6 “Village Portugal” in Africa

Discourses of differentiation
and hierarchisation of settlers,
1950s–1974¹

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Introduction

Much of colonial and imperial historiography appearing soon after decolonisation, either implicitly or explicitly considered settlers – that is, people from the metropole who made their homes in the colonies as their own country – as *in loco* agents of colonialism and did not acknowledge their relevance as objects of study. The analysis of the structures and effects of the colonial system was privileged, as well as resistance and the national liberation struggles. In the late 1980s, however, a group of historians and anthropologists set out to explore new frontiers and themes of research that could challenge the reductive dichotomy between colonisers and colonised.² They argued that approaching these two groups in a homogeneous, stereotyped and diametrically opposed manner did not offer much insight into the colonial situation, since it concealed the ethnic, social and cultural diversity in colonial contexts; the internal heterogeneity of each of those categories; and possible zones of contact and permeability. The idea that these categories were not immanent or static but constructed by colonial power and reused by anticolonial narratives gained ground.³

Taking the literature on settler colonialism into account, this chapter presents a case study of Portuguese colonial experience in Africa. It focuses on white settlers who were sent by the Portuguese *Estado Novo*, the dictatorial, conservative and colonialist regime that prevailed in Portugal between 1933 and 1974, to state-sponsored rural settlements established in Angola (Cela and Cunene) and Mozambique (Limpopo) in the 1950s as archetypes of Portugal in Africa. These settlers were only a tiny portion of Angola and Mozambique’s settler societies and were not representative of the “average” Portuguese colonist.⁴ Although Portuguese citizens, native from the metropole, and “civilised” and Catholic, they were poor and illiterate, moved to rural areas and were supposed to work the land by themselves. Their over-representation, both visually and descriptively, in the press and in the propaganda, often connected with the discourse about the exceptionality of Portuguese colonisation *vis-à-vis* that of the British and the French is intriguing and calls for historical inquiry. This chapter intends to add to a more comprehensive approach to the white societies in “Portuguese Africa”, proving its economic, social and cultural internal

heterogeneity. This contributes to setting up a comparative framework between settler societies in Southern Africa.

I will seek to identify, compare and interpret the different ways of seeing, making visible and understanding the people who settled in the Cela, Cunene and Limpopo *colonatos*, as well as their experience of living and working in these settings. For this, I employ a variety of sources: official discourses, newspapers and propaganda publications, scientific production, self-representations, and perceptions of other settlers and of African people around the *colonatos*.⁵ I open with a brief contextual discussion on the question of planned agricultural colonisation since the late nineteenth century, before proceeding to focus on the 1950s “ideal” *colonatos* as evidence of the contradictions and dilemmas of the late Portuguese settler societies in Africa.

Planned agricultural colonisation: background views, failures and impasses

The establishment of white Portuguese settlers in “Portuguese Africa” was strongly influenced by environmental, economic, social and symbolic factors, and even by legal obstacles.⁶ In terms of effective political action, there is not much to note about state-directed white settlement in Angola and Mozambique until the mid-twentieth century. Except for the creation of Moçâmedes (1849–1850) with Portuguese immigrants from Pernambuco, Brazil, and of Lubango (1884–1885) with settlers from Madeira and Trás-os-Montes, both in the south of Angola, there were only occasional efforts to create agricultural colonies and to provide free transportation for a few hundred settlers. After the sending of hundreds of settlers to Angola and Mozambique in 1891 (a hasty response to the British Ultimatum), local colonial governors severely criticised the settlement policy conceived in Lisbon without any knowledge of local realities; and complained about the burden of poor and unskilled migrants to the Public Treasury in the respective colonies, since the government was forced to repatriate settlers to Portugal on several occasions.

The physician Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro (1839–1917) and the naval physician and naturalist explorer José Pereira do Nascimento (1860–1913) were active supporters of transplanting whites from the metropole to the African colonies based on the scientific study of Portuguese Africa (climate, geography, vegetation, etc.) and the acclimatisation of settlers to tropical spaces, to guarantee their survival and reproduction without the much-feared racial degeneration. Both wrote about the places where Europeans could live without risks for their health, provided they followed the recommended hygiene habits.⁷

Regardless of the scientific conclusions of these two doctors, Africa continued to be seen as a dangerous and inappropriate place for the permanent settlement of Europeans. Due to the inhospitable climate and deadly diseases, it was a fate only for the *degradados* (deportees), the condemned and the perceived failures of the metropole.⁸ At the same time, it continued to be argued that the European could not adapt to the tropics without losing their civilised

habits and moral virtues, and that the European family would hardly go beyond the second generation without losing these.⁹ Irrespective of the possibilities of acclimatisation, prominent Republican politicians considered that it made no sense to settle illiterate and poor Portuguese migrants, to exploit the land on their own.¹⁰ Given the existence of an abundant and cheap African labour force to run the essentially agricultural economies of Angola and Mozambique, only Portuguese people with initiative and capital would be necessary in those territories.¹¹

Norton de Matos, high-commissioner of the Republic in Angola between 1922 and 1924, who was from Minho, a region of abundant emigration to Brazil, argued that, in the Portuguese colonisation of the Angolan plateaus suitable for white settlement, the rural establishment of families of agricultural workers in villages should be prioritised. These families, of the same geographical origin, would reproduce in Angola the households that already existed on the metropole, resulting from kinship and neighbourhood relations, and would work the land without use of African labour. Although the core of Norton de Matos's white settlement programme was rural, he also advocated an emigration of elites capable of raising the cultural level of the entire white population and contributing to the civilisation of the natives.¹²

After the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1926, it fell upon Vicente Ferreira, high-commissioner of the Republic in Angola between 1928 and 1929, to advocate an ambitious plan of settling the Angolan plateaus, which had several aspects: collective colonisation through the direct action of the State, singular colonisation for settlers with capital who would explore medium-sized farms, agricultural orphanages and agricultural penal colonies. However, he gave prominence to the collective colonisation with families of rural workers with few financial resources, coming from all the provinces of the metropole (continent and islands), in order to recreate the ethnic composition of the Portuguese population in Angola. In addition, they would maintain the 'immortal qualities of the race', which they would transmit 'magnified throughout the centuries'.¹³ Nonetheless, and as a deterrent to the perceived unfitness for work and to moral misconduct, the legislative decree provided for the expulsion and repatriation of settlers.¹⁴

In the early years of the *Estado Novo*, the regime displayed no enthusiasm for the transfer of small-scale agriculture of the metropole to the colonies. The discourse that denigrated the Portuguese established in Africa at the expense of the State continued. Armindo Monteiro, Minister of the Colonies (1931–1935), criticised the settlers of the official rural missions for being dependent on state subsidy, for having accommodated to the condition of officials and for demeaning themselves in the eyes of the natives.¹⁵ Only colonisation by capitalist private initiative won his praise. The settlers he presented as models were those who, with their own resources and without State support, embarked on the overseas adventure, bet on the creation of wealth and showed themselves capable of integrating African workers, contributing to the latter's elevation through work and education.¹⁶

The official view was that only individuals with technical knowledge, cadres and leaders of industry, commerce and above all agriculture, should migrate to the colonies.¹⁷ 'People who arrive without knowledge and capital are not lacking in Africa: we have millions of them. We are not in a position of spending money to transport them – and later, by force of circumstances, to repatriate them'.¹⁸ This position was endorsed by the successive ministers of the colonies until the end of the 1940s.

The travel instructions for settlers, published by the *Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa* (Lisbon Geographic Society) in 1945, explained the characteristics that those who set out to settle in Africa should possess: good psychological and physical conditions to adapt easily to the new environment without regretting or becoming sick. Moreover, the prospective settler should be entrepreneurial and determined to love the new land; he should be healthy, strong and relatively young. He should have some education and, at least, be able to read and write and have a trade, since, otherwise he would not have advantages over the Africans with whom he could not (and should not) compete in manual tasks. To prevent the settler from demeaning and lowering himself in the eyes of the native, he should only travel when he had a sure guarantee of work.¹⁹ While the liberal professionals would always have a sure occupation in the colonies, unskilled workers would hardly find a place there. Hence the latter were not considered suitable for Portuguese colonisation in Angola and Mozambique.

The booklet *Brief Concepts for an Ideal Program of Portuguese Colonisation*, published on the same occasion, conveyed the ideal type of settler: a patriotic individual, provident, exemplary, and moderate, a representative of the civilising race, who embodied 'the noblest Portuguese virtues', an example to the natives.²⁰ And once again, besides the moral qualities, the settlers were supposed to have education and professional qualifications. Only then could a racially and socially cohesive settler community be built, protected from the threats and degrading influences of the surrounding environment and of the natives, aware of its superiority and mission, capable of welcoming newly arrived settlers, of imposing patterns of collective behaviour and ensuring their compliance.²¹

It is important to note that the position favouring a small and qualified overseas migration was not ideologically hegemonic in Portugal, as can be attested by dozens of articles published in the *Boletim Geral das Colónias* and the presentations in the colonial congresses advocating the lifting of legal obstacles to colonial settlement and state investment in the intensive white colonisation.²²

Enclaves of rural Portugal in Africa

Growing anti-colonial sentiment following the Second World War and the international dynamics towards decolonisation, on one hand, and revolts and unrest at local level on the other, imposed new development ideas and practices to reform and legitimise the European colonial empires in Africa. For

that purpose, knowledge, planning and public funding were mobilised by the colonial governments in unprecedented ways.²³ In the early 1950s, Portugal replaced the terms "empire" and "colonies" with "Portuguese overseas" and "overseas provinces" in its Constitutional Law in order to sustain the idea of a multi-continental and multiracial country and to justify Portuguese permanence in Africa. The economic boom, due, in particular, to the rising prices of export commodities such as coffee and cotton, had a positive impact in the colonial economies, especially in Angola and Mozambique. From 1953 onwards, the *Estado Novo* launched a set of *Planos de Fomento para o Ultramar* (Development Plans for the Overseas Provinces), intended for six-year periods, to foster the economic and social development of the overseas territories and its inhabitants.²⁴ In the initial plans the most significant expenditure was allocated to infrastructure, exploitation and use of natural resources, and settlement. Between 1940 and 1960 the European population of Angola rose from 44,000 to 170,000, while in Mozambique it rose from 27,000 to 97,000. On the eve of independence in 1974 the European population was estimated at 324,000 and 190,000 respectively. The rapid increase in the Portuguese migration to Angola and Mozambique is linked to the economic growth of these territories – a definitive pull factor for migration not directed by the state – and the new official discourse and policy concerning demographic colonisation.

The overseas minister Sarmento Rodrigues (1950–1955) illustrated the new policy, stating that the government was willing to support all kind of measures that directly or indirectly could export the metropole's perceived demographic surplus to Angola and Mozambique:

I accept all systems, all contributions; I only see the settlement at the end of all acts. I come to subordinate everything to it, like a master idea. [It's] [p]ure deception. It is only a way – a long way – to reach the greatness of the united Nation. . . . It is possible that not everyone realizes this historical, genetic moment that we are going through.²⁵

Directed agricultural settlement was the only possible way. However, for reasons not yet fully understood, but which are partly related to the ideological foundation of Salazarism and to the agency of actors with real political influence, such as the governor-general of Angola, Agapito da Silva Carvalho, and the engineer António Trigo de Morais, the greatest public investment was directed to the creation of three major enterprises of planned agricultural colonisation: two in Angola (Cela and Cunene) and one in Mozambique (Limpopo). Its purpose was the 'tropical acclimatisation of the rural parish of the Metropole'.²⁶

The *colonato* of Cela, located in the mild Amboim plateau in central Angola, was the first official *colonato* created in Angola during the *Estado Novo*. In terms of its size, the amount of public funds invested, and the number of families installed, it was also the most representative of the "model" *colonatos*. This was reflected in the manner it featured in the public imaginary, with Cela seen as 'a

kind of living room of Angola, where the myth of Portuguese colonisation was exhibited to the admiration of strangers'.²⁷

Silva Carvalho visited the Amboim plateau and was positive about its prospects, particularly after viewing the coffee farm of the Portuguese settler Gonçalves Magalhães in Gambagando (Cela), and hearing the farmer's enthusiasm for the land and the climate.²⁸ As a result, Silva Carvalho issued a directive on 25 February 1949 for the identification and evaluation of areas potentially suitable for settlement and cultivation. With this aim, the *Brigada de Estudos e Reconhecimentos Agronómicos da Repartição dos Serviços de Agricultura de Angola*, headed by the agronomist Ilídio Barbosa, inspected the areas of the administrative posts of Cela, Ebo and Condé, and identified Cela as fulfilling the necessary criteria. Based on his impressions, Barbosa therefore endorsed Cela in his preliminary report, including the recommendation that a detailed survey of the area would need to be undertaken. This, however, was never requested by the colonial government.²⁹ In 1958, the agricultural engineer Lains e Silva exposed the fact that Cela had been selected solely on account of Barbosa's impressions, not scientific analysis:

The idea that encouraged the Brigade to the venture of colonising the Cussoi valley was that of the apparent fertility of the lowland, an appearance derived from the existence of a vast plain of black humic soils, to which irrigation should ensure high productivity. [...] Thus was born the proposal of European colonisation of the Cussoi valley, based on the impressionist recognition, or rather, not to say, somewhat romantic recognition, which hastily led to the conclusion that the lowlands of the Cussoi valley were very fertile.³⁰

Construction of the *colonato* commenced in May 1951 and the first settlers from Portugal's Trás-os-Montes, Ribatejo and Alentejo regions arrived two years later. These pioneers had been selected in the metropole by the engineer Francisco António Teixeira Boaventura of the Angolan Agricultural Services, whom the governor-general of Angola had appointed expressly for this purpose. In identifying potential settlers, the preference was for indigent rural workers with large families drawn from Portugal's most impoverished regions struggling with an excess of labour. Since the utilisation of African labour was prohibited on the *colonato*, selecting candidates with large families guaranteed a readily available labour supply for the cultivation of land. At the same time, recruiting families from already impoverished areas would discourage their return to their homeland.³¹

The first settlers who arrived in Cela were installed in the village of Vimieiro. There, they encountered serious problems: while houses were provided, these had no furniture and no piped water. In terms of the settlement and its activities, the authorities had promised to provide technical assistance and commercial infrastructure to support the farmers – yet none of this was in place. This was compounded by the proscription of the recruitment of native labour. In

these adverse circumstances, several families decided to quit the settlement after just a few months – a development the authorities were careful to keep from becoming public.³²

The regulation of the *colonato* of Cela³³ anticipated that each settler would be assigned a plot of approximately 18 ha, an area considered to be appropriate for exploitation by a medium-sized family without use of African labour.³⁴ Settlers were given cash advances for occupying the farm and investing in construction, implements and cattle. This credit was to be repaid over 25 years, from the fourth year after arrival. Along the margin of the lowland of the Cussoi river, fifteen villages, named after counterparts in Portugal, would be established with 25 to 30 agricultural smallholdings (*casais agrícolas*) each.³⁵ According to the *Missão de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola* (Angolan Mission for Agricultural Surveys), the earmarked lowlands 'did not have an effective agricultural occupation' – yet the Mission also acknowledged that this 'does not mean that, in the traditional African uses and rights, they [the lowlands] were considered without an owner'. In practice, the local African population was dispossessed and removed from the area to make way for the new settlers.³⁶ The British Africanist historian David Birmingham published a short fictional story in 1999 about the removal of Ovimbundu farmers from the valley and the alienation of their land by the Administration of the Cela *colonato*. Birmingham's tale followed the archetypal Angolan peasant Kinyama, whose life personified the social and economic transformations in this community resulting from the policy of planned white colonisation.³⁷ The agricultural engineer Jorge Bravo Vieira da Silva, at the time researcher of the Mission for Overseas Research Studies, recalls the violence of the removal during the enlargement of the *colonato* in 1961 as bulldozers razed native villages. The fact, which he witnessed and denounced to the overseas minister, proves that the space was not only occupied from the agricultural point of view but was also inhabited.³⁸

Moreover, the *colonato* did not live up to expectations. While climate was congenial for human habitation, it was unsuited for the cultivation of either tropical or temperate climate crops. As a result, the settlers produced only poor quality products and had to sell them at very low prices, far below what they would have been accustomed to reach in Portugal. This was compounded by the great distance, or even complete absence, of suitable markets.³⁹

Despite these poor results, the state persisted with the expansion of the *colonatos*, maintaining that the lands were fertile and ascribing any failures to the incompetence of the settlers and the lack of water.⁴⁰ Considering the economic difficulties of the families installed in these villages, the initial theoretical framework was adjusted and adapted to the circumstances; the planned agricultural productions and the agricultural character of some villages were diversified. In 1958, it was decided to settle new families in larger farms, oriented to more profitable crops (the medium-sized farms). Generally, the results were similarly poor.⁴¹

Initially, the sale of products was made through warehouses and the canteen of the *Brigada Europeia* of Cela (a technical agency of the Angola government).

The settlers disliked this system because the debits were discounted; and in 1955–1956, they started selling their agricultural production to the merchants who had in the meantime settled in the village of Santa Comba, and with the truck drivers who transported goods to Luanda.⁴²

Of the first 28 families that went to the *colonato*, only ten remained there in 1959. In 1962–1963, 224 agricultural smallholdings were occupied (containing a total of 1,166 individuals), but in 1967, there were only 192. In April 1970, the vacant houses began to be sold by public auction, and in the following year it was decided to sell 126 houses.⁴³ By 1964, 1.5 million *contos* had been spent in the *colonato* of Cela. According to an estimate, the cost of the installation of each family in Cela was about 2,860 *contos*.⁴⁴

The preparation works of the agricultural explorations and the construction of the villages and the town of Santa Comba attracted hundreds of workers and technicians. Despite some mishaps and indecisions, the State invested large sums in the *colonato* of Cela and in the infrastructures of Santa Comba, which in the medium term became an administrative and commercial centre,⁴⁵ with a hospital with 120 beds, schools for about 500 children, a church (a replica of the one in Santa Comba Dão, place of birth of Salazar), public buildings, residences for workers, a market, a hotel, etc. Thanks to the heavy expenditure and to the creation of an urban centre within it, the *colonato* of Cela evolved and became viable. Orlando Ribeiro's notes of his two visits to the *colonato*, in the beginning and end of the 1960s, account for this evolution.⁴⁶ In 1960, the geographer commented that the experience of Cela was desolate: it had been established in soils that had not been previously studied, it was directed to producing commodities whose sale had not been assured, it resorted to the routine techniques of the ox cart and the plough, the available agricultural machinery was not used (it was not adapted to the land, parts were missing as well as people who knew how to operate it), and the settlers led a very difficult life. In 1969 he was surprised to find 'the *colonato* in better conditions and the town of Santa Comba, transformed into an important services centre, lively and with a varied and prosperous commerce'. Industrial units had already been created in the area for the processing of the agricultural products. Since, in contrast to the initial project, the white settlers were not able to generate sufficient income utilising only family labour, African labour and agricultural machinery were widely used. Irrigation was in development. However, this positive picture continued to be tarnished by the lack of technical assistance, by economically irrational decisions,⁴⁷ and by an arbitrary and authoritarian direction without respect for settlers. In his notebook, Orlando Ribeiro wrote: 'Administrator of Santa Comba: appointed for being tough and therefore to be able to solve the impertinences of the settlers "by slap"! Admirable concept of the head of services and proof of racial indiscrimination. . . . A technician of the *colonato* uses the sjambok, which we saw in the seat of the truck'.⁴⁸

The *colonatos* of Cunene (in the valley of that river, district of Huila, South of Angola) and of Limpopo (in the valley of the same river, district of Gaza, South of Mozambique) were established in 1954. They were based on irrigation and in

conjunction with hydroelectric dams and arose from an idea of the civil engineer Trigo de Morais, who had been the director of the *Junta Autónoma de Obras Públicas e Hidráulica Agrícola* (Autonomous Board of Public Works and Agricultural Hydraulics, 1934–1949), state undersecretary of the overseas (1951–1953) and held the position of general inspector and president of the *Fomento Ultramarino*. According to the engineer and geographer Mariano Feio,⁴⁹

irrigation has very little interest in the tropics (except in arid and semi-arid climates), unlike the Mediterranean climate, because in the latter the hot season is sterilised by the dryness, while in the tropics the rainy season is hot, so the crops suitable to these conditions can be grown with free irrigation from the clouds. Thus, in the plateaus, one can say that only orchards (to pass dry season, which is long) and gardens need watering.

He observed that these differences were not understandable, dominating 'the mystique of the transplantation of Portuguese agriculture – familial, small property, intensive cultivation, work by arm and cattle, further imposed by the strong personality of Trigo de Morais, who had already been the apostle of irrigation in the metropole'.⁵⁰

Unlike the *colonato* of Cela, these new enterprises would include white and black settlers. In the words of Overseas Minister Raul Ventura, the option of including natives 'represents only the disguise of a reality: we could not do a work of exclusive European settlement because the place chosen [. . .] was densely populated with natives and, in our political conceptions (and our fears), native should not be expelled'.⁵¹

Thus, although the proposed law took the *colonato* of Limpopo as a factor of white settlement (3,000 families), the *Câmara Corporativa* (Corporative Chamber) and the *Assembleia Nacional* (National Assembly) immediately drew attention to the problem of the Africans living in the area. The Overseas Ministry together with the General-Government of Mozambique opted for the mixed *colonato*. The undersecretary of state, the engineer Trigo de Morais, in an order addressed to the *Brigada Técnica de Fomento e Povoamento do Limpopo* (Technical Brigade of Development and Settlement of Limpopo), underlines that 'It is a work in which the joint life of whites and blacks has to be fraternally connected by the yearning of the spiritual and material aggrandisement of the Nation'.⁵² Overseas Minister Sarmiento Rodrigues approved this plan.

In the *colonato* of Cunene, Trigo de Morais admitted at the start that the inclusion of the African population would be on a small scale. In his opinion, the native of that area was 'in a depressing degree of backwardness', which did not allow the same involvement as in Limpopo.⁵³ The selection of white settlers to be installed focused on rural families, without any assets or material links to the metropole. Francisco de Almeida e Vasconcelos, who was responsible for the recruitment of settlers to Limpopo and Cunene, informed that 435 individuals were recruited from 'amongst families of rural workers who did not have any material interests that could still tie them to the metropole'.⁵⁴

Before presenting the Cunene colonisation project to the president of the *Conselho*, Trigo de Morais commissioned a study from Professor Botelho da Costa. The result of the study of an area of about 50,000 ha was discouraging: 'There are [only] some spots [of] soils suitable for irrigation, each of which has no more than 2,000 or 3,000 ha', in a total of 8,000 ha. The soils of the Cunene basin were, therefore, far from ideal for irrigation. However, Trigo de Morais managed to convince Salazar and his project was approved.⁵⁵

Located in soils unsuitable for irrigation, in a region of healthy climate, at an altitude of about 1,230 m in southern Angola, the *colonato* was at a great distance from the nearest urban centres: 160 km to Sá da Bandeira, 230 km to Moçâmedes and 280 km to Nova Lisboa.⁵⁶ Established in conjunction with the Cunene hydroelectric dam, it was formed by the town of Folgares and the villages of Freixial, Algés-a-Nova, Castanheira de Pêra and Matala. The first eleven settler families to arrive (a total of 71 people) were from the municipality of Mirandela (Trás-os-Montes). Each settler was given: a house, an irrigated property (5–10 ha), a plot of 0.5 ha in the communal land (it failed shortly after), and a plot of 30 ha of dry land for cattle (this parcel was not distributed). Settlers had to give one-sixth of their income to pay the advances, namely the cost of the irrigation works and the buildings. The distance between the houses and the fields was too long (half an hour on foot).⁵⁷

Both yields (of tobacco, tomato, potato, wheat and rice) and prices were low. The problem of commercialisation turned out to be very acute, because the centres of consumption (modest and locally supplied) were at enormous distances and roads were terrible. The income per settler was lower than in the metropole, although the cost of living in the colony was higher.⁵⁸ The *colonato* services took into account the need to transform the products, having built industrial structures from the start to prepare tobacco; to grind, dehydrate and flour lucerne; tomato paste and packaging.⁵⁹

By the end of 1958, 157 European settler families were established in the *colonato*; in 1963, the number of families had increased to 324; in 1968, it had fallen slightly to 319. The cost of installing an agricultural couple, including irrigation and the distributed assets, was valued at 393.2 *contos*.⁶⁰ To keep the promise of forming a mixed *colonato*, 39 African settlers were installed on an experimental basis, with irrigated plots of land of 2.5 ha and no buildings.⁶¹

The Limpopo irrigation project dated back to 1920, when the valley 'was still bush and poorly explored'.⁶² British engineer John Aylmer Balfour had been invited by the governor Moreira da Fonseca to study the possibilities of irrigation and drainage in the Limpopo valley. Despite the favourable conclusions, the policy of agricultural development through irrigation did not proceed, because it conflicted with the interests of the South African mining industry.⁶³ Likewise, the project of Trigo de Morais, drawn in 1925 and resumed in 1936, was not put into practice. It was thought that the colonial agriculture in the South of Mozambique, even the one irrigated, could not prevent Mozambican labour from emigrating to the Rand mines.⁶⁴

The official colonisation of Limpopo was initiated in 1954, with eight families from Alentejo and two from Madeira. The property distributed to the settlers and the legal regime imposed was very similar to that of the *colonato* of Cunene.⁶⁵ In 1958, when the *I Plano de Fomento* came to an end, 262 families of European settlers and *assimilados* were installed in 13 villages, and 650 families of Africans (who were, however, settled on a tract of communal land), in a total of more than 5,000 individuals.⁶⁶ From 1959, some assimilated African settlers were integrated into the *colonato* as settlers of full right, in other words, with the same conditions as the white settlers. In 1968, the *colonato* already had 10,000 inhabitants, making the municipality of Baixo Limpopo one of most populous in Mozambique. The number of full right African settlers grew considerably: about one-third of the 1,593 settlers installed in the *colonato* were of African origin. But by 1974 that number had diminished to 1,380 settlers, of whom 968 were from the metropole and 412 were African. In a portion of communal lands, 2,584 were African.⁶⁷

Rice, land for grazing and dark tobacco predominated in the irrigated perimeter of the villages upstream and in the centre of the valley; downstream was better suited to the production of cotton, light tobacco, tomato, citrus fruits and textile fibres. From the beginning, the need for preparation and industrialisation of agro-livestock products of the *colonato* was understood, and consequently some industrial structures were built.⁶⁸ However, the settlers' standard of living was generally low, the technical support and medical assistance were insufficient, and the discipline imposed in the *colonato* was too rigid. Despite contracts prohibiting the use of paid labour, Portuguese settlers always did so.⁶⁹

Over the years, the need to increase the area of land distributed to the settlers was recognised. From the initial 4 ha it increased to 10 ha in 1960; and by 1965 it was possible to acquire up to 20 ha. However, the size of the white settlers' lands was always higher than that of Africans, averaging 8.5 ha against 5.9 ha. The introduction of machinery was also done unequally: of the 197 tractors purchased by settlers between 1961 and 1973, only 12 percent belonged to Africans, although the latter were one-third of the total number of settlers; the same unequal distribution existed in the possession of vehicles and agricultural implements.⁷⁰

Regarding the prospect of a second phase of the settlement of the Cunene valley and in the Limpopo valley, under the *II Plano de Fomento*, the Overseas Minister Raul Ventura cautiously evaluated the results obtained so far. He stressed that 'above all it is necessary to avoid a racial conflict in Mozambique', thus reacting to the problems encountered with the natives of the Limpopo area, who did not want to abandon their lands, even if they were promised irrigated plots, which they considered too small. He referred to the high cost of the enterprises – the calculation made by the *Inspecção-Geral de Fomento* relative to the installation cost of each individual European settler pointed to 230 *contos* – but assumed that the colonisation would continue up to the 3,000 families. If the settlement ended in 1958, the expense with each settler would amount to 1,322 *contos*. He suggested that new settlers be installed with the funds from

the first phase, and only afterwards reflect on the convenience of extending the irrigated area.⁷¹

Despite Trigo de Morais's instructions,⁷² the implementation of the irrigation plan of Limpopo implied the expulsion of Africans from their lands (*machambas*), which created discontent. The coexistence of white and African settlers was very problematic, with daily acts of threats, violence and insults. A report by the local police blamed the white settlers sent by the Overseas Ministry for the social tension: they stole livestock from the Africans, took their cattle to graze in the Africans' lands, spent their time in the tavern drinking, and did not take care of hygiene.⁷³ However, many Africans themselves did not blame the settlers for the problems brought by the *colonato*. They saw that the settlers were poor like them and worked the land with their own hands.⁷⁴

The memory that persisted amongst the elders of Guijá shortly after independence about the first Portuguese settlers installed in Limpopo was related to the extreme poverty of the latter. Abner Ngwenga recalled during an interview:

They did not even have shoes when they got here for the first time. The whites here gave them blankets, clothes, and shoes when they disembarked at the port of Lourenco Marques. This was done at night so that the blacks did not see that those settlers were badly dressed and barefoot. In the morning they were put on a train to Guijá.⁷⁵

The Africans' expectation of the appearance of whites did not correspond to what they observed in settlers newly arrived in the *colonato*. The posture and behaviour of the settlers were also a source of strangeness, and generated in some Africans a feeling of superiority:

They did not employ anyone to cultivate for them, for they did it by themselves – husband and wife, with their own hands. [...] So it happened that when a Negro asked his own wife: 'My wife, can you make me this or that' the answer was 'I am not a settler ...' (to make such low services). The blacks looked at the settlers with contempt.

[...] we found it very strange to see the settlers walking from house to house selling cabbages which they carried on their heads in conical baskets, trumpeting 'cabbage, cabbage!' In this area, we did not know that whites could go around selling vegetables [...].

When they arrived here, they saw, for example, that the members of the Chambele family cycled to the *machamba*, while they, the settlers, walked. When they came to Guijá they did not expect to find people with a good standard of living, like the Chambele.⁷⁶

The fact that they were poor, and used poor clothing and footwear, were not very edifying examples for local Africans, and led to the "settler" becoming synonymous with 'poor man from Portugal'.⁷⁷ An administrative inspector alerted in confidential information: 'All our steps are closely followed by the natives

and we have to impose ourselves before them, stand by our actions: barefoot, going to the rivers and living, like them, almost in promiscuity with livestock, we do not impose ourselves'.⁷⁸

The lack of schooling of the Limpopo settlers was also a cause for much criticism from the higher strata of the Portuguese settler society in Mozambique. In the initial plan, one of the admission criteria was that the head of the household knew how to read and write, but in practice illiterate settlers were chosen. Since in the Limpopo area there were *assimilados* Africans, it was often found that it was the latter that read the newspaper and wrote the letters to the settlers.⁷⁹ The situation is reported by Commander Gabriel Teixeira in the *Conselho Ultramarino* session on settlement:

To send there settlers who are only good people but are inferior to the black does not work. In the *colonato* of Limpopo [. . .] many of the settlers [. . .] were simple hoe workers, and despite all the selection made, there were many illiterates there who asked the black to write family letters. [. . .] The black, in his simplicity, solved the problem in the following way: there is the white from Lisbon and the white from the bush of Lisbon.⁸⁰

Professor Silva Rego, however, did not see the illiteracy of settlers as an inconvenience because 'they were as carriers of *lusitanidade* [Portugueseness] as the others'; and considered that 'one of the great virtues of our colonisation was to never be afraid of "poor whites"'.⁸¹ He mentioned that he had seen countrymen from the village of Joane (Minho), who lived in the *muçequês* (slums) of Luanda, living side by side with natives, asking the latter to read them the letters. He argued such a fact 'should not embarrass us' because 'This fusion between destitute whites and Africans is also a condition and a circumstance which will help mutual understanding between one another'.⁸²

A study of the social situation in the *colonatos* of Matala and Limpopo criticised the housing for being poorly adapted to the climate and unhygienic.⁸³ The stables were built next to the houses, which could be acceptable in the metropole, but in Limpopo, where the climate is very hot and the insects are abundant, this was a problem. Moreover, the houses did not respect the norms of location and size followed in the province; and the cemetery was made in impermeable terrain. The study furthermore criticised the distance between houses and plots of land, the settlers' advanced age and low schooling levels and the disparity between boys and girls at marriageable age. It is said that the settlers' daughters did not want, in general, to marry the settlers' sons, because they wanted to climb socially. In this regard, the picture of Limpopo was considered alarming:

[here] is part of the reason why the boys are going to look for the native girls in the neighbourhood. And because, unfortunately, the European does not usually marry the native girl, this results in the revolt of the girl's parents and even of the tribe, as one of the *Régulos da Vizinhaça* said: 'parents can forgive, but the difference in colour that the child presents constantly

reminds the whole tribe of the misconduct and abandonment of which the girl was victim by the child's father'.⁸⁴

In the *colonato* of Cunene, the daughters of the settlers were forbidden to marry officials, so they would marry the sons of settlers, but 'in face of the bad results that followed, both moral and social, the prohibition was lifted'.⁸⁵

Few sources thoroughly provide the voice of the settlers. There is very sparse information in academic or scientific works.⁸⁶ These show that settlers were generally unhappy with their economic situation, were poorly motivated, and it does not seem that they had internalised the civilising mission which propaganda attributed to them. Whereas the journalist of the newspaper *A Província de Angola*, visited the *colonato* of Cela and saw 'that those people, rude and healthy as the old land of Trás-os-Montes had the heart overflowing with joy and recognition',⁸⁷ Orlando Ribeiro, in 1969, wrote in his field notebook: 'The "shown" settlers did not show themselves enthusiastic, how will the others be!'⁸⁸

The negative views of settlers, their own discontent, and the problems that arose in model *colonatos* were always hidden from public opinion. Censorship services cut the articles that denounced the settlers' difficulties.⁸⁹ Information from the *Gabinete de Negócios Políticos* of the Overseas Ministry addressed the discontent of the Cunene settlers, given the low price of the products and the delay in their payment; and the abandonment of the *colonato* by the settlers' children, with the aim of improving their lives, generally heading towards the Cassinga mining region.⁹⁰ Facing the despondency and desertion of many settlers, it was again argued, in a private or confidential way, that the selection had not been rigorous, that they had chosen illiterates, individuals without agricultural experience, who felt superior in Africa and did not want to work alongside the natives. Negative consequences about race relations and the removal of Africans who lived in the occupied areas were also underestimated. But politicians and propaganda insisted on praising the *colonato* of Cela – 'within years with 100 villages, it will be an entirely white district in black Africa, a miniature Portugal inside its largest province from which it will radiate colonizing energy'⁹¹ – and the work of the engineer Trigo de Morais – 'on his own initiative [...] great overseas settlement works were executed, which are true workshops of ethnic-cultural convergence, where the process of lusotropicalism accelerates'.⁹² In this last case, due to the political imperatives dictated by the involvement in the colonial wars, the emphasis was placed on the contribution to the creation of multiracial societies.

Conclusion: contradictions, misapprehensions and paradoxes

The state-connected media and propaganda apparatus of the *Estado Novo* represented the Portuguese settlers of the *colonatos* in a manner which differed significantly from representations in contemporary scientific studies, and from the dispassionate and crude perceptions held by the settlers themselves, as well as by their other white and African neighbours. The *colonatos* in "Portuguese

Africa" were based on multiple misconceptions and paradoxes. They were created in a period of accelerated economic development, anchored in technical and scientific knowledge, with which it was sought to relegitimise the empire against the advance of the anticolonial movement.⁹³ Tiago Saraiva points out that 'to fulfil the vision of a rural Portugal', those enterprises were inserted 'in large state plans where technology plays a fundamental role'.⁹⁴ In turn, science (agronomic, economic and social), though mobilised by political power – a priori or a posteriori – to give the *colonatos* a scientific basis, was often overlooked for opposing idealised or already ongoing measures.

The rigid and subservient discipline that was imposed upon the settlers did not hold them individually and socially responsible. Land ownership, the engine of attachment to land and permanent settlement, remained elusive. Moreover, the delivery of the plots of land was arbitrary, as these could be given and withdrawn by the state.⁹⁵ As a programme of deproletarianisation,⁹⁶ that is, of transforming the rural wage earners of the metropole into well-rooted landowners in Africa, the *colonatos* failed. Unable to raise the living conditions of the populations involved, they experienced high drop-out rates. The settlers' children, when they became adults, typically sought jobs in the cities. The goal of securing national sovereignty and security in interior areas of Angola and Mozambique by populating them with white settlers in the *colonatos* was compromised.

As I have argued elsewhere:

settlers who were mobilised for the official *colonatos* occupied a *sui generis* place within the group of the so-called colonisers. Despite all the rhetoric, propaganda and idealisation of the rural settler, he was always a minority in the whole of the overseas migration and did not correspond to the average social profile of the Portuguese who fixated in Africa: with higher educational and professional qualifications, mostly urban and working in commerce, services and public administration.⁹⁷

The settlers who established themselves in the cities, that is, the bulk of the white Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, did not identify with the rural settlers. In fact, they perceived themselves as cosmopolitan, enterprising, and successful. The children of settlers, the so-called 'second-rate Portuguese',⁹⁸ heavily concentrated in urban centres, open to cultural interactions and international mass consumption,⁹⁹ were still less likely to identify with villagers, hoe workers, regarded as caricatures of an archaic Portugal. That difference was perceived and emphasised by some of the colonised, who did not see the distinctive marks of racial and civilizational superiority on the rural settlers.

Notes

- 1 This chapter was translated from Portuguese by Ana Rita Amaral, with the assistance of Duncan Money.
- 2 Cooper and Stoler, 'Introduction'.

- 3 Stoler and Cooper, 'Between a Metropole and a Colony', 6–7.
- 4 The average Portuguese settler in Angola and Mozambique in the mid-twentieth century moved spontaneously and without state assistance, lived in the major cities, had schooling levels above the national average, and worked in the trade and services sector. Cf. Castelo, 'Colonial Migration'.
- 5 The archival sources used for this chapter are housed in Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo (AHM); Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon (AHU); Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, Lisbon (AHD) and Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (ANTT). The printed primary sources and the personal archive of Orlando Ribeiro were consulted in the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP).
- 6 For details on the regulations controlling the migration of Portuguese nationals to Angola and Mozambique, see Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 86–87, 128, 134, 136.
- 7 Ribeiro, *Regras e preceitos de higiene colonial ou conselhos práticos aos colonos e emigrantes que se destinam às nossas colónias do Ultramar*, 2nd edition; Ribeiro, *Guia higiénico do colono nas terras mais insalubres da África central*; Nascimento, *Questões medico-coloniaes relativas à colonização Europeia no Planalto de Mossamedes* (Huila: Typ. Missão Catholica, 1891); Nascimento, *A colonização do Planalto de Benguela*.
- 8 Ferreira Martins, *Ensino Agrícola Colonial: Comunicação Apresentada ao Primeiro Congresso de Agricultura Colonial, Porto, 1934* (Porto: Tip. Sociedade Papeleira, 1934), 5.
- 9 Camacho, *Questões Nacionais*, 83.
- 10 Ibid., 183.
- 11 Costa, *Estudos de Economia Nacional*, 172–173.
- 12 Matos, *A Província de Angola*, 28–29.
- 13 Alto Comissariado da República, *Estatuto Orgânico dos Serviços de Colonização: Aprovado por Diploma Legislativo, n.º 704 de 9 de Março de 1928* (Luanda: Imprensa Nacional, 1928), foreword.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Monteiro, 'Inimigos da colonização. Discurso proferido na inauguração da Exposição Colonial do Porto, em Janeiro de 1934', *O Mundo Português*, 5 (1934), 353–361.
- 16 Monteiro, *Os portugueses na colonização contemporânea*, 6; Monteiro, *Para uma Política Imperial*, 59.
- 17 Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas*, 159, 163.
- 18 Monteiro, *Directrizes duma Política Ultramarina*, 27.
- 19 Santos, *Como o Colono Se Deve Preparar*.
- 20 Santos, *Breves Conceitos para um Ideário de Colonização Portuguesa*.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 78–79.
- 23 See Hodge and Hödl, 'Introduction'.
- 24 First Development Plan: 1953–58; Second Development Plan: 1959–64; Intercalary Development Plan: 1965–67; Fourth Development Plan: 1968–73.
- 25 Rodrigues, *Unidade da Nação Portuguesa*, x–xi.
- 26 Ministério do Ultramar, Missão de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola, *Recenseamento Agrícola de Angola* (Luanda: MIAA, 1964), 14.
- 27 Ribeiro, *A Colonização de Angola*, 183. Orlando Ribeiro, a geographer and professor at the Faculdade de Letras in Lisbon, visited the *colonato* of Cela in two campaigns of the *Missão de Estudos de Geografia Física e Humana do Ultramar Português*.
- 28 Dala, 'O Colonato europeu da Cela é uma magnífica realidade que atrai as atenções do mundo', *Jornal de Angola*, June 1955, 2.
- 29 Lains e Silva, *Aspectos Agronómicos e Económico-Sociais do Colonato da Cela* (Lisbon: Missão de Estudos Agronómicos do Ultramar, 1961), 7–8.
- 30 Ibid., 8.
- 31 See AHU, Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete do Ministro, Proc. 70, Sala 2, no. 280, Telegram from the Overseas Minister to the Angola Governor-General, 16 February 1953.

- AHU, Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete do Ministro, Proc. 44 A, vol. I, Sala 2, no. 132, Portugal de Além-Mar – Emigração inopinada do colonato europeu de Cela – Falando com os colonos que regressam (Frederico Filipe, correspondente de *O Comércio do Porto*, em Benguela)', Secção de Expediente e Cifra do Ministério do Ultramar, 3 November 1953.
- 32 See AHU, Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete do Ministro, Proc. 44 A, vol. I, Sala 2, no. 132, Portugal de Além-Mar – Emigração inopinada do colonato europeu de Cela – Falando com os colonos que regressam (Frederico Filipe, correspondente de *O Comércio do Porto*, em Benguela)', Secção de Expediente e Cifra do Ministério do Ultramar, 3 November 1953.
- 33 'Diploma Legislativo n.º 2550, de 5 de maio de 1954', *Boletim Oficial de Angola*, 18, 5 May 1954.
- 34 The intention was to prove that European families could be self-sufficient in Africa. This prohibition was contested by the settlers and was lifted in 1963.
- 35 The smallholding defined as the house serving as dwelling for the settler family with attached agricultural land, was indivisible and allotted to a head of family from the metropole.
- 36 Ministério do Ultramar, Missão de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola, *Recenseamento*, 13. This body was created by the Portuguese government to supply data for the 1960 World Census of Agriculture launched by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.
- 37 The story is titled 'Colonialism in Angola: the Kinyama's Experience' in Birmingham, *Portugal and Africa*, 122–132.
- 38 'Depoimento de Jorge Bravo Vieira (2016)', audio recorded by Cláudia Castelo, Paris, 27.09.2017. Interview transcript, 19.
- 39 Lains e Silva, *Aspectos Agronómicos e Económico-Sociais*, 13–14; Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 38–50.
- 40 Lains e Silva, *Aspectos Agronómicos e Económico-Sociais*, 15.
- 41 See ANTT, Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/UL-40, pt.3, Memorando sobre a situação das fazendas médias da Cela em fins de Julho de 1963. AHU, Ministério do Ultramar, Direcção-Geral de Economia, Grupo de Trabalho de Povoamento, Pareceres sobre diversos estudos, vol. 3, Information no. 2/DP72, de 13.6.1972, *Junta Provincial de Povoamento de Angola*, which states that, in October 1971, in face of the economic failure of Cela's medium-sized farms, the concessionaires requested the Overseas Minister suspend the taxes they were subjected to until an impartial investigation of the situation was made.
- 42 Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 37.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 44.
- 44 Bender, 'Planned Rural Settlements in Angola'; Bender, *Angola sob o Domínio Português*, 160.
- 45 On Santa Comba becoming a town in 1970, see 'Santa Comba, capital do povoamento, é elevada a cidade', 38–41.
- 46 Ribeiro, *A Colonização de Angola*, 184–185.
- 47 Orlando Ribeiro reports that the *colonato's* administration distributed dairy cattle bought in Denmark to farmers, while there were breeds better suited to local conditions in South Africa. Ribeiro, *A Colonização de Angola*, 185.
- 48 BNP, Arquivo de Cultura Portuguesa, Espólio de Orlando Ribeiro, Caderno de campo de Angola, fls. 5–6.
- 49 Mariano Feio studied civil engineering at the Instituto Superior Técnico, and studied Geology, Paleontology and Geomorphology in Germany. He collaborated with Orlando Ribeiro in the *Missão de Geografia Física e Humana do Ultramar Português*, conducting several fieldwork expeditions in Angola, namely carrying out a geomorphological study of the river Cunene. Daveau, 'A obra geográfica de Mariano Feio'.

- 50 Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 59.
- 51 ANTT, Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/UL-63, pt. 2, Document signed by Raul Ventura about the preparation of the *II Plano de Fomento*, dated 22 June 1957, fl. 9.
- 52 Cited in Almeida, 'Colonato do Limpopo', 39.
- 53 AHU, Ministério do Ultramar, Gabinete do Ministro, Proc. Correspondência sobre o Plano de Fomento (1951–1959), Sala 2, no. 35, Letter dated 31 September 1954, to the Overseas Minister.
- 54 AHU, Inspeção Geral de Fomento Ultramarino, Proc. 3-A, Sala 3, no. 3200, Letter dated 31 December 1955 to the Engineer Inspector General of Development.
- 55 Ricardo, *Rui Pinto Ricardo*, 12.
- 56 Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 59.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 60.
- 58 Margarida Silva e Castro, *Monografia do Colonato do Cunene (Matala)* (Luanda: MIAA, 1971), 119 ff., *apud* Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 62.
- 59 Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 62.
- 60 Barata, 'O aproveitamento do Cunene', 62, *apud* Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 60. Bender estimates that the establishment of each family costed about 715 *contos* (one '*conto*' was one hundred *escudos*, the Portuguese currency at the time). Bender, *Angola*, 160.
- 61 Feio, *As Causas do Fracasso*, 60.
- 62 Covane, *O Trabalho Migratório e a Agricultura*, 223.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 147.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 150.
- 65 See Presidência do Conselho, Secretariado Técnico, *Relatório da Execução do II Plano de Fomento Ultramar: 1959–1964* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1970), 813–815.
- 66 Portugal, Presidência do Conselho, Secretariado Técnico, *Relatório*, 809, 812.
- 67 Hermele, *Land Struggles and Social Differentiation*, 44.
- 68 Portugal, Presidência do Conselho, Secretariado Técnico, *Relatório*, 810–811.
- 69 Hermele, *Land Struggles and Social Differentiation*, 42.
- 70 *Ibid.*
- 71 ANTT, Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/UL-63, pt. 2, Document signed by Raul Ventura, 22 June 1957.
- 72 See the order of the Inspector-General Trigo de Moraes, 25 May 1953, which begins: 'It would have been a great error to start the action of the *Brigada* in the Limpopo Valley with the expulsion of the Africans from their villages (*sanzalas*) and their lands (*machambas*) . . .', AHM, Fundo do Governo-geral, L/10, cx. 489, Confidential letter from the Administrator of Bilene, dated Macia, 12 February 1957.
- 73 *Apud* Covane, *O Trabalho*, 227.
- 74 Hermele, *Land Struggles and Social Differentiation*, 38.
- 75 Manghezi, *Trabalho Forçado e Cultura Obrigatória do Algodão*, 81.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 81–82.
- 77 Moreira, 'Aspectos económicos e sociais', 258.
- 78 Cited in Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 151.
- 79 Covane, *O Trabalho*, 226.
- 80 AHU, Ministério do Ultramar, Conselho Ultramarino, Actas da Sessão Plenária de Outubro de 1965, fl. 13.
- 81 This statement contradicts the position taken by A.A. Mendes Correia in the discussion about the prior warning of Armando Cândido on the demographic excess related to emigration and colonisation at the *Assembleia Nacional*. The deputy, a physical anthropologist and director of the *Escola Superior Colonial*, considered it 'a crime to create in Africa legions of white people, human rags, degraded to a more miserable condition than that of the rudest and backward blacks.' Mendes Correia, *Aumento da População, Colonização, Emigração*, 15.
- 82 AHU, Conselho Ultramarino, 1965, fl. 21.

- 83 ANTT, Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/UL-38, pt. 3, M. Luísa Ressano Garcia, 'Elementos de estudo dos colonatos do Limpopo e do Cunene para um subsequente plano de Serviço Social' (Typewritten document, December 1959).
- 84 Ibid., 18–19.
- 85 Ibid., 52.
- 86 For example, Almeida, 'Colonato do Limpopo'; Castro, *Monografia do Colonato do Cunene*; Moreira, 'Aspectos económicos e sociais'.
- 87 Dala, 'O Colonato', 2.
- 88 BNP, Arquivo de Cultura Portuguesa, Espólio de Orlando Ribeiro, Caderno de campo de Angola, fl. 164.
- 89 See AHD, MU/GNP/158/pt. 17, Note no. 766, Matias da Silva, 18 March 1971, about the 'cuts' made in a report on the village of Senhora da Graça in the *colonato* of Limpopo, which denounced the lack of water and the discontent of the settlers.
- 90 See AHD, MU/GNP/163/pt. 12C, Information no. 2689, J. Catalão, 11 November 1968.
- 91 Rebelo, *Angola na África*, 121.
- 92 AHD, MU/GNP/161/pt. 7, Comment no. 178, 1 August 1967, José Alberto Pereira Monteiro, titled "Um servidor da Portugalidade".
- 93 Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*, 7.
- 94 Saraiva, 'Paisagens Tecnológicas'.
- 95 'As we are entitled to give land, we can also take it away.' BNP, Arquivo da Cultura Portuguesa, Espólio de Orlando Ribeiro, Caderno de campo de Angola, fl. 10. Emphasis added.
- 96 A discussion about the logic of deproletarianization of rural wage earners carried out in the south of continental Portugal by the *Junta de Colonização Interna*, in Silva, 'A Propriedade e os Seus Sujeitos', 28.
- 97 Castelo, 'O 'branco do mato de Lisboa', 27–28. For a demographic and social characterization of the Portuguese who settled in Angola and Mozambique between the end of World War II and the eve of decolonization, see Castelo, *Passagens para a África*, 174–214.
- 98 This category is mainly symbolic and without translation or legal implication.
- 99 Cardão, 'Fado Tropical', 357.