9 'Poland in Europe, Europe for Poland'

National populist narratives on the example of Kukiz'15

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Introduction

The establishment of the Kukiz'15 movement in 2015 has been an event unprecedented on the Polish political scene since 1989. The demagogic activity of its members, who present simple solutions to complex problems in an emotionally charged manner, seems to indicate that the movement consciously utilises a populist strategy to build up its socio-political role and particularly that of the movement's head, the singer Paweł Kukiz, as a populist leader. This chapter attempts to analyse populist political narrative based on the example of this formation in order to review the vision of politics it presents, with a particular emphasis placed on its attitude towards Europe and European integration.

The origins of the movement

The origins of the Kukiz'15 movement can be traced back to early 2015, when the then councillor to the Lower Silesian regional parliament and rock musician Paweł Kukiz announced his intention to run in the presidential election with the aim to 'restore the subjectivity of citizens', as he stated.¹ For him, running to be the head of state was a natural consequence of his previous political activity, which was aimed primarily at introducing single-mandate constituencies in the elections to the lower house of parliament, i.e. replacing the current proportional representation with a majoritarian one. The change of the electoral law as regards the elections to the lower house of Poland's parliament and the introduction of single-mandate constituencies would mean, according to Kukiz's proposal, dividing the country into 460 constituencies, which is the total number of seats in the lower house of parliament. Any number of candidates could run in each of the constituencies, but only the person with the highest number of votes would win the seat. As a supporter of this solution, Kukiz emphasised that its greatest advantage would be to 'de-politicise' the elections. The number of votes obtained would be decisive for the election of a representative instead of their position on the ballot.²

By posing as an ‘anti-establishment’ figure and with no formal support from any political party, Kukiz primarily counted on support from ‘ordinary citizens’.³ With the slogan *Potrafisz Polsko!* (‘You Can Do It, Poland!’), the singer tried to present himself as an actual and unique opponent of mainstream parties and political elites in both Poland and Europe. Stipulating changes to electoral legislation and criticising the Polish political system allowed Kukiz to come in third in the elections with approximately 21% of the vote. His main electorate consisted of people up to 24 years of age, 40% of whom voted for him.⁴ It was an unprecedented phenomenon in Polish political life since the fall of communism in 1989.

From the perspective of later developments, his success in the presidential election was undoubtedly a significant event. It provided sufficient grounds to create a political movement and gave a real opportunity for success in the parliamentary elections which were to take place five months later, on 25 October. At the end of July 2015, the *Komitat Wyborczy Wyborców Kukiz’15* (‘Kukiz’15 Voters’ Electoral Committee’, KWW) was established, with its name directly referencing the singer’s surname. After the spectacular outcome in the presidential election, it was predicted that Kukiz’s movement would win seats in the *Sejm*, so the result obtained in the elections to the lower house of parliament did not come as a surprise. In October 2015, KWW Kukiz’15 took third place, receiving 1,339,094 votes, which accounted for 8.81% of the vote and translated into 42 seats.⁵

In terms of political communication and discourse building, the leader’s declared ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘anti-partocracy’ stance formed an important element – together with obvious references to the interest of the people in contrast to that of the elite.⁶ Even before the official formation of the movement, on 1 June 2015, Kukiz declared the following in one of the entries on his Facebook profile:

The fact that I don’t want to form a party does not mean that I don’t want the supporters of change to Poland’s political system to enter the *Sejm*. For years people have been conditioned to think that it’s only political parties who may have their representation in the parliament (...).⁷

According to Kukiz, this way of thinking is nonsensical. The musician also emphasised that he wished to bring together the diverse voices that say ‘no to the current partocracy’. He stressed that he did not intend to create a ‘Kukiz party’ because he did not care about power, but about systemic changes, e.g. in order to be able to do what he loves in the future – make music. ‘In a free, common Poland’, as he added.⁸

A review of his actions and the political postulates on which the Kukiz election campaign was based can often be regarded as a manipulative way of offering populist formulas to create a role for oneself. The political reality outlined in such a manner allows him to position himself as one of the citizens

first, fitting into the category of 'togetherness' and the category of *vox populi*, a politician speaking on behalf of the people, and only then to place himself within the Kukiz'15 political group, without exposing the structure of individual roles. His efforts have enabled him to create an image of a politician who is the only one who knows 'what it's like', 'what it should be', and whose simple solutions can solve all the problems existing in politics. This approach fits perfectly into the model definition of contemporary populism presented by the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, stating that it is an ideology characterised by the presence of a charismatic leader and based on the principle of dividing society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite'.⁹

An outline of Kukiz'15 political ideas

The vision of the Kukiz movement's new policy was set out in a document entitled *Strategia Zmiany* ('The Strategy for Change') which was adopted during the 2015 parliamentary campaign. The document, drawn up by a team of experts from the newly formed grouping, is divided into three chapters and presents postulates concerning the issues of 'democracy', 'wealth', and 'security'.¹⁰ Although its authors clearly emphasised that it was not a political programme, it is difficult not to notice the analogies with a typical party programme. *The Strategy for Change*, with its telling subtitle 'You Can Do It, Poland' and the chief slogan of 'Let's bring Poland back to Citizens', starts with the following passage:

We love Poland. We are members of a great and wonderful Nation. We are the voice of the Nation that has awakened and wants to regain control of its country. We know that everything that is best in our country comes from Poles' patriotism, diligence, and innovation.¹¹

The analysis of the political message created by Kukiz'15 reveals a clear, negative image of a state divided along the line of 'us-them', which is constantly present in the grouping's narrative, and reflects the society-authority dichotomy. Kukiz uses persuasive forms not only to create a dualistic division of the world according to the 'us-them' scale, but also utilises inclusive forms to build his own ambiguous image as a relay of citizens' thoughts.¹² Speaking out against partocracy and simultaneously defending the people was a constant element in the communications of the group's leader. The antagonistic division between the people and the elite, a flagship trait of populism, is clearly visible in the discourse he was creating. By using the slogans characteristic of this phenomenon, the politician aims to reach all those who have been in any way victimised by institutions and authorities, i.e. to reach potential voters. Opposition to the cartelisation of the party system was expressed by the leader of Kukiz'15 both in official election materials and during concerts

organised as part of the campaign. The narrative built using campaign ads also included elements aimed at mobilising the movement's supporters in the form of requests directed at voters:

Poland is waking up to our dreams. I ask of you to go to the polls on 25 October and give your vote to the people who do not only make promises but sincerely want to change our country, change its constitution, bring it back to citizens, make it civic (...).¹³

Systemic issues constitute the starting point for the postulates of the Kukiz'15 movement. Therefore, it is not surprising that they were presented first in the *Strategy*. While expressing its dissatisfaction with the current political system, Kukiz'15 assigns a principal role in shaping it to the citizens. This would be achieved primarily through the aforementioned change to the electoral law (single-mandate constituencies), shifting from proportional representation to a majoritarian one, but also through the enactment of a new constitution, as well as the introduction of the mechanism of an obligatory, nationwide, non-threshold referendum, and the establishment of the so-called 'referendum day', on which all issues signed by at least half a million citizens would be voted. By advocating for the presidential system, Kukiz'15 activists propose that the executive power should belong exclusively to the president – elected through general elections, but lacking the right of initiative, since it would belong only to deputies and citizens. As far as changes to the state's political and government system are concerned, the movement also proposes to subject courts to the control of the citizens, make public expenditure completely transparent, and to abandon the system of financing political parties from the state budget. Moving a large number of offices and institutions out of Warsaw, aimed at stimulating civic activity in those regions, can be considered an innovative idea.¹⁴

The postulate of a constitutional provision requiring the adoption of balanced budgets both at central and local government levels constitutes yet another issue involving the political system. By opting for the British tax system, the formation aims to implement tax reforms in Poland which would include, among others: the liquidation of personal income tax or the introduction of a zero VAT rate for essential products such as medicines, food, city and rail transportation, and access to the press.¹⁵ In addition to these proposals in the area of social and economic issues, the group is also in favour of taxing foreign corporations, simplifying laws, and reducing the bureaucratic apparatus. It announces it will fight against corruption and nepotism in state and local administration.¹⁶ The third 'pillar' of Kukiz'15's strategy involves issues related to internal and external security.

In its early days, the movement described itself as devoid of any ideology. However, its main postulates and the characteristics of the community gathered around it – descending from radical right-wing circles – provide the basis for determining its political orientation. In addition to non-partisans, the Kukiz'15 electoral committee lists in 2015 included representatives of

right-wing conservative and Eurosceptic parties, such as the Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej, UPR), the Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, KNP), the Right Wing of the Republic (Prawica Rzeczypospolitej, PR), and a few members of Poland Together (Polska Razem, PR), United Poland (Solidarna Polska, SP), the Labour Party (Stronnictwo Pracy, SP), and Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, SRP), as well as, interestingly, representatives of the National Movement (Ruch Narodowy, RN), a Polish political grouping of nationalist, conservative, national-catholic and Eurosceptic nature associated with extreme nationalist organisations, i.e. the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW) and the National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR). The aforementioned political formations are the organisers of the annual Independence March, an event that takes place in Warsaw on each 11 November, the anniversary of Poland regaining its independence. According to the organisers' declaration, the march is 'an element of celebrating the National Independence Day and a demonstration of attachment to Polish tradition and patriotism', but has been recognised by the British daily *The Independent* as promoting xenophobic and white supremacist ideas.¹⁷ It is worth noting, however, that following nationalists' anti-Semitic demonstrations in front of the Presidential Palace in Warsaw in February 2018, the leader of Kukiz'15 apologised in one of his Facebook posts for introducing them to the *Sejm* and distanced himself from these groups.¹⁸

When analysing the Kukiz'15 programme, one may conclude that it is a right-wing movement, which is mainly influenced by recurring nationalistic and conservative ideas, such as a strong state or the primacy of national interests, as well as disapproval of deep European Union (EU) integration. On the other hand, it should be noted that the movement is not devoid of liberal ideas manifested in postulates like low taxes or solutions for business owners. This allows the group to be placed in the socially conservative and economically liberal category, which is consistent with the current self-identification of the movement.¹⁹ Using contemporary typologies of populism,²⁰ the group can be considered a model example of right-wing populism, appearing in the form of the so-called 'New Populism' derived from the New Politics²¹ or the populism of the radical right.²² As far as the traits of a populist leader are concerned, however, it should be noted that, by discussing various aspects of the functioning of politics, Paweł Kukiz leaves no doubts as to the image he is shaping, which fits into the framework of populism mainly due to the language forms he is consciously using. As the leader of a movement explicitly connected with populist communication, he is consciously creating his image as a populist leader of the people, a leader who aims to be a *vox populi* of sorts.

Kukiz'15's European programme

The attitude of the Kukiz'15 movement towards foreign and European policy issues can be categorised as Eurorealism or soft Euroscepticism.²³ It should be

emphasised that while basing its postulates on the priority of national interests and opposition to the expansion of EU law, the introduction of Poland into the Eurozone, or the renegotiation of the energy and climate change package, the grouping does not reject the idea of European integration. As envisioned by the EU Founding Fathers who established an international organisation to guard the peace and sustainable development of its member states, Kukiz'15 is not fundamentally averse to the very idea of European integration or Poland's membership in the EU, but rather expresses reservations about certain aspects of integration, which in effect leads to partial opposition to the Community.²⁴ It supports further development of economic cooperation and the equalisation of economic development in member states, while standing against limiting their sovereignty, whether by interfering in the internal affairs of member states or imposing a common policy towards third countries as well as legal solutions that contradict the socio-cultural conditions of individual countries.

In the light of this trend, it is worth noting that in 2019 the Swedish think tank Timbro carried out an analysis of support for populist parties which are characterised by, among other things, the creation of conflicts between 'people' and 'elites', strong nationalism, striving to remove institutional restrictions on authority, or anti-capitalism. According to the Civil Development Forum (Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju, FOR) regarding the aforementioned Populism Index, the sum of the election results of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) and Kukiz'15 placed Poland fourth in the European ranking in terms of support for populists, right behind Hungary, Greece, and Italy where support for populist groups exceeded 50%,²⁵ based on the results of the last elections. Therefore, it is not surprising that an alliance was formed in the run-up to the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 between the leader of Kukiz'15, already described by the Italian press as the 'Polish Beppe Grillo'²⁶ in the context of the 2015 presidential elections, and 'pro-citizen' populist political groups from Italy (Five Star Movement, M5S), Greece (AKKEL), as well as Finland (Movement Now, Liike Nyt), and Croatia (Human Shield, Živi zid). In the context of the alliance, the daily *Corriere della Sera* featured an article that decried and mocked the leader of the M5S, Luigi Di Maio, who – in turn – attributed sympathy to far-right movements and parties to Matteo Salvini's League while simultaneously going to Poland in search of allies before the European elections and visiting 'a congress of the extreme right-wing party Kukiz'15, which itself is taking an anti-abortion stance and is accused of neo-Nazi sentiments'.²⁷

The programme of these groups, with their vision of a united Europe, contained in a ten-point document entitled *The European Manifesto*, was adopted at a conference attended by the leaders of these groups (Paweł Kukiz, Luigi Di Maio, Evangelos Tsiobanidis, Karoliina Kahonen, Ivan Vilibor Sinčić) in Rome in February 2019 who came together again two months later at a meeting in Warsaw.²⁸ The document, which constitutes an international

agreement for changes at the European level, mimics the vision of politics presented by the Kukiz'15 movement at the national level.²⁹

The issues of the political system based on direct democracy and the resulting influence of citizens on the decisions, as postulated by Kukiz'15 on the Polish political scene, are similarly a key topic for people gathered around the above-mentioned groups. Hence, the slogan 'A Europe closer to its Citizens' was the first statement of the *Manifesto*. Kukiz'15, expressing dissatisfaction with the current political system, calls for an expansion of direct democracy and so-called e-democracy. It proposed to introduce voting via the Internet (e-voting), both in national and European elections. The main beneficiaries are citizens for whom this procedure is intended as a convenience. The text of the commentary explains this message without leaving any doubts. Due to the colourful rhetoric present throughout the document, it is worth quoting it directly:

Politicians and bureaucrats who have overrun EU institutions are completely detached from the lives and needs of ordinary citizens. They are a modern, Brussels aristocracy. This needs to change. That is why the tools of direct democracy and e-democracy should be strengthened, so that citizens can directly influence EU institutions.³⁰

This quote should be considered tendentious, since it takes up one of the most important populist postulates, i.e. placing the ideas and will of the people at the centre, as well as a critique of the extensive system of EU bureaucracy. It fulfils its goals as a piece of propaganda and shapes new social attitudes. Due to the cooperation with the M5S, the leader of Kukiz'15 was very positive about the Italian policy, recognised as the European leader in introducing the tools of direct democracy in the country. He postulated following the Italian model and reforming how referendums are organised. In addition, the document's authors criticised the procedure of the European Citizens' Initiative, considering it unreliable due to the requirement to gather too many citizens' declarations (at least one million). Kukiz'15's antipathy towards Brussels is also reflected in its critical attitude towards the so-called trialogue, that is, meetings between representatives of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union and, in a broader spectrum, against the secrecy of their sessions and documents drawn up therein.

Supporting the rejection of anachronistic ideologies and artificial divisions into 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' parties, the activists of 'pro-civic' parties postulated that issues decided both at the EU level and in individual countries should be divided into those 'good' and 'bad' for citizens. It was assumed that problems affecting citizens of individual countries, such as combating corruption or defending citizens' rights against multinational corporations, are issues that connect Europeans regardless of their views on world issues.

By referring to the common good, the need for a new vision of Europe and 'immediate and profound reform of the EU' was underlined.

The postulate of 'a new future for the "Europe" project', assuming international cooperation while maintaining respect for national identity, corresponded with ideological issues. As Kukiz declared, 'European integration is a guarantee of peace and sustainable economic development in all countries belonging to the Community, but it must involve equality among all countries'.³¹ In his opinion, excessive interference in the 'common' policy by more developed member states, such as Germany and France, may bring about the collapse of European unity. This hypothesis is based on the example of Brexit, where the Brits' discontent was confirmed by their protest expressing itself in the most radical form possible, i.e. the UK leaving the EU. According to Kukiz, by not wanting to adapt European policy to the dynamically changing realities and demands of individual nations, EU decision makers have not learned their lesson from the current situation. In line with the movement's assumptions, the foundation of project 'Europe' should be found in partnership and equal treatment of all nations with respect for their identity and needs. In keeping with the programme under consideration, only a dialogue between member states that leads to concrete, positive actions could change the increasingly visible negative attitude of many Europeans towards EU structures.

Another one of the chief theses presented in the document was the 'Honest Europe' slogan, which was to be implemented by fighting against corruption and organised crime – deemed one of the greatest threats to how EU countries are functioning. As Kukiz's¹⁵ representatives emphasised, this problem 'not only destroys trust in democracy, but also causes an outflow of funds from the legal economy'.³² The document states that combating corruption in Europe should become a priority for all its member states. As Kukiz declared: 'We must find a way to stop lawlessness in the European Union so that all citizens can feel safe'.³³

Going further, the authors of the *Manifesto* took up the issue of reforming EU institutions, with particular emphasis on reinforcing the competences of the European Parliament (EP). In the opinion of the document's authors, the EU is governed by 'undemocratic, commanding, and authoritarian institutions'. These arguments were justified in a rather surprising way. Namely, by referring to the functioning of the European Commission, which – by definition – is a politically independent executive body of the EU, while in fact it is 'a gathering of Brussels bureaucrats' elected by other officials. The programme also called for increasing the role of the EP, recognised as the only impartial representative of Europeans in European politics since it is elected directly by citizens. An innovative solution would be for the EP to have a full right of initiative. It was pointed out that strengthening the competences of the EP is necessary, because the laws it passes directly affect the lives of Europeans. 'The EP must have a voice, since it is the voice of all Europeans'³⁴ – the authors of the *Manifesto* proclaimed.

In addition to these socio-economic proposals, the movement is in favour of improving the quality of life of Europeans in terms of protecting public health and the environment, reducing the impact of financial markets and multinationals, protecting products made in the EU, developing local and European agriculture, as well as implementing new programmes and tools for young Europeans. Another important issue was the call to amend migration and security policy through the introduction of a new European model for controlling migratory movements by strengthening borders with third countries and granting additional competences and powers to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). According to Kukiz'15, migration to the EU from third countries should be better controlled and coordinated, and the procedure for granting protection to refugees should also be changed. During the EP electoral campaign, the leader of the movement postulated the need to differentiate between political refugees, i.e. people actually at risk in their countries, and the so-called economic refugees, who should be properly verified and, if necessary, deported. He categorically opposed the forced relocation of refugees, which – in his view – not only poses a threat to Europeans due to insufficient verification of arrivals from outside the Union, but also violates their human rights. Kukiz'15 is of the opinion that the best way to contain the influx of refugees is to help their own homelands by supporting sustainable economic development.³⁵

All of the proposals included in the document, justified with a short, concise, and arbitrary comment, demonstrated the politicians' intention to convince voters that it is 'ordinary' citizens who can decide the future of the European continent. Explanatory notes included in the documents provide assurance that the coalition is the only rational choice. The movement was intended to symbolise 'the third way, an alternative in the dispute between Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts uncritical about the domination of Germany and France'.³⁶ The ultimate goal of the project was to create a 'civic' Europe of Homelands, capable of implementing a programme aimed at advancing economic development while maintaining political separateness and respecting the sovereignty of individual member states. It assumed simultaneous criticism of European federalism which – according to the Kukiz'15 movement – would lead to the hegemony of the EU's strongest economies over weaker countries.³⁷

When assessing the merits of the *Manifesto*, it is difficult to decide the extent to which it was the personal vision of the Kukiz'15 leader or rather a representation of the views of other coalition politicians. However, it can be said that the ideological and political message of this document is clear. The Kukiz'15 movement aims to radically change current EU policy. It is worth noting that the implementation of this programme was to some degree dependent on the outcome of the EP elections which, however, did not bring the expected results. Receiving only 3.69% of the vote and failing to win any seats, Kukiz'15's defeat in the elections to the EP on 26 May 2019, as well as

the gradual withdrawal of its members from the grouping, made the partially developed project of changing Europe obsolete.³⁸

Concluding observations

A review of the activity of Kukiz'15, its verbalisation of national and conservative ideas and disapproval of deeper European integration, allows us to identify it as the case of a populist right-wing and Euro-realist protest movement on political and socio-cultural issues, albeit liberal in terms of economic policy. Its strategy for policy change should, however, be placed between the ideal types of 'establishment' and 'anti-establishment'.³⁹ The grouping, characterised primarily by its strong opposition to the cartelisation of the party system by 'old parties', expresses a clear anti-party position and the need for greater control of state authorities by citizens. The offensive attitude and emotional rhetoric of the grouping, saturated with messaging clearly indicating its populist character, are also worth emphasising. A number of fundamental features of right-wing populism can be pointed out in the narrative created by the movement, i.e. treating the people as a centrepiece in its vision of the world and always showing it in opposition to the elite, the presence of a leader acting on the will of the people, as well as a simplified linguistic image of the world involving statements based on common language, close to 'ordinary people'. Kukiz uses populist exponents in order to create a typical populist and hierarchical relationship between the leader, the people, and political opponents.

The singer's spectacular political debut in 2015, constantly citing some unspecified 'will of the people', served as a binding agent for many protest movements in the context of a strong social protest. According to the Italian historian Loris Zanatta, the cognitive horizon of populism depends on the situation of individual countries and the issues they are currently dealing with. It is therefore a matter of principle, or rather what populists consider to be principles.⁴⁰ However, it is worth considering if their diagnoses are correct, whether their promises are followed by actions, and what effects do they generate. As the Polish political scientist Ewa Marciniak rightly pointed out, Kukiz has been deemed a populist mainly because of his vision of shifting the electoral law in Poland towards majoritarian representation, which – in his mind – was supposed to satisfy all those who do not participate in elections because they have no one to vote for. This mechanism, as the Polish political scientist said, fits perfectly into the populist 'procedure of making people happy'. The problem is that there is no certainty that voting actually constitutes a basic need of the society.⁴¹

The postulates of the Kukiz'15 European programme raised in this chapter fit in with the vision of the Europe of Homelands, understood as a Europe consisting of Community members treated equally while respecting the sovereignty of states and the development of intergovernmental cooperation – and not a supranational one in the form of federations. The distinguishing

feature of this concept is an emphasis on the central position of citizens in place of EU institutions. The characteristic trait of this concept lies in the emphasis it places on the socio-cultural and economic conditions and identities of individual EU member states. There is no doubt that the grouping is not an opponent of the EU, but rather a supporter of its fundamental reform. At the same time, it should be noted that, in its programme, the movement does not promote the idea of the so-called 'Polexit', i.e. Poland's potential withdrawal from the EU.

Dubious decisions made by the Kukiz'15 leader over the course of his political career, such as forming an alliance with the Polish People's Party (PSL)⁴² before the 2019 parliamentary elections in Poland, led to a gradual absorption of the movement's members by other political formations.⁴³ Although it is unlikely that the movement is ever going to return to its heyday, it is expected that it will seek to maintain its current position and cooperate within the coalitions that are being formed (both nationally and internationally), following the principle of 'a drowning man will clutch at any straw'. At the same time, it will try to maintain, at least fragmentarily, its existing political postulates. Although Kukiz's strategy seems inconsistent, ambiguous and vague, it is worth noting that the Kukiz'15 grouping does not deny the foundations of democratic principles. It only leads to a reduction in decision-making efficiency, and also gives the impression of a certain inconsistency.

The 2019 EP elections can be considered a turning point in the political existence of Kukiz'15. Comparing the activity of its members before and after the elections, we can see a significant decrease in their involvement in the movement. The most serious risk for the grouping now appears to lie in the possibility of its leader wrongly assessing the credibility of allies' guarantees (both domestic and foreign). However, one may conclude that the presented vision has a cognitive value, as it clearly reveals the intentions of anti-establishment populists, which do not seem to change with time. The elements visible in Kukiz'15's discourse that directly point to the populist nature of the grouping may provide a basis for comparison with other political entities operating not only in Poland but also in other parts of Europe and the world.

Notes

- 1 Paweł Majewski and Jacek Nizinkiewicz, 'Paweł Kukiz: Jestem od idei. Zmienię system', (2015), *Rzeczpospolita*, www.rp.pl/pawelkukiz accessed 26 June 2020.
- 2 This system is used, among others, in the UK and the USA, but also in France and India. See Dariusz Grzędziński, 'O co chodzi w JOW-ach? Co by było gdyby w Polsce obowiązywały jednomandatowe okręgi wyborcze?', (2015), *Polska Times*, <https://polskatimes.pl/o-co-chodzi-w-jowach-co-by-bylo-gdyby-w-polsce-obowiazrywaly-jednomandatowe-okregi-wyborcze/ar/3858819> accessed 26 June 2020.
- 3 Paweł Kukiz, 'Lider i założyciel Kukiz'15', <http://kukiz15.org/zespol/pawel-kukiz> accessed 26 June 2020.

- 4 Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, 'Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej', (2015), https://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/319_Pierwsze_glosowanie.html accessed 9 June 2020. See also: Antoni Dudek, *Historia polityczna Polski 1989–2015*, (Wydawnictwo Znak Horyzont 2016), 675.
- 5 Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, 'Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej', (2015), https://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.html accessed 9 June 2020.
- 6 Arkadiusz Lewandowski, 'Antysystemowość ruchu Kukiz 15 w okresie kampanii wyborczej 2015 roku', in Katarzyna Walecka, Kinga Wojtas (eds), *Nowe partie i ruchy polityczne. Praktyka i idee współczesnych demokracji*, (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University Press 2017).
- 7 Paweł Kukiz, 'Nie chce tworzyć żadnej partii', www.facebook.com/kukizpawel/posts/901098533291201 accessed 9 June 2020. Original spelling, no changes.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Cas Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, (Cambridge University Press 2007).
- 10 'Strategia Zmiany. Kukiz'15', <http://kukiz15.org/images/PROGRAM/Strategia-Zmiany-KUKIZ15-dla-Polski.pdf> accessed 12 April 2020.
- 11 Ibid., 3.
- 12 Małgorzata Kołodziejczak, Marta Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 'Przywódca populistyczny i jego językowy obraz w aspekcie retoryki dominacji na podstawie wypowiedzi Pawła Kukiza. Perspektywa politologiczna i lingwistyczna', (2017), 24, *Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Językoznawcza*, 1, 27.
- 13 Paweł Kukiz, 'Polska budzi się z naszymi marzeniami', <http://pressmania.pl/spotwyborczy-kww-kukiz15-pawel-kukiz-polska-budzi-sie-z-naszymi-marzeniami/> accessed 14 June 2020.
- 14 'Strategia Zmiany', (n 9), 7–14.
- 15 *Encyklopedia Kukiz'15, Niskie podatki*, <http://kukiz15.org/program/krajowy/niskie-podatki> accessed 26 July 2020.
- 16 'Strategia Zmiany', (n 9), 16–23.
- 17 Vanessa Gera, 'Fascists to stage' biggest' far-right march in Warsaw on Polish Independence Day', *The Independent*, (London, 10 November 2017), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/warsaw-fascist-far-right-nazi-march-warsaw-poland-independence-day-a8048561.html accessed 26 June 2020.
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- 19 'Kukiz'15', <http://kukiz15.org/kukiz15/o-kukiz15> accessed 26 June 2020.
- 20 Mudde, (n 9); Paul Taggart, 'Populizm, lud i rdzenna kraina', in Olga Wysocka (ed), *Populizm*, (Warsaw University Press 2010), 77–98. See also: Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, (Palgrave Macmillan 1994).
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