INTRODUCTION

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Al-Qaida's 9/11 attacks were a seminal event in modern history and fundamentally changed the way in which the world viewed terrorism and shaped various counterterrorism responses. Within 24 hours, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. One week later, the United States Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the equivalent of a declaration of war in the modern era, against "those nations, organizations, or persons [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such organizations or persons."¹

Within a few short weeks, an international team—spearheaded by the Central Intelligence Agency and Special Operations Forces and supported by U.S. airpower—conducted an unconventional warfare campaign that toppled the Taliban regime.² Yet two decades later, the United States still has troops in Afghanistan, and the threat from Islamist terrorist groups has expanded and contracted in various countries throughout the region and the world: al-Qaida in Iraq, the Islamic State throughout the region, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, Jemaah Islamiyya in Indonesia, and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Republic of the Philippines, among others. It is estimated that the United States alone has spent trillions of dollars on counterterrorism efforts, yet the threat landscape is arguably worse now than it was on 9/11.³

While researchers', analysts', and policymakers' understanding of terrorism—such as the various groups' motivations and capabilities—has grown immensely over the past two decades, similar advancements in the understanding of counterterrorism lag. Thus, this handbook seeks to expand this knowledge, with a special focus on operational-level case studies.

Another distinguishing characteristic of this handbook is its expansion from a narrow focus on counterterrorism to a broader examination that includes irregular warfare. For context, however, it is important to define and discuss both terms. The U.S. Department of Defense defines counterterrorism as "activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals."⁴ Irregular warfare is "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)."⁵

According to U.S. military doctrine, counterterrorism is an irregular warfare activity. Other irregular warfare activities include foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, stability operations, strategic communications, psychological operations, information operations, civil-military operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, and law enforcement.⁶ Over time, the scope of counterterrorism has broadened from "narrowly defined 'offensive operations' typically conducted by [Special

Operations Forces] to one that incorporates . . . a wide range of actions through ‘direct and indirect approaches’ in unified action against violent extremism.”⁷

Counterterrorism operations are often conducted in support of other irregular warfare operations, or these same operations may be conducted in support of counterterrorism operations.⁸ Thus, when studying counterterrorism, it is necessary to take a broader examination where counterterrorism may be the lead strategy or a supporting operation as part of a larger strategy.

A second reason this expansion is necessary is that the counterterrorism responses by the United States and many other nations in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and in the successive decades were shaped by their pre-9/11 counterterrorism and irregular warfare experiences. Nations relied on existing means—organizations, procedures, policy, culture, and experience—to combat this “new” threat while building novel capabilities, organizations, and authorities. As such, it is important to understand how organizational entropy impacted post-9/11 operations and strategy; for example, how U.S. Special Operations Forces employment in the 1990s shaped their employment in the 2000s.

A third reason a broader view of counterterrorism is necessary is the fact that many of today’s terrorist groups do not fit neatly into the single category of “terrorist group.” As Fishman notes in his chapter on the Islamic State, “Even as the Islamic State built a military and administrative capability for its new caliphate, the group prepared terrorist attacks around the globe and used insurgent tactics to counter an ever-growing list of enemies.” He continues,

The group did not fit neatly into traditional analytical categories: it was a pseudo-state, a terrorist group, and an insurgency simultaneously. This complexity both complicated analysis of the organization’s rise and challenged traditional metrics for determining progress and victory in the war against them.⁹

Thus, if a group is a pseudo-state, a terrorist group, and insurgency at the same time, then counterterrorism operations are only one part of the solution.

Therefore, counterterrorism efforts against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups require a much broader approach that includes irregular warfare in which counterterrorism may play a supporting rather than a leading role. Back in 2009, when the Obama administration sought to determine its strategy for Afghanistan, the debate often came down to whether it should adopt a counterinsurgency strategy or a counterterrorism strategy.¹⁰ It was never really a binary choice but a debate as to whether to adopt a primarily counterinsurgency strategy with counterterrorism operations in support or to adopt a primarily counterterrorism strategy with counterinsurgency operations in support.

Another unique aspect of this handbook is its focus on operational cases and the government instruments used to combat terrorism and wage irregular warfare. Few terrorism handbooks examine counterterrorism cases, and the few that do often focus on the strategic or policy levels. This handbook focuses on the operational or campaign level, which is not to be confused with the tactical level, which includes battles, engagements, and small-unit and crew actions.¹¹

Of course, expanding the handbook to include an examination of irregular warfare and operational case studies comes with trade-offs. As indicated by the handbook’s title, it is not aimed to be an all-inclusive guide to terrorism. As such, it will not address every terrorist group; it focuses primarily on Islamist, and especially Sunni, extremist groups because they have commanded most of the West’s attention over the past two decades in its “long war.” Likewise, it does not seek to explain the individual pathways to violent extremism, nor does it analyze in depth why groups choose to adopt terrorism to achieve their goals. While that work is extremely important, it is simply not possible to include in this handbook without eliminating the important operational case studies that make this handbook unique.

This handbook is divided into three parts. The first examines terrorist groups, including al-Qaida and its various affiliates; the Islamic State; and other groups in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin

America. The second part includes operational case studies, including examinations of pre-9/11 operations in Latin America, to post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Mali, Yemen, and Syria. The final section examines a number of government instruments or constructs used to combat terrorism and wage irregular warfare. It examines the counterterrorism efforts of the New York City Police Department after 9/11, command constructs used to wage counterterrorism and irregular warfare campaigns, drone warfare, and the role of social media as a terrorist and counterterrorist tool.

Part I: the threat and regional security issues

Part I provides a review of modern terrorism in the Islamic world and an overview of the major terrorist groups from the past three decades. In addition to providing a history of al-Qaida, it examines the Islamic State, Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Jemaah Islamiyya, the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Taliban, and terrorism in Latin America. It examines these groups from a regional and a broader political violence perspective, with chapters authored by renowned terrorism experts.

James J.F. Forest, in “The evolution of Islamist terrorism in the 20th century,” discusses terrorism in the Islamic world over the past half-century, accounting for the rise and sometimes fall of several prominent terrorist groups, and explains how this historical evolution impacts the understanding of the Islamist terrorist threat today. He provides a review of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that served as the primary contributor to the evolution of Islamist terrorism, and a brief history of terrorism in the Palestinian Territories, the Levant, North Africa, and Asia.

In their chapter “The ideology behind al-Qaida and the Islamic State,” Daniel Rudder and Christopher Heffelfinger review the evolution of Islamism, beginning with an examination of Ibn Taymiyya’s historical role in shaping militant interpretations of Islam. It then takes up the reformers and activists of the 19th and 20th centuries who revived Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas to effect change in their societies and connects these earlier foundational movements to modern, militant jihadi groups like al-Qaida that found rationales within them to carry out terrorist attacks.

No volume would be complete without a discussion on al-Qaida. As such, Seth G. Jones conducts a detailed examination of the group in his chapter, “The evolution of al-Qaida: 1988 to present day.” Jones finds that despite some key successes along the way, al-Qaida is no closer to achieving its ambitious goal of a pan-Islamic caliphate than it was 30 years ago and has been unable to successfully perpetrate a major terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11.

In “The history of the Islamic State: from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” Brian Fishman describes the evolution of the Islamic State, a group that, by 2014, had eclipsed al-Qaida in both reach and reputation. Fishman recounts the group’s rise to power, culminating with its control of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq. Yet the group’s unwillingness to build sustainable alliances hardened its enemies and contributed to a slow crippling resource drain that has furthered its decline. While the group lost most of its territory, it remains capable of disrupting societies in the Middle East and projecting terrorism globally.

In “Contemporary conflict and political violence in the Levant,” Benedetta Berti examines how the unresolved “Palestine question” and the Arab-Israeli conflict have contributed to the development of terrorist groups in the Levant. In accounting for the conflict dynamics in the region, Berti examines the role played by non-state armed groups, focusing on the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

By 2012, U.S. intelligence officials considered al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula al-Qaida’s “most dangerous affiliate.”¹² While the group’s power has waned, Yemen, and the threat of Islamist militancy emanating from its borders, must be understood. As such, Elisabeth Kendall addresses this threat in “Jihadi militancy and Houthi insurgency in Yemen.” She provides an overview of Yemen’s modern history, which

is necessary to understand the origins of today's conflicts. Kendall also examines the emergence and development of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State in Yemen, assessing the goals, strategies, and successes of each. Finally, she describes how the Houthi insurgency managed to take over the government and overrun much of the country in 2014.

In "The roots of terrorism in North and West Africa: AQIM and Boko Haram," Alice Hunt Friend reviews the region's two most prominent terrorist groups. Friend examines their roots; the political conditions that motivated their historical and contemporary manifestations; and how the regional governments, in particular Algeria and Nigeria, have acted to combat them.

Ken Menkhaus discusses the most significant terrorist group on the eastern side of the African continent in his chapter, "Al-Shabaab and the Horn of Africa." Al-Shabaab emerged in 2006 as a cadre of hard-core Islamist fighters within Somalia's Islamic Courts Union; by 2012, al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaida affiliate. The group remains the most dangerous terrorist group operating in the Horn today. Menkhaus examines the evolution and growth of al-Shabaab and factors that have allowed it to remain resilient in the face of persistent U.S. and international opposition.

In "The history of terrorism in Southeast Asia," Peter Chalk examines terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. While these countries have a long history with terrorism and sub-state political violence dating to the struggle of ethno-nationalism and religious groups fighting for minority self-determination during the Cold War, the challenge posed by militant extremism has risen in recent decades. Beyond addressing the region's most significant groups of the past two decades—the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf Group and Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyya—he also discusses the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, the New People's Army, and southern Thailand's "Old" and "New Guard" of Islamist militants.

In 1978, communists seized Kabul, setting in motion a string of events that ultimately led to the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaida. In "The Taliban and the modern history of Afghanistan," Rob Johnson describes how Afghanistan's civil war and the anti-Soviet insurgency led to the rise of the Taliban and how that group took power in Kabul in 1996. Johnson also examines the key themes of the post-9/11 conflict in the state: insurgency, terrorism, narcotics, governance, and military assistance. While the Taliban's power has surged since being ousted in 2001, the Taliban has yet to dislodge U.S. forces or dispose the Afghan government.

In 1979, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah, signaling the modern world's first theocracy. It also signaled the end of close economic, military, and strategic ties that the United States had enjoyed with Iran since 1941. In "The modern history of Iran and the birth of the Shia proxy model," Alex Vatanka provides a short history of contemporary Iran before outlining the challenges that the Iranian Islamist regime poses from an American perspective. He describes how military conflicts—where Iran has been a direct participant or an influential actor—have influenced the evolution of Iranian foreign policy and what it signals for Tehran's future priorities on the regional and international stages.

In "Terrorism, insurgency, and criminal insurgency in Latin America," Román D. Ortiz examines the evolution of the region's terrorist threats over the past 40 years with a focus on El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Liberation Front, Peru's Shining Path, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, and Mexico's Los Zetas. Ortiz also reviews the activities of Islamist terrorist groups in the region, specifically Hezbollah and the Islamic State.

Part II: operational case studies

Part II explores a wide variety of counterterrorism and irregular warfare operations, spanning from the 1980s to the irregular warfare campaign against the Islamic State in northern Syria in 2018. It examines American irregular warfare operations in El Salvador, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, The Philippines, Mali, Yemen, and Syria after 9/11. The irregular warfare campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s shaped the counterterrorism operations in the post-9/11 era.

Most of the chapters are authored by accomplished practitioners who were deeply involved in the operations in which they describe, while others are told by subject matter experts.

Cecil E. Bailey, a retired Special Forces officer with two tours in El Salvador, authors “El Salvador: Operations and Planning Assistance Training Teams and a minimalist approach to counterinsurgency.” The role of the United States in helping end El Salvador’s long counterinsurgency is understudied despite being considered a relative success. In contrast to the American experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, the United States followed a “minimalist” approach with its military support. Bailey recounts the history of the small, Special Forces Operations and Planning Assistance Training Teams and offers lessons for security assistance in counterinsurgency campaigns.

In “Plan Colombia and the U.S. Army’s 7th Special Forces Group,” retired Special Forces officer Kevin M. Higgins recounts the history of U.S. support to Colombia, starting with its assistance to Andean Ridge police units in 1987. Higgins spent a good portion of his military career in the region, including 1999–2001, when he served as the Military Group commander at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, where he helped design and execute Plan Colombia.

Renowned author Mark Bowden recounts the killing of Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. In “The story of the U.S. role in the killing of Pablo Escobar,” Bowden details U.S. support to the Colombian government efforts to target Escobar and other Colombian drug lords. The covert support—consisting largely, but not exclusively, of intelligence support—ultimately contributed to the killing of Escobar. Yet the support raised a number of legal and ethical challenges that Bowden addresses in the chapter.

Jack Devine, a 32-year Central Intelligence Agency veteran, and Amanda Mattingly, a former National Security Council staffer and foreign service officer, explore two of the most consequential proxy wars of the Cold War in “The Iran-Contra Affair and the Afghan Task Force: lessons in covert action.” When President Reagan came to office in 1981, he brought a national security team focused on defeating the Soviet Union and winning the Cold War. For Reagan and his team, this meant taking the fight to the Soviets, their surrogates, and the nations they threatened. The authors examine key lessons learned in why covert action largely failed in Nicaragua but succeeded in Afghanistan.

The first post-9/11 case study begins with the primary account of Mark E. Mitchell in “The horse soldiers: lessons from expeditionary unconventional warfare.” Mitchell, a highly decorated Special Forces combat veteran, was one of the first “horse soldiers” to deploy to Afghanistan and later served as the acting assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict at the Pentagon. Mitchell recounts his experiences and the challenges he encountered working with Northern Alliance forces and reveals how the Northern Alliance—supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, Special Operations Forces, and airpower—toppled the Taliban regime in a few short weeks.

Donald C. Bolduc and Chris Hensley, two Special Forces officers and veterans of multiple combat tours in Afghanistan, team up to author “Special Operations Forces and Afghan Local Police programs.” They recount the development and application of Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs in Afghanistan from 2009–2013. This unique approach integrated security, development, and governance through a balanced, mutually supportive method that addressed many of the underlying sources of instability in rural Afghanistan. While not a panacea for all security and stability issues, the authors provide lessons that may prove valuable when considering the employment of irregular forces in similar environments.

Although a former Special Forces officer, Keith Mines pens his chapter, “U.S. civilian architecture for stabilization and counterinsurgency in Northern Afghanistan (2012–2013),” based on his experience as a foreign service officer in Mazar-i-Sharif. He describes the challenging operating environment that Afghanistan faced and the three “lines of effort”—economy, security and the rule of law, and governance—that he attempted to advance. After his year in Afghanistan, he noted that progress had been made, but the gains were far from irreversible without continued U.S. and international commitment.

In “Dismantling al-Qaida in Iraq,” I detail how the operators and intelligence professionals under General Stanley McChrystal transformed his task force into a highly efficient and effective network, taking

thousands of terrorists off the battlefield and greatly reducing the number of suicide attacks in the country. It also includes a vignette that describes how the task force located and ultimately killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq.

Retired Special Forces Colonel David S. Maxwell provides lessons in training and advising a partner force in his chapter, “Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines: lessons in special warfare.” The chapter is based on Maxwell’s experience in 2001–2002 as a Special Forces battalion commander who commanded the first deployment to Mindanao in support of Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines and in 2006–2007 as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines. He examines U.S. strategy and operations through the lens of special warfare, a special operations activity based on persistent engagement to achieve long-term effects.

The late Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan joined with Pascale C. Siegel to pen “Operation Serval: a swift intervention with a small footprint in Mali.” They describe how a group of Tuareg separatists from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, backed by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, attacked government outposts in northern Mali and launched a separatist insurgency in January 2012. By April, the rebels had captured the major population centers in northern Mali and imposed a harsh form of *Sharia* (Islamic law). With little action from the international community, the rebels gained strength and sent a column of fighters toward the capital less than a year later. The authors describe how a swift, measured, and efficient French-led response—with critical U.S. support—saved the capital from collapse and quelled the jihadi-backed uprising. It provides a model of allied and multilateral cooperation.

In “U.S. counterterrorism policy in Yemen from 2010–2020,” Luke Hartig, former senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council, outlines U.S. counterterrorism policy in Yemen from 2010–2020, with a particular focus on the Obama administration’s efforts to counter al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and respond to a Houthi power grab in Sanaa. He provides context about how al-Qaida maintains ties to local tribal groups in Yemen and operates in ungoverned spaces, which has allowed the group to persist as a terrorist threat to the United States. American efforts in Yemen have largely failed, and Hartig provides an explanation of what went wrong.

In “Defeating the Islamic State: Special Operations Forces in Syria,” five Special Forces and Civil Affairs officers collaborate to describe their experience working with the Syrian Democratic Forces to defeat the Islamic State in northern Syria in 2018. They demonstrate the challenge of working with a partner force in the midst of a civil war in which Russian-supported regime forces routinely attacked, and the Turkish military routinely bombed, the U.S. partner force. The tenuous coalition ultimately succeeded in dislodging the Islamic State, and the authors offer a number of lessons they learned from their experience.

Part III: government instruments in combating terrorism and waging irregular warfare

The handbook’s final section includes chapters that examine the government instruments used to combat terrorism and wage irregular warfare. It includes chapters examining domestic responses in New York City, which remains a top terrorist target; lessons that can be learned from high-casualty attacks; the role of social media as a terrorist recruitment tool and efforts to counter violent extremist organizations in the information domain; some of the military constructs used to wage counterterrorism and irregular warfare campaigns; the employment of drones outside of combat zones; and the United Kingdom’s approach to counterterrorism. The chapters are authored by renowned experts and accomplished practitioners who had a significant role in the organizations in which they discuss.

Former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent Ali Soufan authors “The Joint Terrorism Task Force: investigating to disrupt and prosecute terrorists.” Established in 1980 as the nation’s first, the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force has investigated and disrupted some of the most significant terrorist plots

in the past 30 years. As a result, the activities of the Joint Terrorism Task Force represent a fascinating lens through which to view the United States' ongoing war against terrorism.

"Creating the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau" is the first of two chapters that describe how New York City built its counterterrorism capability following the devastating 9/11 attacks. This first-hand account is authored by the late Michael A. Sheehan, who served as the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) deputy commissioner for counterterrorism from 2003–2006. He describes the creation of the NYPD's Counterterrorism Bureau and its two principal components: the Counterterrorism Division and the NYPD contribution to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force.

In "The inside story of how the NYPD's Intelligence Division adapted in the wake of 9/11," David Cohen focuses on how the NYPD reengineered its intelligence structure, operations, and culture to address the post-9/11 threat to New York City. While the NYPD's response included a broad array of counterterrorism programs, Cohen's chapter focuses on the evolution of its intelligence activities. Cohen spent 35 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, culminating as deputy director of operations, and then another 12 years as the NYPD deputy commissioner for intelligence, a position established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

In "Lessons learned from four high-casualty terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11," Paul Cruickshank analyzes the Fort Hood shooting of 2009, the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013, the San Bernardino attack of 2015, and the Orlando nightclub attack of 2016. Collectively, the attacks killed nearly 80 people and wounded hundreds more. Cruickshank provides a number of lessons that can be learned from the attacks.

Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Seamus Hughes collaborate to write "Social media recruitment of Americans: a case study from the Islamic State." Together, they examine the impact of what they call "virtual entrepreneurs" on the United States. They find that the Islamic State has used social media to reach out to and correspond with radicalized Westerners. In some cases, virtual entrepreneurs have helped plot and direct attacks by so-called "lone wolves," but, more often, the virtual plotters act in more of an auxiliary capacity.

The frontlines in the fight against violent extremist organizations have not only spanned the globe, but the conflict has raged in the information domain. Violent extremist organizations have harnessed 21st-century media capabilities to disseminate their propaganda messaging to coerce enemies, recruit operatives, instill fear, and generate support. Images, videos, and other propaganda materials can reach a worldwide audience in seconds. In their chapter, "Countering extremist organizations in the information domain," Joseph Mroszczyk and Max Abrahms assess violent extremist organizations operations in the information domain and evaluate the evolution of the measures used to counter their influence.

I partner with Charlie T. Cleveland, a retired three-star general and Special Forces officer, to author "Theater Special Operations Command: the operational employment of U.S. Special Operations Forces." Together, we describe the Special Operations Forces headquarters that are responsible for planning and executing special operations missions around the world. Cleveland leverages his experience as the theater special operations commander of U.S. Southern Command from 2005–2008 and U.S. Central Command from 2008–2011 to provide an understanding of how special operations are conducted across the globe.

In "Theater command in Afghanistan: taking charge of the 'Other War' in 2003–2005," retired three-star general David W. Barno recounts his experiences as the theater commander in Afghanistan. With the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Afghanistan became a secondary effort—or a "supporting effort," to use military terminology—for the United States. Barno describes the counterinsurgency strategy he designed and implemented and the challenges he faced.

Peter Bergen and A.G. Sims team to write "America's drone wars outside of conventional war zones." Since 9/11, the United States has conducted hundreds of drone strikes against suspected terrorists outside of traditional warzones. Bergen and Sims explain how these attacks change the character of warfare while at

the same time raising questions about the legality of the strikes. They examine how three different American presidents have relied on armed drones to strike at hard-to-reach targets.

In “The United Kingdom’s approach to counterterrorism,” Robin Simcox and Hannah Stuart examine the evolution of the United Kingdom’s response to terrorism over the past two decades. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism efforts focused on fighting terrorism abroad to prevent attacks on British soil. After the 2005 London bombings, however, the United Kingdom altered its approach to focus on homegrown terrorism. The authors also assess the Islamic State and how it impacted counterterrorism efforts before a brief examination of other European nations’ counterterrorism responses.

Finally, Hy Rothstein provides the volume’s conclusion. The former Special Forces officer and Naval Postgraduate School professor provides some of the findings that result from this volume. Rothstein describes how the character of terrorism has changed, while the nature has remained the same. In summarizing counterterrorism and irregular warfare responses, he provides insight into which responses can be most effective at achieving the desired political outcome and leader traits unique to leading irregular warfare and counterterrorism campaigns.

Notes

- 1 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40 § 1, 115 Stat. 225 (2001), www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf.
- 2 See Mark E. Mitchell, “The horse soldiers: lessons from expeditionary unconventional warfare,” in this handbook.
- 3 Stimson Center, *Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability* (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), 5.
- 4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, JP 3–26 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009), I–2.
- 5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), I–6.
- 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, I–11.
- 7 Ibid., I–12.
- 8 Ibid., I–12–13.
- 9 See Brian Fishman, “A history of the Islamic State: from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” in this handbook.
- 10 See, for example, Fred Kaplan, “CT or COIN? Obama Must Choose Between Two Radically Different Afghan Policies,” *Slate*, March 24, 2009, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/03/obama-must-choose-this-week-between-two-radically-different-afghanistan-policies.html>.
- 11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, I–7.
- 12 Jane Onyanga-Omara, “Al-Qaeda Second-in-Command Killed in U.S. Airstrike,” *USA Today*, June 16, 2015, www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/06/16/al-qaeda-says-leader-killed/28796037/.