3 Peacebuilding in Africa

Popular progressive versus neoliberal peacebuilding

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Introduction

This chapter examines two approaches to the theoretical framing of peacebuilding and its implications for Africa. The first is short-term peacebuilding that follows a war. The second is long-term peacebuilding that relates to the gradual construction of the socio-economic and political institutions of societies. Drawing from critical analysis, this chapter makes a case for progressive peacebuilding as an alternative to the neoliberal peacebuilding dominant in Africa. It examines the two strands of peacebuilding: popular progressive and neoliberal. Popular progressive peacebuilding is historical, contemporary, and futuristic.¹ In this trajectory and evolution there exists a continuous time horizon of connecting the past, present, and future. Peacebuilding as a theoretical and empirical notion has assumed growing prominence following the collapse of the Cold War (Curtis and Gwinyayi, 2012; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Harrison, 2010). The reason for the growing prominence of peacebuilding is related to the rise of the neoliberal interventionist ideology that replaced Cold War order (Harrison 2010). Neoliberal triumphalist disposition embarked on a proselytising mission of humanity along neoliberal values and norms. Western values and norms were elevated to universal ones that every member of humanity should strive for (Tom 2017). This proselytisation propelled an aggressive, interventionist approach to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding not in tune with neoliberal ideology was perceived not only as untenable but also as a danger to world peace (Zaum, 2012, 47; Hutchful, 2012, 81).

Peacebuilding intervention offered an excellent opportunity to convert societies under stress into liberal societies geared along a Western model. Referring to this, Roland Paris (2002, 638) notes, “Without exception, peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period have attempted to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states.” He also designates it “mission civilisatrice,” reminiscent of the European imperial powers’ duty to civilise dependent populations. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan are cases of the neoliberal peacebuilding and state-building intervention (Paffenholz, 2015; Tom, 2017; Call and Vanessa, 2008; Nhema and Zeleza, 2008). The source of the ensuing problems in these countries

was considered to be that their dose of “universal” values and norms was too low. The remedy for the dysfunctionality of fragile societies was an international intervention with the intention of restructuring and rebuilding post-conflict countries along the lines of neoliberal values and norms.

Critics argue that neoliberal peacebuilding is unsustainable and dysfunctional as it is an external imposition and fails to cohere with the specific social, cultural, historical, economic, political, and ethnic realities of the particular society (Harrison, 2010; Paffenholz, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2011; Lederach, 1997). Functional and sustainable peacebuilding rests on the culture, history, social and political structures, and forces of the respective society (Tom, 2017). It should draw on proven domestic institutions, mechanisms, and authorities (Richmond, 2011).

This chapter consists of seven sections. The following section provides an overview of peacebuilding. Section three analyses neoliberal peacebuilding. Section four discusses popular progressive peacebuilding. Section five analyses state emancipation and societal pacification. Section six discusses state-building and peacebuilding drawing upon some African cases. Finally, section seven provides concluding thoughts about how to deepen sustainable peacebuilding in Africa.

Peacebuilding: a broad overview

Peacebuilding is perennial and gradual. It is intimately and dialectically connected with culture, history, socio-economics, structures, institutions, traditions, the authority of the particular society, and moral and ethical imperatives. It is about integration, cohesion, and developing commonalities and peaceful coexistence within a limited territory under the umbrella of a common state. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (quoted in Barnett, 2006, 87).² Four theoretical conceptualisations of peacebuilding run through the mainstream literature: (i) structural violence theory, (ii) transformation relationship theory, (iii) protracted social conflict theory, and (iv) relationship-building (conflict resolution) theory (Paffenholz, 2015, 859). Peacebuilding is often defined as “efforts at national, local, or international levels to consolidate peace in war-torn societies” (Call, 2008, 6). Ultimately, durable peacebuilding concerns the development of the will to live together based on shared overarching values, interests, emotions, cognitions, goals, and expectations, as well as mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, common security, complementarity, and the institutionalisation of mechanisms for problem-solving (Gawerc, 2006, 442). In other words, it concerns the protracted process and project of state- and nation-building (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016; Zaum, 2012).

Post-Cold War and post-conflict neoliberal interventionist peacebuilding on the other hand attempts to shape and reshape African societies along the Western model of societal formation. This neoliberal conception, instead of bringing peace, however, produced more conflicts and instabilities (Steinberg, 2012; Harrison, 2010; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Call, 2008; Tom, 2017). The reason why

rebuilding post-conflict African societies along liberal/neoliberal models and formations failed is because these models disconnect societies from their historical and social foundations. Similar to how uprooted trees with exposed roots face difficulties to grow again, post-conflict societies disconnected from their foundations find it difficult to build peace and stability. In this context, connecting to one's roots is a *sine qua non* for peace, stability, and development (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). Therefore, the proposition is to seek alternative models based on the idiosyncratic specificities of societies in Africa as a prerequisite to durable peacebuilding. This might sound anachronistic in the era of globalisation. Note should be taken, however, that "globalization is increasingly becoming more synonymous with re-colonisation" (Shittu, 2015, 44).

Peacebuilding is more than the absence of war, known as negative peace (Oda, 2007; Gawerc, 2006). Positive peacebuilding is concerned with multidimensional non-war-related social issues such as provision of services, equitable distribution of resources, development, building ethnic relations, and poverty alleviation. The rights to education and health, mutual respect, and recognition are other dimensions of positive peacebuilding (Curtis, 2012; Maiese, 2003). Positive peace is a step further than negative peace; that is, if negative peace constitutes the necessary conditions, positive peace constitutes the sufficient conditions for functional and sustainable peace and peacebuilding.

The Westphalian order with its basic tenets of respect of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference brought relative peace and stability in the state world system (Watson, 1990; Osiander, 2001; Teschke, 2002). The post-Cold War order that disrupted the Westphalian order, on the other hand, spurred uncertainty, disorder, inequality, social rupture, conflicts, and wars as evidenced in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia (Cordesman, 2016; Held and Ulrichsen, 2011). In the post-Cold War and post-Westphalian eras state sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity were (and are) presumed to be eroded. Hence, "there are indications of a gradual shift away from horizontal, and thus intergovernmental or Westphalian, to a more vertical, and thus supranational or post-Westphalian, structure of the global order" (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2014, 570; Tuluianu, 2013). This order-induced Western hegemony has so far proven to be a recipe for intrusion, conflicts, wars, and instability. The defining characteristics of the new world order have become rather chaotic, induced by disequilibrium in global humanity as a result of domination by certain sections of that global humanity as defined by mono-polarity (Harrison, 2010).

Profound and sustainable peacebuilding requires going beyond administrative, technical, and legal subscriptions; and endorsing the basic sociological dimension of societal construction of state- and nation-building in Africa. It is through evolutionary (without subscribing to unilinearity) protracted societal formation that durable and genuine peacebuilding can be achieved. It is also certain that this profound societal construction could not be undertaken by external intervention. Africa is in need of genuine domestic nation and state construction that ensures enduring peace and peacebuilding.

Neoliberal peacebuilding

The literature of peacebuilding connects peacebuilding with liberal and democratic values (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Call, 2008). Two core values of liberal democracy are liberal formal elections and a market economy (Paris, 2002). A growing body of evidence testifies that neoliberal peacebuilding is not working (Richmond, 2006; Barnett, 2006; Paris, 1997; Jarstad and Belloni, 2012; Tom, 2017), particularly in Africa. Neoliberal peacebuilding rests on premises of reconstructing war-damaged societies of non-Western societies along the lines of a Western model (Harrison, 2010; Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009; Tom, 2017). The spread of neoliberal values and norms in the post-Cold War world is the main preoccupation of Western powers. The sociological concepts of socialisation, internationalisation, and externalisation, as an epistemological frame, may help to depict the universalisation process (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Appelrouth and Edles, 2008; Easa and Fincham, 2012). Socialisation refers to the “in-learning” process of socially accepted and established knowledge, information, norms, values, and praxis; while internalisation relates to the internal assimilation of the “learned-in”. This pertains to the “I, me” distinction. Externalisation, on the other hand, relates to bringing out what has been internalised. The latter refers to the objectification of the subjective, inter-subjectivity. Once it is externalised or objectified, it assumes universality whereby no singular person or society could claim ownership. At a global systemic level, this socialisation works in the same vein as at a social-psychological level, through operations of learning, internalising, and externalising Western values and norms so that they become global or universal values and norms.

This is translated into what is today commonly known as liberal peacebuilding. Roland Paris (1997, 56) notes that it

is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflicts: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalisation.

He further notes:

To the extent that peacebuilding agencies transmit such ideas [about what a state should look like and how it should act] from the core to the periphery of the international system, these agencies are, in effect, involved in an effort to remake parts of the periphery in the image of the core.

(Paris, 2002, 639)

International organisations including the UN, INGOs, NGOs, donors, the WB, and the IMF are agents engaged in the transmission and diffusion of neoliberal values and norms (Chandler, 2013, 19). They are part of what is called the liberal NGO peacebuilding enterprise (Paffenholz, 2015, 860) who mediate neoliberal ideology through training, capacity-building, toolbox blueprints, and advising

local and international peacebuilding practitioners. Post-conflict constitution is drafted by Western experts and usually contains concepts such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence and due process, etc. and is later endorsed by national legislation (Paris, 2002, 644). Accordingly, the restructuring and reconfiguration of the state takes place. Local peacebuilders are to be socialised in these neoliberal norms and values, and to ultimately internalise them as universal values and norms.

In short, the successful processing of the trinity – socialisation, internalisation, and externalisation – eventually produces universality. Once the processing is complete, it assumes the status of “taken for granted” whereby no one will be able to question it. It is considered sacrosanct and questioning it is tantamount of committing a sacrilegious act. Neoliberalism, since the end of the Cold War, has been engaged in a systematic and concerted universalisation, through peaceful and coercive means, of Western norms and values, making them uncontested, universal epistemic bodies (Tom, 2017). The effort is not only limited to theoretical or ideological dissemination, but also to practical operation through, for instance, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and in some cases military invasions that aim to limit the state (Barnet, 2006, 89), or to bring regime change using and supporting centrifugal forces (Chetail and Jutersonke, 2015, 7).

The pervasiveness of the neoliberal ideology in the post-Cold War era has led some to talk about neoliberal revolution (Harrison, 2010). The connotation of revolution is intended to express the profound change it seeks to bring about, as Harrison notes:

This is the essence of social engineering: neoliberal intervention aims to destabilise existing habits (expressed within neoliberal discourse as a hostility to bureaucracy and a desire for good governance, for example) and to produce notions of conduct based on efficiency, transparency and utility.

(Harrison, 2010, 75)

The peacebuilding project as prescribed by liberalism is expected to promote market economy and electoral multiparty democracy. The year 1990 was a watershed moment in the triumphant neoliberal discourse. Liberal discourse was replaced by aggressive neoliberal discourse. This aggressive discourse picked up momentum and currency following the September 11 attack on the United States (Harrison, 2010; Barnet, 2006, 87). Some also call the aggressive interventionist venture a “post-modern imperialist scheme” (Henderson, 2015, 256–257).

Post-Cold War peacebuilding was based on neoliberal democracy and market economy norms and values. Now a range of non-state actors – IOs, NGOs, CS, opposition, etc. (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 7; Barnet, 2006) – have been mandated to play active roles in neoliberal peacebuilding. This is so because the state is not to be trusted (Tom, 2017, 66). A concerted assault against the state was therefore unleashed, and concepts such as predator state, criminal state, patrimonial state, etc. were popularised (cf. Hyden, 2013; Englebert, 2000; Herbest, 2000; Bratton and de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Some of

the characteristic features of neoliberal peacebuilding are formalist, technical, and administrative by nature (Chandler, 2013). As formalist, it is grounded on predetermined and imported premises. It usually includes in its shopping lists actions such as reforming the security forces, police, intelligence, and army, while demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) are also prominent (Conteh-Morgan, 2004; Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012; Barnett, 2006). This reformist approach focuses on technical and temporary post-conflict solutions. It neglects the profound political nature of conflicts and the concomitant peacebuilding. Emphasising this, Thania Paffenholz (2015, 861) notes “International liberal peacebuilding becomes an inherently conservative undertaking, which seeks managerial solutions to fundamental conflicts over resources and power.” Admitting the political nature of conflict and peacebuilding would mean seeking political and enduring measures as solutions instead of technical and temporary ones, as well as indulging in the root causes of the conflicts. A peacebuilding that follows peace agreements is constrained by the need to consolidate and institutionalise the deal, even if it is deficient in certain aspects. In addition, overdependence on external experts that devalue indigenous knowledge, experts, and authorities characterises the process. External actors’ prerogatives of defining issues and deciding who should be included and involved in the peace process are other constraints of neoliberal peacebuilding. This denies ownership and agency to the subjects (Curtis, 2012).

Donors have increasingly assumed prominence as a mechanism of bringing together needed resources to achieve peacebuilding. There is no irrefutable evidence, however, that donors and external resources will guarantee peace and peacebuilding. This is another indication of the neoliberal intervener’s concern with conflict and post-conflict situations where the attention is on prevention of the resumption or escalation of violent conflict. This short-term focus of neoliberal peacebuilding is an indication of the unsustainability of neoliberal-driven peace (Tom, 2017).

Failed or unstable societies are perceived to be a threat to international security (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 3; Barnett, 2006, 87; Tom, 2017). Dealing with this security threat presupposes mending of the failed societies; regime change is followed by imposed nation-building (Downes, 2011; Caplan, 2007). This conceptualisation provides Western powers with legitimate rights to intervene. The interventionist measures come with and foster their own conceptions and models of peacebuilding. No attention is paid to indigenous conceptions, institutions, mechanisms, and practices of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Even if attempts to pay attention are made, they fall short of meeting the imperatives of indigenous instruments of peacebuilding to achieve sustainable peace.

Another dimension of the shopping list is that it is usually facilitated by external actors. The preoccupation of external mediators is chiefly with short-term security and stability. The serious consequence of the imposition of an external solution is that it is selective. It is selective in choosing agendas, issues, and domestic actors to be involved (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 4). This certainly makes it incomprehensive, inconclusive, and short-lived. It avoids

addressing root causes; instead, it treats proximate causes and may end up dealing with symptoms (Young, 2012). It focuses only on the combatants (Young, 2012); therefore, a range of actors and interests that undermine the sustainability of the peace deal, or post-war reconstruction, are excluded, thereby producing regimes devoid of wide legitimacy (Barnet, 2006, 103–104; Menkhause, 2012). Elements that will ensure lasting solutions such as social reconciliation, broad participation, inclusiveness transformation, and democratisation are paid scant attention. The welfare of citizens and development are markedly absent from the solutions (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009; Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Above all, it is criticised of being driven by and promoting self-interests and alien ideologies and perspectives, at the expense of indigenous mechanisms, institutions, perspectives, and authorities. The post-Cold War neoliberalism is also criticised of dissociation with classical liberalism; noting this, Issa Shivji writes that

Margaret Thatcher [claimed] “there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.” The individualism of neoliberalism is narcissist. It is not even the enlightened individualism of liberalism which stood for individual freedom and the flowering of the individual. Neoliberalism knows only one freedom – freedom to choose from commodities on offer.³

Finally, it is uncertain if neoliberal peacebuilding addresses issues such as power, legitimacy, representation, and participation (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009) that are vital for enduring peace and functional peacebuilding. Neoliberalism’s drive of a globalism that engenders totalitarian universalism, without the corollary benefits for non-Western societies, only produces a segmentary hierarchised unequal global citizenry. This will not lead to peace, stability, and security in Africa.

Popular progressive peacebuilding

Now I will examine an alternative to neoliberal peacebuilding: popular progressive peacebuilding. Popular progressive peacebuilding relates to a long-term evolutionary development of peace. Peace, in this conception, is historical, contemporary, and future-oriented. It strides along the past–present–future continuum. Furthermore, in a broad and fundamental way, it concerns the profound project of nation and state formation. In this sense, it is an antithesis of neoliberal peacebuilding. Basically, popular progressive peacebuilding deals with the evolutionary construction and reconstruction of society. The concepts of popular and progressive denote the dialectics between popular and progress. The “popular” expresses the people-centred nature of peacebuilding, while “progressive” connotes the long-term, continuous, and future-oriented nature of peace and peacebuilding. There are a number of dimensions that need to be taken into consideration, in order for popular progressive peacebuilding to fulfil its aims.

The basic premises of popular progressive peacebuilding are the embracing of holistic, national, regional, and local ownership; indigenous institutions, authorities, and mechanisms; and inclusive bottom-up and top-down strategies (cf. Richmond, 2011; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011). Local ownership of the agendas, processes, solutions, long-term institution-building, negotiations, bargaining, compromises, reconciliation, participation, and transformation are other aspects of popular progressive peacebuilding. It is a domestic process, home-grown, not oriented towards a winner or loser outcome. According to Isaac O. Albert, peacebuilding in Africa rests on the “commitment to cultural values, beliefs, and norms as the people on the one hand and role expectation on the other” (Albert, 2008, 40). This confers legitimacy on the process (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984).

These are fundamental prerequisites for functional and sustainable peace. Peacebuilding from this perspective is exclusively domestic or home-grown (cf. Paffenholz, 2015). Any external involvement could only serve as an additional supporting toolkit. Neoliberal peacebuilding is proving to be the antithesis of popular progressive peacebuilding because its interventionist policies lead to state fragility, failure, and collapse. Popular progressive peacebuilding endorses the view that “actors are shaped by the socio-cultural milieu in which they live” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, 234). In other words it is culture- and context-contingent.

Popular progressive peacebuilding initiated after a bloody war should aim at society-building. Society-building/reconstruction necessarily involves restoring destroyed values, norms, institutions, structures, and relations (Curtis, 2012, 4–5). Society-building/reconstruction cannot rest on borrowed values and norms (as per neoliberal subscriptions). If the state of anomaly is replaced by a state of normalcy, only then could sustainable and functional peacebuilding be ensured (Tom, 2017). A grassroots-based peacebuilding would celebrate the defining of societal structures, norms, and values such as communalism, collectivism, and solidarity (Conteh-Morgan 2004, Gawerc 2006). Methodological collectivism instead of methodological individualism is the imperative of peacebuilding as a popular progressive alternative. It aims at restoring the balance, the equilibrium. “Among African societies, symbols and rituals are key to an effective and permanent peacebuilding/reconstruction process” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, 241). A characteristic feature of popular progressive peacebuilding is engagement in a protracted discussion until consensus is reached among all citizens. The social fabric of peace rests on the moral authority and wisdom of elders whose guidance, oversight, decisions, and leadership propelled by time immemorial, by proven praxis and ethos, are accepted and obeyed. Mediations and verdicts handed down by elders are binding and fully implemented. The reason they are accepted and obeyed is because they strive to restore social cohesion, harmony, and equilibrium; not to punish, isolate, and marginalise the guilty. Guilt is not an individual act, but rather a collective one, and punishment and reward are also collective acts that aim at restorative justice (Tom, 2017, 78–82).

The focus is a restorative instead of a retributive peace. In this focus cultural resources of peacemaking are of great significance (Conteh-Morgan, 2004).

Familial connections, community networks, trust, dignity, integrity, and respect are variables that create cohesion. These elements strongly contribute to the success of conflict mediation and abide by the verdicts passed by mediators. Both the mediators and the mediated are required to show impeccable social and moral integrity; otherwise they lose face in the community.

Neoliberal [liberal] peacebuilding “may be socially atomizing, hegemonic and lead to the valorization of predatory state elite who gain easy access to an international economic and political cartography” (Oliver P. Richmond quoted in Curtis, 2012, 16). It therefore runs against the aggregating, egalitarian, and collective African values and norms. These values and norms certainly reinforce functional and sustainable peace.

Neoliberal peacebuilding, as state-centred, is confined to global and national state levels. This ignores the sub-national, the marginalised, the peripheries, the indigenous, and the traditional and cultural context of common people. Popular progressive peacebuilding, on the other hand, is people-centred, pervasively inclusive, and straddles all social strata.

State emancipation and societal pacification as requisites for peacebuilding

It took several hundred years for the predecessor of the post-colonial state to emancipate itself and pacify the society under its control (Young, 1994, 15–16). The major challenge for the post-colonial state, in its formation, has been to emancipate itself and pacify its societies. Emancipation means ensuring sovereignty. A sovereign state enjoys both internal and external legitimacy in governing citizens in its domain and in dealing with other states (Young, 1994, 28–29). Legitimacy has sociological and legal dimensions. While sociologically it may refer to the internal, legally it refers to the external (Schaar, 2000; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Henderson, 2015). Nevertheless, the hard reality is that the situation in post-colonial Africa, far from mono-sovereignty where the state has the benefit of absolute sovereignty, is characterised by duality of sovereignty. The emancipation of a state demonstrates the emergence of a matured, developed, peaceful state; a state that is capable of building the society and societal institutions, the mechanisms and infrastructures, that foster peace and thrust peacebuilding forward. Peacebuilding in this sense may presuppose the pacification of societal groups.

The premise of the emancipation of the state relates to the emergence of three interrelated situations: (i) autonomy of the state, (ii) that the state stands above societal groups, (iii) establishment of state hegemony over society (Bereketeab, 2011). State autonomy means the independence of the state to exercise legitimate authority and control over society without interference from other societal agencies. The legitimate exercise of authority in turn presupposes the standing of the state above societal groups where it proves its neutrality and equal treatment of societal groups: class, ethnic, religious, gender, generational, linguistic groups, etc. The establishment of an uncontested hegemonic state position over

society arising through the instrumentality of coercive and administrative apparatuses (Callaghy, 1984; Weber, 1948) is arguably perceived as an indication of the evolvement of a modern state. Yet, its hegemonic position should serve society. Ultimate power lies in society. In sum, then, the three situations constituting emancipation characterise an evolved modern state. The evolution of a modern state, in turn, is an outcome of the pacification of society and the emancipation of a state that heralds peace and enhances peacebuilding; after all the state is *prima facie* a peacebuilder.

State-building presupposes the emancipation of the state from society in that societal groups need to be subordinate to an omnipresent and omnipotent state. State emancipation engenders submission of society to the will of the former. The state assumes its hegemonic position by subordinating centrifugal societal forces. A state that has not gone through this process is presumed to be weak, because it still shares its authority with other centrifugal forces. "The development of a modern state depends above all on the gradual emancipation of established political structures from society" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 4–5). According to this understanding, a properly emancipated state could easily be institutionalised, lack of proper institutionalisation being another source of state weakness and source of conflict and instability.

The non-emancipation of states in Africa is attributed partly to the nature of the colonial state – a state both arbitrarily and poorly bureaucratised (Chabal and Daloz, 1994, 4). Rightly, Chabal and Daloz trace the non-emancipation of the state to its colonial foundation. They contend that the non-emancipation is because the state did not sprout from the womb of society. Being an alien body, it simply floated above society. It did not spring from the local society as such; therefore, the issue of its emancipation was rendered irrelevant. Hence, a non-emancipated state cannot engender peace, and peacebuilding encounters unsurmountable hurdles. As an instrument of oppression and exploitation the colonial state had, as its *raison d'être*, the extraction of resources on behalf of the society back at home, and not concern in the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of local institutions and structures which are salient pre-requisitions for state emancipation and peacebuilding.

The concept of dual sovereignty (Tilly, 1978) appropriately captures the condition in many states in Africa. Duality of sovereignty implies the prevalence of parallel loci of power competing for legitimate dominance, and existing side-by-side, impeding the emergence of conditions that lead to the absolute hegemony of a central state. The prevalence of mutually exclusive centrifugal forces that engender parity (symmetry) between state and society render the state-building process highly feeble. The state–society relation in Africa, broadly expressed, could be defined as still, both functionally and structurally infused. There is also no clear delineation and differentiation between society and state, which is a characterising feature of a modern state. The clear delineation between state and society in the process of peacebuilding fulfils two objectives. The first objective is that the state as both war-maker and peacemaker is checked and counter-checked by society. The second objective is that society as the ultimate powerholder carves its

own space without the meddling of the state unlike, the case where state–society fusion prevails. This space is then used by society to make sure peacebuilding is advanced through the generation of a harmonious, pacified, integrated, and amicable relationship (Paffenholz, 2015, 859).

In the conventional view, the evolvment of a modern state therefore presupposes, among other things, the separation of the state from society (Young, 1994; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The process of separation duly involves two interrelated processes, notably state emancipation and societal pacification. This clear delineation is presumed to have a contributing effect to peace and peacebuilding.

Meanwhile, the pacification of society entails two dimensions, internal and external. In the internal dimension, the most salient condition of the evolution of the state deals with the domination of the state which presupposes the submission of society. The variables of domination and submission as expressions of an evolved modern state progressively have to be couched in emergent national institutions and structures in order to ensure their sustainability. The development of such state institutions and structures coupled with the disarming of centrifugal societal forces produces a matured state. This state coheres peacefully with society. The history of ideas treat the emergence of a state as fundamentally resting on the process of pacification where the state of nature was transformed.

Classical social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Lock were very much puzzled by the process of transformation from the state of nature to the state of culture, pre-society, or simply state. To these scholars of social contract, the state of nature represented an absence of government and regulating laws (Laskar, 2013). For Hobbes the state of nature represented a dark age of human history where “war of all against all” predominated. To escape the chaos state of nature humanity had to invent a political organisation called a state (Hobbes, 1962). To gain certain common benefits people had to voluntarily surrender some of their sovereignty. Based on the covenant the state assumed the legitimate right to exercise violence within the territory it controls on behalf of society (Weber, 1948).

For Lock, on the other hand, the state of nature represented the absolute freedom of the individual, a state of liberty, albeit with some critical deficiency. For Lock the state of nature was a golden age (Laskar, 2013, 3). It was pre-political. In order to remedy the deficiency, the state was invented. The state needs to protect life and property. To equilibrate the relation between society and state there has to be a social contract. The social contract regulates state–society relations. Social contract theorists argued that to overcome the state of nature, human society entered two agreements: *Pactum Unionis* and *Pactum Subjectionis*. While the first pact sought to ensure protection of their life and property through the construction of society, the latter was an agreement that enabled them to submit to an authority and surrender their freedom and rights to an authority (Ritchie, 1891; Mouritz, 2010). Accordingly, they agreed to form a society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had in the state of nature. They had to agree to live together under common laws and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constituted it. For Rousseau, the state of

nature was about happiness and equality. The invention of property, however, heralded humankind's fall from grace. To correct the fall they needed to surrender their right to the "general will" embedded in the social contract.

In short, "the authority or the government or the sovereign or the state came into being because of the two agreements" (Laskar, 2013, 1). This concerns the legitimacy of power. Power is construed as legitimate depending on its origin and the manner it is exercised (Zaum, 2012, 51; Wiafe-Amoako, 2016, 78). In this regard, it is driven by certain values, norms, belief systems, shared goals, expectations, institutions, and mechanisms over which broad consensus reigns. Sources of legitimacy are presumed to be both domestic and external (Coggins, 2014; Osiander, 2001; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). In an ideal situation state legitimacy conflates domestic and external sources equally. Most of the time, however, one dominates over the other.

The external dimension of pacification relates to ensuring territorial integrity, sovereignty, security, and international relations reminiscent of the Westphalian state (Osiander, 2001, 261; Evans and Newnham, 1990; Morgenthau, 1985; Coggins, 2014, 8). The contemporary post-Cold War period, which some designate post-Westphalian (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 6–7; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2014), a neoliberal-ideology-driven campaign has disrupted the status quo in international relations leading to serious conflict and instability all over the world. The neoliberal-induced mobilisation of non-state actors, including armed groups that compete with the state over the monopoly of violence, undermines societal pacification. Supporting and arming anti-Sadam forces in Iraq, anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya, and anti-Assad forces in Syria (Held and Ulrichsen, 2011), or arming warlords against the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia (Samatar, 2013; Muller, 2013), are good illustrations. The push to limit the state and in turn replace its roles with civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other non-state actors is an indication of the hostile position of neoliberal ideology towards the African state (Tom, 2017, 32–34). The post-Cold War and post-Westphalian push of non-state actors with the aim of challenging the state for the purpose of democratisation encourages centrifugal forces. This, in turn, instead of pacification may lead to militarism in society thereby countering peace and peacebuilding. The upshot of this, particularly in Africa, is the disruption of the pacification process with dire consequences. A pacified society is presumed to be one that has surrendered to the state. Otherwise, "The state may be viewed as a ruling organization that competes for power with other political economic, and social organizations and groups" (Callaghy, 1984, 90). The competition eventually must be resolved in favour of the state for centrifugal forces be pacified and tamed. The state is an abstract concept as an institution that is empirically concretised in its expression through its component entities – executive, legislative, judiciary, and administrative – which receive societal legitimacy. This development enhances peace and peacebuilding.

In this regard, the state gains the autonomy it deserves, an autonomy that would enable it to exercise power above class, ethnic, religious, and regional societal groups. This autonomy would also enable the state to pacify societal centrifugal

groups. According to this conception state emancipation and societal pacification gradually consolidate the autonomy of the state. Societal pacification also emancipates the state in order to fulfil its external functional tasks, defending the integrity and security of society from external forces. The lack of state emancipation means that sectarian social groups dominate power, which gives rise to a real or imagined sense of marginalisation of groups. This sense of marginalisation further leads to ethnic and clan-based conflict resulting in chronic civil wars. On the other hand, lack of emancipation and pacification would also imply the absence of a consensual and contractual relationship between state and society, a prerequisite for peace and peacebuilding.

State-building and peacebuilding: harmony and discordance

The common understanding among donors, think-tanks, IFIs, and analysts is that there exists harmony between state-building and peacebuilding (Zaum, 2012, 47). Indeed, the perception is that they complement each other. The one is a presupposition for the other. This is expressed by the book, edited by Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (2008), titled *Building a State to Build Peace*. It is this perception of complementarity that lies behind neoliberal peacebuilding in the form of international intervention in state-building (Tom, 2017). Peacebuilding, in a neoliberal regime, often follows peace deals between the fighting parties and aims at institutionalisation and consolidation of the deal (Paris, 2002; Heathershaw, 2013). Drawing on this neoliberal perception of the harmony between state-building and peacebuilding its proponents, in recent years, have demonstrated extreme interventionist tendencies to mid-wife state-building and peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. This conviction is predicated on the assumption that state-building and peacebuilding are necessary conditions for democratic peace (Tom, 2017, 59–60). The democratic peace thesis is out there to reconfigure Africa (Call, 2008; Curtis, 2012). By extension, the democratic peace thesis therefore serves the globalisation scheme that ensures Western domination through inclusive but unequal global integration.

The contention of this chapter is that there exists some discordance between state-building and peacebuilding, at least initially. This contention is supported by scholars such Call (2008, 3), Curtis (2012), and Robert (2012). The underpinning view of this contention of the discordance involves the different premises that govern state-building and peacebuilding. State-building by its very nature is political. Politics deals with power, with how power is allocated, and with who takes what, how, and when (Hyden, 2013; Harrison, 2012, 167; Schaar, 2000, 206). Moreover, politics generates winners and losers. Losers then seek alternative mechanisms to address their grievances which leads to conflict and in some situations to war (Zaum, 2012, 48). In this manner state-building and peacebuilding go their separate ways.

State-building, perceived as institution-building, is a long-term process that may take several generations (Poggi, 1978; Kamrava, 2000; Mamdani, 1996; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). Institution-building and institutionalisation

also need to be transformed into a political culture if they are to be recognised, accepted, and appreciated by citizens. The gestation of institutions as routinised, entrenched political practices requires a lapse of a considerable period. Political institutions as political culture are established as a result of protracted struggles that include negotiations, bargains, compromises, etc. that are ultimately, reflectively, and discursively expressed in transparency, predictability, openness, accountability in the rule of the game, and expectations recognised and hopefully accepted by citizens.

State-building is also by its very nature domestic. As domestic process, state-building is contingent on continuous negotiations, interpretations, bargains, trade-offs, compromises, dealings, and expectations between multiple stakeholders. These stakeholders, in poly-ethnic, polyglottic, and poly-religious societies are numerous. This numerosity in turn presupposes complex and intriguing arrangements and treatments. In this context, state-building concerns society's construction and ownership by, and legitimacy in the eyes of, citizens (Zaum, 2012; Tom, 2017).

The so-called state fragility, weakness, and collapse that presumably makes state-society relations amenable to radicalism and terrorism, and subjects the West to security risks, "reinforced the association between state-building and peacebuilding" (Zaum, 2012, 47). The state-building and peacebuilding intervention driven by the neoliberal ideology aims at ameliorating the risk involved in state fragility. Facts on the ground, however, do not corroborate the assumed amelioration. If recent developments could be an indication, neoliberal intervention has rather thrown the world into an extremely precarious situation. Neoliberal state-building seeks to build Western-style states in non-Western post-conflict societies, in which "strong institutions" define strong states that are able to ensure internal security and stability, in ways that also eliminate threats to global security and prosperity (Barnet, 2006).

It should be noted that this is a narrow conceptualisation of peacebuilding advocated by donors, INGOs, the WB, and the UN (Barnet, 2006, 88). In this context, neoliberal peacebuilding is, relatively speaking, short-term. As discussed above, neoliberal peacebuilding is concerned chiefly with the technical and administrative managerial nature of conflicts such as DDR, security sector reform, and transforming security institutions, armed forces, police and intelligence apparatuses, the judiciary, etc. (Mac Ginty, 2008; Robert, 2012; Call, 2008). Moreover, as Harrison (2012, 167) notes, "building states is concrete, building peace is abstract, peacebuilding does not signify a specific agency to build." As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the kind of peacebuilding that is in harmony with state-building is one that is based on popular progressive, rather than neoliberal, peacebuilding.

Since state-building as a political project is concerned with power and generates winners and losers that may lead to conflict and war, at least initially, then it will antagonise peacebuilding. In the long run, however, state-building is a necessary requisite for peace and peacebuilding. The state being an agent of war and peace, a matured state would create the necessary conditions for peace. Eventually, there will come a time where the state becomes inexorably

imperative for the harmony between state-building and peacebuilding. Until that time comes a discursive segregation of the two processes is a well-deserved action.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine two theoretical approaches to peacebuilding in Africa. These are neoliberal peacebuilding and popular progressive peacebuilding. Following the collapse of the Cold War, neoliberalism emerged as the dominant ideology. Soon, however, neoliberal peacebuilding drew immense criticism. The criticism pivots around the main concern that neoliberal peacebuilding is primarily externally imposed, technical, managerial, and short-term. It also concerns the post-war external reconstruction of societies. Informed by this criticism this chapter sought to advance an alternative to neoliberal peacebuilding.

Popular progressive peacebuilding is superior to neoliberal peacebuilding for several reasons. First, it is by its very nature domestic and goes beyond post-conflict reconstruction. Second, it utilises domestic resources and infrastructures such as cultural, social, historical, structural, institutional, indigenous, etc. authorities. Third, society-building, in modern terminology nation-building, is an outcome of several generations' work and social processes. The conflation of state-building and nation-building exemplifies a simultaneous dual process of integration and separation. The integration and cohesion of state and nation imply that the state should fit a particular nation or a nation should be represented by its own state. Separation, on the other hand, denotes delimitation between two dialectically interwoven entities. The notions of pacification and emancipation appropriately describe the process of integration and separation in the evolution of nation state formation. The organic process of integration and separation as the evolution of nation- and state-building in Africa, in history, was continuously disrupted by external intervention. This disruption also affected the organic domestic process of peacebuilding as conceptualised by popular progressive peacebuilding.

It is argued the popular progressive peacebuilding will bring sustainable peace in Africa. The protracted evolutionary processes, dynamics, and mechanisms of nation and state formation that are founded on the idiosyncratic specificities of a particular society will ensure a sustainable, functional, permanent, comprehensive peace. This is so because the process is an outcome of protracted negotiations, bargains, compromises, and representation among societal groups that foster agency and ownership, and is sealed by the growth of the will to live together. This in turn rests on the construction of domestic institutions and structures; economic, social, and political transformations; and ethno-linguistic harmony, cohesion, social equitability, etc.

In multi-ethnic societies, fostering the will to live together among members is of great significance for sustainable and functional peace. The will to live together results from the harmonisation of the processes and mechanisms of state and nation formation. Moreover, it is the outcome of historical, cultural, political, and institutional accumulations over generations. Ultimately, this will foster a genuine

social contract between society and state, and the legitimacy of the state, which is a mainstay for peace and peacebuilding.

To summarise, the imposing of neoliberal peacebuilding and state-building programmes on Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regions from the outside would adversely affects the peace process in these regions rather than leading to enduring peace. Conversely, the popular progressive peacebuilding model would result in peace and development. This is because the popular progressive model is by its very nature evolutionary; as a peacebuilding approach it not only addresses the root causes of conflicts but also considers the historical, cultural, and socio-economic contexts of the conflict environments including the structure, agents, and actors in the ECOWAS and IGAD regions.

Notes

- 1 What I have called here “popular progressive peacebuilding” is referred to in the general literature, invariably, as local (Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011; Chandler, 2013), indigenous, or bottom-up (Richmond, 2011; Reno, 2008). Michael Barnett (2006) distinguishes between liberal peacebuilding and republican peacebuilding which is close to what I have called in this chapter popular progressive versus neoliberal. According to Barnett, while liberalism refers to the creation of a post-conflict state defined by rule of law, markets, and democracy, republicanism refers to principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation that help a state recovering from war foster stability and legitimacy. A legitimate state must be organised around liberal democratic principles (Barnet, 2006, 88–89).
- 2 A plethora of definitions abound in the literature of peacebuilding. This chapter is, however, not concerned with definitions of peacebuilding, but is rather concerned with the distinction of the two theoretical strands identified here.
- 3 “It’s the Revolution that Matters: Remembering Che.” Published on *Pambazuka News* (<http://www.pambazuka.org>), June 2016.

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