7 Labour and mobility on Rhodesia's railways

The 1954 firemen's strike

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Introduction

Doris Lessing's *The Grass is Singing* vividly captures the reality of many socially aspirant Europeans who settled in Southern Rhodesia. Freshly arrived from England, Tony Marston is hired as a farm manager for Dick and Mary Turner, poor whites plagued by years of agricultural failure and social isolation. Tony's unbridled optimism for his own future is reflected in his belief that he will soon enough profitably run his own farm. The most successful farmer in the district, Charlie Slatter, a "proper cockney" who started life as a grocer's assistant in London, makes no attempt to hide his resentment towards Tony whose accent, education and relatively liberal racial views mark him as an outsider. Charlie's unease over Tony's presence intensifies when African farm labourers rush to inform him that Mary's dead body has been found on the Turners' property.¹ While Tony, the nearest European to the scene, feels "insulted" that he had been overlooked by the African farm labourers, Charlie and the police sergeant present to investigate the death 'seemed to think it right and natural that he should be bypassed in this fashion, as if his newness to the country unfitted him for any kind of responsibility'. Tony, suspicious that Mary Turner had pursued a sexual relationship with her African domestic servant, is cowed into silence by the two men. Information of this nature was feared to cause irrevocable damage to white prestige and lower the status of all whites in African eyes and Tony retreats to the city; alienated, angered and painfully aware that in order to prevent his permanent ostracism from the settler community he must rapidly adopt certain racialised behaviours and attitudes.²

The interactions between Tony Marston and the established settlers in Lessing's novel speak to a central tension at the heart of settler colonialism in Southern Rhodesia: the viability of a white settler state was reliant upon the mobility of white persons, but this movement simultaneously threatened to disrupt established racialised practices and undermine settler cohesion. Largely set in a farming district, the novel has also arguably contributed to the enduring image of white settlement in Rhodesia as a predominantly rural phenomenon. The notion of the fundamentally agrarian nature of white experience has been strengthened in recent years due to the centrality of white farmers

in struggles over land in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s. This, in turn, has been reflected in the increasing number of studies which have attempted to grapple with issues of belonging, privilege and power in Zimbabwe through a critical framework of whiteness.³ The best of this work has been attentive to the complex processes in the creation of white racial identity, has stressed the diversity of the white population, their backgrounds, political beliefs and experiences, and has acknowledged that racial privilege and power is constructed, claimed and performed in different ways across the settler population.⁴ However, much of this work has perpetuated homogenising tendencies evident in earlier Manichaean colonial narratives.⁵ Despite some scholars recognising that land ownership was not the sole or primary foundation of white power and privilege,⁶ the critical literature which has emerged on settlers in recent years has mostly been bounded by a chronological focus on independent Zimbabwe, has been dominated by rural, politically liberal and middle-class whites, and has failed to investigate broader social differentiation amongst settlers.

The Central African Federation period offers historians an opportunity to examine how white identity was created and claimed during a period of increased immigration and expansion. Imperialism was underpinned by the movement of persons, commodities, knowledge, ideologies and cultures, but paradoxically this movement was accompanied by essentialising processes that sought to create fixed racial categories, erect barriers to movement and concretise national and imperial borders.⁷ Rhodesian authorities encouraged European settlement while placing strict restrictions on the type of white settler it allowed in, refusing those it deemed to be either nationally, ethnically, politically or economically "undesirable".⁸ Settlers also policed themselves in internal processes of regulation. Established settlers instructed new arrivals in "proper" racialised behaviours and the particular standards demanded of white skin in Southern Africa.⁹ Alison Shutt and Tony King have stressed that the transient nature of the settler population meant that re-education was a constant task. Cecil Rhodes, early frontier myths, hostility to apartheid and promotion of the multiracial franchise as a central part of settler identity became important in the socialisation of new immigrants. Yet the success of this settler socialisation has been overstated.¹⁰ While settler ideologues stressed a shared culture, politics and way of life in order to highlight the supposed incommensurability of racial groups, restrictions on settlement, processes of internal regulation and pronouncements of racial unity ultimately failed to create a cohesive white community. Alois Mlambo has noted that post-war immigration of middle-class professionals created differences between "Old Rhodesians" and new arrivals with the latter holding relatively liberal racial ideas, preferring paternalist multiracialism than outright segregation and opposition to majority rule.¹¹ Donal Lowry has acknowledged migrants with a more conservative outlook who desired to escape the British post-war Attlee Labour government as well as the "Bengal Chancers" and "Poonafontein Rifles" who arrived in Rhodesia from newly independent India.¹² Nevertheless, historians have paid less attention to the emigration of lower class whites during this period.

Labour historians of Southern Africa have increasingly interrogated the formation of the highly racialised identities of white workers across Empire and the global processes central to class formation and struggle.¹³ While attentive to the ways in which politics, ideologies and identities were circulated and co-produced within these imperial flows of labour in Southern Rhodesia, the focus of this chapter lies not on the cohesion or common ideology produced by this movement, but in the fragmentation caused by international flows of labour; the ways in which European mobility aggravated divisions *within* white labour and settler society more broadly. The expansion of certain industries and high turnover of labour meant that new migrants, social groups, ideas and ideologies were continually being introduced into the labour force. These new additions meant that the socialisation of new arrivals into normative behaviours was a continual process; but it also meant that existing white workers' identities, cultures and politics were constantly modified. This chapter probes this dynamism, failed settler socialisation and competing notions of idealised white behaviours through exploring an under-examined strike of European firemen on Rhodesia Railways in 1954. For white railway workers, the railways represented more than the mobility of goods and persons, they also held the promise of upwards social mobility in the settler community. However, many of the immigrants who moved from the UK failed to transcend the borders of class and status they were trying to escape. While the 1954 strike ostensibly emanated over pay and conditions, it was also fuelled by an assertion of certain rights and privileges that framed white workers' identity, including the right to organise. Certainly, the strike and subsequent fallout demonstrates the extent to which the settler government feared that white labour had a latent radicalism which could be stirred into frenzied industrial action; that they could join with African labour or simply give African labour "ideas", and shows that the Rhodesian government was prepared to use considerable force in disciplining white labour if it overstepped established boundaries. As such this chapter supports the contention of Jon Lunn and Ian Phimister that white workers engaged in struggles over the labour process and the organisation of work beyond the formalisation of the colour bar under the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, but also militates against the tendency of existing research to present reified, albeit internally differentiated, white worker ideologies, beliefs and cultures by stressing the dynamism of class formation and the ongoing and contested production of white worker identity.¹⁴

The RRWU

The 1954 strike was led by dissatisfied members of the largest European trade union operating on the railways, the Rhodesia Railway Workers Union (RRWU). The RRWU had been established in 1916 and sought to unite European men from all grades on the railways but favoured the employment of white British men and struggled against non-British Europeans, European women and most importantly, African men. It attempted to create a hypermasculine

identity based upon notions of respectability and pride in work and this professed identity was most evident in the RRWU's monthly journal, the *Rhodesian Railway Review*. The *Review* reported on local union news, political and economic developments in Rhodesia and the British Empire more broadly, trade union struggles and Labour Party developments in Britain as well as day-to-day railway life, individuals and their successes, deaths, and promotions, news of football leagues, picnics, dinner dances and social functions organised by railway wives. Importantly, the *Review* also acted as a medium through which the trade union bureaucracy attempted to shape and regulate white worker identity and behaviour. Editorials and articles in the *Review* most clearly represent the views and attitudes of the trade union bureaucracy. Although on occasion the editors of the *Review* noted that they had heavily edited or refused to print particular submissions from members that they either did not agree with or found to be libellous, dissenting voices were not entirely erased from its contents. The contestation over trade union politics and white worker identity more generally is evidenced most clearly in its letter pages and from notes written by locally elected branch scribes. This chapter also uses RRWU Conference minutes, internal investigations and correspondence of the Railway Administration, British and Rhodesian newspapers, correspondence between the Federation's British high commissioner and the Commonwealth Office and Southern Rhodesian legislative assembly debates to analyse divisions within white labour as well as the competing responses of British and Rhodesian state officials, employers and the public to the strike and the idealised behaviours of white settlers more generally.

Overview of the strike

Envisioned as a barrier against majority rule and a route to independence and dominion status by white settlers and African critics alike, the short-lived Central African Federation joined together the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in 1953. The Federation witnessed a period of unprecedented growth. European immigration, African urbanisation and participation in wage labour had dramatically increased during the Second World War and continued apace in the post-war years.¹⁵ Established labour practices were destabilised by these interrelated phenomena. Struggles over the demarcation of white and black work and the differential racialised standard of living were reflected within industrial action taken by both African and white workers over the period.¹⁶ In Southern Rhodesia European railway workers had not taken strike action since 1929 and the last significant European strike had taken place in 1932 in the building trade. Significantly, both of these occurred prior to the introduction of arbitration machinery under the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, which, alongside formalising the European monopoly of skilled jobs, had effectively prohibited strikes in the colony. The 1929 strike had been seen as the last whimper of a weakened European trade union movement which had faced a concerted onslaught from employers in the early 1920s after a period of successful militancy following the

First World War.¹⁷ Despite never fully recovering to its former strength, by the time of the strike in 1954, the RRWU had a membership of 5,728, which represented around three quarters of all European staff employed on the railways north of Bulawayo.¹⁸

In the lead up to 1954, tensions had been building amongst low paid workers for a considerable period. The RRWU had entered arbitration in February 1953 and while a basic pay increase was won for all grades, the arbitration received a mixed response from RRWU members. In particular, married men claimed they were unable to support their families on basic rates of pay.¹⁹ The high number of resignations on the railways fuelled the belief that the Administration were bringing out experienced workers with families from the UK under false pretences. For white railwaymen, an appropriate wage was determined just as much by age and marital status as it was by race and gender. The RRWU argued that men with years of experience and skill were being hired in low skilled work.²⁰ The existence of this layer of whites failing to attain white standards of living within the railway community threatened to bring down the prestige of railway workers more generally. White workers were keen to present an image of social mobility and respectability which demanded ensuring that every white person employed by the railways was able to project an air of prosperity and achievement. Lower skilled and lower paid positions were often understood to be appropriate only for younger, single men from which they would gradually progress after gaining relevant experience. However, staff shortages had forced the Administration to hire older experienced men in the shunting grade, which was considered a "learner" grade. As a result the fireman's wage of £39 per month did not match what many older Europeans expected as a basic rate.²¹

The Railway Administration and RRWU were forced to repeatedly state that the firemen could not take action outside the arbitration machinery and threatened that any man taking illegal strike action would be prosecuted.²² Nevertheless, firemen continued to call for strike action and there were calls from some quarters to form a new independent railway union.²³ As agitation over pay from the firemen's section increased, Charles Robert Taylor, a British trade unionist and fireman who had been resident in the colony for thirteen months, was singled out as a ringleader of the continuing dissent and was expelled from the RRWU on the 31 May 1954. Particularly unnerving to the Administration and the government was the aptitude Taylor had shown in organising and rallying the men. On the first day of the planned strike the CID searched Taylor's house and found what they claimed to be a 'draft manifesto of standard communist type' which provided grounds for his arrest on the 4 June. Another new arrival from Britain, W. Raeburn, was also arrested.²⁴ On hearing this news, firemen voted to carry on with the strike at midday on the same day and Taylor was swiftly deported to the UK.

The strike went ahead in spite of interventions by the Railway Administration, the RRWU's executive and the government, and began in Salisbury where it was reported that all but two of the 125 firemen had joined the

strike. By the 5 June the strike had spread to Northern Rhodesia and police patrolled the railway line near Livingstone after it was claimed that railwaymen had attempted to sabotage the line. However, strike leaders claimed to know nothing of this and 'offered to protect the railway from sabotage if necessary'.²⁵ At Bulawayo, while fewer firemen were reported to join the strike, rail traffic was reported to be at "a standstill".²⁶ While initially consisting solely of firemen, the strike gradually extended to include some sympathetic engine drivers and shunters who were angered by the heavy-handed response. They were particularly irred by the arrests of Taylor and Raeburn and the reaction of the Administration who had automatically dismissed seventy-four of the firemen who had taken strike action.²⁷ The firemen refused to negotiate with the president of the RRWU when he met with them to convince them to return to work and demanded separate representation as they distrusted the leadership who had seemingly aided the state to deport Taylor.²⁸ Garfield Todd, on the other hand, refused to negotiate with the strikers and would only deal with official RRWU representatives. The strikers eventually agreed to return to work on conditions of no victimisation, a fair trial for Taylor and a special commission into their claims. While strikers at Salisbury eventually agreed to end the strike on the 7th, men at Bulawayo refused to trust reports of men returning to work from the RRWU leadership and management, and as a result did not return to work until the 10th, only after Salisbury strikers had been flown out to Bulawayo to confirm the reports.²⁹

Explanations of the strike

The Administration, RRWU executive and the rank and file provided competing explanations as to the strike's causes. Management maintained that the ring-leaders of the strike had no concerns over firemen's pay.³⁰ They were accused of taking advantage of ill feeling in order to have a holiday, and it was noted that it was not entirely 'irrelevant that [the] strike came day or two after payment of wages for May and coincided largely with Whitsun holidays'.³¹ The RRWU Executive Committee asserted that the initial 1953 arbitration had been generally successful and claimed that despite winning concessions and pay rises for some of the men, the firemen would not listen to "reasonable argument".³² Two Executive Committee members described their own attempt to intervene in a meeting of firemen to persuade them not to strike:

One [fireman] had got up and said: 'Mr. Adams and Mr. Longden have persuaded us that we are wrong, but it is too late. Tomorrow we strike. Don't we chums?' and they had said yes. They would not listen to reason; the strike had all been arranged.³³

The RRWU leadership repeatedly described the behaviour of the strikers in ways which served to create an image of an injudicious, malleable mob. The men, it was argued, had no real grievance but had been riled up by Taylor and

his communist propaganda. Taylor was portrayed as a demagogue who did not care about the firemen's concerns and never turned up to branch meetings, but who was obsessed with striking and had deviously tricked the men into his own agenda which included ousting the general secretary and appointing himself as leader.³⁴ Although Charles Taylor received support from the British National Union of Mineworkers and other trade unionists in Britain who had written to the secretary of state for the colonies to protest Taylor's treatment, solidarity within Southern Rhodesia was less forthcoming. Certainly, many in the RRWU did not only refuse to support Taylor but actively cheered his deportation. The rapidity with which Taylor was deported without trial emanated from deep-seated fears of the Administration and government that white workers could hold the country hostage through paralysing the railways. The strike was repeatedly framed in the Rhodesian press as an attack on Rhodesia itself. Addressing the annual congress of the British Empire Service League, Garfield Todd urged the audience to 'fight the foe within our borders' and declared that the strike had followed a 'communistic pattern'.³⁵ The government belatedly justified the deportation on the basis that Taylor had lied to enter the colony; Taylor's wife had confirmed he had been a member of the British Communist Party from 1943 to 1953 and a propaganda secretary for a local branch in Derbyshire, all of which were used to discredit Taylor and the firemen's demands.³⁶

The fireman's strike had received widespread coverage in the British press. In the *Daily Worker* Taylor warned that

Rhodesian reactionaries haven't heard the last of Charles Taylor. I shall do my best to tell as many British trade unionists as I can about conditions in Rhodesia. I promised the lads I left behind that I would do this, and do it I will.³⁷

The publicity that Taylor had garnered in his defence was seen as having the potential to jeopardise essential recruitment of skilled workers from the UK. Taylor had returned to Britain and openly challenged the myth of social mobility in Rhodesia. He hit back at the RRWU leadership as 'smug and lazy', accusing them of ignoring the rank and file and effectively acting as part of management rather than as the representatives of labour. According to Taylor, part of the reason why firemen took action was due to the Administration's offer for improved conditions being restricted to the "UK men", while Afrikaans speaking men who made up half of the frontplate staff were offered no improvements. Taylor described the offer as a "disgraceful" suggestion which 'would have worsened racial feeling and destroyed all hopes of unity for a generation' and he cheered that when the strike eventually came, UK and Afrikaans men walked out together. Taylor also vocally criticised the conditions of Coloured prisoners in the Cape where he was stationed before deportation to Britain. He described the prisoners being 'stripped and whipped with metal-tipped canes' as 'the most degrading sight I have ever seen'.³⁸ He publicised

that men were in debt and that new arrivals were disgruntled at their low pay and often 'did not know where their next meal would come from'. Taylor further described his own experiences in damning terms: 'one day I did the unmentionable thing in Rhodesia: I borrowed money from my "houseboy" to buy milk for the kiddies'.³⁹ Taylor understood that he was contravening white standards of behaviour and offered a view of reliance and dependence upon African domestic staff; an image Rhodesian white labour had put considerable effort into emphatically denying.

The Executive Committee used anecdotes of Taylor's communism and liberal racial attitudes to justify their actions towards the strikers and attempt to erode the fireman's loyalty to him. Mr. Beirowski, a Salisbury delegate at the 1954 RRWU Annual Conference, recalled that he had met Taylor in the Zawi mess room where Taylor was talking about the recent strike of Africans at Wankie and had denounced the Government's actions to break the strike. Beirowski reported that he had challenged Taylor and asked, 'Do you realise what you are saying as regards the African? Do you want the African to upset the country like that and just do as he likes, violence and breaking the law and acting illegally?' Yet according to Beirowski, Taylor had continued to defend the rights of Africans to strike and even declared that 'my views about the African are these. When my daughter grows up, if the African is fit to have my daughter, he can have my daughter'.⁴⁰ Protecting white women was an axiomatic element of white masculinity within Rhodesia. By symbolically offering up his own daughter to an African man, Taylor had transgressed a constitutive element of settler manhood. Notably, it was not the physical occurrence of interracial sex which was being denounced by Beirowski, but rather Taylor's utterance of its acceptability. Taylor's beliefs and attitudes were as much on trial as his actions. As research into the production of settler boundaries has shown, settler colonial states desired not just to regulate the behaviour of their subjects; but to make them 'think and feel' in particular racialised ways.⁴¹ Taylor clearly knew the accepted boundaries of racialised interaction, recognising that his borrowing money from his servant was "unmentionable", yet he did not feel requisite humiliation to hide this transgression; neither did he apparently shy away from public declarations of support for interracial sex or African militancy. Whereas Lessing's Tony Marston was successfully shamed into silence by established settlers over the relationship between a white woman and African that he had seen, it was precisely Taylor's lack of shame or sense of racial propriety which marked him out as dangerous. For the RRWU, their broader reputation was at stake by being seen to tolerate such views; Taylor was recognised 'as a serious threat to union prestige'.⁴²

Taylor's refusal to act in ways expected of white men in Rhodesia was directly linked to his previous political association with the CPGB. Anti-communism was a central tenet of white Rhodesian political ideology throughout the period of minority rule.⁴³ The 1922 Rand Revolt in South Africa made a lasting impression in white Rhodesia. In the first decades of settlement, white workers and trade unions were repeatedly accused of revolutionary communism

by employers, MPs and the press.⁴⁴ One of the first general secretaries of the RRUW, Jack Keller, was nicknamed the 'Lenin of Rhodesia' and European trade unions and the Rhodesia Labour Party had to repeatedly state that they harboured neither communist nor Bolshevik sympathies.⁴⁵ This fear of white labour upheaval and international Bolshevism never entirely dissipated. During the Second World War the presence of European servicemen, refugees and enemy internees heightened suspicion of communist infiltration.⁴⁶ When Communist Party recruitment propaganda surfaced in the colony during the late 1940s, it was blamed upon the increasing presence of "newcomers".⁴⁷

Communist ideas were dangerous not only because of the wider Cold War context and threat of industrial upheaval, but because they were perceived to encourage the erosion of racial boundaries. The propaganda which surfaced during the 1940s was particularly reviled as it embodied 'the dangerous peculiarities of the communistic thinkers . . . they are firm believers in equality of race and colour'.⁴⁸ The presence of communist individuals was thus seen as having a wider corroding effect on the racial order of settler society. Racial thinking had to be learnt and while white labour's structural position engendered animosity towards black workers and inhibited the likeliness of solidarity, such racial attitudes could not be taken for granted. The newcomer who had not yet been adequately drilled in the racial protocols expected of Rhodesian labour had to be prevented from diluting the union's attitude to African workers. This in part reflected dominant ideas that established settlers had intricate ways of knowing the African population unobtainable to the newly arrived settler. This was reiterated by many new arrivals. Sam Wright, a railwayman employed from 1950 to 1976, acknowledged that while recent settlers could achieve amicable relations with Africans they 'never quite had the same association as those African born' who possessed an 'insight into the ways and nature of the Africans'. Wright commented that the more recent immigrants displayed an 'unfortunate variety of attitudes' with complete disregard for the 'boundaries of personal contact that was acceptable'. Unlike the established settler, newcomers did not understand the full implications and 'dangers of too much familiarity which was not to the comfort of either party'.⁴⁹

Accusations of communist ideas taking root amongst white workers may have been informed by real fears, but there is no evidence for widespread communist sympathies amongst the white workforce. The strike had not been universally supported amongst rank and file railwaymen and some railway staff actively tried to break the strike. The Administration reported that virtually all clerical staff at Salisbury had volunteered to take on firemen's duties and an appeal for volunteers had also attracted a substantial response from the public.⁵⁰ Moreover, liberal racial ideals found little receptive audience in the wider white worker community despite broader fears amongst settlers over the erosion of racial boundaries. When an Executive Committee directive ordered that white drivers should work with unqualified firemen to break the strike, it was vociferously condemned as an attack on the colour bar. Initial reports sent between railway management suggest that railway authorities were keen not

to use Africans to perform work usually done by Europeans as they feared it would strengthen the strikers' resolve and garner support for their action from other sections of the European workforce. However, rank and file members accused the Executive Committee of giving 'the right to the Administration to place any human being of any colour on an engine and call him a fireman'. One delegate to the 1954 RRRWU Conference argued in defence of the union that their role was to break up illegal strikes:

it even warranted the use of European convicts on the footplate. Everybody would have been done out of a job. There was also the example to the African. They were putting it in their heads how to get rid of all Europeans in the country; if the illegal strike had been successful they would have "had it".⁵¹

Threats of African industrial action could be used to discipline white workers, but also offered white labour opportunities to coalesce around race.⁵² Despite division between occupations, blue collar and white collar workers, skilled and unskilled trades, white workers could unite out of racialised solidarity when challenged by African workers. After an inadequate basic wage increase in 1956, the Railway African Workers Union (RAWU) called a strike which saw 7,500 Africans lay down tools for three days.⁵³ Police were armed with truncheons and used tear gas on striking Africans who had gathered in Bulawayo.⁵⁴ Bulawayo Branch admitted candidly that 'it has been our duty to do everything in our power to keep the job going which is nothing less than breaking the strike' and accused RAWU of putting its members at risk.⁵⁵

Nevertheless fears of trade union militancy and the erosion of racial boundaries persisted. Rhodesia was seen as fertile ground for radicalism to take root and this was due, in part, to the transience of its settlers. The RRRWU leadership argued that new arrivals had not fully adjusted to the Rhodesian trade union modus operandi or settler culture more generally, and were much more willing to revert to strike action.⁵⁶ Management likewise reasoned that the cause of the strike was down to mass recruitment of new European staff. In 1954, of the 8000 Europeans employed by the railways, 5,200 had less than eight years of service. Although recruits were screened, management admitted that with their huge recruitment drive it was inevitable 'that some of the less desirable found their way into the country'. They further noted that

it was apparent for some time that many overseas recruits were fairly strongly influenced by socialist ideas and felt that labour should negotiate on more militant lines. This feeling among certain grades of recruits goes back some years.⁵⁷

Sam Wright recalled that employees recruited from Britain were 'the most vociferous, in union matters . . . it was a constant ding-dong between them and management'.⁵⁸ European immigration was intended to maintain racialised

employment practices and ease skilled labour deficits, but this was conditional on new arrivals being socially mobile and on being able to perform a particular imagined white identity. The social mobility that Rhodesia promised its white workers was embodied in figures such as Roy Welensky who had risen from a position as a railwayman to the premiership. But this social mobility was neither universal nor automatic. In the year of the strike the Women's Guild had dispensed Government rations of 1s 6d per person to 16 European families and 29 Coloured families every month for the preceding year. A further 96 European families and 74 Coloured families were given secondhand clothes and shoes by the Guild.⁵⁹ In a bid to prevent radicalisation the Railway Administration set up a welfare fund for its European staff in 1956, whose purpose was 'to give assistance for the relief of distress amongst railway employees by means of loans or grants in cash or kind', and in its first year dealt with 1,532 cases of white distress.⁶⁰ By 1957 28 percent of all European employees were approaching the Administration for financial assistance.⁶¹ From these statistics it is unclear what qualified as "distress" for European workers: whether this was an inability to provide for dependents, to pay African domestic staff, or to attain a social standing befitting of white skin. What is clear however is that many white workers felt themselves to be in a position of distress and invested in the idea that they impecuniously existed at the edges of white propriety.

To militate against continuing dissent, as well as initiating more stringent screening processes, it was suggested that railwaymen be forbidden from marrying until they had reached a certain wage, something which was already in place for army personnel, policemen and bank employees.⁶² This, it was thought, would prevent the growth of impoverished families and dissatisfaction from married employees. The Department of Labour likewise expressed a preference for men to come out individually and establish themselves before bringing out their families as the infrastructure could not bear added population.⁶³ Without the requisite housing and services, white recruits were living in conditions below what they had anticipated and as a result were seen as being more susceptible to communist influences and involvement in industrial action. The settler state, Railway Administration and RRRWU itself desired the settlement of white families; families were seen to engender stability and permanence. Yet economic conditions meant the immigration of families had a potentially radicalising effect and discontent surfaced when expectations of upwards social mobility failed to materialise.

Some strikers admitted that their primary concerns were not about pay. At Dett, railwaymen listed demands about street lighting, water shortages, shortages of electrical appliances and home conditions. They specifically complained about their Nursing Sister, who had caused a 'certain amount of friction' due to the fact she was 'of a type above the average driver, fireman and guard and does not socially mix too well'.⁶⁴ In a similar vein, Sam Wright, while usually at pains to emphasise uniformity amongst Europeans on the railways 'in skills [and] social sophistication', was forced to admit that 'dotted in this rather homogenous crowd, were a few exceptions who stood out a bit like sore

thumbs'. Those he noted as standing out were not the poor, but those from the 'higher class of society', one a "pompous" superintendent and another a doctor, scarred from "duelling", who walked around 'with such an air of conceit and self-importance as to become a figure of ridicule and mockery'.⁶⁵ Jon Lunn has fruitfully used the notion of the bailiwick – the area in which workers could assert their limited authority and independence within wider systems and boundaries – and argued this space should be understood as a fundamental area of expression for white worker identity in which gendered and racial hierarchies were enforced.⁶⁶ Railway workers attempted to influence railway spaces by controlling the movement and presence of particular racial and classed groups. Railways enabled settlement, influenced social identifications and produced hierarchies of labour in which racial status was constructed and proclaimed. Carriages and platforms marked out boundaries of class, race and gender and were sites of struggle over social identities.⁶⁷ Numerous complaints over an unwanted African presence littered the *Review* and the management-funded *Rhodesia Railway Magazine* which described 'hordes of Africans, their beds, furniture and possessions that are daily to be found scattered all over the station' and 'the hordes of "loafers" who sprawl all over the station premises at all hours of the day and night'.⁶⁸ Demands for separate African, Coloured and white railway stations and carriages abounded.⁶⁹ Physical distance and separation reinforced claims to particular racial identities, but this animosity extended to upper class whites. Railwaymen attempted to cultivate the railways as a white space; but it was also fundamentally a classed space. The white families of the Dett railway community were angered by a middle and upper-class incursion into their delineated communities. Just as Charlie Slatter despised the middle-class accoutrements of Tony Marston in *The Grass is Singing*, on the railways the presence of such figures was a reminder of many railwaymen's social inferiority and the class divisions that many were trying to transcend, but also pointed to the limitations of white social integration and an inclusive Rhodesian identity.⁷⁰ Workers at Dett attempted to utilise the strike action to set forward their own demands regarding the white railway community and who was and was not a part of it.

Disciplining white workers

The strike itself was also a reaction to the treatment of Taylor; this was an assertion of the right to organise and a flagrant challenge to the RRUW leadership. There was particular anger over the perceived heavy handedness of the state in squashing the strike. The government argued that they could not let a European strike continue especially as they had acted with brutal force against recent African strikers at Wankie.⁷¹ Within hours of the firemen announcing their strike, a state of emergency was declared across the colony. The CID searched the homes of strike leaders and several were arrested, dismissed from the railways, or subsequently demoted. Jack Keller, former president of the RRUW and member of parliament for the railway constituency of Raylton for

the Rhodesia Labour Party since 1928, openly criticised the RRRWU leadership and complained of “gangster” tactics claiming that Garfield Todd and Roy Welensky had descended on his home to interrogate him and his links to the strikers.⁷² He claimed strikers had been “shadowed” by the CID, that letters sent to the Rhodesian press in support of Taylor were suppressed and that his own phone line had been tapped by the state.⁷³ Keller outlined his treatment and accused Rhodesia of being a one-party state in a letter he sent to a number of British media outlets and statesmen including the BBC, Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill. More broadly, in the Legislative Assembly, Keller used the strike to curb state powers against white workers. Specifically he moved a motion to repeal section 8 of the Peace Preservation Act which allowed the governor to make regulations in the event of strikes. The Act allowed the Government to pass laws without parliament; to use forced labour, to hold people without trial, and to arrest without warrant ‘anyone whom they suspect . . . merely suspect – of having said or done something which might in their opinion adversely affect the efficiency of an essential industry’.⁷⁴ Keller denounced the Act as a fascist decree and claimed Rhodesia was a police state, reminding the Assembly that he had been assured that under no circumstances would the Act be used against white workers.⁷⁵ Presumably he believed such measures were necessary to deal with industrial action involving African workers, but impinged on the civil liberties of Europeans. The Legislative Assembly upheld that the Act should be used against both black and white workers in the interests of “freedom”. Europeans could not be seen to be openly flouting the law, and punishment had to be meted out.⁷⁶ All union power had to be curbed and wildcat strikes in particular could not be tolerated. Europeans had a price to pay for their privileged position in the labour market. One MP reminded white labourers that:

The European artisan is not only in a specially favoured position under the law but he also in consequence has special duties to the community in which he lives . . . in the presence of an almost overwhelming mass of uncivilised and unskilled labour [his duty] is to act moderately and temperately in industrial disputes.⁷⁷

In the past public opinion had been mobilised against white industrial action through allusions to African rebellion. Employers, the government and the press had variously argued that white strike action was the height of irresponsibility; it not only threatened white unity but encouraged Africans to rebel against their bosses.⁷⁸ Now the RRRWU trade union bureaucracy also declared that strikes were counterproductive due to their potential influence upon African workers.⁷⁹ They accepted principles of arbitration and came down heavily on any action outside its direct control. Yet what this episode demonstrates is precisely a lack of control over white labour on the railways. Many white workers were failing to display the outward signs of respectability which the RRRWU strove to project. The *Review* condemned railway employees’ behaviour noting

that 'the managers and European staffs of some canteens have been insulted; African servants have been assaulted; furniture and equipment have been broken, and utensils have disappeared at an appalling rate'.⁸⁰ Letters to the *Herald* bemoaned the high expectations of new arrivals and pointed to the fact that the firemen's wage reflected its low skill. While these newcomers would have had a lowly status in Britain 'governed simply by the type of trade in which they were employed, not by the colour of their skin. After a spell in the colony it beats into their brains that they are Europeans and must therefore enjoy this so-called European standard of life'.⁸¹ Dissatisfaction was seen as a consequence of new arrivals' unrealistic expectations. Another letter expressed shock at the behaviour of new immigrants and asked 'if they are not satisfied then why do they stay, and upset others?'⁸² The accused 'lawlessness and irresponsibility' of Taylor, argued one letter, amounted to 'the negation of those qualities which we term British'.⁸³ Those defending Taylor on the other hand argued that the way Taylor had been treated 'smacks of fascism' and was decidedly "unBritish".⁸⁴ Within Rhodesia established settlers and newcomers offered competing definitions of who was, and who was not, *authentically* British. Accusing others of not being British was a way of positioning one's views and beliefs as a legitimate expression of "Britishness" while marking others out as fraudulent or degenerate, but also points to the importance of this national identity in broader settler identification.⁸⁵ These contests over British identity demonstrate competing claims to a superior character, politics and way of life which were themselves rooted in different class experiences; class divisions continued to undermine any sense of a cohesive racial and national identity.

Reasserting control over the rank-and-file

In the wake of the strike the RRWU Executive's assertions of confidence and moves towards providing financial assistance to Europeans at the bottom of the wage scale failed to quell dissent. The close relationship between employer and trade bureaucracy fostered by the Industrial Conciliation Act was coming under greater scrutiny from rank and file members. While in the first decades of the twentieth century the trade union bureaucracy of the RRWU was considered to comprise the most radical and politically engaged section of white workers in contrast to a supposedly apathetic rank and file which lacked political education,⁸⁶ by the 1950s trade union bureaucracies were regarded as increasingly conservative and a barrier to militant action by sections of white labour. Large sections of the rank and file were also seen as failing to meet the standards of white respectability demanded by trade union leaders.

The general manager of Rhodesia Railways and the chief industrial officer of Southern Rhodesia were present at the RRWU Conference and congratulated the RRWU leadership and its role in bringing the rank and file into line. The chief industrial officer further noted that the behaviour and respectability had generally improved due to the 'grandfatherly attitude towards the youngsters . . . you put the lads in their places'.⁸⁷ The RRWU bureaucracy had built

an image of respectability based upon partnership with employers and the state. White monopoly of skilled jobs and racially exclusive trade unionism were justified through a language of responsibility and rights that white workers had *earned* through jettisoning radicalism and embracing conciliation. This close relationship and regulatory role taken by the RRUW leadership did not go unnoticed by rank and file members. There were reports of raucous meetings full of insults and jeering towards officials, and editorials in the *Review* were forced to repeatedly extol the virtues of the current leadership and list their accomplishments in fighting for improved conditions.⁸⁸ Branch scribes, on the other hand, continued to submit notes to the *Review* which defended Taylor and denounced the leadership. The strike, in their opinion, was not a result of Taylor's interference but of 'bureaucratic administration . . . allied with clueless but abundant supervision on the part of many junior officials'.⁸⁹ Branches also accused that the incumbent leadership had caused a wave of resignations from the union.⁹⁰ The union bureaucracy in turn accused the branch scribes of disruption and of the 'flouting of authority', but the dissatisfaction failed to subside.⁹¹ A year on, Que Que Branch continued to call for a special conference and a motion of no confidence in the Executive Committee.⁹² Despite the RRUW's 1954 annual conference passing several motions of confidence in the union leadership, branch scribes complained that delegates had voted against the prevalent feelings of their branch members. Certainly, transcripts of the motions and debates held at the conference reveal that many elected officials feared being held accountable by the rank and file members. One delegate made an impassioned plea in support of a motion which attempted to make conference voting anonymous as 'in some instances if how he voted were to become known to his branch his life would be miserable'.⁹³ The motion was lost but nevertheless reveals that some trade unionists did not see their roles as representing the wishes of their branch members, but as one of instruction and regulation.

During the 1954 Conference there were several failed attempts to remove this conservative layer from the union leadership. Lower grades in the union were keen to prohibit railway officials – including inspectors and instructors – from serving on the Executive Committee, under the contention that these higher grades were effectively working as part of management. The motion was lost by nine to fourteen.⁹⁴ A motion to reduce the number of years a man had to be part of the union to be elected to the NIC from five to three years was likewise summarily rejected by the conference. In a revealing defence of the stipulation, one National Committee member asserted that lowering the number of years would introduce 'foreign elements to disturb and distract them' as it took more than five years 'to become really domiciled as a Rhodesian'.⁹⁵ Here, Rhodesianness and trade union principles were acquired through fixity; being sufficiently settled was a prerequisite for acquiring responsibility. Notably such notions of rootedness were also utilised in justifications of differential wages; white demands for higher wages were made through reference to European monopoly of skill and a white standard of living which was underpinned by

stress upon the *permanence* of white employees in contrast with the supposed transitory and seasonal nature of African labour which allowed them to be paid 'single man's wages', despite the long-term service and urban residence of many African employees. Where a person settled also proved important. To rise to the upper echelons of the RRUW bureaucracy a man had to live and work in Bulawayo. Despite disquiet over the dominance of Bulawayo, a motion to incorporate four more members from elsewhere in Southern and Northern Rhodesia was narrowly lost by two votes.⁹⁶ In this way, the union sought to control the potentially radical elements of its membership. They recognised that this meant that many delegates to the NIC were disliked and not the first choice of its members but the RRUW leadership saw this as a necessary measure to prevent newcomers with dangerous ideas from holding positions of power in the union. Not all white workers were deemed to be fit representatives of Rhodesian labour. In particular, the RRUW sought to control infiltration from communists and militant trade unionists, but it also attempted to enforce a particular racialised respectability amongst its members. In both regards, it was only ever partially successful.

Conclusion

Railways have played a central role in forging new kinds of mobility and in articulating colonial identities. They increased the mobility of persons, goods and ideas which enabled empire and simultaneously disrupted the borders and the production of difference central to the imperial project. The mobility afforded to particular Europeans to traverse imperial locations destabilised established colonial practices and frustrated labour organisations' attempts to cultivate a coherent white worker identity. The white labour upheavals during the period of Federation reveal the general weakness of a divided labour movement, but also points to the ongoing struggles to determine the boundaries of a "white standard of living". It is clear that despite the existence of the colour bar and a series of racialised welfare measures, not to mention the huge wage disparities between African and European workers, substantial numbers of white workers continued to see themselves as hard done by and living either in or on the edge of poverty. Sections of white settlers had failed to achieve the elevated social status they expected through their racial identification. While European workers had a privileged position in the labour market, this was in exchange for a regulated apathy and hamstrung trade union power. For employers and state authorities the use of repressive force was not out of the question; policing settler boundaries was a constant process.

Doris Lessing would be deported from South Africa and declared a prohibited immigrant by Rhodesian authorities two years after Charles Taylor was forcibly returned to the UK. Like Taylor, she was vilified not only because of her political leanings and attitudes to race, but because she had highlighted the hypocrisies of white society, the poor whites the settler state tried to hide from sight and, perhaps most damagingly, written explicitly about interracial sex and

white women's sexual desire. Performing symbolic practices of differentiation was an essential part of maintaining the racial order.⁹⁷ Lessing and Taylor not only failed to think and behave in properly racialised ways, but actively popularised their transgressions. These thoughts, ideas and actions were envisioned to endanger the very racial boundaries which underpinned settler rule. In the broader context of decolonisation and anti-colonial nationalism, Rhodesian authorities sought to strictly control the movement of radical ideas within its borders. The Rand Revolt had made a lasting imprint; white workers could be stirred into frenzied radicalism and were capable of inspiring widespread revolt amongst Africans. Certainly, Taylor was not the first white worker to face deportation for militant trade union activity in Southern Africa.⁹⁸ Pronouncements on Taylor became a medium through which wider fears over the frailty of settler power were expressed. The RRWU expected white male workers to act in ways that supported internal boundaries of difference; but these behaviours did not occur automatically and white trade union bureaucrats struggled to control their members and cooperated with the state to remove undesirable elements from their ranks. However, the notion of what constituted acceptable white behaviour was not simply imposed from above. Neither were the boundaries of whiteness completely obvious or uncontested. Competing ideas over appropriate racialised behaviours, wages and standards of living were central to the ongoing class struggles over white identity and privilege in Rhodesia.

Notes

- 1 Lessing, *The Grass is Singing*, 13, 180.
- 2 Ibid., 21–26.
- 3 See Pilosof, *Unbearable Whiteness of Being*; Kalaora, 'Madness, Corruption and Exile'; Law, 'Mostly We Are White and Alone'; Alexander, 'Orphans of the Empire'.
- 4 Pilosof, 'Reinventing Significance', 141–142. For further criticism of the homogenisation of whites in Zimbabwean history see Hartnack, 'Whiteness and Shades of Grey'.
- 5 McDermott Hughes, *Whiteness in Zimbabwe*, 5; Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens, Exiles*.
- 6 Pilosof and Boersma, 'Not all Whites are Farmers'.
- 7 Roque, 'Race and the Mobility of Humans', 608–609; Ballantyne, 'Mobility, Empire, Colonisation', 35; Barnes, 'Control of African Women's Mobility'.
- 8 Mlambo, 'Some Are More White Than Others'.
- 9 Kennedy, *Islands of White*.
- 10 Shutt and King, 'Imperial Rhodesians'.
- 11 Mlambo, 'From the Second World War to UDI', 77.
- 12 Lowry, 'Impact of Anti-Communism', 172–173.
- 13 Bonner, Hyslop, and van der Walt, 'Rethinking Worlds of Labour'; Hyslop, 'The Imperial Working Class'; Money, 'The World of European Labour'.
- 14 Phimister, *Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*; Lunn, *Capital and Labour*, 10–11.
- 15 Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour in Salisbury', 81–85; Brand, 'Politics and African Trade Unionism', 89.
- 16 Money, 'The World of European Labour'; Phimister, 'Lashers and Leviathan'.
- 17 'Editorial', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, March 1929, 8–16. Phimister, *Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, 190. National Archives of Zimbabwe [hereafter NAZ], S480/1460, Strikes and Labour Disputes among Railway Employees, 1926–1929: Memorandum, 21st February 1929, 1.

- 18 There were 5728 RRWU members in Northern and Southern Rhodesia in 1954 and 7846 Europeans were employed north of Bulawayo in the same year, *Rhodesia Railways Report of the General Manager, for the Year Ended 31st March 1954*, 2.
- 19 'Arbitration Award', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, April 1954, 1.
- 20 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 25.
- 21 The National Archives, London [hereafter TNA], DO 35/4831, Deportation of Charles Taylor: SECRET: Inward Telegram from High Commissioner of Federation to Commonwealth Relations Office.
- 22 'Firemen Told: Illegal to Strike at This Stage', *Rhodesia Herald*, 21 May 1954, 13.
- 23 'Railwaymen Give Notice to Union, Que Que', *Rhodesia Herald*, 4 June 1954, 1; 'Mr Went's Resignation Demanded', *Rhodesia Herald*, 3 June 1954, 1.
- 24 '2 Britons Arrested', *Newcastle Journal*, 7 June 1954, 5.
- 25 'Rhodesian Rail Strike Chief Under Arrest', *Coventry Evening Telegraph*, 5 June 1954, 3. *Daily Herald* (UK), 9 June 1954, 2.
- 26 'Deportation Move Extends Rail Strike', *Birmingham Daily Post*, 7 June 1954, 16.
- 27 '2 Britons Arrested', *Newcastle Journal*, 7 June 1954, 5.
- 28 Bulawayo Railway Museum Archives [hereafter BRMA], SD16: Strike, Firemen. 1954. Rhodesia Railways Letters, Press Cuttings, Etc. Letter to Chief Mechanical Engineer, 16th June 1954, no.368/33, 2.
- 29 TNA, DO 35/4831, Deportation of Charles Taylor: SECRET: Inward Telegram from High Commissioner of Federation to Commonwealth Relations Office.
- 30 BRMA, SD16: Strike, Firemen. 1954. Rhodesia Railways Letters, Press Cuttings, Etc. REPORT, 2.
- 31 TNA, DO 35/4831, Deportation of Charles Taylor: SECRET: Inward Telegram from High Commissioner of Federation to Commonwealth Relations Office.
- 32 'The Firemen and Their Drastic Action', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, June 1954, 5–7.
- 33 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 227.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 224.
- 35 'Southern Rhodesia Strike led by a Briton', *Coventry Evening Telegraph*, 7 June 1954, 8.
- 36 TNA, DO 35/4831, Deportation of Charles Taylor: Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office: From UK High Commissioner in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
- 37 Taylor, 'Why I Was Deported from Rhodesia', *Daily Worker*, 6 July 1954.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 222.
- 41 Jackson, 'Bad Blood'; Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*. For more on interracial sex in Southern Rhodesia see McCulloch, *Black Peril, White Virtue*.
- 42 TNA, DO 35/4831, UK Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 31 May 1954.
- 43 Lowry, 'Impact of Anti-Communism'.
- 44 'Strike Tactics', *Rhodesia Herald*, 23 December 1919, 13; 'Editorial', *Rhodesia Herald*, 30 December 1919, 13.
- 45 'The Strike Deadlock', *Rhodesia Herald*, 23 December 1919, 5.
- 46 See Tavuyanago, Muguti and Hlongwana, 'Victims of the Rhodesian Immigration Policy'; Rupiah, 'Internment Camps and Refugee Settlements'.
- 47 Letters to Editor, 'Communists and the Natives: Party Not Wanted in Colony', *Rhodesia Herald*, 26 March 1948, 11.
- 48 *Ibid.*
- 49 Wright, *Tracks Across the Veldt*, 45–46.
- 50 'Rhodesia Rail Strike', *Belfast News-Letter*, 7 June 1954, 4.
- 51 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 230.
- 52 See Phimister, 'Lashers and Leviathan', 189–191.
- 53 *Rhodesia Railways Report of the General Manager, for the Year Ended 31st March 1957*, 14.
- 54 Ranger, *Bulawayo Burning*, 202.

- 55 'Bulawayo no.1 Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, October 1956, 13.
- 56 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 210.
- 57 BRMA, SD16: Strike, Firemen. 1954. Rhodesia Railways Letters, Press Cuttings, Etc. REPORT, 1.
- 58 Wright, *Tracks Across the Veldt*, 47.
- 59 'Work of Guild of Loyal Women for Salisbury's Needy Families', *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 May 1954, 3.
- 60 *Rhodesia Railways Report of the General Manger, for the Year Ended 31st March 1957*, 11–12.
- 61 Ibid., A total of 2781 employees had approached the railways in 1957.
- 62 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 25.
- 63 TNA, LAB 13/204, 1820 Memorial Settlers Association, Requisitions: Southern Rhodesia.
- 64 BRMA, SD16: Strike, Firemen. 1954. Rhodesia Railways Letters, Press Cuttings, Etc. Letter to Chief Mechanical Engineer, 16th June 1954, no.368/33, 3.
- 65 Wright, *Tracks across the Veldt*, 34, 87.
- 66 Lunn, *Capital and Labour*, 85.
- 67 Bear, *Lines of the Nation*; Butcher, *The British in Malaya*; Aguiar, *Tracking Modernity*.
- 68 Black, 'Over to You', *Rhodesia Railways Magazine*, March 1954, 40, Bulawayo. See 'Over to You', February 1954, 38; March 1955; October 1955, 48, for more examples of complaints over African presence at railway stations. Or from December 1955, 62, demands from 'Bulawayo' for apartheid to be implemented across all stations.
- 69 Black, 'Over to You', 50.
- 70 Lessing, *The Grass Is Singing*, 180.
- 71 TNA: DO 35/4831 Deportation of Charles Taylor: SECRET: Inward Telegram from High Commissioner of Federation to Commonwealth Relations Office.
- 72 TNA, DO 35/4831, Deportation of Charles Taylor: Letter from Keller and Storey, 1. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 968–972.
- 73 TNA, DO 35/4831, Deportation of Charles Taylor: Letter from Keller and Storey, 2.
- 74 Southern Rhodesia, *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 919.
- 75 Ibid., 940.
- 76 Ibid., 956.
- 77 Ibid., 942–946.
- 78 Kennedy, *Islands of White*, 139. For examples of white trade union militancy and organisation influencing African workers see Phimister, 'An Emerging African Proletariat', 61; Lunn, *Capital and Labour*, 130; Ranger, *Bulawayo Burning*, 51–52.
- 79 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 211.
- 80 'Editorial: Our Canteens', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, March 1952, 2.
- 81 Toothpick, 'Payment on Results', *Rhodesia Herald*, 7 June 1954, 5.
- 82 Contented Citizen, 'Wages on the Railways', *Rhodesia Herald*, 2 June 1954, 7.
- 83 'Todd's Warning on Communism and Federation', *Rhodesia Herald*, 7 June 1954, 1.
- 84 TNA, DO 35/4831, Letter from R.J. Scott to Mr. Champion MP; Letter from Keller *et al.* sent to Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee, General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, and various British newspapers.
- 85 See Schwarz, *White Man's World*, 398.
- 86 Jon Lunn argues that the RRWU bureaucracy were more radical than the rank and file, *Capital and Labour*.
- 87 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 3.
- 88 'Salisbury no.1 Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, June 1954, 6; 'The Union's Case Summed Up', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, September 1954, 12.
- 89 'Bulawayo no.1 Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, September 1954, 15. For more criticisms of leadership and support of firemen's strike see, 'Choma Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, October 1954, 20; 'Salisbury no. 1 Branch Notes', 23; 'Bulawayo no. 4 Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, June 1954, 24.

- 90 'Que Que Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, October 1954, 22.
- 91 'The Union's Case Summed Up', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, October 1954, 7.
- 92 'Que Que Branch Notes', *Rhodesian Railway Review*, July 1955, 22.
- 93 *RRWU Conference*, 1954, 11.
- 94 *Ibid.*, 251–255.
- 95 *Ibid.*, 244.
- 96 *Ibid.*, 248–249.
- 97 Kennedy, *Islands of White*.
- 98 Hyslop, 'White Labourism'; Money, 'World of European Labour'.