1 Against Europe or against Germany?

European integration and Germanophobia in France, Great Britain and Italy

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Introduction

Euroscepticism is increasingly widespread throughout the European Union (EU), although it appears with differing degrees of intensity from country to country. Criticism of ‘Brussels’ – an inaccurate but telling eponym used to indicate the EU – is backed by a rather wide range of arguments (which are, in fact, frequently contradictory).¹ In particular, one point that has an important (though of course not exclusive) place in Eurosceptic propaganda is the idea that the European Union mainly serves the interests of Germany. Nonetheless, today’s Eurosceptics can hardly claim authorship of that idea. Germanophobic anti-Europeanism was actually born together with the first European Communities. The Declaration of 9 May 1950 by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, triggered the process that would lead to the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). According to its critics, the fulfilment of the ECSC’s lofty pro-European ideals hid the prosaic and dangerous restoration of Germany’s industrial and military apparatus: it was the first step towards a ‘Germanised Europe’, a perspective that revived the nightmare of the Third Reich’s domination over the continent.

Germany’s Nazi past also poisoned the debate about the European Defence Community (EDC). The invasion of South Korea by North Korean armed forces in June 1950 seemed to confirm the worst fears about the aggressive attitude of the Communist Bloc. The war in Asia made the hypothesis of a Soviet attack on Western Europe plausible. As a result, the Americans asked their European allies to reinforce their own military capabilities, allowing the rearmament of West Germany. Predictably, France opposed this request but Paris could not simply reject Washington’s plans and was forced to find an alternative solution. This took shape in the Pleven Plan – named after the then French prime minister. It involved creating a European army under the EDC, which would include a German military contingent.² The fact that the EDC was conceived precisely in order to avoid the rearmament of West Germany did not prevent anti-Europeanists from emphasising the alleged link between European integration and German remilitarisation – with the associated risk

of the rehabilitation of officials with a Nazi past. The propaganda proved impervious to facts.

After the 1950s, anti-Europeanism and Germanophobia continued to go hand in hand. On closer inspection, it was the latter that justified the former. Participation in the European Community (EC) actually led to objective economic advantages for all the member states; the critical issue therefore became the unequal distribution of those benefits. The structure given in the 1960s to intra-Community trade and, in the following decade, the first plans for monetary coordination would have favoured the establishment of the economic predominance of the Federal Republic (FRG) to the detriment of other member states in the Community. The fact that the EU was no longer the vehicle for the revival of Prussian militarism was only partially consoling: by means of economic integration the FRG was once again carving out a hegemonic position for itself in Europe.

It is nonetheless true that this kind of anti-Europeanism (just like its many other forms) did not manage to undermine the broad support that the EC was receiving. The EC was seen as one of the pillars of the liberal Western order capable of guaranteeing not only security and political stability but also an unprecedented level of economic prosperity. Significantly, this perception survived the uncertainty of the early 1970s, when the monetary upheavals caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the energy crisis sparked by the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973 led to a severe economic recession. For many years after the end of the *Trente glorieuses*, the European Community proved itself capable of protecting and growing the economies of its member states. Even assuming that it existed, the 'economic domination' of the FRG did not impoverish its partners in the Community. For this reason, public opinion was never seriously swayed by the idea that the EC implied the subordination of its member states to the interests of West Germany.

Changing perspectives. Eurosceptic Germanophobia

The early link between anti-Europeanism and Germanophobia and its ability to withstand the test of time – a quality considerably independent of the obvious successes of European integration – gives an important but nevertheless overlooked indication of the value of reversing the perspective used to look at the two elements of this dyad. Aversion to Germany is for the most part considered a key element of Euroscepticism. The events following the economic crises of 2008 and 2011 would seem to confirm the validity of this viewpoint. The insistence of the EU (and of Germany) on austerity, on tight budgetary policies, on fiscal discipline, has been used to propose a narrative of Europe as the 'Fourth (German) Reich': a sort of Gothic tale – as has been claimed – of which 'the disturbing return of pasts upon presents' is a fundamental part.³ It is precisely this use, or rather abuse, of the past (of History) that urges the change in perspective mentioned earlier. Euroscepticism should not be seen solely as a container of anti-German sentiment; it is, if anything, a

vehicle useful for propagating an older and even more deeply rooted attitude. Naturally, the second perspective is not alternative but rather complementary to the first.

To analyse Eurosceptic Germanophobia (the order of terms is no accident) I have chosen three fields of inquiry: France, Italy and Great Britain. As we shall see, in these countries aversion towards Germany is a long-standing tradition. This historical legacy has contributed to making the experience of those three countries in the EC/EU partially conditioned by the sense of *otherness* with respect to the Federal Republic. In my opinion, this observation does not at all permit the conclusion that European integration 'was founded less on the goal of overcoming differences than on cementing them'.⁴ But it is nonetheless true that while the 'Europhile' attitude could go hand in hand with fear of the Federal Republic, Germanophobia has always used criticism of European integration to legitimise itself politically and culturally.

Contemporary political anti-Germanism began with the foundation of the German State. In Great Britain, however, the view of Germany fluctuated enormously, making it very difficult to see a linear development of antagonistic sentiment from 1871 to 1914.⁵ But after the unification of the German territories, polemic references to *Prussian militarism* became frequent; following the Great War of 1914–1918, they turned into actual prejudices. In Britain, denunciation of Prussia made possible a tale of two Germanies: on the one hand a state made up of sensible people such as writers, intellectuals, musicians and 'the millions of kindly men and women'; and on the other, 'the brutally aggressive [Prussian] military caste'.⁶

In Italy, the unification of Germany provoked conflicting reactions. Appreciative and vilifying judgments coexisted in the governing elite and the intellectual milieu. Italy's entry into the First World War inevitably provoked a wave of anti-German hatred.⁷

With the Second World War, anti-Germanism jumped to the next level: this happened with the drawing of a line of continuity between Prussianism and Nazism.⁸ The entire history of Germany, from 1871 on, could be represented as a sort of preparation for the rise of Hitler. The Nazi regime was often seen as a natural inclination in the Germans, the underlying premise for the deployment of their insuppressibly aggressive attitude. A Gallup poll from January 1947 revealed that 63% of the French believed that Germany would soon return to being a belligerent state, keen to spark another war.⁹ It was a sort of anthropological stigma, but not surprising less than two years after the end of the war.

But recent conflicts, those that from the *Deutsche Einigung* onwards divided the two banks of the Rhine, only tell a part of the story. Recently, French fear of the Germans has been traced back to the division of the Carolingian empire¹⁰ – a perhaps excessive backdating that turns Germanophobia into a kind of ontological fact, and as such extraneous to historical processes. It must be said that this theory has been discussed with interest and has received some favourable reviews.¹¹ If, however, we abandon the hypothesis of an ancestral

conflict, then we can consider the diplomatic crisis of 1840, the *Rheinkrise* that divided France and the German Confederation, to be the origin of modern French Germanophobia;¹² or we could reiterate the importance of the events post-1870 in spreading that sentiment,¹³ which should nonetheless be kept distinct from the cultural contempt that developed between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to which the *Germans* as individuals and not *Germany* – which at the time was weak and divided – were subject.¹⁴ On the other hand, the anti-Germanic stereotypes that arose before the birth of the German State played an important role: they represented the cultural substratum on which contemporary political Germanophobia was based.

This cultural substratum survived the defeat suffered by Nazi Germany in 1945. Its main vehicle of transmission became anti-Europeanism.

Misinterpreting historians

Euro sceptic Germanophobia was, and still is, conveyed by a variety of players (politicians, intellectuals, the media). Before the Brexit referendum of June 2016, Boris Johnson declared that the EU had concretised the ambitions of Adolf Hitler, who (like Napoleon) ‘tried [to unify Europe], and it ends tragically. The EU is an attempt to do this by different methods’.¹⁵ Johnson’s statement caused a certain degree of scandal. Once again, however, it was not representative of anything new, especially not in Great Britain. In 1958, commenting on the birth of the Common Market, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned that ‘Western Europe dominated in fact by Germany and used as an instrument for the revival of power through economic means (...) is really giving them on a plate what we fought two wars to prevent’.¹⁶ Thirty years later, in her famous speech at the Collège d’Europe in Bruges, Margaret Thatcher recalled the role played by her country in the freedom of the continent from Nazism: ‘Had it not been for their willingness to fight and die, Europe would have been united long before now – but not in liberty, not in justice’.¹⁷

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Thatcher launched a ‘propaganda campaign against German reunification’.¹⁸ Obviously, the *Deutsche Wiedervereinigung* was a source of worry for many European governments – in particular the French. But while the French president François Mitterrand and the other EC leaders (including Chancellor Helmut Kohl) became convinced that the economic power of a reunified Germany could be contained by accelerating the process of European integration, Thatcher regarded that perspective as a chance naively offered to the FRG to establish its supremacy. After all, according to her, this objective was written into the Germans’ genetic code.¹⁹ To find confirmation for her thesis, in March 1990 Thatcher put her foreign policy adviser Charles D. Powell in charge of organising a Chequers seminar on Germany. Participating in that meeting were academics and historians such as Hugh Trevor-Roper, Timothy Garton Ash, Fritz Stern, Gordon Craig, George Urban and Norman Stone. Apparently,

they did not do much to corroborate Thatcher's prejudices about reunified Germany. If anything, they suggested that the Prime Minister 'be nice to the Germans'.²⁰ Powell drafted the seminar memorandum. How faithfully this document reflected the discussion that took place in Chequers is a controversial matter.²¹ It included a list of attributes that would have characterised the Germans: 'angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality (...) a capacity for excess (...) a tendency to overestimate their own strength and capabilities'.²² When Powell's minutes were leaked to the press, this – as wrote one of the seminar's participants – obviously 'made the headlines, whether in London, Paris, or Frankfurt'.²³ After all, that was what Thatcher wanted. For many readers of those headlines, the question 'Could the Germans be *trusted*?'²⁴ now had an obvious answer.

In the end, the 'Chequers Affair' can be considered an example of the unscrupulousness with which politicians exploit intellectuals and their work (in this case, historians and history).

Naturally, there is no dearth of examples of scholars with a proclivity for legitimising the worst anti-German clichés without any encouragement from a political authority. According to Luciano Canfora, a distinguished scholar of the ancient world, philologist and columnist for the 'Corriere della sera' (the main Italian newspaper), the current European Union 'is an enormous German fiefdom (...) the unexpected fulfilment of the Führer's dream'.²⁵ According to the French scholar Emmanuel Todd, the EU is a hierarchical system, with the southern countries relegated to the back, and France forced to play second fiddle, while Germany occupies the position of central power that dominates all the other member States.²⁶

Manipulating history

One piece of information that emerges from what has been said thus far is a certain repetitiveness of the themes that feed Germanophobic and Eurosceptic views. The evoking of the Third Reich as a historical model for describing the supposed new Teutonic order is an apparently irresistible refrain for critics of the Federal Republic and the EU. This selective narrative isolates and turns a particular chapter of Germany's history into a paradigm, so that Nazism becomes a telling feature of the 'German character', unchanged by the post-war experience. The crassness of this argument should not lead to hasty conclusions. The manipulation of history to feed Germanophobic and Eurosceptic propaganda can take more subtle forms; as we shall see, the portrayal of the EU as a 'German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe'²⁷ may be indirectly fostered by the prevailing interpretation of national historical events.

From what has been said so far, it seems clear that history is the element that connects an old sentiment with one more recently formed. This happens because, for many of its critics, the European Union is an artificial, ahistorical construct. It is to history, therefore, that an appeal is made to find the

antidotes to that artificiality – which, in the end, would be nothing but a demonstration of the irreplaceability of the nation state. The triumph over the latter through European integration, Eurosceptics maintain, is desired by the *parti de l'étranger*, as it has been called in France (or by the ‘enemies of Italy’, *nemici dell'Italia*, as Italian sovereigntists have started to call their pro-European countrymen). *Parti de l'étranger* was a phrase used in December 1978 by Jacques Chirac in his melodramatic Cochin Appeal to make cutting remarks about the supposed ‘designs’ for European federalisation – proof of which he believed was to be found in the imminent direct elections to the European Parliament – and to warn that Europe must not be used to erase France and take away its individual authority and influence in the world.²⁸

In Chirac’s appeal there was an implicit callback to Charles de Gaulle’s appeal to the French on 18 June 1940, to invite them to resist the occupier and not cooperate. At the end of 1978, therefore, Chirac was claiming the right to protect France from an imaginary external threat, establishing a direct political filiation with the one who had defended the country’s liberty and independence in the face of Hitler.²⁹ The analogy was highly controversial, but had a limited impact: the Cochin Appeal was quickly forgotten.

Instead, the current anti-German hysteria³⁰ that is affecting a broad strata of French Euroscepticism is the cause and at the same time the effect of actual historical manipulations, designed to unveil the ‘scandalous’ genealogy (which would have been deliberately hidden by academic historians³¹) of the post-war European project. Most recently, one proof of this tendency is the extremely controversial book by the French Europhobe Philippe de Villiers,³² *J’ai tiré sur les fils du mensonge et tout est venu*.³³ This book claims to demonstrate Jean Monnet’s complete subservience to the Americans, Robert Schuman’s ambiguous position on Vichy France, and Walter Hallstein’s Nazi sympathies at the time of the Third Reich. These portraits (harshly refuted by a group of academic historians in a letter published by *Le Monde*)³⁴ are used to present European integration as a conspiracy promoted by (and for the benefit of) powers outside France, to establish Berlin’s control over Europe.

In spite of their lofty ambitions, Eurosceptic Germanophobes have made history their primary victim. The abuse of the work of historians poisons the debate about the European Union. One example of this are some commentaries on an interesting book by Bernard Bruneteau, *Les Collabos de l’Europe nouvelle*.³⁵ The author reconstructs the complex journey of the French (and Belgian) intellectuals who, from the 1930s onwards, supported the prioritisation of European unification, and ended up seeing the German takeover of France and the continent as a chance to make this objective a reality. It is impossible to summarise here the several, complex reasons that led those intellectuals to collaborate with the Germans to construct a Europe unified under Nazi rule. There is, however, nothing in the book to suggest that the Nazi plans to dominate Europe were a source of inspiration for the process of European integration that began in the 1950s. Nonetheless, some could not resist the temptation to use Bruneteau’s research to propose an inappropriate

analogy, namely to claim that the bases of Hitler's Europe call to mind the Single Market that came into effect in 1993 and the single currency 'to which thought was already being given in the (...) 1940s'.³⁶

Several chapters of Italian history, interpreted in specious ways, have supplied arguments to support the theory that the EU is a 'German fiefdom'. One example is the process of national unification that took place in 1861. Italian federalist historiography – which has a respectable tradition – considers the *Risorgimento* a model for understanding the development of European integration. Scholars belonging to this school have identified an update of the activity of the moderate party led by the Count of Cavour – who pursued Italian unification by way of diplomatic agreements between governments – in the inter-governmental approach to European integration. Conversely, the federalist movements striving for the foundation of the United States of Europe via the mobilisation of citizens would be the heirs of the democratic tradition of Giuseppe Mazzini, who conceived of Italian unification as a revolutionary process promoted by the people. Paradoxically, that historical analogy has more recently served to corroborate the accusation of German supremacy in the EU. For example, in France Alain Cotta did this in the context of a rather harsh judgment of the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union. On the eve of the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty of 20 September 1992, he wrote that the EU Treaty signalled the Germanisation of Europe. It would, he opined, bring with it the deindustrialisation of France and the EU, just the way the 'Piedmontization' (that is, the extension of Piedmont's political and administrative system to the entire peninsula) that took place in Italy after 1861 led to the deindustrialisation, impoverishment and social disintegration of southern Italy.³⁷ Cotta spoke of the 'financial orthodoxy' adopted by Cavour, of an alliance between the latter and the foreign capital, and of the imposition of monetary unification.³⁸ In this way, he projected a vocabulary into the past that was useful for explaining to the contemporary French population that the fate awaiting them was similar to that of the inhabitants of Southern Italy: poverty and backwardness in a Europe shaped by German interests. In that same year, the French journalist and historian Max Gallo saw the strict budgetary rules added to the EU Treaty at Berlin's request as dealing a decisive blow to Southern Italy: 'The logic of uncontrolled liberalism will cause a collapse of the South with everything that implies at a social, cultural, and judicial level'.³⁹

Interestingly, this interpretation of post-Maastricht European integration was welcomed by Italian Neo-Bourbon historiography. Its pseudo-scientific objective is the re-evaluation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the subsequent condemnation of national unification. According to the Neo-Bourbons, the building of the Italian State was a product of Masonic, anti-Catholic design and would have led to the exploitation of Northern Italy to the detriment of the *Mezzogiorno*. In this anti-unitarian revisionism, an increasingly popular and media-driven phenomenon, it was not uncommon to find

the main themes of anti-Europeanism, among them none other than the idea that the EU is the design of an elite class (naturally a Masonic one), aimed at de-Christianising the continent by way of the construction of a 'common space' whose historical origin lies in the hegemonic will of the Third Reich.⁴⁰ In this way, the counter-narrative of national unification intersects with the counter-narrative of European integration, seen as a German conspiracy that ultimately succeeded.

However, misguided interpretations or actual manipulations of national history – or of parts of it – are not necessarily the only way through which Germanophobia and Euroscepticism are merged. The construction of the identity of a nation via a selective approach to its past may lead – sometimes involuntarily – to the same outcome. Great Britain is a case in point. The historian Oliver Daddow identified the source of the country's Euroscepticism in the modernist approach prevalent among British historians, which leads to an 'excessively reverential attitude' towards the recent past. In particular, the Second World War – a heroic epic of resistance to and eventual victory over Nazism, as media and popular culture constantly remind the British public – is presented as the defining experience for the consolidation of the national conscience. Inherent in this narration is the transmission of the image of Great Britain as a great global power, linked to the United States by a 'special relationship'. Europe, however, remains the hostile 'other'. Obviously, this 'other' was often embodied by Germany, seen – both by political circles and by Eurosceptic public opinion – as a rival to be confronted rather than as a partner with whom to build a common European project.⁴¹

Conclusion

At the beginning of the 1950s, the first iteration of the European Community was disliked by those who feared the military and economic rebirth of the Federal Republic of Germany. Current Euroscepticism often employs the argument of an irrepressible German inclination to domination. The element of continuity of Eurosceptic Germanophobia is represented by the idea that European integration is the product of a plan aimed at stabilising German supremacy on the Old Continent. What Hitler had not succeeded in doing would be made possible by the founding fathers of the Community and their descendants. This misguided interpretation cannot do without history – or more precisely without a distorted use of it, a manipulation of the work of historians, and a selective approach to the past. Through these practices, the Nazi experience is de-historicised and turned into a kind of anthropological fact about the German population. This paves the way to anti-Germanic and Eurosceptic propaganda that has a specific goal and an unintended consequence. The condemnation of 'German Europe' would reveal the naivety (or the dishonesty) of those who gave up national sovereignty in the name of a common European interest: in truth, the EU would only be serving German interests. But paradoxically (and here is the unintended consequence) the

stereotypes, simplifications, and actual falsehoods that feed Eurosceptic Germanophobia risk delegitimising – or make less credible – even serious, justified criticisms of the European Union and of the crucial role that Germany plays in EU institutions.

Notes

- 1 Cf Cécile Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism*, (Palgrave Macmillan 2010).
- 2 Cf Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community. A History*, (Macmillan 1980).
- 3 Catherine Macmillan, 'The Return of the Reich? A Gothic Tale of Germany and the Eurozone Crisis', (2014), 22, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 1, 24–38, DOI:10.1080/14782804.2014.887891.
- 4 Almut Möller and Roderick Parkes, 'Conclusions: The Narcissism of Small Differences', in Möller and Parkes (eds), *Germany as Viewed by Other EU Member States*, EPIN paper, 33, June 2012, 69–72.
- 5 See Jan Rüger, 'Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism', (2011), 83, *The Journal of Modern History*, 3, 579–617; Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism & Ambivalence, 1860-1914*, (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Thomas Weber, *Our Friend 'The Enemy'. Elite Education in Britain and Germany Before World War I*, (Stanford UP 2008).
- 6 John Ramsden, *Don't Mention the War. The British and the Germans Since 1890*, (Abacus 2007), 123.
- 7 Cf Federico Niglia, *L'antigermanesimo italiano. Da Sedan a Versailles*, (Le Lettere 2012).
- 8 Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947*, (Harvard University Press 2006), 672 ff.
- 9 Jeremy Vanke, *Europeanism and European Union. Interests, Emotions and Systemic Integration in the Early European Economic Community*, (Academica Press 2010), 94.
- 10 Georges Valance, *Petite histoire de la germanophobie*, (Flammarion 2013).
- 11 See *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui*, (2013), 206, 4, 236–245.
- 12 Renaud Meltz, 'Naissance de la germanophobie française? L'opinion publique et la crise de 1840', in Mathieu Dubois and Renaud Meltz (eds), *De part et d'autre du Danube. L'Allemagne, l'Autriche et les Balkans de 1815 à nos jours. Mélanges en l'honneur du professeur Jean-Paul Bled*, (Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne 2015).
- 13 Laurent van de Wandel, '"L'Allemagne surhumaine est proprement inhumaine" ou les nouveaux visages de la germanophobie', (2013) in *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui*, (n 11), 233.
- 14 Hugues Marquis, 'Aux origines de la Germanophobie: la vision de l'Allemand en France aux XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles', (1991), 286, *Revue Historique*, 2.
- 15 www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36295208 accessed 26 May 2020.
- 16 Quoted in Richard Davis, 'Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955–75', (2017), 22, *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique/French Journal of British Studies*, 2, 12.
- 17 Quoted in Oliver Daddow, Christopher Gifford and Ben Wellings, 'The battle of Bruges: Margaret Thatcher, the Foreign Office and the Unravelling of British European Policy', (2019), 1, *Political Research Exchange*, 17, 1–24.

- 18 Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, *Continental Drift. Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to the Rise of Euroscepticism*, (Cambridge University Press 2016), 452.
- 19 George R Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret Thatcher: an insider's view*, (I B Tauris 1996), 124, 131–132; Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, (Harper Collins 1993), 790–791.
- 20 Ilaria Poggiolini, 'Thatcher's Double Track-Road to the End of the Cold War. The Irreconcilability of Liberalization and Preservation' in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N Piers Ludlow, Bernd Rother (eds), *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990*, (Berghahn 2012), 275.
- 21 Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot. Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, (Macmillan 1998), 360–361.
- 22 Charles Powell, 'What the PM Learnt About the Germans', in Harold James and Marla Stone (eds), *When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification*, (Routledge 1992), 234.
- 23 Timothy Garton Ash, *The Chequers Affair*, (1990), The New York Review of Books 27 September.
- 24 Young, (n 21), 361.
- 25 Luciano Canfora, 'È l'Europa che ce lo chiede!'. (*Falso!*), (Laterza 2012), 39.
- 26 Emmanuel Todd, *un intellectuel nationaliste et germanophobe à Mots Croisés* in www.lejournalinternational.fr/La-montee-de-la-germanophobie-en-Europe_a2187.html accessed 26 May 2020.
- 27 This was the definition of the Economic and Monetary Union given in the summer of 1990 by Nicholas Ridley, the Minister for Trade and Industry in the Thatcher government: cf Ramsden, (n 6), 405.
- 28 Benjamin Leruth and Nicholas Startin, 'Between Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism: the Gaullist Movement Divided over Europe', (2017), 25, *Modern & Contemporary France*, 2, DOI: 10.1080/09639489.2017.1286306.
- 29 Florence Haegel, 'Mémoire, héritage, filiation. Dire le gaullisme et se dire gaulliste au RPR', (1990), 40, *Revue française de science politique*, 875.
- 30 See the statement made in January 2013 by a champion of French anti-Germanism, Emmanuel Todd, during a television broadcast: 'Each time that France tries to do anything within its natural sphere of influence, the Mediterranean and Africa, Germany tries to throw a spanner in the works (...). There is a German plan to isolate France from its European sphere', www.taurillon.org/ accessed 16 July 2019.
- 31 See Annie Lacroix-Riz, 'Europe: l'académisme contre l'Histoire' in www.librairie-tropiques.fr/2019/05/europe-l-academisme-contre-l-histoire-1/6.html accessed 16 July 2019.
- 32 Philippe de Villiers was one of the promoters of the campaign against the Maastricht Treaty. Soon after, he founded the inflexibly sovereigntist Mouvement pour la France.
- 33 De Villiers's book was published by Fayard in 2019.
- 34 'Philippe de Villiers n'a pas le droit de falsifier l'histoire de l'UE au nom d'une idéologie', (2019), *Le Monde*, 27 March.
- 35 Bernard Bruneteau, *Les Collabos de l'Europe nouvelle*, (CNRS éditions 2016).
- 36 Frédéric Lordon, 'Avoir plus d'une idée', (2017) *Le Monde diplomatique*, December, www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2017/12/LORDON/58194 accessed 17 July 2019
- 37 Alain Cotta, *Pour l'Europe contre Maastricht*, (Fayard 1992), 126–128.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 127.

- 39 Max Gallo, *L'Europe contre l'Europe. Entretiens avec Eric Fournet et Olivier Spinelli*, (Éditions du Rocher 1992), 76.
- 40 Cf, for example, Angela Pellicciari, *La gnosi al potere. Perché la storia sembra una congiura contro la verità*, (Fede & Cultura 2014). The comparison between the Piedmontisation of Italy and the Germanisation of Europe is also proposed by another exponent of the *anti-Risorgimento*, the Italian writer Pino Aprile (cf www.radioradicale.it/scheda/546134/presentazione-del-libro-di-marco-ascione-italos-perche-siamo-arrivati-a-tanto-breve/stampa-e-regime accessed 18 July 2019).
- 41 Oliver J Daddow, 'Euroscepticism and History Education in Britain', (2006), 41, *Government and Opposition*, 66.