8 From “spiritual defence” to robust resilience in the Finnish comprehensive security model

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Introduction¹

Of the new concepts that have started to define the way we think about security today, resilience is arguably one of the most influential ones. Indeed, it could be asserted that resilience is *the* notion that captures most succinctly the recent turn to “societal security” as a response to new threat perceptions, both in the Nordic region and elsewhere. Security has been defined in relation to such “new issues” as the flow of information, resources and people, the cyber domain, ecological systems, and international terrorism. As a result, the threats faced by contemporary democratic societies are increasingly viewed as wicked and complex problems that challenge the more traditional strategies of producing (national) security. In addition to defence, protection, and prevention, the focus of security policies has fell more and more on adaptive capacities – that is, on the ability of the key societal functions to pertain their operativity during shocks or disruptions, and to initiate learning-processes in their aftermath. The concept of resilience refers exactly to this ability to combine resistance to crises with adaptive learning. Thus, it has become one of the most pivotal “mentalities” of contemporary security governance, and politics more generally. Several European countries and the EU, as well as the US and many international organisations, have adopted resilience to their vocabularies.

Following the lead of practitioners on this score, resilience has also emerged as one the key terms of International Relations (IR) scholarship in the recent years, especially in the sub-field of security studies. Much has been written, in particular, about the links between resilience and the broader contemporary trend of (biopolitical) neoliberalism. For example, Jonathan Joseph (2013a) has suggested that contemporary resilience policies need to be understood in the context of the neoliberal turn as a tool for shifting responsibility from governments to the individuals and local communities. According to this line of thinking, it is no longer up to the state, to put it bluntly, to protect its citizens. Rather, the state must “nudge” its citizens towards taking responsibility for their preparedness and self-organisation.

Such criticisms capture vividly the political dangers of resilience discourse, especially as it has been implemented in the Anglo-Saxon world. By the same token, it is worth noting that the term is utilised for variety of purposes, and yielding to plethora of different political outcomes. Resilience has been applied to countless different and disconnected aspects and areas of global politics from development, economic policy, and environmental governance to counterterrorism and refugee flows. Besides, policy-makers are usually not *principally* interested in conceptual accuracy and precision (which is not to say they would be incapable to think security conceptually). In the empirical world of politics and governance, resilience is not even an “essentially contested concept”. It is a dispersed non-concept that has become a political buzzword (see Brand and Jax, 2007). Hence, scholars ought to be wary of essentialising resilience in their critiques. Indeed, it makes more sense to talk about “resiliences” rather than about a singular object called “resilience” that carries the same attributes across various contexts (Walklate et al., 2014, p. 419).

In this chapter, we emphasise this polyvalence by calling attention to the local trajectories that define the specific forms taken by resilience as a security political notion in Finland. Policies are not devised and implemented from the scratch, but build on local and contextual trajectories, path-dependencies, and (state) strategic cultures. Resilience policies of the recent years are no exceptions. As Berling and Petersen also suggest in their chapter in this volume, there is variance in the discursive production of resilience policies even across the Nordic countries. Our main argument is that on a strategic and political level, buzzwords such as “resilience” are received as “semi-empty signifiers”; they gain their meaning and practical efficacy when the concept is remoulded and fitted into the historically habitualised understandings of security politics, governance, and strategic culture embraced by the receiving actor or collective.

The first main section of the chapter argues that in order to understand the concrete forms taken by resilience policies in different countries, security studies scholarship needs to balance the conceptual genealogies of resilience with more local and contextual ones. The form taken by Finnish resilience policies, for example, needs to be understood as a dynamic process in which domestic traditions and international trajectories interact with each other. The language game of “resilience” is not only translated into the Finnish language, but also fitted to the grammar and syntax of a more established “comprehensive security” framework. In the second section, we offer an ideal-type taxonomisation through which resilience can be separated from other key mentalities or imaginaries of security governance such as “defence”, “protection”, and “prevention”. This ideal-typical taxonomy serves as a basis for analytically dissecting the typical features of resilience approach. On this ground, the third section argues that resilience has been translated into the Finnish context of comprehensive security in a manner that harks back to the discourse of spiritual defence (or psychological defence) that was developed during the Cold War years.

This does not have to mean that the domestication and translation process of resilience would turn out to be nothing but old wine in new bottles, though. As we discuss in the conclusion, the process of rebaptising may turn out to be a productive act of renewal. The interplay of translated resilience and the historical trajectories may give birth to a new type of resilience (the Finnish or Nordic model), one that is better attuned to the demands of democratic participation, the heritage of the Nordic welfare state, and the requirements of effective climate policies than the ones implemented in the Anglophone world.² But the process also has its pitfalls: translation may bring about a loss of analytical clarity, leading to inability to think clearly. And as the avalanche of critical literature clearly indicates, the political “promise” of resilience as a tool for producing security in democratic societies is hardly unambiguous. Especially as a buzzword, it is vulnerable to ideological projections.

Old wine, new bottles? Towards a genealogy of resilience in Finland

In the IR scholarship, the analyses of concrete forms of contemporary resilience policies have been supplemented with and heavily influenced by a genealogical look at the concept’s history (Brassett et al., 2013; Cavelti et al., 2015). For us too, genealogy seems central for the purposes of making sense of current resilience thinking. Genealogy can be understood as a way of articulating – making conceptually visible – the historically emerged ways of thinking that condition us in the present (See e.g. Koopman, 2013, pp. 1–4, 24, 129). We use the word in a broad sense instead of following the methodological lead of, say, Foucault in detail. For us, genealogy stands for an inquiry into a plurality of historical trajectories looming behind the present-day practices and discourses. Such inquiry serves critical analysis of the present by bringing in light the contingent composition of elements (discourses, institutions, practices) that form the current policies. In contrast to the dominant understanding in IR scholarship, we highlight the importance of context-specific genealogies in addition to conceptual or universal ones.

The critical literature on resilience policies tends to focus exclusively on the trajectory of the concept from life sciences and psychology to policy discourses in the Anglo-Saxon context, and inadvertently universalising this to other contexts as well. In policy-making, however, historically emerged ways of thinking do not derive from scientific literature only but are deeply rooted in local and national decision-making cultures. This is not to say the scientific-conceptual genealogies are not important. They just need to be supplemented with a more context-sensitive ways of tracing historical developments. Thus, our chapter at the same time problematises the rather univocal treatment of the concept of resilience in the critical IR literature and highlights the restrictions imposed by historical state culture for a meaningful resilience policy in Finland.

Particularly influential in IR resilience scholarship has been the genealogy presented by Jeremy Walker and Melissa Cooper (2011). In it, Walker and Cooper argue that resilience was born in system ecology in the 1970s. The notion was then imported to world politics in response to increasing neoliberalisation of the political atmosphere, together with the sense of increased demand for ideas to nurture adaptability in the face of supposedly uncontrollable risks and threats as suggested by the “intuitive ideological fit” of the complex adaptive systems theory and the neoliberal turn (*ibid.*, p. 141; see also Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015, pp. 95–97). In a recent article Philippe Bourbeau (2018) criticises and supplements the argument presented by Walker and Cooper, thereby expanding and diversifying our understanding of resilience and its scientific origins. Instead of the rather uni-directional approach of Walker and Cooper, Bourbeau argues that resilience has percolated from science and research into international politics through several different trajectories (psychology, engineering, social work, ecology) after the Second World War.

As a result of these two genealogies, scholars have a satisfying picture of the diverse trajectories from which resilience has entered international politics. We argue, however, that such conceptual genealogy of resilience is only one aspect that needs to be considered if we are to understand resilience policies currently crafted for security governance purposes. It is equally pertinent to account for the specificities of local political histories and state cultures. The domestication of global trends and buzzwords indeed always takes place through a process of negotiation with the local policy traditions (See Alasuutari and Quadir, 2014). This insight, however, has been lost in the research that has traced the historically effected nature of resilience practices through generalising genealogies.

More generally, too, analytical perspectives on domestication and translation of concepts and governance trends are rarely present or prominent in security studies. In the case of resilience scholarship, this is in part, we suggest, because most research on the topic has been conducted in an Anglo-Saxon context. This is justifiable as countries such as the UK were among the first to re-design its security politics according to the logic of resilience. However, insofar as resilience is approached as a properly *international* object of research, we need a better analysis of its different instantiations in different policy-contexts. In other words, we need *local* genealogies in addition to the abstract conceptual ones, and must be careful not to generalise from the Anglo-Saxon experience. As Bourbeau (2018, pp. 21–22) notes, genealogy as a form of inquiry implies an open-ended interpretation of historical trajectories. It also embraces the idea of historical processes as multidirectional. Building on these insights, and further expanding the argument presented by Bourbeau, we argue that the multidirectional nature of the genealogies of contemporary resilience policies is further highlighted when we consider the local histories within which resilience is adopted.

We also follow the lead of two recent studies, one by Roth and Prior (2014) and another by Joseph (2019). The latter focuses on the applications of the “Anglo-Saxon idea of resilience” in German critical infrastructure protection and overseas humanitarian policies. As a result of his analysis, Joseph argues that resilience remains an idea that is defined by an Anglo-Saxon neoliberal mindset. As such, outside the Anglo-Saxon world, it is easier to implement it in overseas policy, where the conflict with social and political cultures is less likely to emerge (what this tells about the logic of humanitarian policy is beyond the scope of our argument). From our perspective, however, Joseph’s argument is slightly too focused on resilience as a rather univocal Anglo-Saxon import that either does or does not fit the German state culture. Hence, he pays relatively little attention to the dynamic process during which resilience undergoes a transmutation as it draws from historical-cultural resources as it is being translated. Even when resilience was not a key concept of policy-making, every country *per force* was always already engaged in *some* strategies that can be retrospectively understood in terms of enhancing resilience. Thus, when the current discourse of resilience is translated into policy practice, the intertwining local and conceptual genealogies of resilience may produce wildly different outcomes across different contexts.

Roth and Prior (2014), who come closer to our argument, have studied the amalgamation of resilience thinking and the tradition of civil defence culture in the context of Switzerland’s societal security strategies. In the case of Finland, we claim that the tradition of top-down structure of security governance and the Cold War era emphasis on spiritual (or psychological) defence, combined with the Nordic model of melioristic welfare state, have formed a force-field that, in the process of domestication, has impacted the reading of the concept of resilience decisively. The result has been a rather robust reading of how resilience is understood as a national-level attribute and a hierarchical reading of how resilience is built in the field of societal security. This comparison is evident when looked against the understanding of resilience either as an embodiment of neoliberal governance or a tool to enhance individual and local actorness in the realm of societal security.

In the following sections, we substantiate our claim by discussing the emergent resilient paradigm in Finland in the context of the comprehensive security model – a combination of critical infrastructure protection, vital societal functions, and societal security – that has defined Finnish security politics and societal security strategies for the past 15 years or so. Our genealogical analysis traces a strong continuity between Finland’s Cold War conceptions of total/spiritual defence and the recent (re-)emergence of the calls to enhance societal resilience. Instead of witnessing exclusively a turn to “neoliberal governmentality”, or reflexive understanding of resilience as a strategy of responsabilisation, in Finland the surge towards resilience has led to a more robust reading of the concept. It combines societal and defence policy concerns, coupled with a limited amount of civil society

responsibilisation, at least when understood in terms of genuine empowerment. Moreover, the emerging Finnish doctrine of resilience seems to emphasise psychological and material preparedness to resist the status quo threatening effects of certain crisis scenarios, thus pointing more towards the idea of bouncing back in order to preserve the existing order than to the neoliberal idea of adaptive learning through the crisis.

Resilience as a security mentality

To trace out the amalgamation of resilience thinking and the tradition of comprehensive security model in Finland, a baseline criterion or typification on security governance based on the concept of resilience is needed. We do not offer a universal definition of resilience as it would be counterintuitive against our leading premise that security governance techniques and practices should always be studied against local contexts. Indeed, as many scholars have pointed out, the proliferation of resilience discourses and practices in various fields of security governance makes it more comfortable to speak about resilience in the plural and study it contextually (Anderson, 2015; Bourbeau, 2013; see also Berling and Petersen, this volume). But when looked purely from an analytical perspective, it is fruitful to pinpoint some ideal-typical features that separate the (neoliberal or Anglo-Saxon) mainstream understanding of resilience from other strategic concepts of security governance.

Based on definitions put forth in various scientific traditions such as developmental psychology and socio-ecology, resilience is usually defined as the latent ability of systems, individuals, communities, and organisations. Understood as a process, this latent ability is actualised in three necessary steps: the ability to (i) withstand the effects of major disruptions, (ii) maintain one's ability to act amid a crisis, and (iii) "bounce back" from the crisis with the addition of being able to learn from the experience in order to increase one's adaptability in the future (Brand and Jax, 2007; Juntunen and Hyvönen, 2014). Understood as a process, resilience thinking challenges some of the traditional state-centric approaches to security (see further Hyvönen and Juntunen, 2016; Juntunen and Virta, 2019; Virta, 2013). For example, in defence policy and military security the yardstick of successful policies is the safeguarding of the territorial integrity and continuity of key societal functions of a nation state (focus on external security). The main security threats are usually perceived as other state actors or other relatively organised collective entities or polities. In the case of protection and crime prevention, to name other examples on some key concepts informing security strategies, governance focuses either on social, economic, and political substructures that correlate with the level of human development (as in human security paradigm that is based on the idea of protection), or on providing internal security and order through punitive actions, policing, and other deterring technologies and practices (prevention). Here the main

threats are either perceived as stemming from the structural distortions of societies, such as poverty, inequality, and other cultural practices that cause structural violence, or from organised illegal activities and specific societal distortions that endanger the orderliness of the society from within (as in the process of political radicalisation).

Resilience thinking, by contrast to the logics of defence, protection, and prevention, emphasises the openness and uncertain nature of the threat environment in an age of increasing complexity. Thus, the *primary* objective of resilience politics is not to enhance the robustness of critical infrastructures (e.g. energy networks) against certain specific threats, but to increase preparedness to face several possible, even emergent crisis scenarios. Nor does resilience politics rely purely on physical technologies of coercion or dissuasion (e.g. deterrence achieved through the military or police forces). Instead, the logic of resilience emphasises the need to increase the mental, physical, and organisational adaptability of individuals, communities, the private sector, and the civil society to face the unpredictable, even inevitable threats that can stem both from outside and inside of the society. In short, *resilience politics focuses on the enhancement of the society's functionality* in order to face unpredictable societal and ecological threats.³

In addition to the dominant threat perceptions and the epistemological grounding of security governance, the questions of who the key security providers are and to whom or what security is provided for can be used to separate different security logics from each other. When it comes to situating the agency of societal security governance, resilience strategies tend to emphasise private sector, civil society, and eventually individual citizens (Gladfelter, 2018; Stark and Taylor, 2014; Tierney, 2015). However, as several scholars have recently pointed out, the relocation of the agency does not necessarily mean a true transition of power from the central or local government to the local actors and civil society (in terms of being able to define what societal resilience means as a strategic objective) (see, e.g., Roth and Prior, 2014, p. 108; Stark and Taylor, 2014; Virta and Branders, 2016).

As Joseph (2019, pp. 151–152) points out, aforementioned techniques of responsibilisation are typical to the Anglo-Saxon approaches to societal resilience building:

[i]n Anglo-Saxon policy making, there is a fairly swift move from thinking about the dynamics of systems to emphasising individual responsibility, adaptability and preparedness. [...] The Anglo-Saxon approach to resilience thus constitutes an active intervention by the state into civil society and the private sphere [of which] is premised on a certain view of the relationship between state, society and its citizens, of the duties and responsibilities of each, of the role of government, civil society and the private sector, of the means by which information is shared, the public informed and their roles understood.

There are several reasons why the process of responsabilisation is problematic: citizens' unwillingness or fear to take responsibility, the lack of material or psychological resources and skills as well as poor organisation and lack of leadership on a community level are possible reasons that point towards the "receiving end" of the responsabilisation act. On the other hand, several scholars have noted that community-based resilience projects can have negative impact among the civil society (also the receiving end of the project) if participation is limited to a top-down process initiated and controlled by the authorities. The option would be to empower local actors and individual citizens by encouraging outcome-oriented models of participation. In other words, the process of responsabilisation should be perceived as transformative, not merely as a temporary delegative act that is introduced as a response to, say, resource scarcity (Stark and Taylor, 2014; Virta and Branders, 2016).

In the next section, we will use the ideal-typification of resilience-based security mentality to trace the prominence of societal resilience discourses and practices in Finnish comprehensive security model, including the two security strategies for society published in 2010 and 2017. Moreover, we will evaluate what kind of interpretations of resilience (threat perceptions, agency, and location of security) and its societal significance these strategies produce. Our leading hypothesis is that the historical path-dependency of the concept of comprehensive security, stemming from the Cold War era conception of spiritual defence, has "domesticated" the Anglo-Saxon understanding of resilience into a more robust local reading. This robust reading of resilience emphasises the top-down process of defining the strategic priorities and the importance of maintaining the national cohesion (key national values and the need to build them on the basis of bottom-up legitimacy based on high levels of political trust within the society). It also emphasise resistance through preparedness and fast recovery instead of the adaptive and self-governing capacities of the population.

Historicising robust resilience in the context of Finnish spiritual defence model during the Cold War

During the early 1960s Finnish Agrarian Union-led government appointed an expert committee to work on the question of how national defence policy could be advanced on the basis of developments in theoretical and applied psychology. Already in 1957, the National Association for Military Psychology had suggested to the defence minister that a committee working on the systematic integration of the psychological dimension in Finnish defence policy should be established. Eventually the committee was appointed with the name *Henkisen maanpuolustuksen komitea* (The Committee for Spiritual National Defence; HMP committee). This was done as a part of wider effort to establish comprehensive organisational structure of advisory boards to support national defence planning.⁴

Key figure behind the social-psychological turn in defence planning in Finland was General Jaakko Valtanen – later also The Chief of Defence in Finland between 1983 and 1990 – whose 1954 dissertation already dealt with questions concerning national “defence will”. In addition to Valtanen being appointed as the secretary of the HMP committee, the data collected by Valtanen already in 1954 was reportedly used by the HMP committee and younger-generation sociologist Antti Eskola whom the committee commissioned to study the development of values and attitudes that affected to individual’s willingness to defend the society (Rainio-Niemi, 2014, p. 109).

The decision to use the term “spiritual” (in Finnish, *henkinen*) instead of “psychological” defence was not merely semantic in nature: the committee thought that “spiritual” implicated a much broader ideological and societal agenda than the original task that was explicitly based on the integration of military psychology to defence planning. According to Rainio-Niemi (2014, p. 106) this followed direct translation from the German word *Geistige Landesverteidigung* that was in use in Switzerland already in the 1930s.⁵ The committee aimed to bring the wider societal fabric – key societal values, the sense of national unity and purpose as well as the ideological foundations of these values – under the comprehensive agenda of total defence planning and monitoring. From here on the foundations of the willingness of the citizens to defend the democratic society and its core values was perceived as key ingredient of the Finnish national defence ethos (*ibid.*, p. 108).⁶

The ability to endure large-scale societal distress was one of the cornerstones of the total defence doctrine.⁷ As a pronouncedly national-level policy, the total defence concept was implemented as a top-down doctrine. The “spiritual” component here was about the integration of the societal dimension as a kind of a base structure that would support total defence planning. As Rainio-Niemi (2014, pp. 18–19) points out in the context of Austria and Finland, the concepts of *Geistige Landesverteidigung* and *henkinen maanpuolustus* “[...] were about promoting [...] new type of state consciousness and national awareness among the citizens to instill a new sense of ‘enlightened patriotism’.”

The final report of the committee (*Henkisen maanpuolutuksemme perustekijät: sen kokonaistavoitteet ja eri alojen tehtävät sekä johto- ja suoritukset rauhan ja sodan aikana*) was ready in 1962, two years after the inauguration of the committee, and eventually published in 1964. In the report the committee proposed a new, more modern, positive, and pluralistic understanding of patriotism that should be based on key national values of democracy and neutrality. Although the whole project should be interpreted in the context of the Cold War competition between political ideologies, the idea was to present these key values so that they would root in the everyday consciousness of the citizens’ life without the need to rely on explicit enemy images.

The cultivation of the civil culture through the education system was seen integral in the struggle against communism, although the threat of

communism was not explicitly mentioned due to Finland's compromised geopolitical position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. This era also witnessed the invention of national defence courses that aimed to integrate and habitualise influential individuals, interest groups, and branches of the society into national defence thinking.⁸ In light of analysing the historical practices and ideational constructs that condition the present resilience discourses in Finland, it is important to note that the underlying pedagogical idea of the "spiritual defence" project was to maintain it as an essentially top-down endeavour. It was based on the recognition of the importance of citizens' voluntary commitment "to the maintenance and further cultivation of the distinctively national democratic way of life" (quoted in Rainio-Niemi, 2014, p. 112). Thus, the top-down project of building the foundations of spiritual defence was deemed to be based on bottom-up legitimacy that was achieved through policies that are nowadays linked to the Nordic model of social security and welfare state: the inclusive social welfare and educational policies, transparency of the public administration, and a general sense of common Nordic identity as basis of societal stability (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 31).

As Roth and Prior (2014, pp. 110–113) point out, this kind of top-down version of responsabilisation typical to modern societal resilience programmes was already present in Switzerland's *Totale Landesverteidigung* (doctrine of total national defence) during the Cold War and in its predecessor *geistige Landesverteidigung* (spiritual defence) model during the inter-war period. Similar defence political doctrines were adopted also in other neutral or neutralist states in Europe during the Cold War, including Austria and Sweden (the latter was especially important reference in Finland during the late 1950s and early 1960s; see Rainio-Niemi, 2014). Distinctive feature of these spiritual defence doctrines, especially when compared to the Anglo-Saxon idea of resilience that emphasises individual- and community-level responsabilisation, is that the reference point of responsibility (responsibility to whom or what) is pronouncedly national. The underlying rationale in the spiritual defence model was to support the strategic priorities of the state through a whole-of-society approach to crisis preparedness and vital societal functions.

The spiritual defence doctrines adopted by the former Cold War neutrals also shared other key elements. The most obvious of these was conscription-based military service that tied majority of male population to the defence system. In this context it is important to note that Finland is one of the few European countries that has maintained compulsory military service and conscription-based army (large reserves) as the foundation of its defence policy also in the post-Cold War era – a clear sign of continuity in the Finnish strategic culture, especially if compared to transformation of national security thinking and practices in Sweden during the 2000s (see Larsson, this volume). Eventually these tenets led to an amalgamation of a top-down model of national security governance and, on the other hand, networked

security and preparedness strategy for the society in the post-Cold War era (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 27).

The idea of “enlightened patriotism” and its key role as the societal basis of the total defence doctrine was solidified into Finnish security culture during the 1960s and 1970s.⁹ That said, the evolution from the total defence doctrine to the concept of comprehensive security has not been a linear process. Nonetheless, it is impossible to neglect the historical path-dependencies in this transformation, something that also points towards the need to take local genealogies into account when interpreting the ideational impact of in-vogue concepts of security governance such as resilience.

What is important to note here is that these proto-resilience policies¹⁰ were based on a rather robust reading on the goals and methods of national security policy. The aim of these policies was not to increase adaptability in the face of various external threats. Instead, the focus was on the ability to withstand heavy societal pressure, caused by an external aggressor, both on an individual and on a societal level in order to maintain independence and key values of the society. As Bourbeau (2013, p. 13) suggests, a society that understands resilience first and foremost as an attribute needed to maintain the existing order intact “will deal with endogenous and exogenous shocks with rigidity and will underscore the potentially negative transformative consequences brought about by these events”. This kind of policy response that Bourbeau labels “resilience as maintenance” is usually coupled with securitisation acts based on external enemy images and threats. This approach differs from agile and more transformative Anglo-Saxon ideas of resilience building where the concept is understood as a general adaptive capacity that the society, political system, and individuals can use to renew themselves after various types of crises and disruptions originating from conscious political actions or from natural sources.

The aim of psychological defence, then, was not about openness to renewal and learning but to secure the functionality and identity of the society at large, to maintain its key values and norms intact, and to restore the pre-crisis status quo as quickly as possible. The threat conception that drove these policies was also very state-centric, although with an ideological-political underpinning. Although this policy was primarily based on the security mentality of defence, it already included hints of what is now understood as resilience building, especially through the recognition on the importance of bottom-up legitimacy needed for the official doctrine and the key role of mobilising the society as a whole to support the doctrine.

From spiritual defence to robust resilience: the evolution of Finland’s comprehensive security model in the post-Cold War era and the domestication of resilience politics

As Roth and Prior’s (2014) analysis indicates, the tradition of total defence doctrine – its state-led top-down conception of governance and emphasis on

enhancing the psychological robustness of the civil society to protect its key values – has plenty of similarity with the responsabilisation agenda of the in-vogue resilience strategies in the present. What is left somewhat unnoted in their analysis is the historically effected nature of security governance and strategic thinking, namely, how the inherited practices from the total defence doctrine era affect newly imported security mentalities such as resilience and the way they are perceived and put into practice.

Jonathan Joseph (2013b) makes similar argument in the context of France, where the Anglo-Saxon conception of resilience and its emphasis on individual-level responsabilisation has not manifested into an observable change in local strategic culture. Instead, the French white papers on security policy have presented a more robust reading of national resilience with a strong emphasis on “unitary state with highly centralised administration”.

By starting from Roth and Prior’s observation and continuing from Joseph’s point on the need to take the local strategic culture and practices of governance into account, we also argue that the Finnish discourse and practices on resilience politics are historically effected, that is, conditioned by the tradition of total (spiritual) defence policies of the Cold War era and its present reformulation, the comprehensive security model. In order to make sense of local genealogies of resilience one has to both contextualise and historicise their application.

From total defence to comprehensive security

The end of the Cold War brought rapid changes in Finland’s security environment. The demise of the Soviet Union, deepening of the European integration (Sweden and Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995), and the wider trend of global economic liberalisation shook the foundations of Finnish defence and security policy. Moreover, ideational trends such as the broadening of international security agenda and dominant threat perceptions (including the rise of the human security paradigm) and New Public Management theories also affected to the way the Cold War era doctrine of spiritual defence and welfare state model was adjusted in the new era.

During the last decade and a half Finland has adopted the concept of comprehensive security as an all-encompassing strategic framework to security governance. It can be understood as a government-led project that partly responds to the aforementioned trends without losing a sense of continuity in strategic culture. It is in this context that the domestication process of resilience discourses into Finnish strategic culture and security governance should be understood.

Although the idea of comprehensive security was already evident in the 2003 and 2006 strategies on securing the vital functions of the society – these strategies were still based on the conception of comprehensive defence, a successor of the total defence doctrine – Finnish government officially defined the concept (in Finnish, *kokonaisturvallisuus*) as late as in 2012.

Comprehensive security was defined as a desired state of affairs where all threats to the sovereignty of the state, living conditions of the population, and other vital societal functions are perceived to be manageable. State authorities, private business sector as well as various civil society organisations and individual citizens were defined to bear collaborative responsibility on providing comprehensive security – a responsibility that covers preparedness, continuity management during large-scale societal disruptions and the period of recovery.

The sense of increasing interdependence between states and other international actors also affected the way international and national securities were started to be understood as an all-encompassing phenomena during the 1990s. New emerging threats such as international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation, internal conflicts based on ethnic cleavages, and identity politics as well as the increasing amount of displaced people and migration challenged the old military-centric conceptions of security. This was also evident in academic literature that started to parse security into a wide array of alternative dimensions – like those of economic, environmental, political, and societal sectors (Buzan et al., 1998). In policy world this was evident in the proliferation of strategies that contemplated the interrelationships between various levels and dimensions of security under the traditional rubric of national security.

Although issues related to economic security (security of supply), identity security (sense of societal cohesion and national togetherness) and, to a lesser sense, environmental security were already present in the defence planning during the last two decades of the Cold War era, it is important to remember that these issues were subdued to the needs of military security and defence.¹¹ In other words, they were not treated as separate sectors of national security policy as such. The shift towards genuinely broader understanding of security sectors and threat conceptions happened during the first half of the 1990s. This process culminated in the first government white paper on security policy published in 1995.¹²

The emergence of the concept of comprehensive security in Finland can be partly understood as a response to these trends. That said, although the official definition of the concept is based on broad understanding of security threats, something that government's white papers on defence and security policy adopted already in the 1990s, the main impetus behind the comprehensive security concept was that it offered a cross-sectoral cooperative framework for various governmental and civil society actors.

The emergence of the concept of comprehensive security also aligned with the arrival of New Public Management theories and practices from the late 1990 onwards. In the early 1990s Finland faced a major economic depression, partly caused by the sudden end of bilateral trade with Soviet Union. From the mid-1990s onwards the recession was followed by a period of swift economic integration within the EU and waves of privatisation and deregulation, a process that led to an increasingly pluralised group of actors

participating in securing key societal functions and societal security at large. These processes also challenged the traditional understanding of centralised and hierarchical state-led models of security governance, especially when it came to the operational questions of who is ultimately responsible on providing security functions. The concept of comprehensive security is, in essence, a framework that the state actors started to use in order to integrate the interests of various non-state actors participating to the widening security sector to fit the national-level strategic ambitions.

Although in the 1990s and 2000s government's security strategies were already drafted on the basis of a broader conceptualisation of security, the role of Defence Ministry has remained relatively strong within the comprehensive security model.¹³ Virta and Branders (2016), for example, have pointed out that although the role of the private sector and the civil society is emphasised on the level of discourses on societal security, in practice the formulation of these policies is still very much a top-down exercise: there is no genuine devolution of power and agency to the civil society and local communities. In this context resilience is used more as a pedagogical framework to inform the public on the official doctrinal purpose and functions of the comprehensive security model.

Robust reading of resilience

In a sense the government also used the concept of comprehensive security to maintain strategic autonomy in a situation where increasing amount of key strategic functions and assets of societal security were not anymore controlled by the state as such. It should be no surprise, then, that the concept of resilience was also amalgamated with the existing comprehensive security framework when the debate on its meaning started to gain momentum in Finland during the early 2010s.¹⁴

The first time the word resilience (*resilienssi* in Finnish) was explicitly mentioned in the government's security strategies was in the 2013 Cyber Security Strategy (Government of Finland, 2013).¹⁵ The strategy defined "cyber resilience" in relation to the objectives of comprehensive security, covering preparedness, ability to function during unexpected disruptions and ability to recover from harm, objectives that were due to reach in co-operation with private businesses and civil society organisations. Another traditional domain where resilience-driven agenda started to resonate early on was critical infrastructure protection and security of supply policies – a sphere where the importance of private sector actors is also notable. Pursiainen (2018, p. 633) points out that the comprehensive approach to enhance the resilience of vital societal functions was almost a direct continuation of the Cold War era total defence approach and that the latter was merely adjusted to face the demands of a new security environment.

As already pointed out, the robust reading of resilience in Finland is entrenched in the path-dependent ideational and conceptual process that can

be traced back to the tradition of total/spiritual defence during the Cold War. This is also evident in the 2003 and 2006 strategies of vital societal functions that were still based on the conception of total defence. One of the seven vital functions was, and still is, psychological ability to withstand the effects of major disruptions.¹⁶ In the English version of the security strategy for society in 2017 the concept of *henkinen kriisinkestävyys* has been translated as “psychological resilience”, although a more straight translation would be “mental crisis resistance” or “mental ability to withstand crises”. Security Committee (2020) translates psychological resilience “as the ability of individuals, communities, society and the nation to withstand the pressures arising from crisis situations and to recover from their impacts,” and continues by stating that “[g]ood psychological resilience facilitates the recovery process” from societal crisis scenarios.

Unlike the Anglo-Saxon reading of resilience where it is understood as an overarching strategic concept, the understanding of resilience adopted in Finnish societal security strategies thus seems to be narrower in scope. The Anglo-Saxon reading of societal resilience emphasises the need to increase the ability of the population to govern themselves through reflexivity, entrepreneurial attitude, and community-level self-awareness (Joseph, 2019, p. 151). In Finland resilience is (still) primarily understood – in a way that seems to correspond to a similar reading of “robust resilience” also visible in other Nordic countries, especially in Norway, as analysed by Berling and Petersen in the current volume – as a national-level psychological attribute that supports government in its ambitions to maintain the continuity of key societal functions.

In terms of location of security agency, Finnish societal security thinking mixes the traditional top-down model of national security with a bottom-up reading of resilience building by various networks of civil society and private sector actors (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 27). Whereas the strategic priorities of societal security and its key concepts, including resilience, are defined in a state-led process, usually with a special focus on protecting critical infrastructure and key societal functions, the resilience capacities offered by the wider society is understood as an integral part in the execution of these strategic priorities (see also Virta and Branders, 2016). The importance of bottom-up legitimacy, political trust towards authorities, and a general sense of national togetherness – already present in spiritual defence models of the Cold War era – still play an integral part of an otherwise rather top-down state-led model of security governance (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 26).

That said, there seems to be a nascent transition towards emphasising further the responsibility of civil society and individual citizens in national resilience building. This is evident when one compares the 2010 and 2017 Security Strategies for Society (see Government of Finland, 2010, pp. 48–49; 2017, p. 40). While in the 2010 strategy psychological resilience was still linked to the level of national defence will, sense of solidarity, and

perceived cohesion of the national identity, in the 2017 strategy one can see an added emphasis on the responsibilities of civil society organisations and individual citizens. These responsibilities include the attitudes, skills, and “security enhancing outlook” of active citizens who are deemed as key supportive societal assets in national-level psychological resilience building. Moreover, the ability of individuals and civil society organisations to act as resilience providers in their local communities is also mentioned in the 2017 strategy.

One can sense the influence of international and EU-level conceptions of resilience in the aforementioned shift towards the responsabilisation of civil society and individual citizens as key agents in resilience building. On the other hand, the foundations for psychological resilience are still conceived to be something that is constructed through a state-led policy planning based on intra-administrative cooperation. The role of the educational system (critical media literacy is mentioned separately), vertical and horizontal political trust (especially citizens’ trust towards officials and institutions), equally distributed social and welfare services, prevention of rising inequality, national defence will, and social capital accumulated through voluntary work are mentioned as key components upon which psychological resilience capabilities are understood to be based on during normal circumstances. This all sounds familiar when one looks back at the conceptualisations of spiritual defence model during the 1960s.

Moreover, in addition to the top-down national reading of the concept, resilience is still associated with state-led policies of preparedness. This can be interpreted as another sign of continuity in Finnish strategic culture and security governance practices. In the Finnish reading, resilience is understood as a nationwide psychological attribute that is associated with continuity management. Thus, the strategic ambition of reinforcing psychological resilience is to help to restore the operational functioning of society as rapidly and comprehensively as possible should the society as a whole face a major disruption (Government of Finland, 2017, p. 8, 10).

This robust reading can be contrasted to Anglo-Saxon and EU-level conceptions of resilience that emphasise communities’ and individuals’ readiness for positive learning processes, adaptation, and the ability to self-initiated reform after unavoidable crises and disruptions (see European Union External Action, 2016, p. 23). In other words, the Finnish reading of resilience is more reminiscent of the traditional engineering understanding of “bouncing back” (the modern or linear understanding of how to preserve something valuable, or resilience as maintenance), whereas the neoliberal understanding emphasises abilities and attitudes needed in the self-governing processes that aim to “bounce forward” (the post-modern, non-linear understanding on how to learn to live with surprises and failure, or resilience as renewal) (Bourbeau, 2013, pp. 11–14, 16; Chandler, 2014, p. 6).

Finally, it is also worth to note that the understanding of resilience in Finnish comprehensive security strategies does not equate societal cohesion

to ethnic identity, language, culture, and customs, unlike in the original academic definitions of societal security put forth by the Copenhagen School. Instead, national cohesion is understood as an aspired level of interoperability and shared mentality of togetherness that is needed to face major societal disruptions – disruptions that are generally understood to originate outside of the society. In this sense psychological resilience is closely tied to the old concept of spiritual defence. In many ways the “robust” reading of resilience in Finland relies more heavily on a framework based on modern conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality, and national unity than the more post-modern formulations of resilience one can find from the EU Global Strategy, for example (on the latter, see Tocci, 2016).

In this sense the robust reading of resilience also reproduces the logic of dissecting the threat environment into internal and external spheres, an epistemic premise familiar especially from the security mentality of defence.¹⁷ This might paint a misleading picture on the dominant threat perceptions as it seems to hide the fact that certain exceptional measures have been taken to control the threats emerging also inside the society. This is evident in the introduction of new intelligence laws and surveillance measures in 2019 and how they were justified with the increasing need to respond to certain transgressive, internal, and asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and radicalisation.¹⁸

The interplay between state authorities and the rest of the society is still very much a top-down exercise where societal resilience capabilities and other vital functions are organised on the basis of the strategic goals set by the former. At the same time the cross-sectoral logic of governance, including increasing public-private partnerships, is based on the whole-of-society approach of the comprehensive security model. This seems to make security as an all-encompassing societal issue, something that is also evident in the reading that associates resilience with the psychological and material preparedness of the nation as a whole. On the other hand, this “societalisation” of security politics seems to soften the “hard edges” of security thinking based on military security and the logic of defence. In other words, the process of securitisation of the societal fabric is not based on the logic of exceptionality in a sense that it would endanger the normal working order of democratic process. The securitisation of the social sphere should not be understood here solely as a result of political speech acts that claim a deviation or rupture from the normal running of the social order. Instead, the logic of resilience seems to “banalise” security governance when security functions are layered across the whole spectrum of the societal fabric and its “organic” processes.¹⁹

This has been evident in the recent debate in Finland (and elsewhere) on how to respond to hybrid interference in the post-2014 security environment in the Baltic Sea region. Although there is no official resilience-based government-led programme or strategy to face the so-called hybrid threats in Finland, individual, societal, and democratic resilience capacities have

been put forth as potential “detering” or “dissuasive” response to threats stemming from the combination of state-originated hybrid interference and inherent vulnerabilities of democratic societies (see, e.g., Wigell, 2019). This is not completely unproblematic in a sense that it might pave way for further defence politicisation (or securitisation) of the societal fabric, including free media and public speech (assuming the sources of hybrid interference are understood to be originated mainly from other state actors such as Russia) (see further Mikkola et al., 2018).

To sum up the analysis, although the definition and scope of resilience thinking is still being debated in Finland, in official strategic parlance the term was adopted in a rather conservative fashion during the early 2010s (see especially Hyvönen et al., 2019, pp. 14–15). Resilience discourses were amalgamated with the already available concept of comprehensive security and its reading on how to secure key societal functions against plethora of traditional and new threats. According to our genealogical analysis, the Finnish reading of resilience in the context of comprehensive security is historically conditioned and can be traced back at least to the invention (or domestication) of the conceptions of total/spiritual defence from the late 1950s onwards. Thus, in order to understand the specific local connotations of resilience politics, one has to be aware of their contextuality and historicity.

The Finnish reading of resilience portrays it as a robust attribute, as a readiness to endure severe distress, to maintain the essential functioning and cohesion of the society and, eventually, the ability to bounce back to the pre-crisis state as quickly and effectively as possible. When compared to the dominant international understanding of (societal) resilience as an attribute referring to processes of adaptation and learning through responsabilisation, the Finnish reading of the concept tilts more towards resistance and maintenance than the Anglo-Saxon understanding of resilience seems to imply. In the concluding remarks we reflect the possible future of Finnish resilience politics and suggest some ways to develop it further.

Conclusion: on the future of the “Finnish model” of resilience

In this chapter, we have argued that the forms of resilience policy currently prevalent in the Finnish security discourse have to be understood both against the “universal” genealogy of resilience as a scientific notion *and* against the local genealogy of Finnish security politics. This Finnish model is of a “top-down” quality, but in a characteristically different way than the dominant Anglo-Saxon reading of the concept. This is due to its adherence to the longer tradition of valuing the psychological preparedness of the citizens and civil society by large to commit and participate in securing and defending the vital functions of the society. Moreover, in the last couple of decades or so, the Finnish reading of resilience has “domesticated” the concept into auxiliary role in the comprehensive security model – a key strategic concept or cooperative framework that is also based on preparedness and

readiness to endure large-scale societal disruptions rather than on adaptive notions of the ability to reform. This is also evident in the official translations of EU documents, which tend to replace renewal capacities of the English version with an ability to *withstand* crises in Finnish.

The main contributions of the chapter are threefold. First, our analysis helps to understand current trends of security discourse in Finland more thoroughly, especially in the context of government strategies. Second, with reference to the IR resilience scholarship, we highlight the importance of local genealogies. Focusing only on the scientific genealogy of resilience and its appropriation by neoliberal ideologues runs the risk of overly essentialising the notion. In the worst-case scenario, this means treating the Anglo-Saxon applications of resilience as universal, teleological models that are perforce imposed on anyone who invokes the word “resilience”. Thus, and relatedly, the third contribution of the chapter talks more broadly to the critical security studies community, urging scholars to pay increasing attention to the acts of translation and domestication that define the local applications and implementations of global trends.

Moving between the three points, we wish to conclude by reflecting the possible future trajectories of the Finnish model of resilience. For now, resilience is still very much used either as a buzzword or as a synonym for a narrowly defined psychological and material ability to withstand crises in the security political discourse. However, a more clearly articulated notion of resilience is likely to emerge in the coming years. The trajectory taken by this development is still very much in the air and depends on political struggles and contestations of various sorts. There are several promises as well as threats that can be conceived in the trajectories of resilience-in-the-process-of-translation in Finland.²⁰ If resilience remains a vaguely defined buzzword, its implementation is bound to produce clouded reasoning, and the word is likely to remain vulnerable to ideological projections. But other results are also possible.

We see promise in the possibility of translating resilience more effectively into the terms of comprehensive security framework, creating something like a Finnish model of “comprehensive resilience”. Such translation, however, would have a considerable impact both on the Finnish comprehensive security model and on the internationally dominant Anglo-Saxon model of resilience. It would place a lot of emphasis on the political and social foundations of resilience building: societal welfare, education, democratic participation, and inequality reduction. It would also take seriously the centrality of resource and environmental security questions for the upcoming decades. What we envisage, then, is a model of resilience building that simultaneously considers, to use Kate Raworth’s (2018) terms, the social foundation and the ecological ceiling between which policies must move; that provides ample opportunities for democratic participation; and that invests in education of the population. The Nordic countries are in a unique position to go forth with such model, but there is still a long way to go, especially when it comes to climate policy (Hakala et al., 2019). What is more, even if resilience would be translated into a new type of practice according to the

Nordic/Finnish model laid out here, it would nevertheless be important to emphasise that resilience cannot and should not replace the defensive, preventive, and protective strategies articulated above. Resilience, in short, is not the answer to all the security challenges societies face.

Notes

- 1 “An earlier draft of this article was presented at the European International Studies Association conference in Prague in 2018, Tampere Security Research Seminar (TASER) at Tampere University in 2018, Finnish International Studies Association conference in Majvik in 2019 as well as in the final conference of the NordSTEVA project in Copenhagen in 2019. We express our gratitude to all the audience members and fellow panelists in these events, especially Hiski Haukкала, Sirpa Virta, Kari Möttölä, Matthew Ford, Juha Vuori, Rune Saugmann and the editors of this volume, Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard, for their valuable comments that have helped us to improve our argument. Of course, the responsibility for the arguments remain solely with the authors.”
- 2 By “Anglophone” concept of resilience, we mainly refer to the notion of resilience emerging from the national security strategies of the UK and the US. City-level and ecologically oriented resilience strategies may differ from this concept.
- 3 This is also considered as key to maintain the core purposes of societies during crises due to the tight coupling of the societal functions with the increasing complexity and vulnerability of modern physical infrastructure (see further Pursiainen, 2018).
- 4 HMP committee worked under the coordination of the Defence Council (established in 1958) that was tightly controlled by President Urho Kekkonen (on the establishment and first assignments of the HMP committee see Visuri, 1994, pp. 150–163).
- 5 Sweden had a similar committee that had published its report already in 1953 – an example that was explicitly mentioned as an inspiration when the Finnish counterpart was established. See also Larsson (this volume).
- 6 The successor of the committee, Henkisen maanpuolustuksen suunnittelukunta (Planning Commission on Spiritual Defence; HMS), was established in 1964 on basis of the committee’s recommendation. In 1976, after some domestic political debate on the purpose and relevance of the institution – a debate ignited especially by some younger generation politicians in the left of the political spectrum – the agenda of HMS was limited to tasks related to collecting and sharing information on defence and security political matters to the citizens and key interest groups. At this point the name of the commission was finally changed to Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta (The Advisory Board for Defence Information; MTS) under which it still operates today.
- 7 The concept of total defence (in Finnish, *kokonaismaanpuolustus*) was officially adopted, or explicitly mentioned, for the first time by the second Parliamentary Defence Committee in 1976. This was done after the adoption of the territorial defence doctrine in the early 1970s. That said, in practice Finnish defence planning was executed on the basis of total defence thinking already before the official adoption of the term. It referred to a comprehensive policy of preparedness in order to enhance the ability of the society and defence forces to operate under conditions of national emergency, integrating a wide spectrum of non-military societal actors and resources into defence planning. (See Riipinen, 2008, pp. 20–23; Ries, 1988, pp. 262–264.)
- 8 National defence courses, organized both on regional and on national level by the Regional State Administrative Agencies and Defence Forces (National Defence University), respectively, are still an ongoing practice in present-day Finland. The explicit aim of these courses is to “[...] improve cooperation between different

sectors of society and facilitate networking of people working in the various fields of comprehensive security". See National Defence University (2020).

- 9 This includes the still ongoing tradition of constantly evaluating and measuring citizens will to defend the nation. National defence will have been measured continuously with the same questionnaire since 1963 by the Advisory Board for Defence Information that works under Defence Ministry (See Kosonen et al., 2017, p. 96). Both the general and personal will to defence the nation has traditionally been comparatively high in Finland. For example, in 2018 the overall level of willingness to participate into the defence of Finland when the nation was under attack was 84 percent. Even slight declining trends in the general will to defence have usually been a source of domestic debate in Finland (See Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, 2018, pp. 7–11).
- 10 There is an obvious temporal confluence between the rise of resilience-related research themes in the social psychological literature internationally and the build-up of Finnish psychological defence conceptions in the 1960s (on the former, see Bourbeau, 2018, pp. 25–26).
- 11 Economic security was especially topical from the early 1970s onwards due to the need to secure access to strategic energy sources after the two oil crises (see Limnell, 2009, p. 214).
- 12 The constitutional reform in 2000 continued the parliamentarisation of the foreign and security policy decision-making system and further eroded the power of the President in these matters, especially in relation to EU decision-making. This also led to the disbanding of the Defence Council whose tasks were split among the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security policy (responsible for the actual preparation of foreign and security policy, chaired by the Prime Minister but in practice the Committee is organized around joint meetings between its ministerial members and the President of the republic) and Committee on Security and Defence Issues (responsible on the development and coordination of policies related to crisis preparedness and comprehensive defence). The latter was located under the Ministry of Defence, but left without political decision-making or executive power, and in 2013 replaced by The Security Committee whose role was depicted as to "assist the Government and ministries in matters pertaining to comprehensive security [and to follow] the development of Finnish society and its security environment [and coordinate] proactive preparedness which is related to comprehensive security" (Ministry of Defence, 2020).
- 13 As a sign of times the 1995 white paper on national security strategy, coinciding with the ongoing parliamentarisation of the Finnish foreign and security policy decision-making system, was prepared under political guidance by a working group of government officials convened by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 1995 white paper, first of its kind, introduced the concept of broad and comprehensive security (in Finnish, *laaja ja kokonaisvaltainen turvallisuuden käsite*) as the baseline idea for future strategic planning of Finnish security policy. The broadening move aimed to introduce issues such as the respect for human rights, rule of law, economic cooperation, and solidarity in environmental protection as equal issues to security policy agenda alongside traditional themes of military and political security (see Government of Finland, 1995, p. 11). Separate section on defence policy, prepared under the political guidance of the Defence Council or Ministry of Defence, was added to all subsequent white papers from 1997 onwards. This led to a kind of a "dual policy" that only managed to integrate the broadening of the security agenda and the traditional focus on national territorial defence capabilities partially (the uncertainty on the direction of Russia's transition being a unifying factor between the two mindsets). Limnell points out that in practice the defence-oriented mindset dominated over the more cooperative understandings of international security (see Limnell, 2009, pp. 214–219, 223).

- 14 For an overview, see, e.g., Juntunen (2014, pp. 19–26), Hyvönen and Juntunen (2016, pp. 212, 221).
- 15 The strategy was updated in October 2019, now in a more compact format and without references to strategic conceptions such as “cyber resilience”. Instead, the new strategy merely listed three strategic priority areas for the development of future cyber security policies: international cooperation; leadership, planning, and preparedness; educational capacities and national proficiency (Security Committee, 2019).
- 16 Other six key societal functions were state leadership; international activities (including the EU); national defence capability; internal security (threat prevention and justice system); economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; income security and the functional capacity of the population and services (Government of Finland, 2017, p. 14).
- 17 It is worth to note here that the Strategy of Internal Security prepared under the Ministry of the Interior in Finland emphasises the importance to prevent the root causes of these transgressive threats such as halting social polarisation and processes of social and economical exclusion within the society. The Strategy of Internal Security also mentions societal resilience (*yhteiskunnan kriisinkestokyky*) as a key aspect that is based on individual citizens’ readiness to face societal disruptions and recover from them fast but reduces this into a secondary role after the responsibilities that state authorities have in protecting the citizens (see Ministry of the Interior, 2017, pp. 41–42).
- 18 Similar tendencies can be found from the Swedish case where the total defence doctrine was developed towards novel conceptions of societal security and crisis management from the late 1990s onwards (see also Larsson, this volume).
- 19 The idea of securitisation through everyday security practices, “little security nothings”, is taken from Huysmans (2011).
- 20 The current authors have articulated their own suggestion for the future of resilience in Finland in a more elaborated manner in the final report of a project funded by the government’s analysis, assessment, and research activities (see Hyvönen and Juntunen et al., 2019).

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