5 Whites, but not quite

Settler imaginations in late colonial Mozambique, c. 1951–1964

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Introduction

The poor white problem remains an ever-present, although elusive, topic in the literature on Portugal's late colonialism in Africa. While the social and political life of the white settler community in Angola has been studied in some detail and resulted in important book-length publications,¹ in the case of Mozambique this issue has not yet received the same scholarly attention, with the notable exceptions of Cláudia Castelo and Jeanne Marrie Penvenne.² This relative silence can be only partially explained by the drastic imbalance in the demographic make-up of those two settler colonies: while the black African population of Mozambique was always significantly larger than that of Angola, the former's European community never grew to the same dimensions as the latter.³ Relative proximity to Portugal and intense economic development in the post-war period made of Angola a prime destination for Portuguese settlers. Yet it was the racial politics of decolonising Africa that brought this case to the spotlight, in both academic and political circles. As the Congo Crisis unravelled beyond the northern border, in March 1961 Angola was witness to a series of violent clashes between anti-colonial actors, the African population and white settlers, resulting in a sizeable death toll on both sides of the colonial divide in the ensuing months.⁴ In comparison, while an armed struggle was waged in Mozambique from 1964 onwards, settler-led violence, or white terrorism, did not take place in such a widespread manner until 1974, when formal decolonisation was already in motion.⁵ Unlike their Angolan counterparts, moreover, Mozambique settlers did not launch a formal political movement even when their discontent against the metropole ran high.⁶

Of course, while one can certainly argue that the “settler colonial situation” in Mozambique was unusual, that is not to say it was a minor or irrelevant affair. If the relatively scant white presence resulted from a lack of opportunity on the ground, the long-standing economic dependency on its neighbours worked to entangle colonial Mozambique in a regional system of white privilege and rule. While historians tend to agree that here this “proximity” – however understood – to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was consequential in shaping settler culture and society, this is a point made generically, and, therefore,

still invites further study and scrutiny.⁷ In my view, this is important because, despite the increasing scholarly interest on the transnational nature of racial and imperial formations, race and empire remain compartmentalised fields of study, particularly along geographic or linguistic lines.⁸ Even though “settler colonial phenomena” have been described as ‘inherently transnational and transcultural’,⁹ the specialised literature has been typically restricted to former British colonies.¹⁰ Indeed, the emerging field of Settler Colonial Studies has resonated little in the historiography of, say, the French or the Portuguese empires.¹¹ Likewise, histories of colonial racism tend to reify formal political boundaries by concentrating on the relationships between coloniser and colonised alone, which can work to sideline the often influential role of inter-imperial or trans-colonial conversations and connections in shaping racial politics and thinking, in the metropole and colonies alike.¹²

In this chapter, I intend to bridge this gap by articulating the scholarly debate on settler colonialism to my own research on the racial politics of late Portuguese rule in Mozambique. Here, I am interested in exploring the analytical potential of Veracini’s argument that the “settler colonial situation” is a distinctive historical formation, both transnational and relational in nature.¹³ In particular, Veracini has argued that a settler colonial project is always entrenched in a “spectrum of comparison”, i.e. comparison between the settler society and the metropolitan “home”, and between different settler states and their respective projects.¹⁴ This transnational and comparative dimension, I argue, puts in evidence some contradictions and dynamics that are otherwise sidelined in histories centred on the metropole-colony axis alone. In this chapter, I examine the settler situation in Mozambique not only as a Portuguese imperial affair, but also as a context associated to broader international debates on the future of European presence in Africa and to the analogous experience of South Africa. In order to do so, I engage sources that are evocative of both local concerns and transnational sensibilities, from the colonial press to diplomatic correspondence. The “poor white problem”, I contend, can be productively read in this way, across different scales. This is relevant because, while most historians tend to briefly mention the lower-class status of settlers as a distinctive attribute of Portuguese colonial society, much is yet to be done in the way of exploring what Cláudia Castelo has identified as the representations and phantoms surrounding this group.¹⁵

Luso-tropical visions, settler paradise: Colonial settlerism in theory and practice

In 1953, Portugal’s minister for the Overseas Territories, Sarmento Rodrigues, publicly spoke of the principles and goals orienting the country’s overseas policy. His speech focused on the newly launched First Development Plan (*Plano de Fomento*), a substantial public investment package geared to boost economic growth in Portuguese territories by supporting agricultural production, facilitating the exploitation of natural resources and, above all, improving

transport and communication networks.¹⁶ Beyond infrastructural development, Rodrigues emphasised the decisive role white settlement was to play in the near future. Without a considerable increase in the white population overseas, he argued, 'we cannot expect true progress, which includes the efficient and permanent defence of our territories, and their perfect nationalization.'¹⁷ While 'improving living conditions and economic growth' would facilitate white settlement overseas, the state should proceed with caution. After all, Rodrigues remarked, white settlement 'does not mean transferring – without studies, preparation and sometimes painful experiments – the human masses that find themselves vulnerable in Europe'.¹⁸

In my view, Rodrigues's speech is expressive of the tensions and contradictions permeating Portuguese – and, more generally, European – colonial thought and policy in the mid-century. Although, in retrospect, the post-war era may appear to have been inevitably heading to decolonisation as an end-point, historical scholarship has showed that the late 1940s and 1950s were a period of recalibration and restyling of Europe's relations to the colonial world.¹⁹ Certainly, this included steps towards greater autonomy and, at times, negotiated transfers of power. But it also involved European aspirations and strategies of revival and renewal of empire. This "second colonial occupation", as Low and Lonsdale convincingly put it,²⁰ animated political, economic and ideological change, ranging from legal and constitutional reforms, unprecedented commitment to colonial development, and the espousal of various gradations of an anti-racist rhetoric, particularly at a time when racial thinking and discrimination were rapidly falling into disrepute.²¹ Portugal was not immune to these continental and global tendencies, even though here they assumed a particular expression, shaped by financial constraints and the political and ideological conservatism of the Salazar regime.²² The Portuguese post-war settlement policy must be situated against this background.

Politically, Portugal resorted to the reaffirmation of national-imperial unity by introducing a constitutional revision whose main innovation was to abandon the concept of "colonial empire". The term "overseas province" conveniently replaced the politically charged word "colony" to suggest that the non-European territories were integral parts of the motherland. As Bandeira Jerônimo and Costa Pinto have argued, this constitutional unmaking of the empire 'reinvented national identity [and] reinforced mythologies of national and imperial exceptionality'.²³ As the same authors point out, in addition to legal change, increased public investment in modernisation and development also intended to encourage the integration of all parts of the newly defined nation.²⁴ While the First Development Plan was the most significant expression of this policy, other measures were devised to cultivate closer ties within the "Portuguese world". This included an unprecedented investment in colonial scientific research, an expanded bureaucratic and security apparatus, and the encouragement of migration flows to the overseas provinces, by either voluntary movement or under the auspices of settlement schemes.²⁵ It is in this context that Minister Sarmento Rodrigues stressed that white settlement was a

condition for 'the efficient and permanent defence of our territories, and their perfect nationalization'.²⁶

Besides its political expediency, the turn to state settlerism as an imperative of post-war imperial renewal was, too, marked by the critical recalibration of Portuguese colonial discourse and thought, of which Rodrigues's tenure at the head of the Ministry for the Overseas Territories was in itself an indicator. It was with Rodrigues's approval that, in 1951, the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre conducted a notorious research trip to Portugal and its overseas territories as an official guest. Since the 1930s, Freyre had espoused the idea that the Portuguese colonisation of the tropics had been benign and largely free of racial prejudice.²⁷ During his 1951 travels, Freyre coined the term "Luso-tropical" to refer to the "complex of civilization" resulting from the Portuguese ability 'to integrate [non-European] native peoples and cultures' into a new society.²⁸ As Castelo has showed, while in earlier periods Freyre's ideas had failed to resonate amongst a Portuguese elite still committed to racial thinking and eugenics,²⁹ from the mid-century his "Luso-tropicalism" was embraced as a semi-official ideology of the regime.³⁰ At a moment when the national-imperial politics were being redefined in Portugal, the Freyrian argument that social plasticity and the "vocation to colonise" were hard-wired into Portuguese culture gained currency. Culture, however, was understood in clearly racialised terms. As Castelo pointed out, the 'psychosocial characteristics that Freyre attributed to the Portuguese were innate and were present at any time or place'.³¹ The white settler – as a racial *and* cultural agent – was the main protagonist of the process of Luso-tropical formation.

That white settlement and a multiracial rhetoric were to so decisively rise to the frontline of the post-war politics of imperial renewal may appear odd if examined against the historical record. Much effort has been invested in showing how the Luso-tropical thesis was inaccurate at best, if not simply wrong.³² For instance, while racial mixing in Portuguese Africa existed as a historical practice, it was not generalised or free of social stigma.³³ Neither did it result from a peculiar vocation to miscegenation.³⁴ Likewise, for most colonial history, white settlement in Portuguese Africa had been rather scarce. Although Mozambique and Angola had been deemed as potential settler colonies since the late nineteenth century, no consensus existed on whether massive European settlement was desirable or even possible, in racial and climatic terms.³⁵ While in the first half of the twentieth century the white population of these territories increased as a result of expanding colonial bureaucracy and economic development,³⁶ no public initiative was carried out, as the few existing projects failed to materialise.³⁷ The state position until the 1940s was, in fact, marked by public inertia coupled with the active discouragement of private initiative.³⁸ In face of tight state control intended to fight unemployment and prevent the formation of a class of poor whites, migration to the colonies was limited to civil servants and skilled labourers.³⁹

What, then, explains the rise of colonial settlerism in the mid-century? Here, I borrow the term from James Belich's work to name a more or less articulate

ideology by which the standing of colonial migration shifted in official discourse, public debate and popular culture.⁴⁰ Contextual differences aside, the mid-century saw an explosion of efforts and debates on how to better channel Portuguese emigration to the overseas provinces, to a point at which, by the end of the decade, settlement was dubbed, in the Portuguese National Assembly, as ‘the fundamental question that dominates all other issue’.⁴¹ In the literature, this shift in political tone and policy priorities has often been described as an anachronism, the product of a conservative regime unable to face and digest the reality of impending decolonisation.⁴² While this might be true in relation to specific policies, I suggest that looking at the broader colonial world affords us another reading. To many observers in the immediate post-war moment, empire was to play a vital role in European reconstruction. A popular neologism in the political vocabulary of the period – “Eurafrica” – conveyed the idea that Africa represented the natural and rightful solution to Europe’s economic and demographic problems, for it provided a fertile terrain for investment and emigration.⁴³ Here, the notion of “multiracial partnership” promised to deliver the benefits of “modern civilisation” to Africa without authorising Africans’ anti-colonial aspirations or settler’s blatant racial exclusivism.⁴⁴ Yet by upholding the centrality of the white official, skilled labourer or settler as its driving force, multiracialism served to advance a conservative and racially defined model of social and economic change, essentially summarised in the phrase ‘whites carrying the Africans along’.⁴⁵ To the proponents of white settlement, the settler carried the promise of material development and multiracial cooperation. In the political climate of the 1950s, the notion that Europeans could settle and thrive in Africa’s multiracial societies was both “rational and convincing.”⁴⁶

In this context, thus, Portugal’s turn to white settlement and multiracialism as colonial policies becomes less an anachronism and more a political engagement with a rather contemporaneous predicament – and one that was shared by other European countries as well, albeit in different terms. At any rate, in the mid-century the problem of stepping up metropolitan migration to Africa became a political imperative: it was frequently featured in the press and carefully discussed at the National Assembly. A prominent figure in this regard, the Congressman Armando Cândido, was adamant in his call for state intervention: white settlement, he argued, was ‘an imperative duty, a frontline necessity’, because ‘Angola and Mozambique are promises that our blood ought to fulfil’.⁴⁷ “Europe”, he goes on, ‘wants to resurface. Africa wants to advance. (...) No rivalry can surpass this argument of common salvation. (...) Eurafrica is not a new idea, but now it is urgent to follow it through’.⁴⁸ In an exposition delivered to the National Assembly and later published as a book, Cândido suggested a concerted state policy to carry out the “ethnic occupation” of the African provinces with metropolitan settlers.⁴⁹ In this position, he was not alone.

Indeed, by the mid-century very few would vocally deny that white settlement to Africa was a national priority and, consequentially, should be translated into public policy. In the 1950s, development plans offered the budgetary resources to sponsor a new settlement programme.⁵⁰ In Southern Mozambique,

a megaproject of “irrigation and colonization” of the Limpopo Valley directed major investment to infrastructures – particularly to dam the Limpopo River for irrigation and to expand the railway network to the Rhodesian border – but also allocated funds for rural colonisation, including expenses for white settlement.⁵¹ As Castelo has persuasively argued, the Limpopo scheme and parallel megaprojects – e.g. the Cunene settlement in Angola – encapsulate the contradictions and tensions underlying late Portuguese colonialism. On the one hand, they were a deliberate effort to modernise colonial economy through engineering and agronomical science. On the other hand, they were designed to foster an antiquated model of rural production based on the nuclear peasant family working small land units. In transferring Portugal’s traditional structures and rural lifestyles to the tropics, these settlements (*colonatos*) embodied the regime’s conservative politics and nationalist ideology better than other processes of social and economic change, such as industrialisation and urbanisation.⁵²

Surely, the picture was much different when seen from the point of view of the existing settler community. As Castelo has argued, even though a romanticised image of the poor “peasant settler” was disproportionately represented in colonial discourse, this group remained relatively marginal in relation to the global pattern of Portuguese migration and settlement to Africa.⁵³ While potential settlers with little or no resources could apply for travel subsidies and join rural settlement programmes, the majority of the newcomers disembarking in Luanda and Lourenço Marques were voluntary migrants attracted by economic development and not allured by promises of agricultural labour and land ownership. Of these new arrivals, many would enlarge the ranks of colonial bureaucracy or join the mostly urban middle class working in services or commerce. During the late colonial period, the level of education and professional qualification of the settler population remained higher than the national average in the metropole.⁵⁴ To this urban, educated and privileged settler community, a colonial project predicated on rurality, tradition and frugality was perhaps too obviously doomed to fail.

Settlers of ‘the lowest category’: Poor whites and the multiracial myth

On 3 August 1954, the leading Mozambican daily *Notícias* covered the arrival of a group of settlers to Lourenço Marques, aboard the vessel *Império*. Written by the novelist Guilherme de Melo, the article was peppered with lyric flavour and laudatory remarks. The first batch of peasants to settle in the Limpopo Valley, they were ‘rude and simple’, the men with their ‘untied shirts’ and the women in ‘modest dresses’. In their simplicity, however, they embodied ‘the soul of the people, the simple and crude soul of the eternal Portuguese people’.⁵⁵ Later that year, Melo visited the settlement. He saw a ‘rude but sane, humble but hospitable’ people: a woman missing ‘two or three teeth’, and children in their ‘bare feet and torn clothes’. There was something familiar at work here. After all,

Melo pondered: 'this is the Portugal of the villages, [...] which is being built [on the African bush]'. The whole process should not be taken lightly. European settlement was a serious matter, and the entire enterprise was being closely supervised by engineers and technicians, whose offices were adjacent to the farmers' houses. In the future, it was expected, no supervision would be required, for the settlers would become 'accustomed to this new environment, [...] they will own their houses, their own oxen. The land will be theirs'.⁵⁶

The odd juxtaposition of a romanticised portrayal of humble peasant life and a patriotic praise of what was essentially an effort in state-driven modernisation was fairly common in official and popular narratives of Lisbon's settlement programme. To another observer, the great transformation of the Limpopo Valley, made possible by 'a legion of technicians,' marked the dawn of a time of 'renewal and progress'. Yet irrigation systems and agricultural planning co-existed with ideals of home, family and catholic morality. If new buildings, the dam and the railway symbolised modernity, the church built in the settlement 'assert[ed] the spiritual nature of Portuguese colonization'.⁵⁷ This type of narrative was rather common amongst the most conservative voices in the metropole – including Salazar himself – to whom Portuguese society and national identity were based on Catholic morality, on the idea of obedience of hierarchies, on traditional rurality and devotion to the land as epitomes of national virtue, and on the myth of noble poverty, i.e. the valourisation of modesty and resignation to poverty.⁵⁸ The *colonatos* were designed to reproduce and propagate this set of conservative and traditionalist values in Portuguese Africa, while being at the same time a nationalist – and nationalising – gesture of evidently political implications.

Multiracialism was, too, a crucial trope underlying public debates on white settlement. In the Limpopo region, where white settlers were to work in the vicinity of their African counterparts, policy-makers hoped that contact and collaboration would further multiracial conviviality and serve to diffuse Salazarist values. As an official pamphlet put it,

we want (...) white families from the metropole (...) to grow roots to the land, to own the land where they work, exercising here the traditional virtues of the Portuguese peasant – tenacity, modesty, commitment to work and love to the family, therefore serving as an example to their African brothers.⁵⁹

As Castelo has argued, the schemes of rural colonisation relied on the false assumption that the white peasantry would operate as exemplary models to be emulated by the "erratic" African masses, thus leading to increased productivity and social assimilation into the national body.⁶⁰ At work here was the Freyrian notion that the Portuguese settler possessed the innate ability to cooperate with African populations and thrive in the tropical climate, regardless of their level of education, technical training or familiarity with modern methods of agricultural production. Political debate on this matter often depended on problematic

stereotypes and a rather idealised image of the settler. As a Congressman told the National Assembly in 1952: 'the Portuguese peasant, holder of racial virtues, will carry to the bush the qualities of work, persistence, affection for the land, sobriety and candour in behaviour, frugality, all of which will certainly have an effect on the education of the black Portuguese'.⁶¹ Poverty was not necessarily detrimental to the civilising mission. Rather, a common assumption in Portuguese colonial thinking was that lower-class settlers were more prone to co-exist with Africans on cordial terms, given their relative proximity in the civilisational and social scale.⁶²

Unsurprisingly, the picture was much different when seen from the standpoint of settler society itself. Both colonial officials and so-called *naturais* (i.e. second generation, Mozambique-born, whites)⁶³ expressed their reservations, when not open disapproval, about Lisbon's settlement policy. Criticism was found at all levels of society and civil service for various reasons. Some of the detractors voiced their grievances to members of diplomatic missions. After a visit to the Limpopo area, the South African Consul reported that the existing Portuguese community feared that 'the semi-literate peasants [would] have no conception of the conditions and would be appalled by the reality'. Consequently, local residents suspected, the newcomers would drift 'back to the towns, where their illiteracy would make them unemployable except on "kaffir work"'.⁶⁴ The governor-general of Mozambique himself, Major Pinto Teixeira, showed dissatisfaction with the course of action set up by the metropolises. As he told the Consul, the "theorists" sitting in Portugal were "silly fools" with no knowledge of African realities.⁶⁵ According to another diplomat, the US Consul, Teixeira shared the criticism of 'the more intelligent members of the local population' when he publicly stated that 'it is necessary not only to prepare the colony for the colonists, but the colonists for the colony'.⁶⁶ Interestingly, Teixeira urged Trigo de Moraes, the main engineer behind the Limpopo scheme, to conduct a study visit to analogous rural settlements in South Africa, for the purpose of 'inject[ing] a little more realism into the somewhat idealistic plans for the Limpopo Valley'.⁶⁷ The issue of settler selection and preparation was also openly discussed in the press. Oliveira Boléo, an intellectual who wrote several opinion pieces on the issue of white settlement, argued that the 'bar [needed] to be high' or failure and deflection would be inevitable. He feared that 'in a decade [we might] see thousands of settlers wandering the streets [of the capital], knocking on the doors, telling the story of their odyssey in this land'.⁶⁸

Besides misgivings about the feasibility of the project itself, various observers also raised concerns about the possible effects the recent arrivals would have on race relations. While one of the goals of the Limpopo project was to promote multiracial contact by planning for the settlement of African farmers along their European peers, African families were introduced in the scheme progressively, in small numbers, and only from 1957 onwards.⁶⁹ Still, much speculation existed about it from the offset. For instance, the US Consul noted it was 'thought-provoking [. . .] to come upon a community in Southern Africa where white men are driving bullock carts along with black men'. This peculiar situation,

he thought, could provoke a 'significant although unascertainable impression' on the African.⁷⁰ According to a colonial official placed in the area, 'white settlers [could] end up in the same position in life as the natives'. As said official told the Consul, the 'intimate association of white and black [could] destroy the "reasonable barriers" that exist'.⁷¹ Poor settlers, in this view, threatened to disrupt the racial hierarchies of colonial society. This anxiety over the possibility of racial decay was also articulated in the press. An editorial claimed that 'the life of the white men should never mirror that of a black man, for the first is expected to orient, to teach, to rule'. White unemployment and poverty could damage the 'prestige of the European', with negative results as far as the 'respect and obedience of the native' was concerned.⁷²

Interestingly, to other observers the poor white problem was dangerous for the opposite reason, because it could aggravate racial antagonisms by creating colour bars where (presumably) none existed. While the official discourse boasted the innate non-racist attitude of the Portuguese people, confidential correspondence and news articles reveal a different picture altogether, in which poor whites were disproportionately given credit for colonial racism. In a detailed report on the social colour bar in Mozambique, for instance, the US Consul argued that settlers of 'the lowest category, such as domestic workers and manual laborers, are even more prejudiced against Blacks than better-class Portuguese'. It was not at all uncommon, the Consul claimed, to witness a white 'who cannot read or write' mistreating an African 'who is cleaner, smarter, and better educated'.⁷³ The Portuguese anthropologist Jorge Dias painted a similar picture. Dias is an interesting source because he represents a younger generation of thinkers for whom the theory and practice of colonialism needed significant reform. In the 1950s, he was sent to Portuguese Africa on several research missions to study the problem of "ethnic minorities" as part of a larger movement to recalibrate colonial governance by a closer engagement with applied social sciences.⁷⁴ As a result of his travels, he reported on the social life of the settler community in both urban and rural settings. His conclusions were less than reassuring. In a visit to the Limpopo Valley in 1960, he was perturbed to find white farmers terribly ill-prepared for local conditions, including by the sight of youngsters farming the land barefooted or drinking untreated water because they had seen 'the Africans do the same'.⁷⁵ To Dias, 'some whites give the impression of being more primitive than many Africans'.⁷⁶ Yet despite 'their misery and difficulties in adaptation', some settlers harboured unrealistic pretensions, such as a husband who 'had promised his wife to find her a Black servant to wash her feet'.⁷⁷ Going against the grain of dominant colonial thinking, Dias argued that 'we cannot count simply on the virtues of our people, [but] we need to select and prepare them'.⁷⁸ Perhaps more importantly, it was imperative to "educate" settlers so 'they do not feel they are superior merely by the virtue of being white'.⁷⁹

Despite these recommendations, two years later the conditions in the Limpopo Valley deteriorated even further. A government report on the uplifting of the African population in the region singled out the white farmer as a source

of racial antagonism. Contrary to what was expected, many of the new settlers did not get along with their African peers at all. Quoting from a police report on the quarrels between Europeans and Africans in the settlement, the reporting officer described the poor white in rather unflattering terms: 'approximately 70% [of our settlers are] wicked and lazy, which causes constant hostility between them and the natives'.⁸⁰ The list of reprehensible, if not criminal, behaviour was long, and included trespassing on the property of African farmers, grabbing their chickens, invading their crops, reaping their corn, stealing their watermelons and pumpkins, mistreating their cows and threatening them with violence in case they reported any such offences. 'All these acts', the rapporteur concluded, 'stimulate the natives' dislike of the European'.⁸¹ In the Limpopo Valley, daily life was tainted with 'heated arguments, obscene insults, threats, and beatings, and things are worsening'.⁸² Local opinion was that the metropole was to blame, due to the lack of rigorous vetting of potential settlers. In fact, 'rumour had it' that settler recruitment was managed by priests and council administrators in Portugal, who were eager 'to get rid of their bad elements and for this reason convince them to come to Africa'.⁸³ To avoid further escalation of racial tensions, the reporting officer requested more policing and discipline, to be imposed energetically if necessary. The police, he advised, 'should not follow the same methods observed in a civilized context'. In the Limpopo settlement, the state needed to intervene without reservations, to 'abuse its authority' in face of the 'ignorant settler'.⁸⁴

The situation in the urban centres was not necessarily better. Rural settlers who could not adapt to the harsh conditions abandoned the *colonatos* for Portugal if they could afford it or migrated to the capital or even South Africa.⁸⁵ Particularly in Lourenço Marques, they joined a growing population of unemployed whites. To be sure, the problem of settler unemployment had haunted Mozambique's economy seasonally, since at least the early 1950s.⁸⁶ As the decade progressed, it served to fuel the growing local criticism of Portugal's settlement policy. Jorge Jardim, a prominent businessman and Mozambique's delegate to the National Assembly, dismissed rural colonisation as a both expensive and ineffective venture, while defending instead the industrialisation of Mozambican economy coupled with the facilitation of voluntary migration of skilled labour.⁸⁷ Mozambique's Legislative Council, too, called for a more rigorous control of immigration based on the aptitude of settlers.⁸⁸ Only then, Gonçalves de Mesquitela pointed out, would Mozambique 'receive the last inapt [of settlers], as we cannot expect to receive the most apt'.⁸⁹ Another Council member, Dias Ferreira, opposed an "open door" settlement policy, claiming this would result in a 'factory of unemployment' for which the local government would have to pay.⁹⁰ In conclusion, the Council favoured larger powers to be given to the local Mozambican government in the areas of immigration and settlement while opposing schemes of rural colonisation.⁹¹

The late 1950s was also ripe for a small but rather prominent group of settlers, frequently *naturais*, to voice their opposition to the metropolitan government for what they regarded as an exploitation of Mozambique's resources

without much in return. This local settler opposition was a diverse but not formally organised political force. It included liberal professionals, such as lawyers, and politically-minded members of the businesses community. Their grievances had several causes: from the conservative politics of the regime to the economic stronghold it imposed on the province and the lack of local autonomy and decision-making power.⁹² Lisbon's settlement policy was another critical issue through which this local elite expressed their political dissent, including by criticising it as a social liability and an imprudent spending of public resources. In May 1961, an anti-government manifesto distributed in Beira and Lourenço Marques openly targeted a policy that was producing in Mozambique 'a poverty similar to that of the metropole'. The signatories condemned Lisbon's record of indifference, which for many years had allowed voluntary Portuguese emigrants to go, 'like human ants', to Brazil, Venezuela and other destinations. After years of this 'waste of manpower, which other more capable countries put to use', the Lisbon government was now 'adopting, although too late, its colonization scheme [. . .] which have destined some of the settlers *ab initio* to an almost certain life of misery'.⁹³

Despite the local criticism, the settlement policy survived way into the 1960s, even though the rate of new arrivals decreased if compared to the previous decade.⁹⁴ If anything else, the early 1960s saw a push to the intensification of existing policy. As part of a broader legislative package of reforms, Lisbon created Settlement Boards (*Juntas de Povoamento*) to specifically manage white settlement in Mozambique and Angola, while establishing the free circulation of people and goods between Portugal and its overseas provinces. The relaxation of immigration procedures was intended to promote the unity between metropole and overseas territories by facilitating voluntary white settlement. Certain restrictions on settler mobility, such as the presentation of an invitation letter and proof of employment, were lifted. These measures did not sit well in local circles. In June 1962, editorials published in the newspaper *Notícias* bitterly criticised the 'propagandists of illusion' enticing 'poor, uneducated and ignorant agricultural workers to come to the "land of opportunity" without the slightest knowledge or assurance of employment'.⁹⁵ In an open criticism of Lisbon's priorities, the editors stressed that 'there are no conditions for work, because neither industry, nor agriculture, [. . .] nor anything have been developed sufficiently'.⁹⁶

While the problems of unemployment and white poverty were windows into what many settlers saw as the injustice of the imperial relationship itself, other observers were more interested in how economic competition for unskilled and poorly paid jobs was deteriorating the state of race relations. As the paper *Notícias da Beira* reported, 'the formation of a white proletariat is not [. . .] an admirable manifestation of absence of race prejudice, neither does it encourage, in the African, the sentiment of equality before the European'. Rather, because poor whites now flooded the labour market to compete for low skilled jobs with the African with no instruction, 'the doors are closing [for the latter]'.⁹⁷ Therefore, by limiting the employment opportunities available to Africans,

the news article cautioned, 'we may fall into a racial segregation that is [. . .] the opposite of what our vocation dictates'.⁹⁸ While economic competition in urban settings was not a particularly new problem – and had been on the rise since the early 1950s – it became increasingly entangled to colonial concerns about the state of seemingly deteriorating race relations.

In fact, in 1956, two years after the launch of the Limpopo scheme, Jorge Dias described with disquiet the racist behaviour within the settler community in Lourenço Marques, in what he saw as a dangerous disregard for the (presumably) traditional non-racist attitude of the Portuguese people. Yet to him this unfortunate situation did not result from the reality of colonialism itself. Rather, he was more inclined to trace the origins of colonial racism to the influence that apartheid South Africa exerted on white settlers. The poor, individuals with 'no culture or half-cultured', were an easy prey to apartheid's appeal. Dias's reading is so vivid that I will quote it at length:

Many of the Portuguese of Mozambique, [. . .] because they drink whiskey, drive cars, know how to say a few things in English and have acquired the mockery of a culture, translated in the acquisition of [material goods] to which they were not used, feel an inferiority complex in relation to their neighbours [in South Africa]. [. . .] Placed then in the position of admirers of their neighbours, vaguely displeased with their own economic power when compared with the latter's, and convinced of their own superiority in relation to the metropole, where people of their class have a clearly inferior standard of living; these third-class Portuguese – despite their undeniable virtues – seek to imitate these neighbours. [. . .] Well, if their neighbours, in their eyes so civilized, consider the African to be inferior, it would be unreasonable to act otherwise. [. . .] This general trend opens the gate to various acts of violence and rudeness by individuals with no scruples, who, once in Africa, think they are an elite by the simple fact that they are white. [. . .] Some of them, who in the metropole were in the lowest social rank, hold on greedily to the opportunity of upward mobility and think that in order to achieve this end they must demean the Africans, by brutalizing them at times, both morally and physically.⁹⁹

In my view, the elitist bias of his remarks evidence how class inequality within white settler society informed understandings of race relations and was crucial in defining what counted as respectable, civilised behaviour. This opinion was not uncommon amongst an educated and self-proclaimed progressive class of government officials and settlers, who blamed the state of racial unrest on their poorer countrymen. Because Portuguese late colonialism was so strongly predicated on the claim to multiracialism as a civilising virtue, cordial multiracial relations were celebrated in public discourse, the press, and official functions. The type of racist behaviour associated with the lower classes was deemed as uncivilised, inconvenient and in need of reformation. The notion that poor settlers were particularly racist persisted for years to come. But what is interesting

about Dias's observations is that he repositioned the problem of colonial racism and white settlement in a comparative frame, and explicitly relates it to apartheid South Africa. While Dias was concerned with the cultural, and as a result political, influence of apartheid on the settlers' mindset, other observers pointed out the very material, tangible shadows of South African presence in Mozambique, from economic dominance to the tourist trade. While in Mozambique regional tourism had been a recurrent topic of public debate for decades, in the 1960s it assumed greater proportions, as the industry grew steadily to represent a significant economic activity.¹⁰⁰ At a time when multiracialism was being celebrated as a benign colonial ideology, South African tourists were accused of bringing the colour bar with them.

That Portuguese settler colonialism existed in the shadows of apartheid was a claim that gained much appeal on the eve of decolonisation. Already in the late 1950s, the American anthropologist Marvin Harris, who had spent a year in Mozambique and interviewed dozens of Africans, published what was, at the time, one of the only first-hand critiques of Portuguese colonialism. Going against the official narrative, Harris described an 'apartheid-like system of separate and unequal treatment more severe in many respects than that which exists within the Union of South Africa'.¹⁰¹ Liberation movements, too, deployed similar arguments and analogies in their struggle to expose the evils of Lisbon's rule. As the Angolan nationalist João Cabral put it, the 'so-called anti-racialist policy' had given way to a 'classic colonialist policy' based on massive white settlement. As poor whites were now working on positions earlier occupied by assimilated Africans, Cabral argued, 'colour discrimination was taking more obvious apartheid forms'.¹⁰² Likewise, when the prominent Mozambican nationalist – and later president of FRELIMO¹⁰³ – Eduardo Mondlane spoke to the United Nations in 1962 as a petitioner, he stated that Portuguese settlers 'had exactly the same attitude toward Negroes as the South Africans had'.¹⁰⁴ Two years later, as the clash of political forces accentuated and Mozambique, as much as the rest of Southern Africa, descended into a liberation war, the entanglements between Portuguese settler society and regional white rule became perhaps too obvious to ignore. One decade later, an article by the white oppositionist António de Figueiredo published in the *Anti-Apartheid News* denounced that Lisbon's multiracialism 'means white domination'.¹⁰⁵ In the long run, settler colonialism had simply imploded the multiracial myth.

Conclusion

The transfer of metropolitan peasants to Africa was a move to secure colonial sovereignty amidst what was perceived as a particularly "troubled time" (that is, the eve of decolonisation). Yet this shift to transform Mozambique into a settler colonial space necessarily strengthened social and political entanglements with the other settler states in Southern Africa in ways that often escaped and challenged metropolitan control. The unrealistic expectations that the settler, however unskilled or unprepared, could bring economic development, civilisation

and multiracial conviviality to Africa were frustrated by the rapid deterioration of race relations and failure of settlement projects. The contrast between a state initiative centred on small-scale family farming and poor settlers, on the one hand, and the aspirations of a local settler elite, on the other, only served to emphasise the politically conservative and economically deficient nature of Lisbon's late colonial rule. Local oppositionists were aware of this contradiction and criticised Lisbon-based policy-makers for forcing on Mozambique the same poverty experienced in the metropole. At the same time, the allure of South Africa was not limited to its booming economy and promises of settler comfort. Here, the disquieting notion that racial prejudices could cross the border and come to shape the racial attitudes of the Portuguese settler community was common. In fact, to some observers, Mozambique 'had been infected by South Africa'.¹⁰⁶ Colonial officials were unable to perceive racism as a defining attribute of settler culture, but frequently singled out poor whites as "bad apples" in an otherwise healthy and colourful fruit bowl. Despite Lisbon's insistence on producing "Portugals in Africa", the poor, uneducated settler remained perpetually out of place in a system where race and civilisation were supposed to overlap. They were whites, but not quite.

Notes

- 1 On the political views of the white community in Angola, including forms of political organisation, see: Pimenta, *Branços de Angola*; Pimenta, 'Angola's Whites'; Pimenta, *Angola*; Pimenta, 'Angola's Euro-African Nationalism'. On the social composition and racial attitudes of the white population in Angola, see Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*; Castelo, *Passagens para a África*.
- 2 Castelo, *Passagens para a África*; Penvenne, 'Settling Against the Tide'. Another significant, although less detailed, study is Middlemas, 'Twentieth Century White Society in Mozambique'. See also Zamparoni, 'Entre Narros & Mulungos'.
- 3 For instance, the 1950 Census registered 78,826 whites in Angola compared to 48,200 in Mozambique. In 1960, this number jumped to 172,529 compared to 97,200. See Penvenne, 'Settling against the Tide', 86.
- 4 There are no definitive figures for the number of dead in the March 1961 revolts, but most accounts vary from 200 to 1,200 whites and up to 8,000 Africans, 3,000 of whom were Bakongo and associated to nationalist movements. For a recent account on figures, see Mateus and Mateus, *Angola 61 Guerra Colonial*, 129.
- 5 To be sure, this is not to say that colonial massacres did not happen in Mozambique in the late colonial period. Hundreds of Africans were reportedly killed in Mueda, in 1959, and Wiriyamu, in 1972.
- 6 Pimenta has written extensively about FUA (*Frente de Unidade Angolana – Front of Angolan Unity*), an independent movement formed mostly by white settlers and, to a lesser extent, mestiços. See Pimenta, *Angola*.
- 7 Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 380–381; Castelo, 'Colonial Migration', 122–123; Chabal, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, 111–112.
- 8 For groundbreaking considerations on circuits, networks, and transnationalism more generally in histories of race and empire, see Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony'; Stoler, 'Tense and Tender Ties'; Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*; Stoler, 'Racial Histories and Their Regimes of Truth'; Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*; Jerónimo and Monteiro, *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World*.

- 9 Veracini, 'Settler Colonialism', 313.
- 10 The notable exception, which purposefully includes a more diverse plethora of cases, is Elkins and Pederson, *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*.
- 11 For recent explorations of this literature, see Pimenta, 'Colonialismo Demográfico Português em Angola'; Choi, *Decolonization and the French of Algeria*; Barclay, Chopin and Evans, 'Settler Colonialism and French Algeria'.
- 12 On the 'transcolonial' as a productive historical lens, see Ghosh and Kennedy, *Decentering Empire*.
- 13 Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*; Veracini, 'On Settleriness'.
- 14 Veracini, 'On Settleriness', 3.
- 15 Castelo, "'O 'branco do mato de Lisboa'" is the only available study specifically addressing the poor white question in Mozambique. In his review of the literature available in 2010, Pimenta points out that 'in spite of existing studies, a history of the Portuguese settler, properly speaking, does not exist.' Pimenta, 'Perspectivas da historiografia Colonial Portuguesa', 153.
- 16 For instance, when in 1957 the National Assembly reviewed the public budget for previous years, the expenses relating to the Development Plan in Mozambique were registered as follows: from a total of 1,096,834 contos invested in the country, 744,452 (around 67%) were dedicated to the Limpopo Railway, 54,034 to the Vila Luísa de Manhiça Railway, 29,999 to the Port of Nacala, 21,067 to the Lourenço Marques Airport, and 12,732 to other aerodromes. See República Portuguesa, Secretaria da Assembleia Nacional, *Diário das Sessões*, Sessão Número 184, 8 March 1957, 320–391.
- 17 Rodrigues, 'Plano de Fomento do Ultramar', 65.
- 18 Ibid., 66.
- 19 For a pan-European view, see Buettner, *Europe After Empire*.
- 20 Low and Lonsdale, 'Introduction'.
- 21 On the issue of imperial revivals, see Lynn, *The British Empire in the 1950s*; Butler, *Britain and Empire*.
- 22 See Jerônimo and Pinto, 'A Modernizing Empire?'; Castelo et al., 'Introdução'.
- 23 Jerônimo and Pinto, 'A Modernizing Empire?' 55–56.
- 24 Ibid., 59–64.
- 25 On colonial scientific research, see Castelo, 'Scientific Research and Portuguese Colonial Policy', 391–408; Martins and Albina, *Viagens e Missões Científicas nos Trópicos*. On colonial development, see Castelo, 'Reproducing Portuguese Villages'; Castelo, 'Developing "Portuguese Africa"'. On Salazar's emigration policy, see Galvanese, 'Os discursos sobre a emigração portuguesa'; Pereira, 'La Dictature Salazariste'.
- 26 Rodrigues, 'Plano de Fomento do Ultramar', 65.
- 27 Freyre, *Casa grande & Senzala*.
- 28 Freyre, *O Luso e o Trópico*.
- 29 On racial thinking in Portugal until the mid-century, see Thomaz, *Ecos do Atlântico Sul*; Thomaz, "'O Bom Povo Português'"; Matos, *The Colours of the Empire*; Cleminson, *Catholicism, Race and Empire*.
- 30 Castelo, *O modo português de estar no mundo*; Léonard, 'Salazarisme et lusotropicalisme', 211–226; Thomaz, 'Tigres de Papel'.
- 31 Castelo, 'Prefácio à presente edição', 17.
- 32 Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*; Cabaço, *Moçambique*; Neto, 'Ideologias, Contradições e Mistificações'.
- 33 Boxer, *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire*; Hammond, 'Race Attitudes and Policies', 205–216.
- 34 For a convincing comparative analysis between the Portuguese and the British cases, see Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*. On colonial ideas of miscegenation, see Cleminson, *Catholicism, Race and Empire*; Vale de Almeida, 'Anthropology and Ethnology', 435–438; Vale de Almeida, 'Longing for Oneself'.

- 35 On arguments against white settlement in the tropics circulating in this period, see Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 49–54. On the historical constitution of Angola and Mozambique as settler colonies, see Meneses and Gomes 'Regressos?'.
- 36 The white population of Angola grew steadily in the first decades of the century, from 9,198 in 1900 to 20,700 in 1920 to 44,083 in 1930. In Mozambique, it grew from 2,064 in 1900 (excluding the area under the Administration of the Mozambique Company) to 11,000 in 1920 to 27,438 in 1940. See Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 59; Pimenta, *Angola's Euro-African Nationalism*, 196; Penvenne, *A History of African Labour*, 421.
- 37 Projects on the colonisation of Southern Mozambique, for instance, had been in preparation since the 1920s but failed to materialise until the 1950s. See Lopes, 'Colonato do Limpopo'. For an excellent assessment of the settlement policy up until the mid-twentieth century, see Gonçalves, 'Of Peasants and Settlers'; Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*, 97–104; Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 43–106; Penvenne, *African Workers*, 97–100.
- 38 Gonçalves, 'Of Peasants and Settlers', 169–172.
- 39 Castelo, 'Colonial Migration', 111.
- 40 Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 153–164.
- 41 República Portuguesa, Secretaria da Assembleia Nacional, *Diário das Sessões*, VI Legislatura, Sessão Número 203, 679.
- 42 See Castelo, *Passagens para a África*; Penvenne, 'Settling Against the Tide'.
- 43 Hansen and Jonsson, 'Demographic Colonialism', 261–276; Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.
- 44 Soske, 'The Impossible Concept'; Dixon, 'The Multiracial Myth', 61–65.
- 45 Tischler, *Light and Power*, 221.
- 46 Hansen and Jonsson, 'Demographic Colonialism', 272.
- 47 Speech delivered to the National Assembly on 10 December 1952. República Portuguesa, Secretaria da Assembleia Nacional, *Diário das Sessões*, VI Legislatura, Sessão Número 178, 290.
- 48 Ibid., 291.
- 49 Cândido, *O problema dos excedentes demográficos*, 210–215.
- 50 Castelo, 'Colonial Migration', 110–112.
- 51 The First Development Plan allocated 236,580 contos to the River Dam project and 744,452 contos for the construction of the Limpopo Railway, which ran until the Rhodesian border. Up until 1961, 324,200 contos had been invested in colonisation, of which 45,9% was dedicated to the installation of settlers and 8,1% to their transportation, while 25,5% was invested in collective infrastructure for the rural settlements. See AHD, 6569, 'Irrigação e Colonização do Limpopo', Brochure sent from Trigo de Moraes to Cabinet of Political Affairs, 17 May 1961.
- 52 Castelo, 'Reproducing Portuguese Villages in Africa', 273–274; Gonçalves, 'Of Peasants and Settlers', 177–178.
- 53 Castelo, 'O 'branco do mato de Lisboa'', 27–28.
- 54 Ibid., 30.
- 55 'Chegaram os primeiros colonos para o Limpopo', *Notícias*, 3 August 1954.
- 56 'Ergue-se na terra negra do Limpopo uma aldeia tipicamente metropolitana', *Notícias*, 19 November 1954.
- 57 Article published in the Mozambican newspaper *Guardian* and reprinted in Santos, 'Aproveitamento do Vale do Limpopo', 190.
- 58 Adinolfi and Costa Pinto, 'Salazar's "New State"', 170–171; Rosas, 'O salazarismo e o homem novo'.
- 59 AHD, 6569, 'Irrigação e Colonização do Limpopo', Brochure sent from Trigo de Moraes to Cabinet of Political Affairs, 17 May 1961.
- 60 Castelo, 'Reproducing Portuguese Villages in Africa', 97.
- 61 Speech delivered to the National Assembly on 6 December 1952. República Portuguesa, Secretaria da Assembleia Nacional, *Diário das Sessões*, VI Legislatura, Sessão Número 175, 201.

- 62 Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*, 225.
- 63 *Naturais* ("naturals of"), in reference to their Mozambican roots.
- 64 NASA, BTS, 1/14/6-239, 'Report on a visit to the Railway Extension and Irrigation at Guija in the Limpopo Valley, 24-26 June 1953', from South African Consulate in Lourenço Marques to Department of External Affairs, 19 July 1953.
- 65 NASA, BTS, 1/14/6-239, Confidential Despatch 46/1, from South African Consulate in Lourenço Marques to the Secretary for External Affairs, 6 July 1953.
- 66 National Archives and Records Administration II, Washington, DC, USA (hereafter NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, Box 3718, 'Survey of Local Attitudes', Foreign Service Despatch no 188, From American Consulate in Lourenço Marques to Department of State, 6 May 1952.
- 67 NASA, BTS, 1/14/6-239, Confidential Despatch 45/2/2, from South African Consulate in Lourenço Marques to the Secretary for External Affairs, 30 November 1953.
- 68 Boléo, 'A propósito do Povoamento do Vale do Limpopo', *Notícias*, 29 September 1952.
- 69 As Matine has argued, the late gesture of introducing African farmers in the Limpopo scheme was pursued mostly for its propaganda value, precisely to discredit any accusation that the programme was being carried out on racially discriminatory grounds.
- 70 NARA II, RG59, Box 2586, 'Visit to the Limpopo Scheme', Foreign Service Dispatch no. 279, from American Consulate in Lourenço Marques to the Department of State, 28 June 1961.
- 71 NARA II, RG 59, Box 5041, 'Limpopo Dam and Irrigation Project - Mozambique', Confidential Section, Foreign Service Despatch no 88, 30 November 1953.
- 72 'Fixação de Brancos no Ultramar', *Boletim Geral das Colónias*, 28(1953), 113.
- 73 NARA II, RG 59, Box 4628, 'Social Apartheid in Mozambique', Foreign Service Despatch no 117, American Consulate in Lourenço Marques to the Department of State, 16 December 1958.
- 74 More on this context, see Castelo, 'Scientific Research'; Leal, *Etnografias Portuguesas*; Pereira, 'Conhecer para Dominar'.
- 75 Dias, *Relatório da Campanha de 1960*, 23.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 Ibid.
- 80 AHD/MU/GM/GNP/060/Pt. 1, Confidential, 'Relatórios sobre a elevação da população nativa dos Governos dos Distritos de Gaza, Inhambane, Manica e Sofala, Zambézia, Tete, Moçambique, Cabo Delgado e Niassa, referents ao 1o. trimestre do corrente ano', Informação no. 45/1/CM/962, 20 December 1962, 5.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 Ibid.
- 83 Ibid., 6.
- 84 Ibid., 7.
- 85 It is estimated that 8,3% of settlers abandoned colonato in the first 10 years. See Castelo, 'O 'branco do mato de Lisboa', 46-47.
- 86 Penvenne, *African Workers*, 101-102.
- 87 República Portuguesa, Secretaria da Assembleia Nacional, *Diário das Sessões*, VI Legislatura, Sessão Número 145, 926.
- 88 'O povoamento de Moçambique: de novo o debate, mas quanto a execução?' *Notícias da Beira*, 22 April 1959.
- 89 Ibid.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 US Consular Files are particularly rich in regard to the activities of this opposition, as many of its members voiced their criticism to the US Consulate in Lourenço Marques.

- 93 NARA II, RG 59, Box 1818, 'Anti-government Manifesto Circulated in Beira and Lourenço Marques', Full text annexed to Foreign Service Despatch no. 238, from American Consulate in Lourenço Marques to Department of State, 9 May 1961.
- 94 Castelo, 'Colonial Migration'.
- 95 NARA II, RG 59, Box 2586, 'Labor – Sharp Increase in European Unemployment in Mozambique; March of Unemployed to City Hall', Airgram A-28, from American Consulate in Lourenço Marques to Department of State, 23 July 1962.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 'Realidades da vida portuguesa', *Notícias da Beira*, 4 November 1961.
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Ibid., 8.
- 100 By the early 1970s, white South Africans and Rhodesians represented nearly 75% of the foreign clientele, see Coelho, 'Elementos Estatísticos', 145–161, 158.
- 101 Harris, 'Portugal's African Wards', 6.
- 102 Cabral, 'A Portuguese Letter', 60–62.
- 103 FRELIMO was formed in 1962 and resulted from a fusion of two other nationalist organisations' operation in Dar-es-Salaam: National Democratic Union of Mozambique (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique – UDENAMO), Mozambique African National Union (MANU).
- 104 NASA, BTS/1/14/6–7, 'Committee Continues Questioning of Petitioner from Mozambique', United Nations Press Release, 10 April 1962.
- 105 Figueiredo, 'Portuguese "Multi-racialism" Means White Domination', *Anti-Apartheid News*, 10 March 1972. Figueiredo was a white oppositionist who had personally helped Marvin Harris to gather information for his pamphlet on Mozambique. After being harassed by the security police, he eventually went into exile in London.
- 106 NARA II, RG 59, Box 4628, 'Social Apartheid in Mozambique', Foreign Service Despatch no 117, American Consulate in Lourenço Marques to the Department of State, 16 December 1958.