1 Introduction

Regional economic communities and peacebuilding in West Africa and the Horn of Africa

Victor Adetula, Redie Bereketeab, and Cyril Obi

Introduction

The view that peace and development are intrinsically linked has continued to feature prominently in mainstream discourses about global governance and conflict transformation. Many African countries are either dealing with internal conflicts or have just come out from civil war which has far-reaching consequences for development. In 2019, there were active armed conflicts in 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan (SIPRI, 2020, 8). Most of these conflicts were internationalised and overlapped across states and regions “as a result of the transnational activities of violent Islamist groups, other armed groups and criminal networks” (SIPRI, 2020, 8). The complexity of conflict dynamics and emerging security challenges at the regional and global levels require greater cooperation and coordination among states and non-state actors. The current waves of globalisation, coupled with other compelling cross-cutting issues such as the global campaign against terrorism and the impact of climate change, are already feeding into consensus formation and international coordination on a regional basis. Admittedly, there are growing signs of push-back from populist and nationalist groups in some countries. Notwithstanding, the realities on the ground across Africa have contributed to the need and desire for regional collective security systems and conflict management mechanisms on the continent.

Regional efforts to address threats with transnational dimensions such as cross-border conflicts, pandemics, erratic weather changes leading to droughts or flooding, natural disasters, and transnational crimes have led to the adoption of coordinated approaches and mechanisms. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), established in 1996, are the cases used in this book to examine the structures, roles, and performance of African regional economic communities (RECs) in peacebuilding. ECOWAS comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; and

the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprises Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD was created as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which had initially been set up in 1986 to address natural resource management and development issues in the Horn of Africa.

The use of comparative analysis and case study approach to assess the performance of the RECs regarding peacebuilding is desirable both in universal and specific contexts. Reference to the global context is in terms of the imperative of regionalist solutions in a world that has become increasingly interconnected, characterised by the changing dynamics of violent conflict, and driven by less altruistic motives. Most of the global powers have been increasingly retreating from active engagement outside their immediate geographical locations. Also, traditional global platforms for the maintenance of international security such as the United Nations (UN) are overstretched, even as multilateralism is in retreat because of growing populism and nationalism in some of the world's hegemonic states. Consequently, regional institutions have become increasingly relevant and visible.

This relevance has also resonated with the idea of “African solutions to African problems” which underpins the notion of the African Renaissance. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni the concept of an African Renaissance is based on the idea of “African struggles against colonialism and imperialism as well as within the terrain of African initiatives to unite Africa, and set Afro-modernity afoot” (2020, 2). It cohered with early pan-Africanist thinking, and more recently, the thoughts of scholars like Ayittey (2014), who referred to “African solutions to African problems” as being aimed at stopping the imitation of models from outside the continent, and at looking inwards for solutions based on African experiences and traditions. In the view of Fantu Cheru (2002), the concept had to do with abandoning dogmatic approaches to development and governance, learning from local/homegrown successes and a new kind of African politics.

In the 1990s, former South African President Thabo Mbeki advanced the concept of an African Renaissance and promoted its integration into the thinking that informed a pan-African effort to reposition the continent in an emerging post-Cold War order. This thinking was key to the establishment of the New Partnership for African Development in 2001, the (re)birth of the African Union (AU) in 2002, and the launching of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002 – all initiatives encapsulating the collective search for an Africa-initiated and -driven response to the depredations of colonialism, imperialism, and globalisation. In the words of Lobakeng (2017), “African solutions to African problems” was marked by the search for “a viable solution towards a united, prosperous and peaceful Africa.” It emphasised the centrality of African solidarity, norms, institutions, and mechanisms as solutions to the structural and emerging challenges facing African peace, governance, and development, and in placing the continent on a path towards greater global reckoning in the 21st century.

Thus, the emergence of the AU as an important actor represented a renewed commitment of African states to the regionalist approach to peace and security

on the continent. The AU's main mechanism for promoting peace and security is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which involved decision-making on issues related to "prevention, management and resolution of crisis, conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction, and development." The APSA also represented a significant paradigm shift in the AU's normative framework from "non-interference to non-indifference," paving the way for the AU to intervene in any member state where genocide, human right violations, and crimes against humanity are committed. The AU officially recognises the RECs as the representative regional associations of African states. Initially, African RECs were established to promote economic integration. But they have increasingly taken up a prominent role in conflict resolution and peace interventions as evident in the recent peace and security processes across the continent. This recognition of RECS as the "building blocks" for African continental integration was formally acknowledged in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) of 1991 and the AU Constitutive Act of 2000. APSA was designed to function in collaboration with the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs).

Conceptualising regional integration and peacebuilding

Regional integration

Integration simply refers to units coming together to satisfy objectives which they cannot meet when they act independently. It is, therefore, a process that hastens the achievement of certain objectives in the interest of a larger body. Regional integration is a process of cooperation by countries drawing on historical and geographic commonalities to come together to achieve a set of shared goals: economic and political. Usually, regional integration entails a formal agreement laying out the principles, goals, and targets of such cooperation arrangements. As a process, integration involves the shifting of loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new and larger centre whose institutions and processes demand some jurisdiction over those of the national states. The extent of such a transfer of loyalties and authority enjoyed by the new centre depends on the level and goals of integration schemes, as well as the socio-economic and political ramifications that the implementation of integrative policies generate within and between the integrating units (Adetula, 2014, 193).

Often, "regional integration" and "regional cooperation" have been used interchangeably. However, there is a difference between the two in qualitative and quantitative contexts. While "cooperation" may be employed to identify loose forms of interstate activity designed to meet some commonly experienced needs, "integration" refers to a much more formal arrangement that involves some political and economic sacrifices, as well as commitments, concessions, processes, and political will, to redefine participation in the international economy (Axline, 1977; Ihonvbere, 1983). It is within this context that regional integration is conceptualised as a dialectical unity of social, economic, and political processes (Cocks, 1980). Even at that, the debate among scholars

about the similarity and difference between the two notions continues to this day. However, there seems to be an agreement that regional integration can be regarded as a process or as a state of affairs reached by that process. According to Fritz Machlup, the more difficult question is what is being integrated – people, areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies, or something else? (Machlup, 1976, 63). The conception of economic integration as the progressive elimination of trade and tariff discrimination between national borders shows it as a state of affairs and a process. The foregoing notion and many concepts, models, and theoretical formulations that derived from the experience of European integration have long dominated the principle and practice of regional integration. Based on these restrictive conceptualisations and formulations on regional integration, many self-styled common markets, federations, unions, and communities have emerged with their motives, agendas, contents, and mechanisms of operation. Many organisations are pursuing regional integration as strictly an “economic agenda” or “tariff matter” which leaves out some critical issues of development broadly defined.

In the context of the global South, regional integration is an extremely complicated and varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and political dynamics different from those in the global North. In other words, the experience of European integration is significantly different from that of the regions of the global South. The universalist claim that the European theories of regional integration are applicable on a worldwide basis without regard for regional differences is deficient. Similarly, the failure to engage the worldwide setting in which regional integration takes place, while nevertheless recognising the importance of exogenous factors as contributing variables, constitutes a contradiction.

As Daniel and Nagar (2014, 9) observe,

Although an institutional framework towards regional integration exists in Africa, implementation of many of the protocols signed over the past five decades has often been hampered by ineffective coordination between the African Union – and before then, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – and Africa’s “sub-regional bodies.”

Beyond this, they have faced challenges linked to the leveraging of national sovereignty over regional interests, weak institutions, poor governance, competitive rather than complementary intra-African trade, poor funding, inter-REC competition, and low levels of domestication of regional policies, standards, and regulations. Gill (2009, 702) offers a critical theoretical perspective to regional integration. He is critical of the role of the West in “imposing and sustaining a discursive hegemony over regionalism” in the global South, which drives a “modernist” conception of regional integration. He argues that “African regionalism has been pursued, both theoretically and empirically, in terms of a neoliberal, free market and Westphalian state model built upon the experiences, values and norms of European integration,” which is “limited and structurally inappropriate” for Africa’s realities.

While the critique above has some merit, it does not address the role of regionalism in Africa adequately, particularly since the end of the Cold War, and within the context of the growing importance of the peace, security, and development nexus. We argue in support of a new perspective that requires broadening the conceptual and theoretical treatment of regional integration to include areas and dimensions neglected by the orthodox approaches to regional integration based mostly on the processes and experiences of regional integration in the global North.

The discourse on regional integration generally has been influenced by history, and by the connection of regionalism to political and socio-economic development, and to security processes. Regional integration as a strategy of development has Western roots connected to the vision of a post-Second World War order, in which regional organisations, working with the United Nations, were expected to play a critical role in the maintenance of international peace and security (see Chapter 2). Admittedly, this global setting may have influenced the discourse about development in Africa where regional integration as a development strategy became appealing to the elites, and where by the 1950s it was incorporated into anti-colonial struggles and efforts towards some forms of “African unity” (Adetula, 1999).

Upon gaining independence, many African countries, in the pursuit of regional integration, acknowledged development as a strategy for reducing dependency and underdevelopment. Many African leaders invested their energies in working for African unity by building pan-African institutions and seeking to defend Africa’s political and economic independence. In this regard, motives for regional cooperation and continental integration included broad economic, social, and political interests, the need for greater international bargaining power, economic prosperity by pooling resources and by connecting markets across national frontiers on a regional scale, and the quest for “African unity” fired by the ideals of pan-Africanism. Many African countries favoured the gradualist approach to African unity, which subsequently resulted in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Since its creation in 1958, the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) has played a significant role in the discourse on African development. The OAU and UNECA worked together towards promoting African development and economic integration through sub-regional groupings (Adetula, 1993). These developments are part of the background of the emergence of the African RECs, such as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as laudable regional economic initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the Final Act of Lagos, the African Economic Community (AEC), and, more recently, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The AU replaced the OAU in 2002 when the Consultative Act of the African Union came into force. The AU promotes common African positions, democratic

institutions, popular participation, and good governance. It also protects human rights and promotes sustainable development and the integration of Africa. The AU seeks effective collaboration and partnership with the RECs in the execution of its mandates. In this regard, the AU has formally acknowledged the eight African RECs as building blocks for African continental integration under the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). However, the performance of several intergovernmental organisations in Africa in relation to regional cooperation has not been impressive.

At the African continental level, there have been noticeable movements towards increased integration including the efforts of its countries as well as the renewed interest in pan-Africanism, which culminated first in the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) and later in the inauguration of the AU. Beyond this, the institutional innovativeness of ECOWAS since the 1990s has demonstrated the ways regionalism has flexibly responded to threats to peace and security in West Africa, enabled collaboration with non-state actors, and envisioned an “ECOWAS of the Peoples” (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). In the same way, some of the challenges faced by IGAD also point to the limits of state-led regional integration efforts and their implications for peace and security in the Horn of Africa (see Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15). It is within the continuum between conflict, its prevention, its management, and its resolution that African RECs engage and connect to a project of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding

At different times in history, societies have experienced peacebuilding practices in multiple forms. However, peacebuilding as a theoretical construct and development practice assumed prominence only recently, and its early development is often associated with Johan Galtung (1976). Conceptually, peacebuilding links security and development “to offer an integrated approach to understanding and dealing with the full range of issues that threatened peace and security” (Tschirgi, 2003, 1). Thus, the peacebuilding process includes the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts, consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict reconstruction to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. Conceived in this way, peacebuilding addresses “the proximate and root causes of contemporary conflicts including structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and environmental factors” (Tschirgi, 2003, 1). The UN with its emphasis on such issues as disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR); rule of law; security sector reform (SSR); and refugee return and reintegration is regarded in some circles as aligning with some of the critical elements of peacebuilding, if not with a broader context that underscores inclusive development with a focus on human security. This perspective presents peacebuilding practices beyond the cessation of violence and hostilities to include deep consideration for the key indicators of sustainable peace and development (see Diehl, 2006; Mason and Meernik, 2006; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2009; and Bjorkdah, 2012).

The UN's *An Agenda for Peace* is a significant landmark in global consciousness on peacebuilding enterprises within the human security framework. The former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, referred to peacebuilding as "actions to identify and support structures which will tend to solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict" (United Nations, 1992). Thus, peacebuilding is associated with the "construction of a new environment," most probably in a post-conflict environment (UN General Assembly, 1993). However, the seeming restriction of peacebuilding to actions and activities that promote peace in the post-conflict phase began to wane within the UN circle in 1995 when Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*, expanded the notion of peacebuilding to include preventive actions. The *Brahimi Report* further improved on the conceptualisation of peacebuilding by presenting it as "activities undertaken on the far side of the conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for the building of those foundations on something more than just the absence of war". The submission made by the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee (UNSGPC) in May 2007 further advanced the conceptual treatment of peacebuilding by declaring that peacebuilding practice within the UN system involves "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace and development" (2007).

As part of the Western hegemonic agenda, peacebuilding is constructed as a post-conflict project connected to an integral part of universalising neoliberal values and norms. Additionally, peacebuilding interventions offer excellent opportunities for hegemonic states, as well as international and regional organisations, to convert post-conflict societies and other societies under stress into "modern" cultures guided by liberal or neoliberal values. According to Omeje (2019, 4),

modern post-conflict peacebuilding involves mobilisation of efforts and resources to rebuild social life at three inter-related levels: (a) rebuilding the state and its governance and service delivery institutions, (b) rebuilding the economy to support the state and society, (c) rebuilding the society to resuscitate the fabric of social and community life.

He goes on to observe that many critics observe the "one-size-fits-all" bias inherent in neoliberal peacebuilding, and its macro-level perspectives on conflict and peace (Omeje, 2019, 5).

The direct contrast to the neoliberal approach to peacebuilding is the "popular progressive" model, which is based on the culture, history, and social and political structures and forces of conflict and post-conflict societies (see Chapter 3). This is also a departure from mainstream peacebuilding and its focus on post-conflict societies. Its approach to peacebuilding is "maximalist" (Omeje, 2019, 5), spanning the "entire conflict spectrum," including pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases. Accordingly, peacebuilding is better conceptualised and practised as an "integrated process whose elements include prevention and resolution of

conflict, consolidation of peace, once violence has been reduced through systematic mediation and reconciliation, and post-conflict reconstruction, with a view to avoiding lapses that lead to violent conflict” (Adetula, 2015, 57).

The regional integration and peacebuilding nexus

The idea that regional organisations have a key role to play in maintaining peace and security is not a recent development. The founding fathers of the United Nations proposed an international collective security system that allows regional organisations to manage conflicts in their respective regions. Thus, Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides for such regional arrangements to complement the UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. However, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council, except for measures against an enemy state. Also, regional arrangements and agencies are expected to have adequate capacity to undertake such action, which of course should either be on the initiative of the states concerned or referred by the Security Council.

The strategic withdrawal of Western powers from Africa in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War had its consequences. The outbreak of violent conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the shock generated by the Rwandan genocide, which could have been prevented had the world paid more considerable attention, convinced African leaders that the time had come to take the continent’s destiny into their own hands. As earlier noted, this spurred them to create a new set of innovative norms, principles, and mechanisms aimed at connecting African unity, self-reliance, and regional integration to the quest for collective peace, security, and development.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, pioneered the first regional peace intervention by an African regional economic community when civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989 (Adetula, 2005; Obi, 2009, 121). ECOWAS established a regional peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to bring an end to the conflict in Liberia, and has since continued to link regional integration to peace and security in other countries in the West Africa sub-region: Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, and Mali (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8). This laid the foundation for building some of the most sophisticated regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding norms, mechanisms, and frameworks on the continent. Currently, there is variation in conflict management performances by the African RECs generally. Their relative success helped in recognising the complex and multiple linkages in African conflicts and contributed towards regional approaches to peacebuilding imperatives.

Usually, regional organisations have acted as first responders during peacekeeping missions before UN forces have intervened. They share in the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. For example, regional organisations and alliances were responsible for 32 of the 63 multilateral peace

operations active in 2017 (SIPRI, 2018, 103). During that year, African regional organisations conducted seven multilateral peace operations: four by the AU and three by the RECs (SIPRI, 2018, 107). Fewer multilateral peace operations were recorded in 2018, with 60 missions and operations globally, out of which 33 were conducted by regional organisations (SIPRI, 2019, 147–148). In 2019, there were 61 active multilateral peace operations, 20 of them in sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI, 2020, 3, 8). The strategic importance of continental and regional organisations in the chain of global responses to threats to peace and security is fast gaining recognition.

Most of the conflicts in the Sahelian region, particularly those in Mali, are recent examples of how the conflict in one place can spread through the mobility of fighters and the proliferation of arms. The flow of armed men and resources from a post-Ghaddafi Libya into northern Mali transformed a Tuareg campaign into a massive separatist movement. Arguably, the jihadists, insurgents, and other militant groups in the Sahel benefitted from the inflow of disbanded fighters and arms from Libya. For instance, at the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, there was concern that the conflict in Mali would spill over into the country. In 2012, President Idriss Déby of Chad expressed his fears that Boko Haram could destabilise the Lake Chad basin. He called on countries adjoining northern Nigeria to institute a joint military force to tackle the militants. In 2013, when Mali faced a similar situation, Chad sent troops to support French troops to drive al-Qaeda allies out of northern Mali.

In relation to IGAD and the Horn of Africa, the regional dimension of the conflict in Somalia is further complicated by the fact that Somalis are spread across the Horn but most noticeably in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and of course Somalia. It is plausible to argue that developments in Somalia at any given time are likely to provoke responses and reactions from “the Somali nations” scattered across East Africa in solidarity. Also, conflicts and instability in the Great Lakes region, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, and neighbouring South Sudan, have had implications for the countries of the Horn. IGAD has played an active role in conflict prevention and mediation in various conflicts in the region (see Chapters 9, 10, 14, and 15) and remains active in restoring peace to Somalia, as well as in ongoing negotiations directed towards bringing about peace between the warring factions in South Sudan. The physical and demographic features of Africa and the porosity of its borders make it easy for insurgencies, and environment-induced conflicts, to assume a regional character. It is in this context, for instance, that climate change, desertification, famine, and drought are considered threats to regional peace and security in West, East, and Central Africa – and have become the focus of RECs’ efforts towards conflict prevention and the restoration of peace.

The foregoing underscores the point that while most post-Cold War conflicts in Africa have been intra-state in nature, they had much broader ramifications. These include the destabilisation of neighbouring states and sub-regions because of the mobility of fighters, the proliferation of arms, disruption of economic activities, instability, internal displacement, and massive inflows and outflows of refugees.

The complex and multiple linkages in African conflicts have made regional approaches to peacebuilding imperative. Most of the conflicts in the Sahelian region, the Lake Chad basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes region have regional dimensions. It is within this context that African RECs, working with African leaders and civil society groups, and with the support of international partners, have directed their energies towards peacebuilding as a critical component of regional integration and development. Of note in this regard is the collaboration between the UN, AU, international donors, and RECs, which despite existing challenges has recorded some modest successes in West Africa and the Horn of Africa. As the chapters of this volume aptly demonstrate, there is a lot that African RECs can learn from each other's experiences in relation to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the nexus of peace and regional integration.

ECOWAS and IGAD in comparative perspective

The case studies in the book examine two African RECs: ECOWAS and IGAD. Both have in place programmes and activities for promoting peace and security in their respective regions. While ECOWAS started out in 1975 (and adopted a revised treaty in July 1993) as a regional economic integration program of 16 West African states, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was initially established in January 1986 to “combat desertification and the effects of drought on food security and rural livelihoods” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139). Following changes attendant to the end of the Cold War, the emerging peace, and the security challenges on the continent, both organisations expanded their mandates to cover peace and security-related issues (Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo, 2016, 21, 29–30; Obi, 2009, 120).

In July 1993, ECOWAS leaders endorsed the ECOWAS Revised Treaty which extended economic and political cooperation, including the creation of new institutions: a court, an economic and security council, and a parliament. Of note was the introduction of a structure for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) – with 14 components, including early warning, democracy, and political governance – as well as the ECOWAS Standby Force. ECPF has contributed to the success of ECOWAS both in terms of the ways it aligns with the AU's APSA, and the ways it has partnered with the AU and the UN in mediating conflicts in the region and restoring peace to Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali.

The lessons learned from the ECOWAS intervention and the ECOMOG peace-keeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone contributed to the consolidation of mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa. More recently, other regional economic communities (RECs) on the continent have replicated the example of the ECOWAS “success story” in mediation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. Of note is the role IGAD has played in mediating and resolving conflicts in the Horn of Africa. IGAD, along the lines of ECOWAS, expanded the basis of its regional integration agenda to include conflict management, peace, and security. Much like the experience of ECOWAS in West Africa,

IGAD's role in the Horn of Africa underscores some of the successes, as well as the challenges, RECs face in the promotion of regional peace and security.

In the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was formed in 1986 with the responsibility for coordinating regional resource issues – tackling drought, desertification, and food security-related issues in the Horn of Africa – the heads of state amended the organisation's charter, and changed its name to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in March 1996. They also expanded its mandate to include “conflict prevention and resolution, economic cooperation and integration” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139; also see Chapter 11). Bereketeab further notes that IGAD focused on three overarching objectives, “food security and environmental protection; promotion and maintenance of peace and security; and humanitarian affairs, economic cooperation and integration” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139). IGAD's membership now consists of eight countries that include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.

The experiences and the challenges facing ECOWAS and IGAD in the quest for sustainable regional peacebuilding examined in this book relate to the lack of adequate resources and capacity in logistics, weaponry, and technical and professional expertise. Others include the lack of political will among decision-makers of member states, competing national interests, and external interference. The book interrogates the claim that resource and capacity deficits partly explain the tendency of African RECs to rely on external funding and technical support. Dependence on external funding may compromise the integrity, legitimacy, and ownership of peace mediation, peace operations, and peacebuilding processes. Also, the divergence of interests among member states, coupled with the strategic interests of powerful donor states, can undermine the consensus necessary for the effectiveness of the RECs in their respective regions.

The records of IGAD and ECOWAS in promoting peace, stability, and development in their respective regions are mixed. The chapters in this book offer a balanced analysis of the successes and challenges facing both organisations. Both RECs play critical roles in peace mediation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Apart from examining the status, roles, and performances of ECOWAS and IGAD in regional peace and security, the book explores new ideas and actions that are likely to strengthen their capacity to address the challenges facing both regions effectively.

From the foregoing, while ECOWAS and IGAD have expanded their mandates in response to emerging changes in their regional contexts, they have also experienced certain challenges that have limited their capacity to effectively deliver on all aspects of their expanded mandates. In the case of ECOWAS, several commentators and analysts have identified institutional and financial weaknesses as among the factors hobbling the organisation (Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo 2016, 24; Obi, 2009, 120). This creates a level of dependency on external sources of funding and support, and provides an opportunity for external hegemonic actors such as France, the UK, the US, and the EU to leverage their influence over ECOWAS's decisions and actions (see Chapters 6 and 7).

It has also been pointed out that ECOWAS has achieved its successes in terms of conflict management, peace, and security at the expense of economic integration and development (see Chapter 6). As pointed out by Sesay,

the neglect of the economic integration aspects of ECOWAS, evidenced in its failure to meet vital community targets and in particular, its inability to execute community-wide projects, has left West Africa behind other regions in economic development and human development index.

(Sesay, 2016)

Another challenge is the weak political will of some of the leaders, who also tend to leverage personal, national, or external relationships over regional interests. This in many ways undermines the cohesion of the organisation, including its capacity to pool internal resources and to act decisively in the face of crises or emergencies within the region.

IGAD has also not been without weaknesses of its own. According to Bereketeab (2019, 140), the factors that contribute to its challenges include “its structure, dependence on external funding, the lack of capacity to achieve optimal results in relation to its stated goals, and Ethiopia’s dominance of the organisation” (also see chapters 9, 13, 14, and 15). He goes on to identify the structural problems facing IGAD, including how these adversely affect its “flexibility, performance and efficiency,” and the influence of donors, operating under the rubric of the IGAD Partners Forum (Italy, Canada, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and the US), over the organisation. In his view, external involvement undermines IGAD’s autonomy and legitimacy, and like ECOWAS its capacity to embark on certain actions. Also like the case of ECOWAS, IGAD’s effectiveness is constrained by the lack of political will on the part of some political leaders. As Bereketeab (2019, 144) explains,

IGAD is only as strong as the leaders of a state allow it to be and can engage in peace mediation only where the member-states are willing. Evidence of this can be seen in the way Ethiopia blocked IGAD from engaging in the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict.

Also, IGAD’s weaknesses have accounted for some of the inconsistencies and limited successes in mediation efforts in several countries of the region, including Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia (see Chapters 9, 10, 13, and 14).

While Ethiopia may be perceived as a hegemonic player in the IGAD region (and Uganda and Kenya to a lesser extent), the same cannot be said of Nigeria, which is ECOWAS’s largest donor, but which does not exert hegemonic influence over the regional organisation (Udo and Ekott 2013). Also while ECOWAS has been able to build a strong partnership with civil society organisations in setting up a sophisticated early warning system and election monitoring processes (see Chapters 4 and 5), “IGAD is perceived as a weak link with regard to civil society engagement and activities in an organised and institutionalised peacebuilding

process” (Bereketeab, 2019, 148). However, many analysts are of the view that, in spite of the relative successes of ECOWAS and IGAD in the area of peace and security – ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire, and IGAD in Somalia and the Sudan–South Sudan War – both RECs seem to have achieved this at the expense of effective economic integration. However, it has also been observed that ECOWAS has during the same period developed a more sophisticated peace and security architecture, as well as stronger mechanisms and connections with civil society, while IGAD has yet to overcome external interventions, build strong mechanisms, and foster an effective level of participation by civil society in its peace and security institutions and processes. As the chapters of this volume aptly show, both organisations have a lot to learn about, and from, each other, and have great potential to expand the frontiers of peacebuilding in their respective regions.

Structure and organisation of the book

This book is structured in four parts. Part I focuses on the introductory overview and conceptual dimensions, legal and theoretical, of peacebuilding in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, and its relevance to the regional integration–peacebuilding nexus. It is followed by Part II, which explores ECOWAS’s evolving approach to regional peacebuilding in West Africa, particularly the shift from a state to a participatory, and people-centred, paradigm. In Part III, the chapters provide analyses of institutional approaches to ECOWAS peacebuilding, one exploring the role of a regional power, and the other exploring the role of international cooperation partners. In Part IV, which is the largest section of the book, there are case studies based on analyses of how ECOWAS–member state and IGAD–member state relations impact and shape peacebuilding, peace, and security in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as the prospects for the future.

In Chapter 2, “RECs and peacebuilding in Africa: analysis of legal framework and concerns for international law,” Olugbemi Jaiyebo and Victor Adetula analyse the legal challenges that RECs face in expanding their original mandates beyond economic development to include peacebuilding roles. In this regard, the authors also interrogate “the legal impetus that supranationality gives the African Union and other RECs in furtherance of their peacebuilding mandate,” and show how “the existing legal infrastructure puts the RECs at an advantage over the UN and other external actors in the areas of right of access to the theatre of conflict, enforcement of ceasefire agreements, discipline, and oversight of international personnel.”

In Chapter 3, “Peacebuilding in Africa: popular–progressive versus neoliberal approaches,” Redie Bereketeab critiques the conceptual underpinnings of neoliberal peacebuilding, and makes a case for a progressive alternative. The chapter discusses neoliberal peacebuilding as an interventionist paradigm designed to rebuild post-conflict societies along the lines of liberal/modern societies based on the universalisation of Western values, norms, and models. It notes that neoliberal peacebuilding is “unsustainable and dysfunctional as it is an external imposition

and fails to cohere with specific realities of the particular society,” and calls for a more viable option that should ideally utilise “domestic resources and infrastructures such as cultural, social, historical, structural, institutional, indigenous, etc. authorities” of African societies. On this basis the chapter makes a case for progressive peacebuilding as an alternative to the imposition of interventionist neoliberal policies on Africa’s conflict-affected states.

In Chapter 4, “Towards a human security-centred approach to peacebuilding: ECOWAS’s experiences and lessons,” Remi Ajibewa and Jubril Agbolade Shittu provide an in-depth analysis of ECOWAS’s efforts to transition from a state-centred to a people-centred approach to regional peace and security. The chapter provides a clear explanation of the introduction of institutional, structural, and human security approaches to regional peacebuilding, consistent with the tenets of the ECOWAS Vision 2020, which was adopted in 2007, to transform the organisation from an “ECOWAS of States, to an ECOWAS of Peoples.” The authors engage with some of the challenges ECOWAS has faced in this regard and propose some solutions for addressing them. They conclude that these experiences and lessons, particularly those regarding its inclusion of civil society organisations in its agenda for human security and people-centred integration, should be shared with other African RECs.

Following this, Chapter 5, by Chukwuemeka Eze, “Civil society organisations and the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda: a case study of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP),” is based on a case study of WANEP’s engagement and partnership with ECOWAS in the areas of people-centred conflict prevention, conflict management, and mediation. It unpacks the factors that drive civil society engagement with ECOWAS in West Africa. The chapter examines the ECOWAS–civil society partnership in the context of the successful realisation of ECOWAS’s Vision 2020 but notes that much work still needs to be done.

In Chapter 6, Amadu Sesay, writing on “ECOWAS and the limits of peace-making in West Africa,” provides a succinct analysis of the organisation in relation to “the significant progress in the areas of conflict prevention, management, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement in West Africa.” The chapter also provides a historical perspective on the evolution of ECOWAS, and notes that ECOWAS’s “venture into the realm of peacemaking and peace support operations is in many ways fortuitous,” and concludes that, while it turned out to be a “successful security community,” it “failed to promote economic development in the member-states.”

Chapter 7, “ECOWAS and triangular cooperation for peacebuilding in West Africa: challenges and prospects from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiences,” by Kehinde Olusola Olayode, provides critical insights into how the contributions of partnerships framed within a South–South triangular cooperation framework impacted peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The chapter examines the experiences (and prospects) of bilateral and multilateral partnerships for international peacebuilding support in West Africa, against a background of the overstretching of ECOWAS’s limited capacities and resources. Drawing on ECOWAS relations with the United Nations, the African Union, India, Brazil, and

the South Africa forum (IBSA), as well as other Western powers and non-Western emerging powers, the author unpacks the challenges facing South–South triangular cooperation with Liberia and Sierra Leone. While noting the bright prospects of triangular cooperation, a compelling case is made for better coordination by donor states and organisations. More fundamentally, the author proposes greater ownership, capacity, and control by ECOWAS member states over the region’s peacebuilding agenda.

Oshita A. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli, in Chapter 8, “Nigeria’s role in the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda for West Africa,” explore Nigeria’s pivotal role in shaping the organisation’s role in promoting peace and security in West Africa. They examine Nigeria’s regional leadership credentials and how they played into its provision of the human and material resources necessary for ECOWAS’s peace interventions across the region. After reviewing Nigeria’s immense contributions to ECOWAS’s mediation peacekeeping, peace support operations, and peace and security architecture, they argue that, given the country’s economic challenges, the burden of mobilising human and material resources needs to be equitably shared among member states.

In Chapter 9, “The IGAD–Eritrea impasse: future prospects in light of recent developments,” Senai W. Andemariam explores the tensions underpinning Eritrea–IGAD–AU relations, and attributes these to Eritrea’s view that Ethiopia had used its dominance of IGAD to marginalise the country, hence the decision to suspend its membership of the organisation. Thus, while Eritrea was able to return to the AU in 2011, the same effort to reactivate its membership of IGAD was rebuffed, partly due to Ethiopia’s opposition. The author engages with Eritrea, making a case for economic integration as a step towards resolving the political issues preventing the reactivation of its membership of IGAD.

Chapter 10, by Nureldin Satti, “Lessons to be learned from IGAD’s involvement in the Sudan peace process (1993–2005),” critically examines the various aspects of IGAD’s mediation and peacemaking efforts in Sudan, and how this impacted the outcome of the peace process. It analyses the context within which IGAD mediation engaged the two conflicting sides, the government of Sudan and the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, as well as international partners, culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The author unpacks the role of the various stakeholders which eventually contributed to the secession and independence of South Sudan in 2011. Drawing on lessons from IGAD’s involvement, he argues for minimising external influences “by ensuring the financial, technical and intellectual independence of IGAD.”

In Chapter 11, Kizito Sabala, writing on “Kenya’s diplomacy and international relations within the IGAD region on matters of peace and security: growth, development, and prospects,” focuses on the country’s contribution to IGAD’s peace and security agenda. The author addresses the evolution of Kenya’s engagement with IGAD in relation to peace and security, zeroing in on the conflict in Somalia, the Sudan–South Sudan War, the CPA followed by the independence of South Sudan, and the conflict that engulfed Africa’s youngest state. The chapter

concludes by examining the prospects of Kenya's diplomacy noting its strategic interests in peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts in the IGAD region.

This is followed by Chapter 12, "Uganda and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)," in which Kasaija Phillip Apuuli provides an in-depth analysis of Uganda-IGAD relations, with an emphasis on the latter's peace and security programs. Of note is the attention paid to Uganda's involvement in peace processes in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, and the IGAD's Conflict Early Warning System (CEWARN). The chapter also provides explanations for IGAD's non-intervention in conflicts in Uganda, the accumulated arrears of Uganda's IGAD membership dues, as well as the country's ambivalent relationship with Sudan and Ethiopia and its unilateral involvement in the war in South Sudan. This also suggests how divisions within IGAD member states weaken the organisation, and how Uganda's membership of the East African Community may also undermine its commitment to IGAD.

In Chapter 13, "Peacebuilding in the context of Ethiopia-IGAD relations," Kassahun Berhanu unpacks this complex relationship, particularly Ethiopia's position as a pivotal state within the region, and how the perception of the state as a US ally has made it a target of terrorist and extremist groups in the region. The chapter argues that such perceptions have wider implications for regional peacebuilding efforts, particularly for those who question Ethiopia's motives within the Horn. The author highlights some of Ethiopia's contributions towards strengthening IGAD's peacebuilding roles but notes the challenges that the Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry pose for the organisation.

Mohammed Haji Ingiris, in Chapter 14, "The big elephant in the room: the meddling and machinations of IGAD and Ethiopia in Somalia," interrogates what he describes as the "Ethiopianisation of IGAD." The author unpacks the role of Ethiopia as a hegemonic regional actor in the Horn of Africa, and its "intrusion into Somali affairs," using the politics of IGAD peacebuilding. He provides an overview of the changing relationship between Somalia and IGAD, and the evolution of Ethiopia's influence over the latter during the various mediations, conflict management, peace operations, and peacebuilding processes in Somalia. In concluding, the author does not foreclose the possibility that the Somali people will someday regain control of the politics of nationhood and peacebuilding in their country.

Jacob D. Chol explores in Chapter 15, "'You don't own peace': the coward state, South Sudan, and IGAD relations," the relationship between IGAD and the government of South Sudan. The chapter provides an overview of IGAD's mediation in the South Sudan conflict, including the complications arising from this, the weakness of the South Sudanese state, as well as the competing interests of neighbouring countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The author then explores ways for improving relations between IGAD and the government of South Sudan based on confidence and trust-building.

There is a consensus by all the contributors to this volume that although ECOWAS and IGAD have achieved some levels of success, both RECs have a lot to learn from each other in their quest to connect peace and security to their

regional integration projects. There is a concern in some circles that regional peace and security gains have eclipsed regional economic integration in Africa. The challenge, therefore, is to continue to strengthen existing regional peace and security mechanisms and processes, while equally prioritising the consolidation of regional economic integration by ECOWAS and IGAD in West Africa and the Horn of Africa. African RECs will for the foreseeable future play a key role in addressing the structural, economic, political, and institutional challenges that militate against peace and development in Africa. Addressing these challenges in West Africa and the Horn of Africa will require not just an “ECOWAS of the People” and “IGAD of the People,” but an “Africa of the People,” consistent with vision underpinning Agenda 2063.

References

- Adetula, V.A. (1993). “Three Decades of ECA in Africa: An Appraisal,” *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 37–52.
- Adetula, V.A. (1999). “Pan-Africanism and the Evolution of Modern Integrative Initiatives in Africa,” in W.O. Alli (ed.), *Africa and the African Diaspora: Aspects of an Experience*, Jos: Mazlink Nigeria Ltd., pp. 107–122.
- Adetula, V. (2005). “Development, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Africa,” in S. Best (ed.), *Introduction to Peace and Security Studies in West Africa*, Ibadan: University for Peace/Spectrum Books, pp. 383–405.
- Adetula, V.A. (2014). “Regional Integration and the Quest for Peace and Stability in Africa,” *Revolutions*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 190–218.
- Adetula, V.A. (2015). *African Conflicts, Development, and Regional Organisations in the Post-Cold War International System*. Current Issues 61. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Adetula, V.A., Bereketeab, R. & Jaiyebo, O. (2016). “Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa—The Experiences of ECOWAS and IGAD,” *Policy Dialogue*, No. 12, Nordic Africa Institute.
- Axline, A. (1977). “Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World,” *International Organization*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 63–105.
- Ayittey, G. (2014). “African Solutions for African Problems—Real Meaning,” *Pan-African Visions*, 2 January, <https://panafricanvisions.com/2014/01/african-solutions-african-problems-real-meaning/> (accessed 21 June 2020).
- Bereketeab, R. (2019). “Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding: The IGAD Experience,” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 137–156.
- Bjorkdahl, A. (2012). “A Gender-Just Peace?” Exploring the Post-Dayton Peace Process in Bosnia,” *Peace and Change*, Vol. 37, pp. 286–317.
- Cheru, F. (2002). *African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization*, London: Zed Books.
- Cocks, P. (1980). “Towards a Marxist Theory of European Integration,” *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 1–39.
- Daniel, R. & Nagar, D. (2014). “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa, Centre for Conflict Resolution,” Policy Research Seminar Report, Cape Town.

- Diehl, P. (2006). "Paths to Peacebuilding: The Transformation of Peace Operations," in T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (eds.), *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, London and Paris: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, pp. 107–129.
- Galtung, J. (1976). "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding," in Galtung (ed.), *Peace, War, and Defense: Essays in Peace Research*, vol. 2, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, pp. 282–304.
- Gill, R. (2009). "Regional Integration and Africa's Development Trajectory: Metatheories, Expectations and Reality," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 701–720.
- Ihonvbere, J. (1983). "Towards a Reconceptualisation of Integration Theory in Peripheral Regions – The Case of ECOWAS," *ODU: A Journal of West African Studies*, Vol. 24, pp. 10–29.
- Lobakeng, R. (2017). "African Solutions to African Problems: A Viable Solution towards a United, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa," Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper, No. 71.
- Machlup, F. (1976). "A History of Thought on Economic Integration," in F. Machlup (ed.), *Economic Integration Worldwide, Regional, Sectoral*, Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, pp. 61–88.
- Mason, T.D. & Meernik, J.D. (2006). *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, London and Paris: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
- New Partnership for Africa's Development. (2001). *The New Partnership for Africa's Development*, <http://www.dfa.gov.za/events.Nepad.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2020).
- Obi, C. (2009). "Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire," *African Security*, Vol. 2, No. 2 &3, pp. 119–135.
- Omeje, K. (2019). *Introduction: Peacebuilding in Contemporary Africa in Peacebuilding in Contemporary Africa: In Search of Alternative Strategies*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Omeje, K. (ed.) (2019). "Peacebuilding in Contemporary Africa," in *Search of Alternative Strategies*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–17.
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2009). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
- Sesay, A. (2016). "ECOWAS and the Limits of Peace-Making West Africa," Paper presented at the Policy Dialogue on Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, IPCR, Abuja 1–2 September, and Abuja.
- SIPRI. (2018). *SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SIPRI. (2019). *SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SIPRI. (2020). *SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Summary)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf (accessed 26 May 2020).
- Tschirgi, N. (2003). *Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?*, New York: International Peace Academy.
- Udo, B. & Ekott, I. (2013). "Nigeria, ECOWAS' Largest Donor Continually Outsmarted by Smaller West African Countries," *Premium Times*, September 4, <https://www.pre>

mumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsma-rted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html

UN General Assembly. (1993). *An Agenda for Peace: Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly*, 8 October 1993, A/RES/47/120B.

United Nations. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping* (A/47/277-S/24111). New York.