7 Designing resilience for security in the Nordic region

Implications for strategy

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Resilience as a security practice

Resilience has become the new means in security politics. It defines a security practice and organisational *raison d'être* that takes uncertainty and the possible future catastrophe as its main condition. New uncertainties require resilient organisations; organisations that can withstand, bounce back or adapt to new circumstances through strong social networks, community building, awareness and preparedness.

In security studies, the debate on resilience has grown for the past five to ten years and, while most security scholars agree that the concept draws on its metaphorical association with its sister concepts in biology and development studies, the translation has not happened without debate (cf. Cavelti et al 2015; Walker and Cooper 2011). Boiling it down, the main debate has been over the level of decision-making (micro versus macro level) and over the meaning of change (adaptation versus progression).

In terms of level of decision-making, resilience has traditionally been thought of as a solution that relies on each individual's capacity to act. Yet, and unlike its biological sister concept, resilience in security politics refers to more than just the inner strength of individuals and organisations, but also to that of learning and understanding the role of the self in the production of new risks (Chandler 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2017). It is about agility and therefore also about the ability to constantly evaluate and revise actions in the face of new threats. While the concept of resilience is a concept that offers solutions to new and unexpected threats, it turns security away from macro-planning, and puts trust in the individual's capabilities to self-reflect and self-govern. The security solutions are, in other words, mainly offered at the level of individuals and organisations rather than at the political level of governments.

If one takes this turn to micro-planning seriously in international relations, it might have grave implications for the idea of international or national security. From being a question of macro-planning and strategic thinking¹ (based on democratic concerns), the practice of resilience makes security politics a local and individualised matter – a decentralised rather

than centralised practice. Implications include the repositioning of the individual citizen as a ‘voluntary’ frontline defence, and an institutionalisation and legitimisation of surveillance around the clock. This call to civil action might create, what Awan calls, a general ‘state of civil anxiety’ (Awan et al. 2019, 69), and a polity that makes every individual’s ‘wrong-doing’ subject to a symbolic political blame-game. As the threat is considered highly diffuse and unknown, the security decision loses its reference to the exceptional movement in the acts on security (Bigo 2006; Huysmans 2006). The securitising move, thus, becomes invisible, or ‘banalised’ as Didier Bigo contends (Bigo 2006). Security becomes detached from decisions of leaders and their speech acts on where to go and how to get there.

The conceptualisation of change (temporality) related to resilience is moreover different from the one we normally associate with security. Where resilience is described as a management solution in the face of uncertainty, like precaution or pre-emption (Corry 2014),² a discourse on national security usually identifies the presence of a threat. The description of new and uncertain threats (possibly catastrophic), which resilience is considered to be an answer to, makes us give up on the idea of being able to identify, plan and thus mitigate new threats at a strategic level. While Phillipe Bourbeau (2018) is right in arguing that ‘Resilience is not only about maintaining the status quo, but it is also about transforming and re-modeling an individual, a group or a social structure’ (28), resilience does *not* entail a grand vision for change. It is not about providing promises, as Claudia Aradau rightly argues (Aradau 2014). Rather, in the image of resilience, change becomes a matter of *adaptation* to new circumstances. Because the practice of resilience fundamentally relies on an acceptance of the future as uncertain, it is, in many ways, an anti-thesis to political planning and strategy. One might even say that the concept of resilience describes a shift in security thinking from ‘grand design’ to ‘muddling through’: it is preparation without grand visions or promises.

The question is of course whether the actual practice of resilience, in the field of security, is a ‘muddling through’ individualised practice or whether the role of strategic thinking still plays a major role in the security thinking on resilience. Are there, we ask, different kinds of resilience in play? Is there ‘a form of resilience’ that leaves open the possibility for planning and grand visions contrary to what the theoretical discussion argues? In even wider terms, this raises the question of whether it is actually possible to have ‘grand designs’ and strategy in a world where uncertainty is the overarching narrative.

In this chapter we zoom in on those questions by studying resilience practices in the three Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Norway (see also Hyvönen and Juntunen, this volume, for the Finnish case). The political systems of these countries are in many ways similar: all celebrate a welfare state model which aims to secure economic equality and individual freedom, and all, following from this belief in the welfare state, have a remarkable degree

of trust in the state's ability to handle personal information. Based on this description of the political systems in Scandinavia, one might expect rather similar policies and attitudes towards security and resilience.³ The study presented below, however, points in a different direction, showing considerable diversity in the Nordic approaches to resilience. While the study shows that all countries place great trust in state institutions when it comes to that of 'creating' a resilient civil society, the national approaches differ quite substantially when it comes to the meaning of adaptation: where the Norwegian discourse tends to stress society's ability to bounce back in the face of an external threat, the Danish and Swedish discourses also conceptualise resilience as that of being reflexive about one's own production of threats. Further, where Swedish and Norwegian authorities have openly enrolled all citizens as first responders if a catastrophic event should occur, the Danish authorities target only certain groups in society for this.⁴

In the following we will first substantiate our choice of material, our method and selection of sources. Second, we dig deep into the empirics as we investigate how the term 'resilience' has been used in the Scandinavian debates on national security and terrorism, from 2011 until today. We argue that it is possible to identify three concepts of resilience: 'robust resilience', 'reflexive resilience' and 'organised resilience'. Organised resilience emerges as a form of resilience not covered in the academic literature. It offers conceptual renewal but also a dubious form of strategic security politics. In conclusion, we will discuss whether it is possible to talk about a Nordic Model on resilience.

Research design

In the following, we present a comparative study on the Scandinavian public debates on resilience in security politics, from 2011 until 2017. In this period, we witnessed three terrorist attacks: first the Breivik attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011; second the Copenhagen shootings at the venue 'Krudttønden' and against a Jewish synagogue in 2015; and third the so-called Stockholm attack in 2017, where a truck rammed into a crowd in central Stockholm.

By comparing the responses to these crises in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, we implement a most-similar research design that allows us to analyse differences and similarities in the Nordic perceptions of resilience as a means to national security.

The governmental institutions included in the study are mentioned in Table 7.1. The media analysis covers all media sources mentioning the concept of resilience, as well as some of the synonyms often used in relation to the concept.⁵ Following the German conceptual historian, Reinhart Koselleck, by tracing and mapping the concept of resilience, we can come to understand the political possibilities imbedded in the choice of resilience, as a solution to today's security issues. While the concept of resilience is studied by tracing the word and the discursive meaning given to it, the

Table 7.1 Authorities included in the analysis

	<i>Emergency management</i>	<i>Police and police intelligence</i>	<i>Defence and defence intelligence</i>
Denmark	Beredskabsstyrelsen	Politiets efterretningstjeneste Justitsministeriet Rigspolitiet	Forsvarets efterretningstjeneste Forsvarsministeriet
Sweden	Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap	Polisen Justitiedepartementet Säpo (Säkerhetspolisen)	Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten
Norway	Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap	Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste Justisdepartementet	Forsvarsdepartementet

entire semantic field of concepts is of interest here. The concept of resilience should be understood as part of a semantic field of many concepts (similar and counter-concepts) that gives it meaning.⁶ In all of the three countries, we can observe how ‘robustness’, ‘comprehensive security’,⁷ adaptation,⁸ radicalisation and most recently ‘cyber security’ are central to the semantic field. However, in the case of Denmark, we find especially strong references to ‘preventive security’; in Norway, the concept of ‘total defence’ appears strong; and in Sweden, the concepts of ‘civil defence’ and ‘holistic approach’ stand out.⁹

Based on a systematic reading of governmental reports, plans and strategy papers as well as newspaper articles from the period covering these three events in the three countries, we found three main discourses on resilience:

- i One concept of resilience, termed ‘robust resilience’, refers to having a personal or organisational, inner strength and ability to adapt. This concept is often organised around practices of individual self-sufficiency and survival, physically and mentally. Commonly, it is assumed that threats are external to the individual or the organisation and that resilience fundamentally is a matter of being able to bounce back.
- ii The second concept of ‘reflexive resilience’ designates resilience as an ability to be reflexive about our co-production of new threats; being self-aware of the future (unknown) consequences of one’s own actions.¹⁰ This discourse often stresses learning as a tool for progressively reaching such state of reflexive resilience.
- iii The third concept, termed ‘organised resilience’, is discursively unstable as it conceptualises resilience as a management tool within a means-ends logic, yet getting its authority by reference to uncertainty. This concept stresses how new forms of institutions, e.g. partnerships, outreach, education and training programs, can help create expectations about expectations for the management of future threats. Settled within a discourse of uncertainty, the focus is on agility, voluntary actions, hand-shakes,

and character-building and new forms of institutions, rules and control. We found two versions of this concept in the empirical material: one that aims to manage the future by setting up tools to support robustness, and one that aims to create reflexive resilience for the purpose of improving future management. What the two versions share – and what they add to the first two discourses on resilience – is a belief in the possibility to plan and manage the unmanageable: by means of robustness or reflection, or a combination of the two. This concept of organised resilience, which so far has been overlooked in the literature on resilience, is powerful in the governmental reports. It is however also a concept that raises many questions. Ultimately, it is democratically untenable, as it promises direction based on worst case scenarios rather than on positive visions on where we, as a society, want to go.

Three concepts of ‘Nordic’ resilience: robust, reflexive and organised resilience

As mentioned earlier, in all three of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the semantic field defining the meaning of resilience all stress societies’ (and individuals’) ability to adapt and defend themselves against new and uncertain dangers. Concepts such as adaptation, robustness and comprehensive security are commonly used to describe this development. We also see a common focus on topics such as terrorism, extremism and cyber security as risks with catastrophic effects and which are hard to locate and manage by normal means of control. While many of the words used in relation to resilience are the same in the three countries, they are given different connotations. For example, as we shall see in the analysis below, the concept of Total Defence has resurfaced as important for understanding the Norwegian concept of comprehensive security. In Sweden, on the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on ‘civil defence’, something that only plays a minor role in the two other countries. Finally, Denmark stands out as the only country without mass distribution of crisis information to households testifying to a different understanding of how to handle so-called black swan events.¹¹

Below we present three discourses on resilience, which can be identified in the analysed material: ‘robust resilience’, ‘reflexive resilience’ and ‘organised resilience’. As we argue below, not all three discourses are equally represented in the three countries. There are important deviations. Together, they however tell us how ‘security governance as resilience’ is justified in these Nordic countries and how the ‘strategic’ role of governments is constructed. This matters politically as it helps us to comprehend how some managerial practices and solutions become possible and others impossible, as well as helps us to understand how Nordic security institutions and media perceive the role of planning and strategy in a world increasingly apprehended as uncertain.

The concept of 'robust resilience'

This form of resilience refers to that of having strength, mental robustness and health: the ability of individual adaptation to new situations and demands. It is a matter of taking psychology and physical needs into the practice of security. Much of what can be observed in this debate on resilience is well known from the emergency preparedness we saw during the World Wars and the Cold War. It stresses the individual's or the organisation's ability to survive in the face of shocks, by building shelters and fences, by storing food and otherwise preparing for war (gas masks, taping up windows). This discourse of physical and mental protection is strongest in Sweden and Norway, while almost absent in Danish media and official reports.¹²

In 2015, a crisis drill concerning the resilience of the Swedish people was held. Headlines in local newspapers in the aftermath were gloomy: 'Three days. That's how long a household should be able to stand its ground in the event of a crisis. But the preparedness of the public seems low' (*Nya Wermlands-Tidningen*, 03.03.2015).¹³ Summing up after the drill, Stefan Anering, unit manager at the Swedish MSB, concluded that 'Swedes will not survive a crisis'.¹⁴ Pure and simple. He continued: 'The system in place for crisis management builds on individual responsibility, at least in the beginning of a crisis. Most people lack the mental preparedness that something could happen'. In 2020 another drill is planned for to exercise 'total defence'.¹⁵ While this drill does not run contrary to the other drills, it emphasises the need for people to assist during wartime, understood in rather conventional terms. Thereby, robust resilience runs as a common thread through wartime and peacetime alike in Sweden.

A certain level of household preparedness forms part of this preparedness¹⁶: 'access to water, some dry and canned food, perhaps batteries for a radio, a flashlight and such things'¹⁷ (*Arbetarbladet*, 26.02.2015). These quotes illustrate that it is clearly the responsibility of the individual Swede to withstand in the event of a crisis, and that most people are not mentally prepared. This is supported by the following quote in which it is spelled out that individuals are frontline fighters alongside corporations and public administration in the event of a crisis: 'It is clearly not just businesses and authorities that lack crisis preparedness. Our civilian preparedness is not among the best either'.¹⁸

In an attempt to teach the public its role in crisis preparedness and the mental robustness required, the Swedish civilian organisation 'Lottakåren' has held courses all over Sweden. The courses are called 'Take care of yourself'¹⁹ and teach the participants to plan an individual emergency response. It is underlined that this does not mean to 'not give a damn about others'²⁰ as it is bluntly expressed by a volunteer.

It might seem provocative, but it means that you have to strengthen yourself first in order to be able to help others. Precisely like the oxygen

masks on an airplane where you put your own on first and then help others.²¹

This form of resilience is repeated in many of the sources from Sweden. To take an example, after the terrorist lorry attack in the centre of Stockholm in 2017 we find similar sentiments:

While authorities, police, and politicians do their best to protect the citizens from crime and terror, *we have to do our part as private citizens to protect society*. That entails to keep trusting our fellow citizens and our social system. We can do it. Everyone in Stockholm who helped one another during and after the attack in Drottninggatan showed us that.

(‘Visa tilltro till dina medmänniskor’, *Sundsvalls Tidning*, 18.04.2017, our underlining).²²

In Denmark we see a slightly different and less optimistic attitude when it comes to the strength of the individual as a frontline fighter. In relation to a terrorism case (Kundby sagen), the national newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* expressed scepticism towards the idea of ‘robust resilience’:

The concept of robustness is used so often – it has become a sort of “air-bag of life”. We only know if it works when we crash. The discouraging news is that there is no robustness test or a “quick fix” which can check and boost you mental robustness.²³

(Jyllands-Posten 08.04.2017)

In Norway, like in Sweden, a brochure on how to withstand the first 72 hours of a crisis has been distributed with similar recommendations as to what to keep in stock in the event of catastrophe.²⁴ Furthermore, individual, robust resilience was discussed extensively after the 2011 attacks. Primarily in terms of robustness, expectations and control ‘How can we learn to live with the fear of terror?’, a sociologist asked soon after the Utøya shootings and the bombing of the government quarters in Oslo.

We need more knowledge about the social and psychological mechanisms that partake in developing collective and individual resilience when our society is struck by such meaningless terror. Norway has to learn from what has happened on many levels, also the psychological one.

(‘Hvordan leve med terrorfrykt?’, *Aftenposten*, 29.07.2011).²⁵

Another voice joined the choir and spoke of how the group enhances individual resilience: ‘External danger makes people move closer together and often a strong group bond develops. This enhances a person’s resilience considerably. Team building and a strengthened *esprit de corps* and we-feeling

are essential' ('Norsk mestring av terror', *Forskning.no*, 28.07.2011).²⁶ He continues by stating that when facing risk, it is ideal if a person has positive expectations so that if anything happens, the person thinks that 'something can be done, by yourself or by the authorities' (ibid.). On the contrary, a person who expects the opposite is 'prone to feeling helpless' and might in the worst case 'deny that the risk exists' and therefore will not prepare and protect himself (ibid.) This kind of feeling of lack of control and ensuing helplessness is clearly not considered desirable. The solution can be found at the level of perceptions:

Actual control in the sense of being able to make a choice and solve or avoid a problem is of course preferable. When actual control is not possible, a sense of control can be very useful. It has been shown that many people have the ability to feel a certain degree of control even in situations where this feeling is not accurate.

(Norsk mestring av terror, *Forskning.no*, 28.07.2011)²⁷

An individual who perceives of herself to be in control – even if this is not the case – creates robustness. However, '[r]esilience (...) or resistance/survivability is natural and cannot be taught. Research shows no results in such training programmes. Natural resilience is the most important mechanism in how people handle trauma and grief' (Sorg og smerte er individuell, *Stavanger Aftenblad*, 27.07.2011, Tommy Ellingsen).²⁸

But even if resilience cannot be taught, individuals are clearly held responsible for their own robustness and resilience in the Norwegian sources:

Recent research shows that those who spend a lot of time in front of a screen checking the news have more negative reactions. Even if cause and effect are unclear, we can as individuals take responsibility by shielding ourselves (and our children) from too much exposure to media and thereby avoid anxiety and retain robustness.²⁹

(Hvordan leve med terrorfrykt?, *Aftenposten*, 29.07.2011)

In Norway, there is also a very strong sense of how the group assists in creating robustness. There are recurring references to a special kind of *Norwegian pride* connected to how they handled the attack as a group (ibid.). '... what better societal security exists than the fact that we stand united when some extreme terrorist or terrorist group attacks our society?'³⁰ (Tanker etter terrortragedien, *Hallingdølen*, 11.08.2011).

Overall, robust resilience is present in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, but in different forms. In Norway, the group is of utmost importance for robust resilience. In Sweden, the physical robustness and mental preparedness are key. And in Denmark, robustness is recognised, but not to the extent where brochures are distributed nationwide in order to enhance our chances of survival during a crisis.

The concept of 'reflexive resilience'

Resilience in this form is an ability to not only adapt but also to be reflexive about our production of new threats. This is what Chandler calls a 'post-modern' concept of resilience. He explains, 'the goal becomes not security but a self-reflective awareness of the unintended consequences... of any securitising measure' (11). It puts ourselves and our communities centre stage, not only as frontline defence but also as co-producers of threats. The distinction between ourselves and our environment is blurring, as the outside threat can never be fully understood as external to our own doing.

This concept of resilience assumes (or wants to promote) individual and organised reflexivity. It assumes that we live in a Beckian 'risk society' where we as individuals have become aware of and reflexive about our own production of risk (Beck 1999). Resilience is not directed towards one *thing*, *person* or *threat* (as in the first discourse on robust resilience), but everyone has to tap in and contribute to the definition and management of the threat. Resilience is in this way 'the creation of a society that creates... [C]itizens are asked to not only create resilience but also to co-create the mere definition of resilience' (Petersen and Tjalve 2013, 12).

This discourse on resilience is strongly represented in the Danish and Swedish debates on security and resilience, while it is almost absent in Norway. The Norwegian discourse on resilience is very modern in the sense that the focus is primarily on the inner strengths of the individual citizen to withhold and adapt to a rather firmly defined threat (the first discourse).

In Denmark, this form of resilience is found in government reports on radicalisation, cyber security and emergency management. In the 2016 annual report, the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) writes how resilience is about 'including local societal actors, who can contribute to secure the social cohesion and resistance of local communities towards radicalisation' (18). Similarly, the emergency management agency (DEMA) writes 'A contingency thinking and culture has to be anchored in society, to make citizens and companies better empowered and self-governed to prepare and manage larger incidents and crises' (DEMA 2016, 21, our underlining).³¹ Unlike in the first discourse on robust resilience where citizens were asked to stock up supplies in the event of a crisis, the Danish strategy is awareness-making and the creation of a contingency *culture*. For both the intelligence agency and the emergency management agency, resilience is used to describe their approach to *preventive* security. As we will argue below, this preventive effort described in the Danish and Swedish reports is linked to new forms of organisation and security governance: the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs), outreach programmes, risk communication and implementation of a special operational unit within the Security Intelligence Agency (PET 2016: 21, 23, 2017: 4, 17). These instruments are constructed to help manage future threats and build up resilient local environments.

In the media sources we found this form of resilience present as well. In an interview, a volunteer from the Swedish 'Lottakåren',³² Britta Christott, explains that

there is so much to gain from being mentally prepared in the event of a crisis. You have to learn to turn on your radar and pay attention to connections you might not have seen before. The next step is to create your own crisis plan.³³

(*'Kriskurs till länet'*, *Länstidningen Östersund*, 21.02.2015, 9)

Given that the organisation itself is part of the Swedish Total Defence, one could have expected a presentation of 'Lottakåren' as one that helps to defend against a demarcated outside territorial threat. This example however shows no clear defining line between the threat environment and the individual that needs to act. Rather, the individual constantly is asked to assess the situation and the environment that he/she is part of.

Similarly, in Denmark, the incident known as 'Kundby-pigen', where a 17-year-old school girl was apprehended by police while planning terror attacks against schools, the focus also turned to reflexive resilience:

...teachers learn to spot stress and signs of radicalization. This is a skill which is likely to be more important in the coming years. The work has to be systematized in order to focus on the resilience towards extremist opinions and movements in children and youth

(*Berlingske*, 'Lærere slog alarm over Kundby-pige forud for anholdelse', 16 April 2017).³⁴

Another source supports this focus on reflexive resilience:

For every terror suspect apprehended, there are heroes we never hear about. But there are even more heroes for each person with massive social and psychological problems that never end up as a terrorist suspect. Because someone did something extra for the man who was far out, but didn't come that far. Police officers, school teachers, educators, social workers, abuse consultants, publishers, coaches and other volunteers. Family and friends.

(*Information*, 'Kundby-pigen', 21 April 2017).³⁵

Reflexive security is a form of resilience that takes into account the feedback loops and effects of one's own sayings and doings. We found this form of resilience present in Sweden and Denmark primarily.

The concept of 'organised resilience'

Overlooked in the literature on resilience but powerful in many governmental reports across the Nordic countries is this concept of organised

resilience.³⁶ This concept is settled within a discourse of uncertainty and focuses on agility, voluntary actions, hand-shakes, character-building and new forms of institutions, rules and control. In this discourse, the strategic element of planning for and managing the future figures more prominently than in the two aforementioned forms of resilience. Briefly speaking, one can say that resilience is, in this discourse, a tool of management between means and ends, the end however being defined negatively as a matter of ‘coping with uncertainty’ and the possible catastrophe and the means being that of setting up the right institutional structures. We argue that organised resilience comes in two forms in the empirical material: one connected to robustness, and one connected to reflexive resilience. What the two versions share in common – and what they add to the first two discourses on resilience – is the idea that it is possible to plan and manage the unmanageable: by means of robustness or reflection, or a combination of the two.

While seemingly a logical development in times of uncertainty, this concept raises many questions. Ultimately, it is democratically untenable, as it promises direction based on worst case thinking rather than on positive visions on where we, as a society, want to go. The discourse seems unstable as it, on the one hand, stresses the inability of planning (cf. the stress on uncertainty) while it, on the other hand, engages with exactly that. When Lindberg and Sundelius (2012: 1297) paint a picture of how Sweden should prepare for so-called black swan events through resilience they follow this exact logic: calling for the management of the unmanageable. Quoting Comfort, Boin and Demchak (2010: 9) they write ‘Resilience is the capacity of a social system (e.g., an organization, city, or society) to proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances’ (quoted in Lindberg and Sundelius 2012: 1297). Accordingly, we should plan for that which we cannot plan for, anticipate that which cannot be anticipated and manage that which cannot be managed (Lindberg and Sundelius 2012). How does that make sense? How can we plan for a future that we do not know?

In an article on the logic of administrative decision-making in the Danish public administration, Andersen and Pors (2017) show how uncertainty came to matter by the turn of the 21st century. Where decision-making in the 1960s and 1970s focused on *planning* for a known future,³⁷ in the 1980 we start to see *supervision* (a call for self-governance and the use of internal contracts between state and municipalities) as the main idea behind decision-making. The future is no longer an image of the past but is considered as something complex that can only be managed locally, under the supervision of the state. Around the year 2000, they argue, the basis for decision-making changed once again as the idea of a fundamentally uncertain future takes over from ‘complexity’. The aim is now to see and consider the *potentials* for the future by means of co-creation, innovation and re-thinking. The answers to future problems can hence not be guided by planning or supervision. Instead, the task becomes one of establishing ‘expectations about the future with the expectation that all expectations will undergo a radical

change' (Åkerström and Pors 2017: 132). The goal is to establish institutions and means of governance that create potentials for the future. One example of such an institution is PPPs, but also outreach programmes and organisations for dialogue with religious communities are doing exactly that. These institutions and organisations are organised around a discourse on uncertainty, demanding awareness, flexibility and co-creation of future solutions.

As we argue below, such institutions and programmes are formulated as a means for governing resilience and thereby as the solution to many of the new security threats. These organisations seemingly dissolve the paradox of uncertainty by claiming to organise that which cannot be planned, assuring flexibility, agility and decision in the face of the unknown.

In the governmental reports and newspaper articles from the three countries, this form of organisation spans from organisations of dialogue and awareness in Sweden and Denmark (including PPPs) to 'How-to-survive-campaigns' in Sweden and Norway.³⁸ Where the first kind of organisation (awareness and dialogue) mainly supports and emphasises 'reflexive resilience' thinking, the 'how-to' campaigns are set up to support 'robust resilience'.

Organising reflexive resilience

In Sweden the web-based tool, the *Dialogue Compass* (Samtalskompassen), is a good example of an attempt to create dialogue and awareness on extremism in society. In an editorial with the title 'Will you be an extremist, little friend?'³⁹ the editor of a large Swedish newspaper explains how the web-based educational tool is for people who meet 'persons in risk of radicalization, primarily young people'. The tool will help by teaching 'supportive and preventive dialogue to strengthen the resilience against extremist messages' ('Blir du extremist, lille vän?', *Fria Tidningen*, 25.02.2015).⁴⁰ In an interview, Swedish national coordinator on violent extremism (and former minister) Mona Sahlin explains further:

If the extremists can succeed in finding youth to recruit, the society can too. Or we should be able to. But we have to be more vigilant. We can never give up the fight to avoid radicalization, recruitment to violent extremism, or to teach people to refrain from using violence.⁴¹

('Vi måste växla upp mot extremismen', *Expressen*, 22.02.2015)

The method is clearly one of organised 'reflexive' resilience.

In order to identify these people in time and to prevent that they commit crime, the different parts of society have to cooperate. Parents, sports trainers, social workers, teachers, priests, nurses, after school teachers,

imams and police in the vicinity of the person in question have to come together to discover, understand and act.

(‘Vi måste växla upp mot extremismen’, *Expressen*, 22.02.2015).⁴²

And this is the responsibility of all: ‘The fact that the dialogue compass is available to all means that there is no longer any excuse for not participating in the preventive work’⁴³ (‘Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism lanserar utbildningsmaterial’, *Cision Wire*, 17.02.2015).⁴⁴ In Denmark, similar educational initiatives have been taken to raise the Danish public’s awareness towards radicalisation. Yet, these have been organised as projects, especially targeted at schoolchildren.⁴⁵

Similar teaching and communication projects on extremism and cyber security have also targeted private companies. In Denmark, the Danish security intelligence has initiated three of such programmes. In the course description of one of the courses (RASK⁴⁶), the PET writes:

Humans are generally the bulwark against threats, but are also the weakest part of an organization’s security. The human side of security is an aspect of resilience that is central but perhaps more complex or controversial to speak of? Threats from spies and insiders are well-known to many, but how do we deal with these human threats? How to prevent and manage the situations where employees accidentally make mistakes that can have major consequences for the company or the organization.

And two sentences down:

Participants are enabled to come up with ideas on how to involve and create ownership for the security of both management and employees.⁴⁷

Organisational learning and employer awareness are stressed as tools for creating ‘ideas’, ‘ownership’ and thus responsibility for progressively reaching security.⁴⁸

Following up on the same idea, the Swedish political party *Moderaterna* has argued that

We also need to identify ways of communication and develop targeted messages in order to enhance the robustness of specific groups against extremist viewpoints. The state is often not the most efficient messenger, and therefore businesses working with social media or anti-extremist and anti-terrorist Muslim organisations should be involved.

(‘Skärp straffen för brott med terrorkoppling’, *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28.04.2017).⁴⁹

The idea is to support reflexive thinking amongst different groups in society, to make them partners in managing the threat, not by defining exactly what should be fought but to have their ears and eyes open to new developments.

Organising robust resilience

While the examples mentioned so far stress the need for citizens, school-children and employees to be more reflexive about their own production of risks, other discourses on 'organised resilience' tend to enforce a much clearer distinction between the citizens and the threat environment, stressing the possibility of organised robustness. This type of organised resilience is mostly found in Norway and in Sweden. The role of the authorities is here more on of directing the behaviour of citizens, to enhance peoples' and critical infrastructures' robustness and frontline defence. Emergency management is, in this case, the typical instrument of an organised resilience which stresses robustness (rather than reflexive thinking).

Most explicitly, this form of organised resilience has resulted in the campaigns in both Sweden and Norway under the title of '72 hours' mentioned earlier under robust resilience. This is how long a household has to withstand in the event of a major crisis such as breakdown in electricity, flooding, fires and the like.⁵⁰ A Swedish representative of the emergency services (MSB) explains how the 'crisis response of the common people needs to be improved'⁵¹:

This entails sitting down and talking about what your household needs are. Don't underestimate the power of thought. Be innovative and don't complicate it too much. Use what you have and add a few things, such as flashlights and batteries. This is a process of gradual knowledge-sharing and responsabilisation.⁵²

Basically, the plan is that every household in Sweden needs its own crisis response strategy. The message is clear in an article entitled 'Prepare for the unexpected'⁵³:

...not only individuals, but also municipalities need more knowledge about their duties. The people must understand that the resources in society are not sufficient if many people are hit at the same time. People will have to wait and therefore they have to take more responsibility.⁵⁴

Here we thus have a discourse on resilience that is founded on a dilemma between uncertainty and management, yet solves this by turning to robustness and emergency preparedness.

In Norway, the answer has also become a refocusing on the concept of Total Defence:

Cooperation is a prerequisite for good societal security and reasonable use of our resources. When the resources of civil society are not

adequate the defence can assist as long as possible. This concerns everything from search and rescue to the handling of terror attacks. In the same way, civil society can assist the defence during crisis and war. We call it Total Defence and it concerns how we as a nation make all resources available during serious incidents. It is about defending ourselves with all we've got.⁵⁵

(‘Totalforsvar viktig’, *Avisa Nordland*, 24.04.2017.)

The threat is uncertain, but the answer is coordination and mobilisation of all levels of society – for the purpose of creating robustness. After the Utøya attacks, the focus was less on the grand design, but rather on thinking through and systematising what went well that day in July 2011. One of those things was the remarkable willing to act on the part of random bystanders. Therefore, an initial conclusion was that

it is important to study the informal ad-hoc structures. Amongst these the people on the camping sites [close to Utøya]. It is said that the person who will save your life is the person next to you. That capacity of random people has to be studied from an emergency perspective

(*Aftenposten*, 09.08.2011).⁵⁶

Overall, ‘[a]cting together is a concept which has caught on after the 22 July terror. To find one another, learn about others’ capacities and identify mutual dependencies between emergency actors are central elements of the concept of acting together’ (*Aktuell Sikkerhet*, 01.03.2017).⁵⁷

In both cases of organised resilience – the one that stresses the enhancement of reflexiveness and the one that stresses the creation of robustness, the focus is on uncertainty but the institutional answers through management are different. Planning used to be done against the image of future which was expected to be complex, yet manageable. Planning was a way of prescribing a strategy for improvement – a matter of picturing a new future and defining how to get there (Brodie 1973). This image of organised resilience turns everything upside down as the description of the future becomes a negative one. In the image of uncertainty, strategy is a question of avoiding the ‘worst case’, not one of defining a new vision for the future. The question is how to instrumentally prepare for uncertainty by setting up the right institutional framework. It is in this sense a rather apolitical and instrumental solution to security.

Yet, while this discourse on the one hand draws its authority by referring to the unknown future, it also rests on a modern belief that knowledge accumulation and information sharing will help us to improve and prepare for the so-called black swans. Similar to the second discourse, on reflexive resilience, we see an optimistic emphasis on learning. Risk communication is one tool that, BRF and MSB repeatedly argue, will help create a ‘contingency culture’ in local communities. Likewise, PPPs are suggested by both the national and the defence intelligence agencies (especially on cyber

security) as a way to increase the knowledge base and help avoid the next big event (Petersen 2019).

In this discourse, resilience comes to resemble what we would normally associate with a precautionary approach to risk: it is not described as ‘just’ a matter ‘muddling through’ by strengthening the capabilities to cope with new situations (discourses one and two), but it is based on the belief that it is possible to set up an institutional structure that makes society able to circumvent potential future catastrophes. Thus, macro-planning is considered possible.⁵⁸

This concept of organised resilience, however, raises many new questions and concerns as it is ultimately democratically untenable. These institutional forms (dialogue initiatives, outreach programmes, educational initiatives and ‘how to survive guidelines’) are presented as ‘sponges’ that can absorb the worst in any crisis, yet what exactly has to be absorbed is virtually unknown.

Conclusion: regaining strategic initiative

Resilience as a theoretical concept has received a lot of attention in scholarly debates over the past five to ten years. In this chapter, we asked if those widely described individualised security practices could be identified or whether other forms of resilience practices were visible in the Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The chapter has argued that three forms of resilience can be found in media sources and governmental reports: the concept of robust resilience, the concept of reflexive resilience and the concept of organised resilience. The latter concept has not before been identified in the scholarly debates and thus constitutes a novel contribution.

In terms of the different resilience practices in the Nordic countries, the chapter started out with an expectation that these quite similar Nordic countries would have similar patterns of practice related to resilience. Overall, it was confirmed that the trust in the state and the overwhelming willingness to share information with the state are common features that enable resilience practices. However, differences were also clear. For example, robust resilience in the form of physical and mental protection was far more widespread in Norway and Sweden. Denmark did not use nationwide distribution of crisis instructions as part of the resilience toolbox, whereas both Sweden and Norway did. Further, an interesting difference appeared when comparing the discourses on reflexive resilience. Where Sweden and Denmark were both highly influenced by this Beckian risk society form of resilience understanding, stressing reflectivity and co-production, Norwegian sources tilted towards an understanding of risks coming from the outside, and not as something we are co-producing ourselves.

The last form found in the material – namely organisational resilience – is probably the most politically problematic. While all countries agreed that future threats were uncertain and that prediction and a positive end goal no

longer steered security planning, all three countries enacted initiatives to make authorities and citizens expect the unexpected. To prepare for the unknown. To a large extent, this produces a normalisation of the exceptional and legitimises a range of initiatives in the name of safeguarding against any future threat. Resilience becomes the standard answer in the Nordic countries, but we are unsure to what. Resilience is however not entirely without promises. The promises are instead in the expectations that key institutions will deliver on the promise of always adapting and finding new solutions to future challenges. The strategic feature of the concept of resilience is, in other words, reduced to a matter of finding the right architecture to cope with future challenges, and does not entail a description of that future – as the future is basically unknown. We find this highly problematic. This notion of resilience entails a description of the future in terms of fears and thus tends to nourish an inward-looking and anxious mode of existence. Also, this turn to organised resilience changes our understanding of authority and responsibility in security politics by dispersing power and responsibility to the many on the one hand, while still claiming to be able to somehow steer. Yet, while security might still be supervised by the state, the vision of the future is wrapped in an uncertainty and no one can really be held accountable for the future events. This is hardly a way of regaining strategic initiative.

Notes

- 1 As the military strategist Bernard Brodie wrote in 1973, the focus of strategy is – at the level of planning – to prescribe new and better solutions (Brodie 1973: 332). Strategy has since been used by a wide set of organisations to define a general direction that defines a preferred future and the steps needed to achieving that future.
- 2 Yet, at least in policy debates, there is a striking difference between a precautionary approach and that of resilience. Where the precaution principle holds on to the promise of macro-planning in its description of ‘the principles’ that we, as a community, have to follow (Stirling 2007), the thrust of resilience lies in decentralised individual decision-making.
- 3 Anders Wivel (2017) even discusses a special Nordic Model of International Peace and Security and Hagemann and Bramsen (2019) discuss the many Nordic peace and conflict resolution efforts in a Nordic Council of Ministers report.
- 4 Reference to the ‘72 hours’ pamphlets in Norway and Sweden.
- 5 The quotes in the following analysis are representative. When including references to local media the direct source is quoted. The same wording is, however, most often found in many similar articles in other local journals on the same or the following day because the local media outlets use the same source.
- 6 Search words in the analysis were: Norway: Resiliens, Samfunnssikkerhet, Totalforsvar, Motstandskraft, Motstandsdyktig, Robusthet. Sweden: Resiliens, Totalförsvar, Samhällssäkerhet, Motståndskraftig, Motståndskraft, Samhällsskydd, Robusthet. Denmark: Resiliens, Samfundssikkerhed, Totalforsvar, Modstandsdygtig, Modstandskraft, Samfundsmæssig sikkerhed. We are aware that ‘Samhällsskydd’ is also part of the Swedish emergency management agency, and that ‘Samfunnsikkerhet’ forms part of the name of the Norwegian counterpart.

- 7 In Sweden this appear as 'holistic approach' (Counterterrorism strategy 2014/15), 'whole of society' or 'greater societal capacity'. In Norway, this is referred to mostly as 'total defence', while in Denmark the concept of 'societal cohesion' is used as synonym to comprehensive security.
- 8 In Norway agility is referred to as adaptability ('Omstillingsparat', NSM 2017, DSB 2017: 70); and in Denmark, as 'adaptive operations' (PET 2016) and 'crisis-capacity'. Adaptation is not as often mentioned in the Swedish texts but appears as 'proactive adaptation' (see more under organised resilience); yet the concept of 'motståndssanda' appears from 2017.
- 9 Sometimes also referred to as 'whole of society' (see Lindberg and Sundelius 2012: 1297).
- 10 This concept of 'reflexive' is taken from Ulrich Beck, who observes how we, in the second modernity, have become self-reflective of our own role in the production of dangers, looking back at the industrial modernity. It describes that of being self-critical and aware about the (often unintended) consequences of our own acts and calling for self-limitation, -restrain and -control (1999: 79–81).
- 11 The popularity of Nassim Nicholas Taleb's 2007 book, *The Black Swan*, made the 'black swan' image a metaphor of the unlikely and unpredictable future event that might change societal and organisational priorities by destabilising the modern understanding of risks, as something to be forecasted.
- 12 The reasons for this can be many. Norway and Denmark were both frontline countries during the Cold War, but differ on this aspect. Neutral Sweden has focused on civil and frontline defence as a shield against foreign invasion for a long time.
- 13 'Tre dygn. Så länge ska ett hushåll kunna klara sig om en kris skulle uppstå. Allmänhetens beredskap verkar dock vara låg och kommunen jobbar på att ta fram tips och råd' (*Nya Wermlands-Tidningen*, 03.03.2015).
- 14 'Svenskar klarar sig inte i kris' (*Arbetsbladet*, 26.02.2015).
- 15 For more, please see: www.msb.se/sv/utbildning--ovning/ovning/totalfor-svarsovning-2020/, accessed 3 September 2019.
- 16 The official pamphlet distributed to all households can be found here: <https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/28706.pdf>
- 17 'Krisberedskapssystemet bygger på att människor kan ta ett eget ansvar, åtminstone i början av en kris'. 'De flesta saknar nog främst en mental förberedelse för att något kan hända. Men också en viss hemberedskap – att man kan tappa upp vatten, har lite torrmat och konserver, kanske batterier till en radio, en ficklampa och sådana saker, säger Stefan Anering' (*Arbetsbladet*, 26.02.2015).
- 18 'Så det är tydligen inte bara företag och myndigheter som saknar krisberedskap. Vår civila samhällsberedskap är alltså inte den bästa' in 'Vår krisberedskap är inte god' (*Nya Wermlands-Tidningen*, 24.02.2015, 22).
- 19 'Sköt dig själv'. (ibid.) See more on the campaign here: www.svenskalottakaren.se/utbildningar/skot-dig-sjalv. A list of things to keep at home: www.svenskalottakaren.se/system/files/content/paragraphs/attached_files/checklista_krislada_a4.pdf?file=1&type=paragraphs_item&id=401&force=1, accessed 3 September 2019.
- 20 '... innebär inte att du ska "skita i andra"' (ibid.).
- 21 'Det kan uppfattas som provocerande, men det handlar om att man ska stärka sig själv först för att sedan kunna hjälpa andra. Precis som med syrgasmaskerna på flygplanen som man också först måste sätta på sig själv för att sedan hjälpa andra med sina' (ibid.).
- 22 'Medan myndigheter, poliser, politiker och andra gör sitt för att skydda medborgarna från kriminalitet, brott och terror, så ska vi göra allt som privatpersoner för att skydda samhället. Det innebär att vi fortsätter ha tillit till våra

medmänniskor och till vårt samhällssystem. Det kommer vi klara av. Det visade alla människor i Stockholm som hjälpte varandra under och efter attacken på Drottninggatan' in 'Visa tilltro till dina medmänniskor' (*Sundsvalls Tidning*, 18.04.2017).

- 23 'Begrebet robusthed bruges i flæng – det er blevet en slags "livets airbag" (...) Vi ved først om den virker, når vi kører galt. Den nedslående nyhed er (...) at der hverken findes en robusthedstest eller et quickfix, som lige kan tjekke og booste den mentale robusthed' in 'Mental robusthed er evnen til at komme sig efter svære hændelser', (*Jyllands-Posten*, 08.04.2017).
- 24 'You form part of Norway's preparedness', see also www.sikkerhverdag.no/din-beredskap/hendelser-og-kriser/beredskap-i-hjemmet/. For some reason, Norwegians are advised to keep iodine tablets in case of a nuclear incident. Swedes do not have these on the check list.
- 25 'Vi trenger også mer kunnskap om sosiale og psykologiske mekanismer som bidrar til å utvikle kollektiv og individuell motstandskraft når vårt samfunn rammes av slik meningsløs terror. Norge skal lære av det som har skjedd på mange nivåer, også det psykologiske' in 'Hvordan leve med terrorfrykt?' (*Aftenposten*, 29.07.2011).
- 26 'Ytre fare gjør at mennesker søker sammen og ofte oppstår et meget sterkt gruppesamhold. Dette øker personens motstandskraft betraktelig. Teambygging og styrking av korpsånd og "vi"-følelse er derfor essensielt' in 'Norsk mestring av terror' (*Forskning.no*, 28.07.2011).
- 27 'Det beste er selvfølgelig at man har reell kontroll, dvs kan foreta et valg som gjør at problemet løses eller unngås. Der reell kontroll ikke er mulig, vil opplevd kontroll kunne være meget nyttig. Det viser seg at mange mennesker har evnen til å føle en viss grad av kontroll selv i situasjoner hvor denne ikke er så helt reell' in 'Norsk mestring av terror' (ibid.)
- 28 'Resiliens ... eller motstandsdyktighet/overlevelseevne, er naturlig og kan ikke bli lært gjennom trening. Forskning på resiliens viser ingen resultater av slike treningsprogram. Naturlig resiliens er den viktigste mekanismen bak hvordan mennesker klarer store trauma og sorg' in 'Sorg og smerte er individuell' (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 27.07.2011).
- 29 'Nyere forskning viser at de som etter terrorhendelsen tilbringer mye tid foran skjermen for å se på nyhetene opplever mer negative reaksjoner i etterkant. Selv om årsak-virkning forholdene er noe uklare, kan vi som enkeltmennesker selv ta ansvar ved å skjerme oss selv (og våre barn) mot for mye mediainntrykk og på denne måten unngå indre uro og opprettholde robusthet' in 'Hvordan leve med terrorfrykt?' (*Aftenposten*, 29.07.2011).
- 30 '... hva er vel bedre samfunnssikkerhet enn det at vi kan stå sammen, når en eller annen ytterliggående terrorist eller terroristgruppe måtte true samfunnet vårt?' in 'Tanker etter terrortragedien' (*Hallingdolen.*, 11.08.2011).
- 31 This vision is echoed in the yearly reports and strategies of the DEMA all the way back to 2014. Before that the focus was more on the institutional capacity to coordinate amongst different national authorities, thus on the horizontal coordination. In the publications of the PET, the discourse is also present in the 2014 reports. In Sweden we see a similar shift from coordination to self-governance.
- 32 Lottakåren is a Swedish women's organisation that works on civil preparedness in the event of a crisis. See also www.svenskalottakaren.se/.
- 33 '...det finns mycket att vinna genom att vara mentalt förberedd när en kris uppstår. Man får lära sig att koppla på radarn och att vara uppmärksam så att man tidigt ska kunna se samband som man kanske inte sett tidigare, säger Britta Christott. Nästa steg är att man själv skapar sig en krisplan' in 'Kriskurs till länet' (*Länstidningen Östersund*, 21.02.2015., 9).

- 34 '...lærere (...) lærer at spotte mistrivsel og tegn på radikalisering. En kompetence som der er udsigt til, får mere fokus i de kommende år. (...) indsatsen skal systematiseres for at øge fokus på børn og unges modstandskraft mod ekstremistiske holdninger og bevægelser' in 'Lærere slog alarm over kundby-pige forud for anholdelse' (*Berlingske*, 16.04.2017).
- 35 'For hver terrormistænkt, som pågribes, er der helte, vi aldrig hører om. Men der er endnu flere helte for hvert menneske med massive sociale og psykiske problemer, der aldrig ender som terrormistænkt. Fordi nogen gjorde noget ekstra for det menneske, som var langt ude, men ikke kom så langt ud. Politibetjente, skolelærere, pædagoger, socialrådgivere, misbrugskonsulenter, forkyndere, trænere og andre frivillige' in 'Familie og venner' (*Information*, 21.04.2017).
- 36 The concept of 'organised resilience' is inspired by Michael Powers term 'organised uncertainty' (2007). Similar to his argument on how we as society have come to see risk management (compliance systems and auditing techniques) as a matter of 'just' organising uncertainty, one can argue that the institutional structures set up to create resilience (and thereby organise uncertainty) are resting on a similar paradox of wanting to control the uncontrollable.
- 37 A typical example is to base administrative decisions on works of commissions and public councils, in order to work out the problems and recommend new directions. Accordingly, the future was considered calculable and therefore possible to control (Andersen and Pors 2017: 125–126).
- 38 Both campaigns are from 2018. Please see links to brochures earlier in notes 10 and 20. The Norwegian state radio even ran a podcast called '72 timer' (72 hours) in which they discuss the level of individual preparedness ('egenberedskap') with several famous Norwegians. https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/72_timer, accessed 13 August 2019.
- 39 'Blir du extremist, lille vän?' (*Fria Tidningen*, 25.02.2015).
- 40 '...ett webbaserat utbildningsmaterial under namnet "Samtalskompassen". Webbsajten sägs rikta sig till de som "möter personer i riskzonen för radikalisering, framför allt unga i deras vardag" och sägs ge verktyg för att "med hjälp av stödjande och förebyggande samtal, stärka ungas motståndskraft mot extrema budskap"' in 'Blir du extremist, lille vän?' (*Fria Tidningen*, 25.02.2015).
- 41 'Kan de extremistiska rekryterarna hitta svenska ungdomar som går att rekrytera, så kan samhället också göra det. Eller vi borde kunna det. Men vi måste skärpa oss. Vi kan aldrig ge upp i kampen att hindra radikalisering, rekrytering till våldsbejakande extremism eller att förmå människor att ta avstånd från våld' in 'Vi måste växla upp mot extremismen' (*Expressen*, 22.02.2015).
- 42 'För att identifiera dessa personer i tid och förebygga att de begår brottsliga handlingar måste samhällets olika instanser samverka. De föräldrar, idrottstränare, socialarbetare, lärare, präster, sjuksköterskor, fritidsledare, imamer och poliser som finns i personens närhet måste tillsammans verka för att upptäcka, förstå och agera' in 'Vi måste växla upp mot extremismen' (*Expressen*, 22.02.2015).
- 43 'Att Samtalskompassen finns tillgänglig för alla gör att det inte längre finns några ursäkter för att inte delta i det förebyggande arbetet' in 'Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism lanserar utbildningsmaterial' (*Cision Wire*, 17.02.2015).
- 44 Another initiative that falls under this concept of resilience is the recent Swedish decision to include psychological defence under the emergency management agency. It was announced at the annual 'Folk och försvar' security conference in Sälen on 14 January 2018. See also www.thelocal.se/20180115/sweden-to-create-new-authority-tasked-with-countering-disinformation, accessed 5 November 2019.
- 45 One such initiative is a web-portal entitled 'strong communities' (www.stærkefællesskaber.dk), created on private funding by a consultancy company (Certa for Trygfonden).

- 46 RASK stands for 'Risiko, Adfærd og Sikkerhedskultur' (Risk, behaviour and security culture).
- 47 'Mennesker er generelt et bolværk mod trusler, men er også samtidig det svageste led i organisationens sikkerhed? Den menneskelige side af sikkerhed er et aspekt af modstandskraft som er centralt, men måske mere komplekst eller kontroversielt at tale om? Truslen fra spioner og insidere er for mange velkendte, men hvordan håndterer vi disse menneskelige trusler. Hvordan forebygger og håndterer man de situationer, hvor medarbejdere utilsigtet begår fejl, der kan have store konsekvenser for virksomheden eller organisationen' and 'Deltagerne sættes i stand til internt at komme med idéer til at inddrage og skabe ejerskab til sikkerhed hos både ledelse og medarbejdere', available at www.pet.dk/Forebyggende%20Afdeling/-/media/Forebyggende%20Afdeling/Kurser/201706FolderenRASKFINALpdf.ashx.
- 48 The term 'learning from near-misses' is often used in relation to resilience and organisational learning (see Dalgaard-Nielsen 2017 for an analysis of how Danish organisations understand resilience).
- 49 'Därtill behöver kommunikationsmetoder identifieras och budskap utarbetas i syfte att effektivt öka olika målgruppers motståndskraft gentemot extremistiska budskap. Staten är ofta inte en effektiv avsändare och därför bör till exempel företag som arbetar med sociala medier och muslimska organisationer som tar tydligt avstånd från extremism och terrorism involveras' in 'Skärp straffen för brott med terrorkoppling' (*Svenska Dagbladet*, 28.04.2017).
- 50 At the local level in Halland, Sweden, people are working to become resilient together: 'Resilience in society does not exist. If supply of electricity or oil were stopped in a crisis situation, how long would we be able to manage with existing repositories? For that reason (...) we have decided to start up an exchange-circle [bytesring]. We want to become self-sufficient in water and electricity', translated from 'Det finns ingen resiliens i samhället i dag. Om tillgången till el eller olja skulle stoppas i en krisituation, hur länge klarar vi oss då på det som vi har i föråden? Därför vill vi i sambruket bygga upp en bytesring. I sommar kommer förmodligen en i arbetsgruppen också att arbeta med att starta ett socialt företag och anställa arbetslösa. Vi vill bli självförsörjande på allt från vatten till el' in 'Två sambruk startas i Halland' (*Fria Tidningen*, 24.02.2015).
- 51 'Kampanj ska förbättra allmänhetens krisberedskap', Christina Andersson, projektledare på MSB (*Sveriges Radio*, 15.04.2017).
- 52 'Att man sätter sig ner där hemma och pratar om hur behovet i hushållet ser ut. Man ska inte underskatta tankens kraft. Var uppfinningsrik och gör det inte för komplicerat. Använd det som finns och komplettera med till exempel ficklampor och fungerande batterier. Det handlar om stegvis kunskap och medvetandegörande', Christina Andersson, projektledare på MSB (*Sveriges Radio*, 15.04.2017).
- 53 In Swedish: 'Förbered dig på det oväntade'.
- 54 'Men det gäller inte bara individen utan även kommuner behöver mer kunskap om hur deras skyldigheter ser ut. Befolkningen måste förstå att samhällets resurser inte räcker till om många drabbas samtidigt. Människor kommer att få vänta och behöver därför ta ett större ansvar', Christina Andersson, MSB, in 'Förbered dig på det oväntade' (*Nordssverige*., 27.04.2017).
- 55 'Samarbeid er en forutsetning for god samfunnssikkerhet og fornuftig utnyttelse av de ressursene vi totalt sett har til rådighet. Når sivilsamfunnets ressurser ikke strekker til, kan Forsvaret bistå så langt dette er mulig. Det gjelder i hele spekteret fra søk-og redningsoppdrag til håndtering av terrorangrep. På samme måte må sivilsamfunnet være i stand til å bistå Forsvaret i krise og krig. Vi kaller det totalforsvaret, og det handler om at vi som nasjon må kunne stille med alle tilgjengelige ressurser for å håndtere alvorlige hendelser. Det handler om å

- kunne forsvare oss med alt det vi har' in 'T otalforsvar viktig' (*Avisa Nordland*, 24.04.2017).
- 56 'Ifølge Bjørn Ivar Kruke, forsker på samfunnssikkerhet ved Universitetet i Stavanger er det også viktig å også studere de uformelle ad-hoc-strukturene, blant annet folkene på campingplassen. Det sies at den som redder livet ditt, ofte er den som står ved siden av deg. Den kapasiteten tilfeldige personer bidrar med, bør studeres i et beredskapsperspektiv, sier han' in 'Beredskapen før 22. juli: Den politiske beredskapen' (*Aftenposten*, 09.08.2011, 7).
- 57 'Samvirke som begrep har fått et godt fotfeste etter 22.juli terroren. Å finne hverandre, lære hverandres kapasiteter å kjenne og identifisere gjensidige avhengigheter mellom beredskapsaktører, er sentrale deler som inngår i samvirkeprinsippet' (*Aktuell Sikkerhet*, 01.03.2017).
- 58 As argued by Stirling (2007), precautionary measures usually assume the possibility of planning at the level of governments.

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