ideological labour their project required off their own accord. Thus white civil servants were routinely subjected to often invasive and intimate forms of regulation and surveillance. The accommodation of lower-class whites into the apartheid state was clearly viewed as a necessary, if uncomfortable, requirement if white minority rule was to survive.

A number of chapters reveal the manner in which European settlers were perceived by the colonial state and by more established settlers as either wavering in or even failing to be white. While this related to familiar colonial taboos of, for instance, fraternising with Africans or engaging in politics which challenged the racial status quo, it also extended beyond intentional behaviour – that

is, beyond those who, as it were, did not *behave white*. Recently settled Europeans in particular – those whose racial status might have been expected to be most secure, having so recently arrived from Europe – could fall into racial ambiguity by virtue of circumstances beyond their control. The lack of agency inherent in such shifts highlights the manner in which dominant definitions of what constituted acceptable whiteness was inherently fluent and historically contingent. George Bishi shows how, in mid-century Southern Rhodesia, amid a massive state-led immigration campaign, this perceived failure was indexed by the notion of “undesirability”. The appearance of this term in contemporary sources may come as a surprise to historians of this region with its characteristic racial demography: surely, within the context of white minority rule, the force of numbers would dictate that no white could ever have been undesirable? Yet different colonies upheld different entry requirements depending on the kind of settler they sought to attract, even within the same empire. Requirements for prospective white settlers in Kenya were, for instance, more stringent than British colonies in Southern Africa.⁵¹ Bishi’s case study demonstrates that both standards of morality – ranging from respectability to outright criminality – as well as economic position shaped assessments of a person’s commitment to “colonial virtues” and hence their desirability within the settler community. Bishi notes several individual instances in which white settlers – all men – were deported on account of engaging in socially or morally unacceptable practices, including homosexuality, laziness, insubordination in the workplace, and parental neglect.

In the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, too, Simões de Araújo shows how, in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘class inequality within white settler society informed understandings of race relations and was crucial in defining what counted as proper, civilized, or racist behaviour’. In this context, ethnicity played little role in defining ways of being white – new settlers were, after all, themselves Portuguese citizens, transplanted from the metropole to the colonial territories in an effort to bolster the colonial project amid advancing decolonisation on the continent. In this context, official discourses formulated in the metropole sought to reconceptualise the Portuguese empire as consciously, proudly and harmoniously racially integrated. The Salazar regime, with its priorities of rural colonial development, regarded Portuguese peasants as the most suited agents of this “civilising” mission. Indeed, Simões de Araújo and Castelo both show how white settlers were regarded as agents of progress, harbingers of European civilisation and conservative Catholic virtue who would bring about economic development of the colonies.

But such efforts to obfuscate race by reformulating the Portuguese colonial project as a ‘Luso-tropical civilisation’ nevertheless saw culture or civilisation understood in racial terms. This was vividly demonstrated in the newly established peasant *colonatos*, where established settlers and colonial officials soon objected to the manner in which the ignorance and poverty of the new immigrants threatened to disrupt the colony’s established racial hierarchy. Continuing

the discourse of “civilisation”, but with seeming disregard for that of “multiculturalism”, they argued that it was whites’ vocation to simultaneously instruct and rule over Africans, who should themselves pursue civilisation, but remain respectful and obedient. In the context of such discourses, “civilisation” and engaging in behaviour and practices deemed “civilising” in nature, became the way to be white, and peasant immigrants’ poverty and lack of education saw them fail to live up to this vocation. It emerges that both in the Portuguese and British colonial contexts, rural life and agricultural activity was regarded as particularly suited to or even rehabilitative for struggling whites. In Southern Rhodesia, rehabilitation schemes aimed to turn recalcitrant white youths into productive farmers. It was the failures on the part of some white settlers to live up to their vocation as bearers of superior civilisation which evoked state efforts to supervise, discipline and rehabilitate problematic whites. As the various instances of subaltern white indocility discussed in this section demonstrate, such efforts, too, often failed.

3 The opportunities and limitations of physical and social mobility for nonhegemonic whites

Physical mobility has been a key focus of work about whites in earlier periods,⁵² and a number of contributions in this book demonstrate that it remained a central feature of many white working-class lives and communities throughout the century, even in colonies generally regarded as established settler states. Hyslop’s chapter demonstrates this reality in three colourful and remarkable vignettes which follow the lives of individual working-class or poor white figures across the region. The physical mobility visible in these border-crossing lives is mirrored in a number of the subsequent chapters and runs against much of the accepted wisdom in existing literature. Global mobility was a crucial formative factor in the white working-class identities of miners in Northern Rhodesia. As Duncan Money shows, white mineworkers stayed on the Copperbelt for an average of less than six years before moving on to other workplaces in the imperial network. Effectively labour migrants, they were by definition transient and transitory. This shaped the very nature of white working-class mobilisation on the Copperbelt, and Money shows how in the context of the rising tide of African independence struggles, these white workers showed little interest in propping up the white-run state in which they lived. To be sure, Copperbelt miners were no less racist than their counterparts to the south – but in contrast to the South African labour movement, their trade unions had remained largely autonomous from the state, and, as highly mobile workers, they were to a great degree detached from local political and citizenship arrangements. Copperbelt miners’ white privilege was mainly determined by their relationship with management and resulting workplace arrangements. This resulted in a particular way of being white. Hence, during the 1963 strike, white workers emphasised their position as workers rather than whites, and

unperturbed by the challenge of black nationalist demands, even appealed to African labour and politicians. Yet they remained a racially delineated class, committed to white supremacy in the workplace, if not in the political sphere.

Mobility was also a necessary feature of the job and identity of the railway workers discussed by Nicola Ginsburgh. Ginsburgh contends that the fractures and divisions created by the arrival of working-class immigrants during this period remains a blind spot in the existing literature. As hers and a number of other chapters demonstrate, European immigration to settler colonies did not unproblematically strengthen the hand of the racial state. In labour terms, states struggled with the high attrition rates of immigrant European workers. Insufficiently committed to the colony and unsatisfied with what it had to offer, many workers resigned or simply absconded. Employers bemoaned the “wandering” tendency of white workers. And Ginsburgh shows that the physical mobility of its white labour force could pose further problems to the racial state. Unaccustomed to the racialised practices of the colonies, new arrivals were routinely ignorant of or resistant to the racialised behaviours they were expected to perform. Those who did not fall into line threatened to attract the ire of the state, trade union officials or fellow white workers. This could lead to cases of such whites being deported. Physical mobility and returning to Europe was, therefore, not always a matter of choice. Bishi’s chapter similarly shows that whites deemed “undesirable” by the colonial state ran the risk of being expelled, returning them to the often dire prospects they faced in their home countries.

Indeed, the socialisation of newly arrived white settlers was clearly a central concern for established white communities and racial states alike. Contemporary observers in Rhodesia stressed the role of “old hands” in explaining the acceptable boundaries of behaviour to new settlers and enforcing those boundaries through social ostracism rather than state intervention.⁵³ Labour disputes such as the 1954 firemen’s strike on the Rhodesia railways provide a helpful window onto the challenges the transient European workforce posed to the settler state in terms of their unfamiliarity with or potential hostility towards the racialised behaviours and practices of colonial life. Ginsburgh argues that the existing literature’s concentration on either rural or middle-class whites results in an overstatement of the degree of social cohesion and successful socialisation which characterised white society. A focus on the urban working class offers new insights. It reveals the contradictions inherent in the settler project – the colonial state’s dependence on white working-class immigrants to maintain racial labour hierarchies and ameliorate skills deficits, when these very immigrants held the potential of importing radical ideologies and non-racialist sympathies into settler society. Arguably, scholars have been too quick to assume that immigrant workers rushed to embrace the wages of whiteness offered by the racial state. The acceleration of white immigration to the Central African Federation witnessed in the 1950s should therefore not unproblematically be assumed to have served the goal of strengthening white hegemony in the region.⁵⁴

White dominance in political, economic and social terms was an inter-imperial concern, closely connected to prevailing conditions in Europe and colonial empires at large. It is therefore unsurprising that immigration featured as a central concern, despite the fact that the states under consideration here at times harboured very different understandings of themselves. As Simões de Araújo shows, the mid-century context of decolonisation saw the Portuguese empire under Salazar reconceptualise itself as an ostensibly multiracial unitary state variously consisting of European and overseas territories. This constitutional and semantic effort at unifying the metropole and its colonial provinces came in the face of the rapid collapse of British and French imperial power. Simões de Araújo and Castelo's chapters demonstrate the Portuguese state's concern with promoting immigration to Mozambique and Angola in the context of advancing African independence. Indeed, Simões de Araújo identifies an 'explosion of efforts and debates' on emigration from Portugal to its colonies, to the extent that by the late 1950s, the Portuguese National Assembly viewed this as 'the fundamental question' dominating all other issues. The same period saw Southern Rhodesia, too, launch an immigration campaign in a bid to increase its white population and address skills shortages. Opportunities for physical mobility offered by transnational industrial and imperial connections were, therefore, not just pursued as an individual life choice. It was also actively promoted and driven by imperial states for whom white immigration formed a key part of strategies for political consolidation and economic development, both overseas and in the post-war metropole, and hence involved substantial public investment.

Physical mobility, crucially, created opportunities for social mobility and was often entered into for precisely this reason. As in the case of Portuguese Africa, many of the skilled workers who travelled to the Rhodesias were attracted by the upward social mobility which colonial employment promised, and which was embodied by prominent figures like railway fireman-turned-prime minister Roy Welensky. But material and social ascendance was neither universal nor automatic. Colonial newspapers reproached new arrivals for having too high expectations. Ginsburgh demonstrates the hardship suffered by many immigrant workers, with many in employment becoming reliant on relief funds – evidence that the colonial government recognised that some workers were struggling to maintain a European standard of living. When the railway worker Charles Taylor was deported, he lost no time informing the British working-class public of the fallacy of social mobility in the colonies. In addition to insufficient pay, strikers complained of inadequate public services, housing shortages, and the disdain which they were treated by other classes of whites. Clearly, racial identity was not enough to ensure upwards social mobility or social cohesion in the racial state.

Like "undesirable" whites being deported back to their European homelands, social mobility, too, could potentially be reversed. Van Zyl-Hermann's chapter reveals the anxiety which labour reforms evoked amongst white workers in South Africa at a time when assertive African labour movements and economic

recession already posed threats to blue-collar whites' status and material position. Hyslop's three vignettes, too, demonstrate that white workers' upwards social mobility and the so-called "solving" of white poverty in South Africa was never as solid as scholars tend to assume.

This book demonstrates that an integrated history of white societies in Southern Africa is possible, and becomes particularly clear when the historian's focus is broadened to include issues of class alongside race. In contrast to prevailing understandings which cast the period of white minority rule in terms of a racialised binary power structure, the chapters presented here render visible the fact that racial identity was never the sole marker of social status and power in the region. In context of the racial state, individuals, communities and classes identified as workers and were conversely identified as poor, "undesirable" and deviant. For this hyper-visible, numerically small and – for most of the century – politically dominant group, class disrupted as much as race bound together in twentieth-century Southern Africa.

Notes

- 1 For the conceptual confusion around the term "white working class", see Bhambra, 'Brexist, Trump, and "Methodological Whiteness"'; Roediger, 'Who's Afraid of the White Working Class?'
- 2 Stoler, 'Rethinking Colonial Categories', 137–138.
- 3 Roos, 'South African History and Subaltern Historiography'.
- 4 Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historian's Imagination'.
- 5 See Posel, 'Whiteness and Power'; Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*; Grundlingh, "'Are We Afrikaners Getting Too Rich?"; Van Zyl-Hermann, 'White Workers and South Africa's Democratic Transition'; D. Money, "'No Matter How Much or How Little They've Got, They Can't Settle Down'". One important exception here, though he discusses a slightly earlier period, is Van der Walt, 'The First Globalisation and Transnational Labour Activism in Southern Africa'.
- 6 One exception to this, which demonstrates the value of a regional approach, is Adhikari's edited collection *Burdened by Race*.
- 7 Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, 8.
- 8 Michelle Brattain, for instance, argues that 'Whiteness was, and continues to be, a very real determinant of social relationships and material benefits.' Brattain, *Politics of Whiteness*, 4.
- 9 Van Zyl-Hermann and Boersema, 'Introduction'; Steyn, 'As the Postcolonial Moment Deepens'.
- 10 Posel, 'Race as Common Sense'.
- 11 Bozzoli, 'Intellectuals, Audiences and Histories'; Bonner, 'New Nation, New History'; Freund, 'Labour Studies and Labour History'.
- 12 Katz, *A Trade Union Aristocracy*; 'Part Five: White Workers and Political Ideology' in Bozzoli, *Class, Community and Conflict*; Katz, *The White Death*; Vincent, 'Bread and Honour'; van Onselen, *New Babylon, New Nineveh*, 309–326; Lange, *White, Poor and Angry*; Hyslop, *The Notorious Syndicalist*; Krikler, *White Rising*; Higginson, 'Privileging the Machines'; Van der Walt, 'Anarchism and Syndicalism in South Africa'.
- 13 Freund, 'Introduction', xiii.
- 14 For instance, the contributions in Morrell's edited collection *White but Poor* all focus on this period.
- 15 Teppo, 'The Making of a Good White'; Grundlingh, 'Are We Afrikaners Getting Too Rich?'; Hyslop, 'The White Poor'; Jackson, 'Shame of Not Belonging'; Posel, 'Whiteness

- and Power in the South African Civil Service'; Mooney, 'Ducktails, Flick-knives and Pugnacity'.
- 16 Freund, 'A Ghost from the Past'.
 - 17 Kruger, '(Dis)empowered Whiteness'; Sibanda, 'Social Pain and Social Death'; Sibanda, 'Wounded Citizenship'; Schuermans and Visser, 'On Poor Whites in Post-Apartheid Cities'; Sharp and Van Wyk, 'Beyond the Market'; Bottomley, *Poor White*. In terms of media coverage, see for instance 'The Editors: Do White People Have a Future in South Africa?' *BBC News*, first broadcast 27 May 2013; 'Reggie Yates Extreme South Africa: The White Slums', *BBC Three*, first broadcast 20 February 2014; 'Trevor MacDonald: White Poverty After Apartheid', *ITV*, first broadcast 21 June 2018.
 - 18 Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa*, 235; Phimister and Van Onselen, 'The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe', 44–45.
 - 19 Penvenne, 'Labor Struggles at the Port of Lourenço Marques', 230.
 - 20 Perrings, *Black Mineworkers in Central Africa*, 51–54.
 - 21 Phimister and Tembo, 'A Zambian Town in Colonial Zimbabwe', 53. On the ostensible retreat and delegitimation of class identities in favour of racial identification in the South African context, see Kenny, 'Servicing Modernity', 374, 377; Van der Westhuizen, *White Power*, 10–11; O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 78.
 - 22 Drew, *Discordant Comrades*, 67–73.
 - 23 Van Zyl-Hermann, 'Baas or Klaas?', 142–143.
 - 24 Van der Linden, 'Labour History'.
 - 25 Davies, 'The White Working-Class in South Africa', 49; Wolpe, 'The "White Working Class" in South Africa', 223–230; Davies, *Capital, State and White Labour*, 25. For the contrary view on white workers in the gold industry, see Johnstone, *Class, Race and Gold*, 25, 56–61.
 - 26 Scholars on Angola made a similar argument, that class differences among the white population were blurred and subsumed by race. Clarence-Smith, 'Class Structure and Class Struggles', 113–115.
 - 27 Morrell, *White but Poor*, xi–xii. The chapters on Southern Rhodesia are Challis, 'Education and Southern Rhodesia's Poor Whites'; Stigger, 'Minute Substance Versus Substantial Fear'.
 - 28 See Phimister, 'White Miners in Historical Perspective'; Lunn, *Capital and Labour on the Rhodesian Railway System*, 77–106; Money, "'There Are Worse Places Than Dalmuir!'"
 - 29 Nyamnjoh, 'Blinded by Sight', 70.
 - 30 Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens, Exiles*; Hughes, *Whiteness in Zimbabwe*; Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being*; Law, "'Mostly We Are White and Alone'"; Alexander, 'Orphans of the Empire'.
 - 31 Pilosof and Boersma, 'Not All Whites Are Farmers'.
 - 32 Hartnack, 'Whiteness and Shades of Grey'.
 - 33 Brownell, *The Collapse of Rhodesia*, 3; Bender and Yoder, 'Whites in Angola on the Eve of Independence'; Penvenne, 'Settling Against the Tide', 86.
 - 34 Department of Statistics, *Statistical News Release: Mid-Year Estimates – Republic of South Africa (24 October 1974)* (Pretoria: Department of Statistics, 1974).
 - 35 Hodder-Williams, 'Afrikaners in Rhodesia'; Stassen, *Afrikaners in Angola*.
 - 36 Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, 79–83.
 - 37 Glaser, 'Portuguese Immigrant History'.
 - 38 Brownell, 'The Hole in Rhodesia's Bucket'.
 - 39 Johnstone, 'White Prosperity and White Supremacy', 135.
 - 40 Steyn, 'Rehabilitating a Whiteness Disgraced', 143; Guillaume and Teppo, 'Le Privatisation Du Destin'.
 - 41 Glaser, 'White but Illegal'; Chichava, 'Unlike the Other Whites?'; Brownell, *Collapse of Rhodesia*, 14.
 - 42 Jackson, 'Shame of Not Belonging', 86.

- 43 There is emerging scholarship on this in Zimbabwe, see Kufakurinani, *Elasticity in Domesticity*, 73–105; Mhike, ‘Intersections of Sexual Delinquency and Sub-normality’.
- 44 Koorts, “‘The Black Peril Would Not Exist If It Were Not for a White Peril’”; Bundy, *Poverty in South Africa*, 40–53; Seekings, “‘Not a Single White Person Should Be Allowed to Go Under’”; Kufakurinani, ‘Empire and Sexual Deviance’.
- 45 Shutt, *Manners Make a Nation*.
- 46 Lucas Phillips, *The Vision Splendid*, 177.
- 47 St. John Wood, *Northern Rhodesia*, 63.
- 48 Perhaps the best example of this is Dimitri Tsafendas, a Mozambican-born revolutionary who assassinated Hendrik Verwoerd, and had attempted to have himself reclassified from ‘white’ to ‘coloured’ under apartheid laws, see Dousemetzis and Gerry, *The Man Who Killed Apartheid*. The Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński also encountered white guerrillas in the ranks of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola while reporting on the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola: Kapuściński, *Another Day of Life*, 54, 67, 78.
- 49 Posel, ‘The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970’.
- 50 In an earlier article, Deborah Posel has similarly pointed to the stigmatisation of white civil servants. See Posel, ‘Whiteness and Power’.
- 51 Kennedy, *Islands of White*, 43.
- 52 Jonathan Hyslop has produced a large and diverse body of scholarship in this area. See for instance Hyslop, ‘The Imperial Working Class Makes Itself “White”’; Hyslop, *The Notorious Syndicalist*; Hyslop, ‘The World Voyage of James Keir Hardie’; Hyslop, ‘Scottish Labour, Race, and Southern African Empire’; Hyslop, “‘Undesirable Inhabitant of the Union’”; Hyslop, ‘The Politics of Disembarkation’.
- 53 Lessing, *Going Home*, 202–203; Kennedy, *Islands of White*, 179–180.
- 54 This can usefully be linked to debates on whiteness in North America on whether whites from poorer regions of Europe – Italians, Greeks or Slavs – became white in their new society, or whether they were ‘white on arrival’. See Barrett and Roediger, ‘Inbetween Peoples’; Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*.